Pension funds and socially responsible investing : determinants of the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds by Seidler, Alexander
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2010
Pension funds and socially responsible investing : determinants of the SRI
behavior of Swiss pension funds
Seidler, Alexander
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-164031
Dissertation
Published Version
Originally published at:
Seidler, Alexander. Pension funds and socially responsible investing : determinants of the SRI behavior
of Swiss pension funds. 2010, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
 
 
PENSION FUNDS AND 
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
Determinants of the SRI Behavior of Swiss Pension Funds 
Dissertation  
for the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration  
an Information Technology of the University of Zurich 
to achieve the title of 
Doctor of Economics 
presented by 
Alexander Seidler 
from Germany 
approved at the request of 
Prof. Dr. Rudolf Volkart 
Prof. Dr. Alexander Wagner 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology of the Uni-
versity of Zurich hereby authorizes the printing of this Doctoral Thesis, without thereby giv-
ing any opinion on the views contained therein. 
 
Zurich, October 27, 2010 
 
The Dean: Prof. Dr. Dr. Josef Falkinger 
 
 

 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
My recognition goes to all the people in my private, academic and professional environment 
that have accompanied me during the writing of this thesis, and have made it possible to get it 
done and well succeeded. 
The biggest thank you goes to Leyla Krause who provided me with immense support over the 
past years. Thanks for your patience, for your unconditional support, and for keeping me 
grounded by teaching me how to drop my work once in a while. I would also like to thank my 
lovely daughters Hannah and Paula who were born just a few weeks before the handing in of 
this thesis. Your arrival has been the right kick up the backside to get this done. I am also very 
grateful to my parents, Rositta and Gotthard Seidler, who provided me with the opportunity to 
be where I am and who gave me the necessary dedication and discipline.  
I am also especially indebted to my supervisors Prof. Rudolf Volkart and Prof. Alexander 
Wagner who gave me the freedom to develop my own thoughts while at the same time pro-
viding me the necessary guidance. Thanks for having faith and confidence in me. 
I am also very grateful to UBS where I have spent the last four years during the writing of this 
thesis allowing me to combine both the practice and theory of the corporate responsibility 
field. It has been a very interesting and rewarding experience. In particular, I would like to 
thank Liselotte Arni and Yann Kermode from Environmental and Social Risk who have al-
ways been supportive and flexible and showed much patience during this challenging time. 
A big thank-you goes to all the friends that have contributed to this thesis through their inspir-
ing conversations. In particular I would like to thank Franck Amalric and Ingeborg 
Schumacher who gave me the necessary stimulation not only to start but also to finish this 
project. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank Swisscanto in particular Paul Wininger, and onValues 
for providing the data set. 
 
 
Zurich, October 2010, Alexander Seidler (alexseidler@yahoo.com)  
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. Research Question ....................................................................................................... 2 
1.2. Structure and Key Contributions ................................................................................. 4 
1.3. Sources of Information ................................................................................................ 8 
1.4. Methodology................................................................................................................ 8 
2. Socially Responsible Investments Defined .............................................................. 9 
2.1. SRI Definition.............................................................................................................. 9 
2.2. SRI Related Terminology.......................................................................................... 11 
2.3. SRI Approaches......................................................................................................... 14 
2.3.1. Negative Screening ............................................................................................ 15 
2.3.2. Positive Screening .............................................................................................. 19 
2.3.2.1. Best in Class Selection ....................................................................................... 19 
2.3.2.2. Thematic Investing............................................................................................. 22 
2.3.3. ESG Integration.................................................................................................. 24 
2.3.4. Shareholder Engagement.................................................................................... 26 
2.3.5. Community Investment and Social Private Equity ............................................ 27 
2.4. SRI Investors Defined ............................................................................................... 28 
2.4.1. Disposition of Institutional Investors Towards SRI........................................... 29 
2.4.2. Rationales of SRI Investors................................................................................ 32 
2.4.2.1. Two Conceptions of an Investor’s Ethical Motivations..................................... 34 
2.4.2.1.1. Ensuring Compliance with own Values ............................................................. 35 
2.4.2.1.2. Promoting Change / Having an Impact .............................................................. 36 
2.4.2.2. Financial Motivations: Risk / Return Considerations ........................................ 37 
2.4.3. Typology of SRI Investors ................................................................................. 39 
2.4.3.1. Rational Economic SRI Investors ...................................................................... 39 
2.4.3.2. Socially Responsible Investors........................................................................... 40 
2.4.3.2.1. Ethical Performance Focused Investors / Ethical Investors ............................... 41 
2.4.3.2.2. Balanced Investors / Ethically Minded Investors............................................... 42 
2.4.3.2.3. Shareholder Value Focused Investors / Quasi Ethical Investors........................ 42 
2.5. Effectiveness of SRI Strategies ................................................................................. 43 
2.5.1. Avoiding the Risk of Complicity ....................................................................... 43 
2.5.2. Promoting Change / Having an Impact .............................................................. 44 
2.5.2.1. Exerting Pressure on Companies........................................................................ 45 
2.5.2.1.1. Through Screening ............................................................................................. 45 
2.5.2.1.1.1. Demand for Corporate Stock.............................................................................. 46 
2.5.2.1.1.2. Information about the Fundamental Value of the Asset .................................... 48 
2.5.2.1.2. Through Shareholder Engagement..................................................................... 50 
2.5.2.1.2.1. Determinants of the Effectiveness of Shareholder Engagement ........................ 52 
2.5.2.1.2.2. Contribution to the Generation of New Information.......................................... 55 
2.5.2.2. Having an Impact on Society ............................................................................. 56 
2.5.3. Generating Financial Performance..................................................................... 56 
2.5.3.1. Norm-Based Exclusions..................................................................................... 58 
2.5.3.2. Shareholder Value Focused Forms of SRI......................................................... 61 
2.5.3.2.1. Best in Class Selection and ESG Integration ..................................................... 65 
2.5.3.2.2. Thematic Investments ........................................................................................ 67 
2.5.3.2.3. Shareholder Engagement.................................................................................... 68 
2.5.3.3. Social Private Equity / Community Investments ............................................... 70 
3. The SRI Behavior of Swiss Pension Funds............................................................ 71 
3.1. Swiss SRI Offering.................................................................................................... 73 
3.1.1. Main Providers of SRI Products......................................................................... 75 
3.1.2. Characteristics of SRI Offerings ........................................................................ 77 
3.1.2.1. SRI Mutual Funds .............................................................................................. 78 
3.1.2.2. SRI Mandates ..................................................................................................... 80 
3.1.2.3. SRI Structured Products ..................................................................................... 81 
3.2. SRI Behavior of Swiss Pension Funds ...................................................................... 82 
3.2.1.1. Number of Pension Funds Engaging in SRI ...................................................... 84 
3.2.1.2. Total SRI Invested Assets .................................................................................. 85 
3.2.1.3. Preferred Asset Classes ...................................................................................... 86 
3.2.1.4. Preferred SRI Approaches.................................................................................. 87 
4. Determinants of the SRI Behavior of Swiss Pension Funds ................................ 91 
4.1. Stakeholder Characteristics ....................................................................................... 92 
4.1.1. The Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 93 
 
 
4.1.1.1. Financial Perception of SRI ............................................................................... 94 
4.1.1.2. Board Demographics.......................................................................................... 95 
4.1.1.3. Board Size ........................................................................................................ 100 
4.1.2. Disposition of Employers................................................................................. 101 
4.1.3. Role of Beneficiaries ........................................................................................ 104 
4.1.4. Reliance on Investment Consultants ................................................................ 108 
4.2. Portfolio Characteristics .......................................................................................... 109 
4.2.1. Portfolio Size.................................................................................................... 110 
4.2.2. Risk-Taking Capacity....................................................................................... 112 
4.2.3. Investment Horizon .......................................................................................... 113 
4.2.4. Portfolio Diversification................................................................................... 115 
4.2.5. Size of Corporate Holdings .............................................................................. 117 
4.3. Institutional Characteristics ..................................................................................... 119 
4.3.1. Reliance on External Asset Managers.............................................................. 120 
4.3.2. Level of Disclosure .......................................................................................... 120 
4.3.3. Administrative Form ........................................................................................ 121 
4.3.4. Plan Type.......................................................................................................... 121 
5. Methodology and Survey Results ......................................................................... 124 
5.1. Database................................................................................................................... 124 
5.2. Sample Characteristics ............................................................................................ 124 
5.3. Variable Descriptions .............................................................................................. 126 
5.3.1. Dependent Variable.......................................................................................... 127 
5.3.2. Independent Variables...................................................................................... 127 
5.3.2.1. Stakeholder Variables ...................................................................................... 127 
5.3.2.2. Portfolio Variables ........................................................................................... 129 
5.3.2.3. Institutional Variables ...................................................................................... 130 
5.4. Methodology and Summary Statistics ..................................................................... 133 
5.4.1. Strategy of Inquiry ........................................................................................... 133 
5.4.2. Bivariate Analysis ............................................................................................ 134 
5.4.3. Multivariate Analysis: Binary Logistic Regression ......................................... 142 
6. Analysis of Results ................................................................................................. 146 
6.1. Stakeholder Characteristics ..................................................................................... 146 
6.1.1. The Board of Trustees ...................................................................................... 146 
6.1.1.1. Financial Perception of SRI by Pension Fund Trustees................................... 146 
6.1.1.2. Professional Qualification of Pension Fund Trustees ...................................... 150 
6.1.1.3. Female Representation in Pension Fund Boards.............................................. 150 
6.1.1.4. Board Size ........................................................................................................ 152 
6.1.2. Disposition of Employers................................................................................. 153 
6.1.2.1. Mission Background ........................................................................................ 153 
6.1.2.2. CR Agenda and Sin Stocks .............................................................................. 154 
6.1.2.3. Legal Form ....................................................................................................... 155 
6.1.3. Role of Beneficiaries ........................................................................................ 157 
6.1.4. Reliance on Investment Consultants ................................................................ 160 
6.2. Portfolio / Investment Characteristics ..................................................................... 160 
6.2.1. Portfolio Size.................................................................................................... 160 
6.2.2. Risk-Taking Capacity....................................................................................... 162 
6.2.3. Portfolio Indexation.......................................................................................... 163 
6.2.3.1. Investment Horizon .......................................................................................... 164 
6.2.3.2. Portfolio Diversification................................................................................... 165 
6.2.3.3. Size of Corporate Holdings .............................................................................. 166 
6.3. Institutional Characteristics ..................................................................................... 168 
6.3.1. Reliance on External Asset Managers.............................................................. 168 
6.3.2. Level of Disclosure .......................................................................................... 169 
6.3.3. Administrative Form ........................................................................................ 170 
6.3.4. Plan Type.......................................................................................................... 172 
7. Conclusion and Research Outlook ....................................................................... 173 
7.1. Research Outlook .................................................................................................... 175 
8. Appendix................................................................................................................. 177 
8.1. Swisscanto Pension Fund Survey 2008 ................................................................... 177 
8.2. Participating Pension Funds .................................................................................... 186 
9. Literature ............................................................................................................... 193 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 – Thesis Outline ........................................................................................................... 4 
Figure 2 – Different Terms Used for Thematic SRI Products ................................................. 12 
Figure 3 – Negative Screens Applied to Mutual Funds and Screened Mandates in the U.S. .. 17 
Figure 4 – Structure and Weights of Different CR Ratings ..................................................... 21 
Figure 5 – Categories of SRI Investors in Canada ................................................................... 28 
Figure 6 – U.K. Charity Equity Holdings Subject to SRI (in GBP bn) ................................... 30 
Figure 7 – Rationales of SRI Investors .................................................................................... 33 
Figure 8 – Typology of SRI Investors...................................................................................... 39 
Figure 9 – Willingness to Accept Reduced Financial Returns to Invest Ethically .................. 41 
Figure 10 – Supply and Demand of a Given Company’s Stock (1)......................................... 46 
Figure 11 – Supply and Demand of a Given Company’s Stock (2)......................................... 48 
Figure 12 – Motives of Investors in Sustainable Themes ........................................................ 56 
Figure 13 – SRI IA from December 1996 to August 2008 ...................................................... 74 
Figure 14 – Market Share of Swiss Asset Managers, 2008 ..................................................... 76 
Figure 15 – Evolution of Asset Classes in SRI products by Swiss-Based Asset Managers .... 77 
Figure 16 – Evolution of Investment Vehicles 2005 – 2008.................................................... 77 
Figure 17 – Investment Vehicles by Investor Types, 2008...................................................... 78 
Figure 18 – Asset Allocation of Swiss SRI Funds 2005 – 2008 .............................................. 78 
Figure 19 – Preferred SRI Approaches for Mutual Funds 2005 – 2008 .................................. 80 
Figure 20 – Composition of SRI Mandates 2005 – 2008......................................................... 80 
Figure 21 – Preferred SRI Approaches for Mandates 2005 – 2008 ......................................... 81 
Figure 22 – Composition of SRI Structured Products 2005 – 2008......................................... 81 
Figure 23 – Preferred SRI Approaches for Structured Products 2005 – 2008......................... 82 
Figure 24 – SRI Holdings by Institutional & Retail Investors in Europe ................................ 82 
Figure 25 – Share of Institutional and Retail SRI Investors .................................................... 83 
Figure 26 – Types of Institutional SRI Investors Engaging in SRI in Europe......................... 84 
Figure 27 – Number of Swiss Pension Funds Engaging in SRI............................................... 85 
Figure 28 – Percentage of Pension Fund Portfolio Invested in SRI......................................... 86 
Figure 29 – Preferred Asset Classes Among Swiss Pension Funds......................................... 86 
Figure 30 – Preferred SRI Approach Among Swiss Pension Funds........................................ 87 
Figure 31 – Preferred Negative Screens................................................................................... 88 
Figure 32 – Forms of Shareholder Activism / Engagement..................................................... 89 
Figure 33 – Stakeholders of Pension Funds ............................................................................. 93 
Figure 34 – Client Awareness of SRI, Interest and Sales ...................................................... 107 
Figure 35 – Length of Investment Horizon for Different Types of Institutional Investors ... 114 
Figure 36 – IA by Surveyed Pension Funds........................................................................... 125 
Figure 37 – Financial Perception of Pension Funds Regarding SRI (1) ................................ 147 
Figure 38 – Financial Perception of Pension Funds Regarding SRI (2) ................................ 149 
Figure 39 – Female Representation in Pension Fund Boards ................................................ 151 
Figure 40 – Size of Pension Fund Boards .............................................................................. 152 
Figure 41 – Distribution of Size of Pension Funds Included in the Sample .......................... 161 
Figure 42 – Coverage Ratio of Swiss Pension Funds ............................................................ 163 
Figure 43 – Percentage of Pension Assets Managed Externally............................................ 168 
Figure 44 – Distribution of Swiss Pension Funds With Closed and Open Membership ....... 171 
Figure 45 – Distribution of Swiss Pension Funds by Plan Type............................................ 172 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1 – SRI Definitions........................................................................................................... 9 
Table 2 – Overview of SRI Approaches .................................................................................. 14 
Table 3 – Early European and U.S. Ethical Funds................................................................... 16 
Table 4 – Companies Subject to Cluster Munitions Screeen ................................................... 18 
Table 5 – Insight's Engagement Record on ESG Issues in 2007 ............................................. 27 
Table 6 – Ethical Rationales of SRI Investors ......................................................................... 35 
Table 7 – Articles Examining the Impact of Asset Selection on Asset Prices......................... 47 
Table 8 – Articles on the Capacity of Shareholder Engagement to Impact Management ....... 51 
Table 9 – Selected Studies on the Financial Implication of Negative Screening Strategies.... 60 
Table 10 – Selected Studies on the Performance of Best in Class & ESG Integration............ 67 
Table 11 – Selected Studies on the Performance of Engagement Strategies ........................... 69 
Table 12 – Number of Institutional Asset Owners Signatory to the UNPRI, by Country ....... 72 
Table 13 – Signatories to the UNPRI, by Country................................................................... 75 
Table 14 – SRI Share Total Assets by Main SRI Providers in CH.......................................... 76 
Table 15 – Top 20 SRI Funds in Switzerland by IA................................................................ 79 
Table 16 – SRI Funds Available under the Private Pension Pillar......................................... 108 
Table 17 – The World's Largest Pension Funds in Terms of IA............................................ 110 
Table 18 – Sample Characteristics ......................................................................................... 124 
Table 19 – Sample Distribution of Plan Type by Legal Form ............................................... 126 
Table 20 – Testable Variables................................................................................................ 131 
Table 21 – Summary Statistics............................................................................................... 137 
Table 22 – Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................ 139 
Table 23 – Correlation Across Variables ............................................................................... 141 
Table 24 – Variables Used for Multivariate Stage................................................................. 142 
Table 25 – Logistic Regression Analysis............................................................................... 144 
Table 26 – Mission Background of Pension Funds................................................................ 154 
Table 27 – SRI Behavior of Sin Stocks.................................................................................. 155 
Table 28 – Shareholder Engagement Practices by Swiss Pension Funds .............................. 156 
Table 29 – Ethical Rationales for SRI Behavior .................................................................... 159 
Table 30 – The Ten Largest Holdings of the Canton of Zurich ............................................. 167 
List of Abbreviations 
AHV  Federal Old-Age insurance 
BVG Federal Law on Occupational Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Benefit Plans 
BVV2 Ordinance on the Occupational Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Benefit 
Plans 
CDP Carbon Disclosure Project 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CHF Swiss Francs 
CR Corporate Responsibility 
DB  Defined Benefit 
DC Defined Contribution 
DJSI  Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
EAI Enhanced Analytics Initiative 
EIRIS  Ethical Investment Research Service 
ESG Environment, Social, Governance 
Eurosif European Social Investment Forum 
FSO Federal Statistical Office 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GMO Genetically Modified Organisms 
GRI Global Reporting Initiative 
HNWI High Net Wealth Individuals 
IA Invested Assets 
ICCR  Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OR Swiss Code of Obligations 
SEE Social, Environmental, Ethical 
SIF Social Investment Forum (United States) 
SIO Social Investment Organisation (Canada) 
SIP  Statement of Investment Principles 
SPFS Swisscanto Pension Fund Survey 
SRI Socially Responsible Investment 
UKSIF United Kingdom Social Investment Forum 
 
 
UN United Nations 
UNGC United Nations Global Compact 
UNEP FI United Nations Environmental Program Finance Initiative  
UNPRI United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment 
WCW Who Cares Wins Initiative 
Abbreviations for Pension Funds 
ABP Arbeidsongeschiktheids Pensioen (Pension Fund for Employers and Employ-
ees in Service of the Dutch Government and the Educational Sector) 
AP1-4 Swedish National Pension Funds 
AP1: Första AP-fonden (First Swedish National Pension Fund) 
 AP2: Andra AP-fonden (Second Swedish National Pension Fund) 
 AP3: Tredje AP-fonden (Third Swedish National Pension Fund) 
 AP4: Fjärde AP-fonden (Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund) 
CalPERS  California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
CalSTRS California State Teachers' Retirement System 
CIA  Caisse de Prévoyance du Canton de Genève (Pension Fund of the Canton of 
Geneva) 
ERAFP Etablissement de Retraite Additionnelle de la Fonction Publique (French Pu-
blic Service Additional Pension Scheme) 
FRR Fonds de Réserve pour les Retraites (French Pensions Reserve Fund) 
NGPF Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
NPRF Irish National Pension Reserve Fund 
NYCERS  New York City Employees’ Retirement System 
NZSF New Zealand Superannuation Fund 
PFZW Stichting Pensioenfonds Zorg en Welzijn (formerly PGGM)1 
PGGM Pensioenfonds voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen 
(Pension Fund for Health, Mental and Social Interests) 
TIAA-CREF Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America – College Retirement 
Equities Fund 
USS  Universities Superannuation Scheme 
                                                 
1 On 1 January 2008, PGGM changed its name to PFZW as part of a restructuring that involved the 
separation of its asset management operations. PFZW uses the PGGM brand to market its asset man-
agement services. 

 
 

1 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Socially Responsible Investments (SRI) are a rapidly growing segment of the asset manage-
ment industry. In the United States, by the end of 2008 roughly 11% of invested assets (IA) 
were reported to be invested in SRI. From 2005 to 2007 alone, SRI IA increased by more than 
18%, while total IA increased by less than 3%.2 Although at a substantially lower level, a 
similar trend can be observed for the Swiss market, where by the end of 2009 SRI IA reached 
an all-time high with a total of CHF 34.1 billion corresponding to around 3% of the market. 
Compared to 2005, this represents an increase of 220.6%, showing that in recent years growth 
in SRI has considerably surpassed growth in conventionally IA.3 Many observers expect the 
SRI market to grow further in coming years. For example, Robeco, a Dutch asset manager, 
sees SRI becoming mainstream within the asset management business, reaching between 15 – 
20% of total global IA by 2015.4 
The growing maturity of the SRI market is accompanied by the increasing complexity of the 
players involved and the types of products and services offered. Today a considerable number 
of specialized SRI asset managers, as well as conventional financial institutions, provide an 
ever-increasing variety of products and services to their clients. Previously this offering con-
sisted of only a handful of equity-based mutual funds. Today it encompasses all asset classes, 
including fixed income, real estate, commodities, private equity and venture capital or hedge 
funds. This development has gone hand in hand with the increased coverage of SRI within the 
academic field. A substantial body of literature has accumulated over past decades, exten-
sively examining a wide range of issues, such as the possible link between a company’s cor-
porate responsibility (CR) performance and its financial performance. In fact, the growing 
evidence about the materiality of a firm’s CR performance has lead to a shift in the legal opin-
ion concerning the integration of SRI aspects into conventional investment analysis. While at 
an early stage of SRI the integration of such aspects was considered contrary to standard fi-
nancial practices and as a violation of fiduciary duties, today evidence about the materiality of 
CR makes the integration permissible, or as some suggest, even required from a fiduciary 
perspective. Accordingly, while at an early stage this form of investing was restricted only to 
a small group of ethically-minded investors, this shift in the legal opinion substantially con-
tributed to the more favorable perception of SRI among many mainstream practitioners today. 
As a consequence, what started as a fairly marginal investment practice by certain religious 
groups or other mission-based organizations and which was at odds with standard financial 
practice, has in the meantime grown into an investment strategy that is increasingly adopted 
by a wide range of mainstream investors including many pension funds. 
Pension funds, which are at the head of the investment value chain, have steadily increased 
their interest in SRI and as a result have become a major driver of this form of investment in 
                                                 
2 See Social Investment Forum (2008, p. iv) 
3 See onValues (2010), Eurosif (2008, pp. 11, 46) 
4 Robeco, Booz & Company (2008) 
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various markets. The idea that pension funds may have a special role to play in promoting 
higher levels of CR through engaging in SRI and thereby may contribute towards more sus-
tainable societies has increasingly been discussed in recent years, not only within restricted 
circles of experts, but also in wider public debates. A number of countries, including the 
United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Germany and Australia have even passed legislation that 
seems to be inspired, at least in part, by this idea. Amalric describes the growing interest by 
pension funds in acting as “responsible” shareholders as the result of a number of coexisting 
and interrelated trends.5 First, pension funds have grown substantially over recent decades, 
resulting in their ownership of an increasing proportion of outstanding corporate shares. This 
concentration of ownership (which Drucker described as an “unseen revolution” in the owner-
ship of corporate America6) seems to give pension funds, at least in theory, enough invest-
ment power to hold corporations accountable. Second, there has also been growing public 
attention for the wider issue of sustainability, which for many has culminated in concerns 
about climate change. This development is closely linked with the view that in a global con-
text corporate practices especially in an environmental or social context are often not suffi-
ciently regulated by nation states, thereby allowing firms to externalize their costs to society 
in situations where no regulation exists or where rules are not sufficiently enforced. Finally, 
even before the recent financial crisis there was a growing perception that larger investors, 
similar to other groups of corporate stakeholders such as clients, employees or civil organiza-
tions, have an important role to play in supervising corporate practices. As a consequence of 
these trends and under the combined pressure of pension fund beneficiaries, domestic legisla-
tion and public opinion, pension funds in many countries are increasingly adopting SRI prin-
ciples in their investment and ownership practices. 
1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Despite growing awareness about the role of pension funds, limited understanding still exists 
as to what drives pension funds when they engage in SRI and what strategies they should pur-
sue in order to effectively meet their underlying objectives. In the light of their key role in the 
SRI market, the two central research questions in this dissertation are to explain how and why 
pension funds engage in SRI. That is, the initial aim is to provide a detailed overview of exist-
ing SRI practices and the second aim is to explore the underlying rationale for their SRI be-
havior by testing for specific explanatory fund characteristics. For this purpose data is used 
from a sample of Swiss pension funds provided by Swisscanto Asset Management 
(Swisscanto). 
In addition to the author’s close proximity to the Swiss SRI market, there are a number of 
other reasons why this thesis is focused on the Swiss pension system. First, although there is 
                                                 
5 See Amalric (2004a, p. 1). From 2004 – 2006, the author of this thesis worked as a research assistant 
at the Center for Corporate Responsibility and Sustainability at the University of Zurich, focusing on a 
research program on the role of pension funds in promoting sustainability. This represents the basis of 
this thesis. 
6 See Drucker (1976) 
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some anecdotal evidence on the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds, to date there has been 
no exhaustive quantitative study addressing the subject. Second, the Swiss pension fund sys-
tem is a highly developed market with a considerable degree of diversity in terms of the gen-
eral investment policies of pension funds, their institutional set-up, or the level of benefits and 
contributions they provide to their beneficiaries. As a result of this it is anticipated that there 
is considerable heterogeneity in the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds, thereby challenging 
the commonly accepted view that as fiduciary investors pension funds have only very limited 
room for maneuver in this field. Finally, data shows that demand for SRI from Swiss pension 
funds lags behind the demand from pension funds in other countries such as the U.K., the 
Netherlands or Scandinavia. While in these countries the institutional share in the SRI market 
accounts for up to 90% of the total, the Swiss SRI market has been more evenly balanced in 
terms of demand by private and institutional investors. Partly, the limited demand by institu-
tional investors can be explained by the absence of regulatory incentives. In other countries 
pension funds are incentivized to engage in SRI by such requirements, but no such incentives 
exist in Switzerland. As a result, the Swiss case provides an ideal example to investigate the 
role of other potential drivers for pension funds to engage in this form of investment. 
As will be shown in this thesis, in general SRI practices among pension funds are very di-
verse. While pension funds in the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, Australia, France or Scan-
dinavia have acted as thought leaders by developing comprehensive SRI strategies that con-
sidered SRI criteria across all asset classes, in Switzerland, so far this development has been 
limited to only a handful of mostly public pension funds such as the Cantons of Geneva and 
Zurich or collective institutions such as Nest or Abendrot. These institutions stand out by hav-
ing established a comprehensive SRI strategy that is also disclosed publicly. In addition, an-
ecdotal evidence suggests that there are certain funds that have approached SRI in various 
ways, but which have not taken a public position on this subject. To obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of current practices, a central part of this thesis is attributed to a detailed de-
scription of how Swiss pension funds engage in SRI. As will be shown there is a greater in-
volvement among Swiss funds in SRI than generally reported. Furthermore, we will show that 
their SRI practices are very diverse in terms of scope, preferred approaches or asset classes. 
Finally the analysis confirms that few funds currently apply a comprehensive strategy, 
whereas most funds treat SRI rather as a “nice to have”, which raises questions about their 
underlying objectives for engaging in SRI. 
In order to better understand these underlying objectives, a second research question asks why 
certain pension funds engage in SRI, while others do not. Interestingly, the analysis shows 
that although as fiduciaries pension funds are bound by wealth maximization objectives, the 
reality seems more complex, as some funds appear also to have non-financial reasons for in-
vesting in this way. This suggests that neither purely performance-based nor ethical argu-
ments satisfactorily explain current SRI practices by Swiss pension funds. While the perform-
ance argument does not sufficiently echo the basic intuition as to why pension funds may 
have a special role to play in promoting CR or sustainability, the ethical argument seems in 
4 
direct opposition to the fiduciary responsibility of pension fund trustees. To gain more clarity 
regarding possible determinants of their SRI strategies, we integrate different theoretical per-
spectives regarding the relationship between pension fund characteristics and a fund’s propen-
sity to engage in SRI.7 On the one hand, our results show that pension funds are a very diverse 
group of investors that differ in many ways. On the other hand, despite this great diversity, the 
results further show that there are some common characteristics among those funds that en-
gage in SRI and which help to explain why they are more responsive to this form of invest-
ment. Although some of these characteristics are not specific to pension funds, this finding is 
in line with the view of many proponents of SRI that consider pension funds as having dis-
tinct attributes which qualify them as ideal SRI investors.8 
1.2. STRUCTURE AND KEY CONTRIBUTIONS 
In order to answer the two key research questions of how and why Swiss pension funds en-
gage in SRI, the thesis is composed of three main parts. It starts with an extensive overview of 
SRI, which will provide the basis for understanding how investors can act in a socially re-
sponsible manner. This is followed by a description of the SRI behavior of Swiss pension 
funds. Finally, a third part includes an empirical analysis of distinct pension fund characteris-
tics that should explain why some funds engage in SRI while others do not. The overall struc-
ture of the thesis is displayed in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 – THESIS OUTLINE 
1 – Introduction 
Research question Structure and key contributions Sources of Information Methodology 
2 – Socially Responsible Investments Defined 
Definition Terminology Approaches Investors Effectiveness of strategies 
3 – The SRI Behavior of Swiss Pension Funds 
Swiss SRI offering SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds 
4 – Determinants of the SRI Behavior of Swiss Pension Funds 
Stakeholder characteristics Portfolio characteristics Institutional characteristics 
5 – Methodology and Survey Results 
Database Sample characteristics Variable descriptions Methodology and summary statistics 
6 – Analysis of Results 
Stakeholder characteristics Portfolio characteristics Institutional characteristics 
7 – Conclusion and Research Outlook 
Source: Own illustration 
Chapter 2 provides the necessary theoretical background on SRI. It is largely conceptual and 
aims to give a comprehensive overview of this multifaceted concept by looking at it from dif-
                                                 
7 See Johnson, Greening (1999, p. 572) 
8 See Szczesny, Wilhelm (2005) 
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ferent angles. It starts with a first section on the definition of SRI as a high level concept (see 
section 2.1), followed by an overview of related terminology (see section 2.2). Section 2.3 
then outlines different SRI approaches and techniques, including positive and negative screen-
ing, shareholder engagement, environment-social-governance (ESG) integration or commu-
nity investment. These first introductory sections show that there is still substantial confusion 
relating to the use of terminology, concepts and definitions, which vary considerably among 
different market participants and across different markets, creating problems to define clear 
boundaries. In section 2.4 we turn to SRI investors, by exploring who is engaging in SRI and 
for what reasons, while trying to establish a typology of SRI investors. We show that a num-
ber of different motivations exist for investors to engage in SRI, including ethical but also 
financial factors as a result of which there is considerable diversity among SRI investors. In 
an attempt to classify these investors we categorize them according to how they combine ethi-
cal and financial motivations. Within the proposed typology, pension funds are categorized as 
SRI investors that by definition have a strong shareholder value focus. Finally, in section 2.5 
we consolidate the findings of the previous sections by examining to what extent the different 
approaches are effective in meeting the varying motivations of investors. We thereby show 
that the effectiveness of different SRI strategies in meeting the underlying objectives of SRI 
investors varies considerably. For example, we show that ‘value consistency’ can best be 
achieved through negative screening, while shareholder engagement seems more effective 
from the perspective of having an impact on a target company. In contrast, investors primarily 
driven by financial self-interest should focus more on shareholder-value based strategies that 
factor material CR issues (e.g. through ESG integration, thematic investments or best in class 
selection). By providing this overview we challenge and debunk a number of persistent 
myths, which on the one hand oppose the further advancement of SRI (e.g. by claiming that 
SRI systematically underperforms against conventional benchmarks), while on the other hand, 
being used by providers of SRI products to artificially attract demand from investors (e.g. by 
stating that by investing in any form of SRI, investors can impact corporate behavior). An 
important aspect of this chapter is that throughout the sub-sections we look at SRI as an evo-
lutionary concept by showing how the definitions, terminology and underlying approaches, as 
well as the composition of the SRI investor base, have matured over time and continuously 
increased in complexity. This section concludes that as with other actively managed products, 
SRI products are also only as good as their investment managers and the respective underly-
ing financial analysis and that the challenge for pension funds is to find the best managers for 
the respective products. 
Chapters 3 – 6 present and explore the empirical data. First, building on the framework devel-
oped in chapter 2, chapter 3 examines the specific role of Swiss pension funds with regard to 
SRI and provides a description of the main features of their current SRI practices. In order to 
gain a better understanding of the domestic SRI market, section 3.1 begins with an overview 
of this market (for the period 2006 – 2009) by reviewing data from onValues, a Swiss invest-
ment consulting firm specialized in the SRI field. This first section shows that despite the lack 
6 
of any regulatory drivers, the Swiss market is at an advanced stage in terms of total SRI IA 
and also with regard to the diversity of products and services offered by specialist providers, 
alternative and niche distributors, as well as mainstream banks that increasingly recognize the 
market potential in this field. In section 3.2, we complement the market review by exploring 
what pension funds effectively do when they engage in SRI. This second part is based on data 
obtained through an institutionalized pension fund survey conducted by Swisscanto. This em-
pirical section provides a detailed picture of the demand side of the equation, showing that in 
the Swiss market private investors play a relatively important role as compared to other coun-
tries. Although institutional investors seem to play only a relatively limited role, the data pro-
vided by Swisscanto shows strong evidence that there are actually more pension funds engag-
ing in SRI than commonly reported. Moreover, the data shows that there is a considerable 
diversity of approaches and views among Swiss pension funds with regard to SRI. However, 
while some funds already apply a comprehensive strategy across all asset classes, most pen-
sion funds engaging in SRI still focus their SRI commitment only on a part of their equity 
portfolio, which suggests that certain SRI strategies lack consistency with regard to the under-
lying objectives. Nevertheless, overall these findings suggest that there is growing interest 
among pension funds and further market potential for the providers of SRI products. 
While chapter 3 describes how pension funds engage in SRI, chapter 4 begins to answer the 
question of why some funds engage in SRI while others do not. To better understand the rea-
sons for this, we explore to what extent the SRI behavior of pension funds can be explained 
by referring to specific pension fund characteristics. That is, we summarize a number of 
propositions that specify the conditions under which pension funds are more likely to engage 
in SRI. On one hand we thereby challenge conventional wisdom that pension funds are a ho-
mogeneous group of investors and suggest that the SRI engagement by pension funds may 
depend upon a larger number of variables. On the other hand, we argue that pension funds 
that engage in SRI actually share certain common characteristics, some of which can specifi-
cally be attributed to pension funds, while others may also hold for other institutional inves-
tors. In order to get an understanding of these characteristics, we propose an analytical 
framework in which the relationships between these characteristics and the SRI behavior of 
the funds are explored. To the extent that there is currently no comprehensive theoretical 
model available which would sufficiently explain the SRI behavior of pension funds we refer-
ence different strands of literature and recall earlier studies that identified mechanisms of de-
cision-making by institutional as well as private investors with regard to SRI. As a result, we 
propose three sets of characteristics that are related to a fund’s investment decision process 
and that we believe offer the greatest explanatory potential to distinguish between pension 
funds that engage in SRI and those that do not. First, in section 4.1 we explore the influence 
of different stakeholder groups. In section 4.2 we analyze how specific portfolio characteris-
tics affect the capacity of a fund to engage in SRI, and finally section 4.3 assesses the role of 
certain institutional characteristics. Each characteristic is analyzed in relation to the potential 
SRI behavior of a pension fund, followed by a short review and synthesis of the existing lit-
erature and concluding with the formulation of the testable hypotheses. By exploring these 
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potential determinants on the basis of the existing literature and practices by foreign pension 
funds, the thesis tries to contribute to the better understanding of why pension funds engage in 
SRI and explores possible incentives that could also lead to greater monitoring of corporate 
behavior in the Swiss context. 
Chapter 4 forms the background to the empirical analysis conducted in chapter 5, where we 
introduce the data (see section 5.1), the corresponding sample (see section 5.2) and define the 
variables used in the analysis (see section 5.3). In section 5.4 we then present the strategy of 
inquiry and the methodology for testing the hypotheses followed by an overview of the results 
of the logistic regression analysis applied alongside summary statistics. The main empirical 
findings are as follows: A key determinant of the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds con-
cerns their financial perception of SRI in terms of long-term performance, increased costs and 
risks. The role of the employer also turns out to be a significant factor. In particular, examin-
ing the role of the legal form of a pension fund shows that public institutions are more likely 
to engage in SRI than private institutions. For private institutions however, pension funds 
seem more likely to engage in SRI in cases where the sponsoring institution is also committed 
to such principles (e.g. through its own CR strategy). Furthermore, beneficiaries have consid-
erable influence, either by actively raising the need for SRI with their trustees or when pen-
sion fund trustees independently consider SRI as being in the best interest of their plan par-
ticipants. In contrast, the presence of investment consultants or reliance on external asset 
managers seems to act rather as an obstacle for the development of a SRI strategy among 
Swiss pension funds. The results also show that certain characteristics commonly considered 
as key factors for the SRI engagement of pension funds, such as their size, their coverage ratio 
or the plan type, do not play a role. 
Based on the data introduced and the analysis provided in chapter 5, chapter 6 contains a de-
tailed discussion of the results for each variable. In addition to the results from the logistic 
regression, individual cases are examined to better understand the variety of rationales for 
pension funds to engage in SRI. In fact, as will be shown, there is evidence that pension funds 
are not only shareholder value driven when they engage in SRI, but also have normative rea-
sons, suggesting that they have considerable room for maneuver to apply SRI criteria in their 
investment and ownership strategies. The analysis is complemented by specific recommenda-
tions to various stakeholder groups including pension fund trustees, regulators, beneficiaries 
and employers, asset managers and consultancies that already provide SRI products as well as 
those that do not yet offer such services to pension funds. As will be argued, each of them has 
a certain role to play in contributing to the interest of pension funds for SRI and thereby to the 
development of a truly ‘sustainable’ retirement system. 
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and reports implications regarding the role of pension 
funds with regard to SRI while also suggesting a direction for future research. 
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1.3. SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
The information used throughout this thesis comprises secondary data from different studies 
carried out in this field, as well as primary data gathered in the form of interviews with either 
providers of SRI products and services or pension funds. Regarding the latter we first used 
data gathered by the Zurich based investment consultancy firm onValues to gain a better un-
derstanding of the supply of SRI investment solutions proposed by Swiss asset managers. The 
data used to answer our two main research questions is largely based on data obtained through 
the annual Swisscanto pension fund surveys (SPFS) 2002 – 2009. These surveys each include 
a standardized section consisting of questions relating to general pension fund issues such as 
their name, contact details, legal and administrative form, number of beneficiaries, informa-
tion about balance sheets (e.g. assets and liabilities), profit and loss accounts (e.g. administra-
tive costs, performance data) and contributions. The data obtained from this standardized sec-
tion as of the end of 2007 provides the basis for examining possible determinants of the SRI 
behavior of Swiss pension funds. In addition, it also includes a single question dealing with 
the share of the pension portfolio invested according to SRI criteria, which will be used as an 
independent variable throughout this thesis. Finally, in its 2008 edition, the Swisscanto survey 
contained a separate and very detailed section on SRI, on which the descriptions of the SRI 
behavior of Swiss pension funds is based.9 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis we use a two-stage regression analysis for hypothesis testing and modeling the 
relationship between pension fund characteristics and the SRI behavior of Swiss pension 
funds. Initially, bivariate logistic regressions are run to examine individual relationships and 
to gain preliminary insights about irrelevant predictors and identify problems of collinearity 
among explanatory variables. Subsequently, the insights gained from the bivariate analysis 
serve as a basis to conduct a multivariate analysis in which we simultaneously examine a se-
lection of possible determinants. 
                                                 
9 For a copy of the SPFS 2008 questionnaire see section 8.1. 
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2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS DEFINED 
SRI is a subject that has evolved into different strands over time and different regions and as a 
consequence means different things to market participants. In this chapter we will show how 
SRI has grown and matured over time, in the sense that it has become more complex and di-
verse with regard to the definitions, terminology and the underlying approaches used by dif-
ferent types of investors. To reflect the diversity of the subject this background chapter exam-
ines SRI from various angles, starting in section 2.1 with a basic definition of SRI, followed 
by a short review of related terminology in section 2.2. Section 2.3 then provides an overview 
of SRI techniques such as screening, ESG integration, shareholder engagement and commu-
nity investment. Section 2.4 looks at the evolution of SRI by introducing different types of 
investors as well as their underlying motivations for engaging in SRI. Finally, section 2.5 
combines the findings from section 2.3 and section 2.4, by exploring the effectiveness of dif-
ferent SRI strategies in meeting the underlying motivations of investors for engaging in SRI. 
Thereby this chapter provides the necessary background for chapter 3, in which we examine 
the SRI behavior and attitudes of Swiss pension funds. It is important to note that this back-
ground chapter does not lead to a definite answer of what SRI is. Rather it provides a snapshot 
of what is currently considered SRI and tracing a chronology of what has been considered as 
SRI over time, while being aware that market participants will continue debating definitions 
and terminology with the objective of further advancing existing concepts. 
2.1. SRI DEFINITION 
A considerable number of definitions for SRI exist from academics and practitioners alike. 
Some selected examples are included in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 – SRI DEFINITIONS 
Source Definition Restriction 
Eurosif (2006) [SRI] combines investors’ financial objectives with their 
concerns about social, environmental and ethical issues. 
Definition does not include corporate 
governance issues. 
Social Invest-
ment Organiza-
tion (2007) 
[SRI] is the integration of environmental, social and govern-
ance (ESG) factors in the selection and management of in-
vestments. 
Definition does not include ethical but 
corporate governance issues. 
Hudson (2006, 
p. 1)  
[SRI] is an approach to investing driven by the value system 
of the key investment decision-maker. [...] More specifically, 
SRI entails taking environmental, social, ethical and govern-
ance factors into account in the construction of portfolios or in 
the choice of investments more generally. 
This values focused definition does not 
consider conventional investors that 
engage in SRI for purely financial 
reasons. Moreover it focuses on in-
vestment decisions but does not in-
clude responsible ownership. 
CFA Institute 
(2008, p. 22) 
[SRI is an] investment process that seeks to achieve social and 
environmental objectives alongside financial objectives. 
This definition presupposes that SRI 
investors pursue a combination of both 
financial and ethical objectives. 
Deutsche Bank 
Research 
(2007, p. 2) 
In essence, SRIs strive to consider both the financial return of 
an investment and its social, environmental and ethical conse-
quences. 
This definition assumes that SRI inves-
tors are impact driven in the first place. 
Source: Own illustration 
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As shown in Table 1, these definitions all vary to some degree, some emphasizing issues such 
as the environment, social, and ethical or corporate governance aspects, while other defini-
tions stress the capacity of SRI to either take account of social, environmental or ethical con-
sequences of one’s investment decisions (see CFA Institute and Deutsche Bank) or ensure 
value consistency (see Hudson). These definitions also share a common element, which will 
be used as basic definition for SRI throughout this thesis: SRI is a form of investing that, in 
addition to traditional financial factors such as risk and return, also takes account of 
environmental, social, ethical or corporate governance aspects.10 A major advantage of 
this reduced definition is that it allows embracing all types of SRI sub-sets and thereby serves 
as an umbrella term avoiding implicit restrictions as shown in the definitions in Table 1. For 
example, to the extent that this definition does not specify how certain criteria are taken into 
account, it allows the different approaches outlined in section 2.3 to be considered as sub-
forms of SRI (e.g. including responsible ownership practices). Also to the extent that it does 
not presuppose specific investor rationales or motivations (see the outline of ethical and fi-
nancial rationales of SRI investors in section 2.4.2)11, or how effective SRI is in terms of 
meeting these investor rationales (see section 2.5), this definition avoids excluding important 
aspects of SRI. 
On the other hand, an obvious shortcoming of this definition is that it does not further clarify 
the specific principles or issues to be considered by SRI investors and may eventually cause 
confusion or ambiguity between different types of investors with regard to the meaning of the 
term. Consequently, critics argue that SRI is somewhat ill-defined or imprecise, making it 
difficult to draw clear boundaries of what SRI actually is.12 This critique applies particularly 
to values-based or normatively oriented forms of SRI such as negative screening (see section 
2.3.1) which typically reflect an investor’s ethical preferences.13 It's in the nature of things 
that such preferences could include a wide range of issues – even mutually exclusive strate-
                                                 
10 These aspects are sometimes referred to as intangibles, non-financial or extra-financial criteria. 
Some proponents of SRI (i.e. see Business for Social Responsibility (2008, p. 15) or the Enhanced 
Analytics Initiative (EAI)) explicitly avoid the term ‘non-financial’ as it creates an image of being 
non-substantive to the financial performance of a firm and they therefore use the term ‘extra-financial’ 
instead. Others use the term ‘intangibles’ (see De Groot, Churet, (2009)). 
11 For example, Knight and Dixon (2009, p. 5) distinguish between SRI and ESG integration according 
to the underling motivation of the investor. In their view, investors engaging in SRI are essentially 
motivated by ethical imperatives and aim to actively shape the market. In contrast, investors pursuing 
ESG integration are motivated by economic imperatives to the extent that this is a risk analysis tool 
aimed at capturing the effects of environmental, social and corporate governance considerations on the 
risk-adjusted return of portfolios. In contrast, for Sparkes (2001, p. 199) SRI has the same meaning as 
ESG integration for Knight and Dixon. He distinguishes between SRI and green investment such that 
in the former an investor is motivated by profit maximization objectives as opposed to motivations 
related to the encouragement of sustainable development for the latter. 
12 See Bengtsson (2008, p. 969), Signori (2009, p. 145), Berezin, Wood (2009, pp. 3-4) 
13 Schäfer distinguishes between normatively and economically-oriented forms of selection. While in 
the former selection criteria reflect ethical motivations (similar to those described under negative 
screening), the latter promotes criteria that are material to the financial performance of companies (see 
Schäfer (2005, p. 116). 
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gies.14 For example, environmentally-oriented investors who feel strongly about the preserva-
tion of the environment may consider investments that factor in the environmental impact of a 
firm as SRI, while a faith-based investor may instead consider SRI as what is in line with his 
or her religious beliefs. The problem with this subjective application of the term is that each 
individual investor is likely to have his or her own ideas about what constitutes SRI.15 Thus 
by applying such a definition, it is ultimately the values-based reasoning system of the inves-
tor to an ethical question that determines whether an investment is considered to be ethical 
and not the objective investment properties or the impact of the investment itself. According 
to Schwartz, this personalization of SRI puts “this subject into a subjective realm where it 
becomes difficult to conduct any thoughtful discussion or analysis”.16 In similar terms, 
Langbein and Posner criticize that “[t]here is no consensus about which social principles to 
pursue and about which investments are consistent or inconsistent with those principles.”17 
The same critique may also be raised for more economically-oriented or shareholder-value 
based forms of SRI, such as best in class selection (see section 2.3.2.1) or ESG integration 
(see section 2.3.3). In these cases, the main challenge for a SRI investor is to conduct a mate-
riality check of CR activities for a given sector in order to determine which issues he or she 
needs to consider. Such a SRI investor has to have a clear understanding of which CR activi-
ties are material and how they can be tracked and assessed in a reasonable way. But to the 
extent that society and the environment in which companies are operating are not static, there 
will always be new CR related risks and opportunities that are potentially material from a 
company perspective and relevant from the perspective of an SRI investor. Schröder con-
cludes that: "it's easy to get agreement that [SRI] is about social, ethical, environmental and 
long term economic issues, but what lies behind those terms is very subjective".18 
2.2. SRI RELATED TERMINOLOGY 
As a direct consequence of the great variety of SRI definitions, a large number of similar or 
related terms exist, showing that a coherent usage of the terminology is far from being estab-
lished.19 Related terms include ethical, values or mission-based, faith or morally responsible, 
green, social, socially aware/conscious investment, ESG, triple bottom line, sustainable or 
simply responsible investment. While these terms usually emerged within a particular context 
                                                 
14 See Brown (2007, p. 14). It is not surprising that there are funds with mutually exclusive screening 
strategies. An example cited by Dunfee (2003, p. 248) concerns the U.S. retail giant Wal-Mart which 
may be considered exemplary from an environmental perspective while not acceptable from the per-
spective of its respect for labor standards. The same goes for issues such as abortion, gay rights, nu-
clear power, etc. where perspectives among investors may differ fundamentally. 
15 See Perks et al. (1992, p. 43) 
16 Schwartz (2003, p. 208). Applied within the context of pension fund trustees investing on behalf of 
thousands of beneficiaries, it would be very hard to develop a common position on certain ethical 
questions (see section 4.1.3). 
17 Langbein, Posner (1980, p. 83) 
18 See Grene (2008) 
19 See Sparkes, Cowton (2004, p. 2), Thamotheram (2008) 
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over time, today they are often used interchangeably, or in some cases serve as synonyms for 
SRI. The variety of terms used is reflected by the results of a survey that tracked the labels of 
thematic SRI products (for more details on thematic SRI products see section 2.3.2.2). Results 
showed that while most asset managers use the term ‘SRI thematic fund’, others opted for 
‘environmental fund’, ‘sustainable thematic fund’ or preferred more conventional labeling 
such as ‘thematic fund’ (see Figure 2). While these funds differ in a number of aspects, they 
have in common that for the selection of the portfolio asset managers combine financial and 
extra-financial criteria. 
FIGURE 2 – DIFFERENT TERMS USED FOR THEMATIC SRI PRODUCTS  
 
Source: Giamporcaro et al. (2007, p. 7) 
Among these various terms ‘ethical investment’ and ‘SRI’ have been the two terms most 
commonly used labels in the past. In its original meaning, the term ethical investment is gen-
erally not about achieving some wider ethical end, such as promoting equality or justice in 
society, rather it refers to an investment approach through which the investor acts in accor-
dance with his own ethical or moral standards.20 For the Ethical Investment Association “ethi-
cal investment results in a personalized investment approach which takes account of an inves-
tor’s ethical values, codes or beliefs relative to a specific situation”.21 According to Sparkes, it 
was in the 70s and early 80s that both the terms ethical investment and SRI became estab-
lished by the introduction of specific products designed for the retail market.22 At this stage, 
both terms were largely used as synonyms, but today their application is less consistent. 
While some still use them as synonyms, others point at their differences. The former simply 
consider ethical investment as the older term, which is now being replaced in general use by 
‘SRI’.23 They also point to regional preferences in the application of these two terms. For ex-
ample, while ethical investment is a still widely used term in the U.K., Australia and Canada, 
SRI is more common in the U.S., continental Europe and Japan.24 In contrast, for others ethi-
cal investment remains closely associated with its original meaning, which is about the val-
                                                 
20 See Schwartz (2003, p. 202), McCann et al. (2003, p. 31) 
21 Ethical Investment Association (2006) 
22 Sparkes (2001, p. 195) 
23 See Cowton (1999), Sparkes (2001), Schwartz (2003), Hellsten, Mallin (2006, p. 393) 
24 See Cowton (1999, p. 60). According to Sakuma and Louche (2008, pp. 431-432) SRI is the pre-
ferred term in Japan to the extent that ethical investment has never been translated as the use of ethics 
is regarded as reserved for groups of intellectuals or those who have had a Christian education. 
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ues-based avoidance of certain corporate practices (see negative screening 2.3.1).25 For them, 
SRI has instead evolved into an umbrella term that also encompasses modern forms of SRI, 
such as best in class or thematic investment.  
The normative connotation of the term ethical investment has been an important contributory 
factor in the slow take-up of SRI in certain markets.26 For example, the authors of a report by 
the Allan Consulting Group write that for many the term ethical investment involves some 
sort of moral ‘high ground’, which is likely to turn people off the message, which is why they 
suggest that SRI should be used rather than ethical investment. Furthermore, other critics of 
the term argue that so-called ‘ethical exclusions’ of companies on the basis of an investor’s 
personal values may have little to do with ethics if it fails to rely on a refined ethical judgment 
or analysis by the investor. As a result, Anderson argues that “for the most part ‘ethical’ is 
another name for fashionable causes and a way of pre-empting complex moral arguments in 
favor of a particular foregone conclusion”27. Similarly, for Schwartz, the label ethical invest-
ment barely gives sufficient consideration to the underlying ethical dilemmas associated with 
some of these exclusions, in particular when conflicting ethical judgments exist.28 
Today, other terms such as ‘triple bottom line’, ‘sustainable investment’, ‘sustainable & re-
sponsible investment’ or ‘responsible investment’ have also gained popularity. These terms 
have emerged to describe specific forms of SRI, which are about the integration of sustain-
ability analysis into mainstream investment processes. Against this background, they have 
emerged in order to disassociate from earlier forms of SRI such as ethical investment and 
have also sometimes become silhouetted against SRI. In many cases it could be argued that 
they represent more of a repackaging of economically-oriented forms of SRI. Hagart and 
Knoepfel state that if a product is labeled ‘ethical’ or ‘SRI’, it will appeal only to a narrow 
range of investors. “If the positive financial characteristics of a product [...] are highlighted, 
then the potential range of interested clients increases”29. In the light of the great variety of 
terms and the inconsistency in their application among different market participants, in this 
thesis the term SRI is used, while being aware of the ongoing semantic debate and the fact 
that other terms such ‘responsible’ or ‘sustainable & responsible investment’ may eventually 
become the preferred terms in the future. In doing so, we follow the majority of practitioners 
in this field whose ongoing preference for SRI is mainly due to practicable and marketing 
reasons, as SRI is still the most acknowledged expression.30 
 
                                                 
25 See Sparkes (2001, p. 195) 
26 See The Allan Consulting Group (2000, p. 49), Signori (2009, p. 146) 
27 Anderson (1996) 
28 Schwartz (2003) 
29 Hagart, Knoepfel (2007) 
30 See Eurosif (2006, p. 1), Kinder (2007, p. 1) 
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2.3. SRI APPROACHES 
Even though SRI is sometimes understood as a separate product category or asset class, it is 
ultimately a specific investment approach or process through which social, environmental, 
ethical or corporate governance criteria are taken into account in decisions over whether to 
acquire, hold, manage or dispose a particular investment.31 Although many SRI products have 
historically focused on equity and bonds, the SRI logic could be applied to the entire range of 
asset classes including also real estate, private equity, alternative investments, or commodity 
investments.32 To show this, the following section explores the different approaches and proc-
esses in more detail, distinguishing between negative and positive screening, ESG integration, 
shareholder engagement, community investing and social private equity (for an overview see 
Table 2). 
TABLE 2 – OVERVIEW OF SRI APPROACHES 
SRI approach Definition Climate change related examples 
1) Negative screening / 
exclusion 
Exclusion of firms, sectors or regions from 
the investment universe based on environ-
mental, social, ethical or corporate govern-
ance related screens. 
Investors exclude firms from polluting indus-
tries (e.g. oil & gas, mining) or particular 
firms that cause worst case environmental 
impacts. 
a) Best in 
class  
Selection of those firms within a sector that 
demonstrate leading practices with regard to 
environmental, social, ethical or corporate 
governance related criteria. 
Investors select those firms that have an 
advanced climate change strategy, perform 
relatively well with respect to mitigation 
measures or have a low CO2 footprint. 
2) Positive 
screening 
b) Thematic 
investment 
Selection of firms that derive market oppor-
tunities from wider social or environmental 
challenges society faces. 
Investors select firms that offer solutions or 
technologies to address impacts from climate 
change (e.g. providers of alternative energy). 
3) ESG integration / inte-
grated valuation 
Integration of environmental, social, ethical 
or corporate governance information into the 
conventional valuation process of securities. 
Investors identify positive and negative 
impacts from climate change and actively 
integrate this in the company valuation. 
a) Dialogue Making use of ownership rights to enter into 
dialogue with a firm on environmental, so-
cial, ethical or corporate governance issues. 
Shareholders directly engage with firms to 
promote reporting on climate change related 
risks and opportunities (e.g. through CDP). 
4) Share-
holder 
engagement 
b) Proxy 
voting 
Making use of ownership rights to vote at the 
general meeting on environmental, social, 
ethical or corporate governance-related proxy 
resolutions or issue own resolutions. 
Shareholders publicly engage on climate 
change related issues with the objective of 
influencing corporate behavior (i.e. share-
holder campaign over BP tar sands plans). 
Community investment and 
social private equity 
Provision of resources to environmentally or 
socially desirable economic activities (e.g. 
via micro-credit). 
Investors engage in microfinance products 
that promote the provision of renewable 
energy to households. 
Source: Own illustration 
By reviewing these approaches, we will also show how SRI has grown and matured over 
time, in the sense that it has become more complex and diverse. In section 2.3.1 we start with 
negative screening that is considered to be the original form of SRI and which goes back to 
equity based ethical funds in the 1960s and 1970s that excluded companies in such sectors as 
arms, tobacco or alcohol. Such products were originally provided by a small number of spe-
cialist providers for mainly values-based investors such as charities or religious groups. In 
                                                 
31 Cowton (1999, p. 60) 
32 For an overview of how SRI criteria are being integrated across all asset classes, see Boston College 
Center for Corporate Citizenship (2007). 
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section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 we show how SRI has developed in an increasingly versatile and com-
plex investment philosophy by including also positive strategies in which environmental, so-
cial, ethical and governance factors are taken into account to achieve long-term value crea-
tion. Consequently, such approaches have been adopted by a wider group of investors includ-
ing mainstream investors such as pension funds. In addition to these portfolio screening tech-
niques, section 2.3.4 looks at different forms of shareholder engagement which are primarily 
aimed at initiating structural changes among target firms by directly interacting with the firm. 
Finally, in section 2.3.5 we look into community investment and social private equity. 
For all these different approaches, the development of mechanisms that inform potential or 
actual investors about environmental, social, ethical or corporate governance related factors is 
key.33 In the following sections we therefore review these approaches in detail to better under-
stand the processes of how issues are factored into either the investment decision or the en-
gagement process. Based on this analysis, in section 2.5 we will then explore the effectiveness 
of these approaches in meeting specific objectives of investor to engage in SRI.34 
2.3.1. NEGATIVE SCREENING 
When examining the evolution of SRI, one has to start with early values-based or conviction-
based concepts that were primarily aimed at aligning an investor’s investment needs with their 
personal beliefs or values, normally resulting in the exclusion of companies, sectors or regions 
from the investment universe.35 According to Kinder, until the 90s this form of negative 
screening was what was widely understood to be SRI.36 In fact, the intention to align invest-
ment decisions with one’s beliefs through avoidance is actually an ancient concept.37 For ex-
ample, forms of faith-based investing can be traced back to early Jewish doctrine as well as 
Christian and Moslem thinking38 or practices by religious groups in the 18th century such as 
the Quakers or Methodists who refused to do business with firms involved in the slave trade, 
gambling or the production of tobacco and alcohol.39 Other early examples date back to the 
beginning of the 20th century when the U.K. Methodist Church began investing in the stock 
market while avoiding companies involved in alcohol and gambling, or to the U.S. Pioneer 
Fund40 established in 1928 that excluded companies involved in alcohol or tobacco. Yet the 
real shift towards modern-style negative screening was made only later, when the first ethical 
retail funds open to the public were established (see Table 3). In 1965, the first public ethical 
                                                 
33 See Cullis, Lewis (1992) 
34 This includes concerns about the financial implications of these different approaches. These will be 
analyzed in more detail in chapter 2.4.3.2.3. 
35 See Dembinski et al. (2003, p. 206), Kinder (2007) 
36 See Kinder (2007, p. 23). 
37 See Brown (1998), Sparkes (2001), Bengtsson (2008, p. 970) 
38 See Schwartz et al. (2007, p. 139ff) 
39 See Schwartz (2003, p. 197), Statman (2005c, p. 14), Social Investment Forum (2008, p. 4) 
40 See Entine (2007, p. 175), Gabriel (2008, p. 30) 
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investment fund named Ansvar Aktiefond41 was launched by the Temperance and Baptist 
movements in Sweden,42 followed by two funds in the U.S., the Pax World Fund43 launched 
in 1971 and the Dreyfus Third Century Fund launched in 1972. In the U.K., the first ethical 
fund, the Stewardship Trust was created in 1984 by Friends Provident44 and according to the 
Quakers’ pacifist traditions was designed to avoid companies involved in the arms trade. The 
launch of these ethical funds was also closely linked with other social, environmental or po-
litical movements for civil and women's rights and anti-war protests that emerged in the 60s 
and 70s and served to expand SRI to wider social concerns.45 
TABLE 3 – EARLY EUROPEAN AND U.S. ETHICAL FUNDS 
Country Name of fund  Fund provider Start year 
Sweden Ansvar Aktiefond Sverige Aktie-Ansvar 1965 
U.S. Pax World Fund Pax 1971 
U.S. Dreyfus Third Century Fund  Dreyfus 1972 
U.K. Stewardship Unit Trust Friends Provident 1984 
Scotland/U.K. Ethical Scottish Equitable 1989 
Netherlands Het Andere Beleggingsfonds ABF 1990 
Finland Forum Gyllenberg 1999 
Spain Fondo Etico Morgan Stanley Dean Witer 1999 
Source: Based on Kreander (2001) 
To the extent that negative screening results in a narrowing of the investment universe, it has 
traditionally been more prominent among faith or values-based investors such as churches, 
charities, endowments, non-governmental organizations (NGO) or individuals that have the 
avoidance of certain unethical corporate practices as a primary objective, rather than long-
term financial performance. For such ethically-motivated investors, negative screening has 
been an acceptable strategy to the extent that their ethical concerns are an integral part of their 
investment strategy. Conversely, this approach has been rather unpopular among the majority 
of conventional or mainstream institutional investors for whom negative screening runs 
against either their own investment rationale or in the case of pension funds, against the best 
interests of the beneficiaries (with ‘best interests’ typically referring to their best financial 
interests). Sethi affirmed that “conventional wisdom argues that the fiduciary responsibility of 
the pension funds’ trustees must be solely focused on their beneficiaries and therefore their 
                                                 
41 www.aktieansvar.se 
42 The fund took account of the core ethical values of the Temperance and the Baptist movements by 
excluding producers of alcohol, armaments, firearms and tobacco, see Kreander (2001, p. 13), 
Bengtsson (2008, p. 973). 
43 This fund still exists under the name Pax World Balanced Fund www.paxworld.com.  
44 Friends Provident (www.friendsprovident.co.uk) was founded in 1832 by Quakers to provide life 
insurance for its members. The name ‘Stewardship’ was inspired by a passage on the rightful use of 
money in the ‘Parable of the Talents’ in St. Matthew’s Gospel (Matthew 25: 14-29), see Kreander 
(2001, p. 15). 
45 See Statman (2005c, p. 15), Bengtsson (2008, p. 970) 
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investment criteria must be based on narrowly defined financial measures.”46 For long this has 
been a major obstacle for mainstream investors such as pension funds to engage in SRI and 
has left SRI restricted to a rather small number of activist investors.47 
Although the most common set of negative criteria typically includes policies against weapon 
manufacturing, tobacco or gambling, it could actually include a much wider range of things. 
In fact, evidence reveals considerable diversity with regard to the exclusions that have been 
applied over time, across regions as well as among different types of investors and products. 
For example, in the U.S. where negative screening is still the most preferred approach, to-
bacco is the most prominent screen for both SRI funds as well as screened mandates (see 
Figure 3). The antipathy of SRI investors to tobacco is also the case in other countries such as 
Australia and Canada.48 In contrast, in Europe screens on arms and human rights rank first.49 
FIGURE 3 – NEGATIVE SCREENS APPLIED TO MUTUAL FUNDS AND SCREENED MANDATES IN THE U.S.  
 
Source: Social Investment Forum (2008, pp. 11, 19) 
As shown in Figure 3, certain screens are more frequent in screened mandates (e.g. Sudan, 
human rights), while others play a more important role in pooled products (e.g. alcohol). This 
can partly be explained by the fact that screened mandates, which tend to be tailored to the 
needs of a specific investor (usually institutional investors or high net wealth individuals 
(HNWI)), can be adjusted more easily to current trends and preferences (e.g. Sudan divest-
ment). In contrast, in the case of pooled vehicles, which gather the money of a large number 
of smaller investors, new restrictions are more difficult to introduce as they may shift the bal-
                                                 
46 Sethi (2005, p. 99) 
47 See Entine (2007, p. 175) 
48 See Social Investment Organization (2007, p. 10) 
49 Eurosif (2006, p. 7) 
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ance of a fund considerably and thereby eventually lead to inconsistencies with the values of a 
large number of clients.50 
Since preferences for negative screens may also differ among client groups, asset managers 
have the opportunity to differentiate their offering in order to respond to specific client needs. 
For example in the U.S., the Calvert Group Mutual Fund translates investors’ values into five 
restrictive screens, including the environment, workplace, product safety, international opera-
tions and human rights, and weapons contracting. In contrast, Citizens Funds breaks it down 
into ten restrictions, including the environment, equal opportunities, employee relations, 
community relations, human rights, nuclear power, alcohol and tobacco, weapons, gambling, 
and the treatment of animals. KLD Research & Analytics provides a set of restrictions that are 
grouped into three different categories: controversial business restrictions (company involve-
ment in sectors of interest to social investors such as adult entertainment, alcohol, arms, gam-
bling, military, nuclear power or tobacco), social issue restrictions (measure of CR perform-
ance with regard to the environment, human rights, union relations, employee safety, diver-
sity, product safety, etc) and custom restrictions (including specialty areas such as animal wel-
fare (e.g. animal testing or factory farming) or Islamic restrictions (e.g. pork or usury).51  
TABLE 4 – COMPANIES SUBJECT TO CLUSTER MUNITIONS SCREEEN 
Asset managers Pension funds Companies involved in 
the production of cluster 
munitions Danske Bank 
KLP 
Kapital-
forvalt-
ning 
SNS 
Asset 
Man-
agement 
NGPF AP1-4 NZSF ABP PGGM 
Alliant Techsystems         
Cobham - -  - -  - - 
GenCorp    -  -   
General Dynamics         
Goodrich Corporation - -  - -    
Hanwha Corporation          
Kaman Corporation - - - - - -   
L-3 Communication         
Lockhead Martin         
Magellan Aerospace - - - - - -   
Poongsan Corporation         
Poongsan Holdings -  - - - - - - 
Rayethon -        
Singapore Technologies          
Textron         
Source: Data retrieved from websites of the respective asset managers and asset owners 
                                                 
50 See Social Investment Forum (2008, p. 19). The same holds also for the introduction of negative 
criteria in pooled pension fund portfolios. 
51 See KLD Research & Analytics (2008) 
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Finally, as shown in Table 4, even in cases where asset managers and asset owners apply the 
same screen (in this case, production of cluster munitions) they may end up excluding a dif-
ferent set of companies from their portfolio. This shows that even for a seemingly straight-
forward screen like cluster bombs there is considerable room for interpretation of how the 
screen is applied by investors. 
2.3.2. POSITIVE SCREENING 
Contrary to negative screening, positive screening leads to investment in companies that per-
form relatively well with regard to certain environmental, social, ethical or corporate govern-
ance criteria while avoiding poor ones. Traditionally, positive screening consists of either a 
best in class approach or so-called thematic / pioneer investing. Typically such positive con-
cepts are economically-oriented, in the sense that they assume that companies that perform 
relatively well with regard to these criteria will also perform well in financial terms in the 
long run. As a consequence, the emergence of these concepts during the late 1980s and 1990s 
was accompanied by a considerable broadening of the SRI investor base. While in the previ-
ous stage values-based investors dominated, at this point SRI became also an option for con-
ventional or mainstream investors such as pension funds or insurance companies that lacked a 
mission-related commitment to ethical causes and which felt uncomfortable with the respon-
sibility for moral or ethical judgments that decisions based on non-financial criteria imply.52 
According to Smith, this shift in the investor base is a direct consequence of the growing evi-
dence that the behavior of companies with regard to environmental, social or ethical issues 
may well have a financial impact and hence may also involve opportunities for investors.53 In 
this light, promoters of SRI argue that fiduciary investors such as pension fund trustees who 
are acting on behalf of others are not only legally permitted to consider environmental and 
social concerns, but are even required to factor such concerns into their investment and own-
ership decisions in the interest of their beneficiaries (see section 2.4.1). 
2.3.2.1. BEST IN CLASS SELECTION 
SRI products applying a best in class approach typically select those companies from a broad 
market index that demonstrate leading CR practices within their sector, thereby avoiding a 
priori exclusions of whole sectors from the investment universe.54 As such, best in class prod-
ucts typically include large caps that have sufficient resources to run an advanced CR pro-
gram. They tend to have an economic focus, as the underlying assumption is that a company's 
CR performance is positively related to its long-term financial performance through both po-
tential equity premia and risk reduction (see section 2.5.3.2.1). As such, best in class selection 
                                                 
52 See Sparkes, Cowton (2004, p. §363), Caerlewy-Smith et al. (2006), Kinder (2007, p. 32), 
Bengtsson (2008) 
53 Smith (2005, p. 57), see also Schwartz (2003, p. 196) 
54 Hence companies chosen according to this approach tend to be large caps whereas smaller compa-
nies are often penalized because of their deficits in CR reporting and disclosure. As a result, best in 
class portfolios are generally not benchmarked against SRI specialist indexes but against conventional 
indexes (see Hudson (2006, p. 6)). 
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can be considered as a form of active portfolio management, where asset managers try to beat 
conventional market indexes by selecting those companies which perform best against envi-
ronmental, social, ethical or governance criteria, assuming that such information is not suffi-
ciently reflected in the share price.55 In line with this growing demand for information, new 
research and rating organizations emerged that helped to increase the transparency of compa-
nies with regard to their CR performance.56 Such organizations establish regular company 
ratings by tracking the firm’s CR performance and use the information for either the construc-
tion of SRI indexes and / or corresponding investment products. For example, many SRI 
funds are licensed on the basis of such indexes indicating that the emergence of these actors 
was an important step in raising the general recognition of SRI as an investment area.57 
The information gathering associated with best in class selection focuses on a number of im-
portant challenges. For example, due to the qualitative nature of many CR criteria, best in 
class analysis and selection is a more complex and resource intensive process than negative 
screening. First and foremost, this is because SRI analysts face the difficulty of evaluating a 
firm’s CR performance consistently and calculating ratings based on both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria in order to reveal the best-positioned companies within a sector. In this 
regard Kinder writes: “today social investors also screen stocks on qualitative social criteria 
such as employee relations and corporate governance. These screens often require nuanced 
appraisals of corporate behavior. Whether a company has a “good employment record” rarely 
yields a quick yes or no. Reaching an answer for a large, complex company, such as DuPont, 
can take hours of analysis. In contrast, whether a company is in the gambling industry always 
produces a “yes” or a “no” answer, often in a matter of seconds.”58 Although the introduction 
of standardized reporting frameworks such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has partly 
increased comparability of company data, rating organizations still have to make a consider-
able effort to ensure the comparability and quality of the data which is drawn from different 
sources (e.g. company documents, media reports or through direct company interaction by 
questionnaires or interviews). Also, it has to be noted that the quality of such company data is 
often limited as the corporate self-assessment on which these ratings are based are rarely veri-
fied by independent sources and therefore in some cases may not be reliable. Especially in 
                                                 
55 The assumption is that certain risks or opportunities that relate to a company’s responsibilities are 
completely overlooked by mainstream financial analysts causing the corresponding share price of a 
company not to be fairly valued by the market. 
56 See Schäfer (2005, p. 108). The first rating agencies involving mainly normatively oriented rating 
organizations were established in the U.S. to meet the needs of faith or mission-based institutional 
investors such as churches or charities, but also pension funds, see Schäfer et al. (2006, p. 156). For an 
overview of different corporate responsibility rating organizations see SustainAbility, Mistra (2004), 
Schäfer (2005) and Schäfer et al. (2006). 
57 For example Dow Jones Sustainability Index series (DJSI) launched in 1999 hold more than 70 li-
censes as of end 2009, accounting for USD 8 billion assets under management (www.sustainability-
index.com). 
58 Kinder (2007, p. 27) 
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cases where companies use such ratings as a promotional tool this may lead them to overstate 
achievements while not disclosing controversial information. 
An important challenge for best in class selection lies in the materiality check of CR activities 
for a given sector. Analysts must have a clear understanding of which CR activities are mate-
rial and how they can be tracked and assessed in a reasonable way. According to the authors 
of the 2004 report "Values for Money", only a few research or rating organizations suffi-
ciently analyze this relationship.59 Instead, to simplify matters they often tend to use a com-
pany’s CR performance as a proxy for good management, without having a clear understand-
ing of the correlation between a company’s CR and financial value drivers. To some extent 
this can be explained by the fact that the mechanisms of the relationship between CR and fi-
nancial performance are still not well known or understood60 and that contrary to conventional 
financial reporting there is no uniform reporting standard or methodology for the reporting of 
CR information. Quoting Schäfer et al.: “the body of knowledge about the causal relationships 
between individual [CR] criteria and their economic consequences seems to be still rudimen-
tary, allowing concept providers sufficient latitude in developing their concepts (and pre-
sumably, for creating correlations that are real only in appearance)”.61 As a result, the rating 
methodologies as well as the proprietary scoring algorithms may differ considerably among 
providers of best in class products, indicating that there is neither agreement about what con-
stitutes a responsible or sustainable company nor how this should best be measured. For ex-
ample, the rating methodologies disclosed in Figure 4 are divided into different thematic cate-
gories (usually involving an environmental, a social as well as an economic or governance 
dimension), which are then further divided into different sub-sections. Each category and sub-
section is weighted according to the providers’ proprietary scoring algorithm, reflecting the 
relevance attributed to rating criteria and serving the rating organizations as a means to differ-
entiate their offering from their peers. 
FIGURE 4 – STRUCTURE AND WEIGHTS OF DIFFERENT CR RATINGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 See SustainAbility, Mistra (2004, p. 2) 
60 For an overview of these linkages see Rauschenberger (2001). 
61 Schäfer (2006, p. 162) 
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Source: DJSI (2009), oekom (2009), WestLB Research (2007) 
2.3.2.2. THEMATIC INVESTING 
Another form of positive selection concerns thematic or pioneer investing, which refers to the 
selection of companies of the future that derive market opportunities from the wider chal-
lenges society faces (e.g. companies that offer solutions or technologies to address climate 
change, water scarcity, ageing populations, infrastructure, clean technology, forestry, etc.). 
The first thematic products, labeled green or eco-efficiency funds, have already emerged in 
response to the debate around sustainability that was triggered by the publication of the 
Brundtland Sustainability Report in 1987. The focus of these early thematic products was 
primarily the promotion of eco-friendly and sustainable products and technologies to increase 
resource efficiency, the development of renewable energies and sustainable development in 
general.62 According to Sparkes, the financial performance of these early thematic invest-
                                                 
62 Gabriel (2008, p. 30), see also Scholand (2004, p. 67), Bengtsson (2008, p. 973) 
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ments was not particularly good.63 In retrospect, it appears that fund providers went through a 
learning phase in which they pursued a radical green stance rather than focusing on financial 
goals. In addition, their strong bias towards small and mid-cap companies (rather than large 
caps that have only a small proportion of their business exposed to a specific sustainability 
theme) caused thematic products to experience a relatively high level of volatility, which 
qualified them rather as satellite investments. Although their exposure to small and mid-caps 
persists, more recent forms of thematic investments are also financially sounder and match or 
even outperform conventional fund performances. Applying a top-down approach, today’s 
thematic products focus on correctly identifying themes or behavioral or growth trends and 
then finding pioneering companies that promise also to be good investments. For example, 
Insight Investment, a U.K. based asset manager, writes that once they have identified a theme, 
they first assess whether this warrants an in-depth analysis by analyzing the impact of the 
theme on supply / demand balances, potential disruptions to existing markets and the scale of 
the opportunity or risk.64 Where companies are identified as being beneficiaries of a theme 
they conduct initial screening to assess whether these companies are suitable investments for 
their products. If this is the case, conventional and SRI analysts undertake more detailed 
analysis to understand how the thematic driver might affect cash flows, returns and other fi-
nancial measures of the company’s success.65 
For some, the resulting investment products qualify as SRI to the extent that they have suffi-
cient exposure to sustainability related themes without involving (contrary to best in class 
products) an elaborate sustainability analysis at the company level. This means that potential 
investment targets would only need to have sufficient exposure to drivers identified for a spe-
cific theme (e.g. water). Products and services profiting from such a theme would typically 
need to constitute a significant percentage of the firm’s sales or revenue. Again for others 
such as the European Social Investment Forum (Eurosif) or onValues, this would be insuffi-
cient to be labeled as SRI to the extent that thematic investments must truly take environ-
mental, social and governance considerations into account by including sustainability screen-
ing in the construction process of the product (e.g. sustainable water).66 Therefore, the prod-
ucts and services offered by companies included in a thematic SRI product should not only 
profit from a specific environmental or social challenge but also offer a sustainable solution. 
This does not mean that companies need to be best in class in all areas of sustainability (as 
many of the companies suited for thematic investing are small and mid-sized, such tight con-
straints would unnecessarily reduce the investment universe). However, in their view, compa-
nies need to comply with certain minimum requirements regarding their own environmental 
and social footprint. This means for example that a company in the biofuels sector should not 
only contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions, but also avoid causing disproportionate 
                                                 
63 Sparkes (2001, p. 200) 
64 See Insight Investment (2009b) and www.insightinvestment.com 
65 As such thematic investment overlaps with integration (see section 2.3.3). 
66 See Eurosif (2006, p. 12), onValues (2007) 
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environmental and social impacts otherwise (e.g. forest and peat land destruction, violation of 
the rights of indigenous peoples , impact on food prices, violation of labor rights). 
In the Swiss market, thematic SRI fund products as well as structured products have played a 
key role in the growth of SRI67 due to increasing awareness of both client advisors and clients 
to issues such as climate change and water. Strong performances in recent years coupled with 
an easy to understand research story (e.g. high energy prices and alternative energy, public 
and political attention and the creation of carbon markets through government regulations) 
has made such products attractive for retail and institutional clients alike. In return, the popu-
larity of thematic investments has resulted in significant inflows of capital into corresponding 
products, thereby pushing up the valuations of these companies.68 
2.3.3. ESG INTEGRATION 
Increasingly terms such as integration, ESG integration69 or integrated valuation are being 
used to describe a separate approach to SRI. For example, Vigeo defines integration as a form 
of SRI that is about the integration and management of pertinent extra-financial information 
into the mainstream analysis.70 Similarly Eurosif considers integration as the explicit inclu-
sion by asset managers of environmental, social and governance risks in traditional financial 
analysis71, meaning that these criteria explicitly enter the valuation process of asset prices 
through their incorporation into the assessments of expected future cash flows. As such, inte-
gration differs from values-based forms of SRI in that its only purpose is to identify those 
aspects of a company’s CR performance that are material to the operational and financial per-
formance of companies and therefore it is free from a priori value judgments except, of 
course, those relating to financial value. Conceptually this may overlap with other economi-
cally oriented forms of SRI such as best in class selection or thematic investing. However, for 
Eurosif integration differs from these approaches to the extent that the consideration of mate-
rial factors is not practiced in conjunction with any type of screening or selection as it is ap-
plied for example by providers of conventional SRI funds. Instead integration is practiced on 
“mainstream” or “traditional” assets and aggregated into an overall investment decision by 
becoming a mainstream component of financial instruments.72 Another difference with regard 
to positive screening refers to the actors typically involved in the investment analysis and de-
cision-making. Whereas for other SRI techniques, such as best in class or thematic invest-
ment, the analysis is usually conducted by specialist SRI teams focusing on certain product 
                                                 
67 Eurosif (2006, p. 12) 
68 See Watson Wyatt (2008, p. 6) 
69 ESG is an acronym commonly used to represent ‘environmental, social and corporate governance 
issues’. Socially responsible investing sometimes also refers to corporate governance issues (e.g. ex-
ecutive remuneration or separation between ownership and control) along with social, environmental 
or ethical issues as part of the broader group of extra financial issues (Eurosif, 2006). 
70 Vigeo (2006) 
71 Eurosif (2008, p. 13) 
72 See Eurosif (2008, p. 13), Wheelan in Responsible Investor (2009, p. 5), Robeco, Booz & Company 
(2008, p. 6) 
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and client segments with a high CR exposure, integration is an integral part of mainstream 
financial analysis involving all types of relevant business activities, regions, asset classes and 
client types.73 An expression that is often heard in this context is 'mainstreaming', which refers 
to ESG factors becoming an integral part of mainstream or conventional financial analysis. 
This also means that SRI investments are no longer regarded as a separate category, but that 
ESG criteria are being applied to a large part of a client's portfolio encompassing all asset 
classes.74 In fact, if all financial analysts consider material ESG factors in their analyses, 
many investment products currently labeled as SRI would become redundant, as these aspects 
would already be reflected in company valuation and hence also in portfolio construction.75 
Finally, another difference with regard to economically-oriented forms of positive screening 
has been raised by Viederman and is that whereas the methodology for positive screening is 
more retrospective, looking at the past performance of a company on social and environ-
mental issues, ESG integration (although also using past data) emphasizes the capacity of a 
company to respond to future trends and developments (e.g. climate risk and opportunities).76 
In this context a number of new and distinct initiatives have emerged, which are first and 
foremost aimed at improving the availability and quality of mostly qualitative ESG company 
information and which promote the integration of this information into standard company 
valuation models. The initiatives that need to be highlighted are the UNEP Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI), the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) and the Enhanced Ana-
lytics Initiative (EAI). The UNEP FI77, founded in 1991, is a global partnership between 
UNEP and the financial sector (including banks, insurers and fund managers) and served as a 
nucleus for the debate around ESG integration. Through its Asset Management Working 
Group (AMWG), the initiative substantially contributed to the understanding of the impact of 
ESG factors on the valuation of securities and the integration of these factors into investment 
analysis, decision-making and ownership practices. Out of the UNEP FI, and driven by con-
cerns around fiduciary duties, in 2005 a group of primarily large institutional asset owners 
developed the UNPRI78, a high level framework for institutional asset managers and owners 
to integrate ESG consideration into their mainstream investment practices. Since its founda-
tion the UNPRI has attracted a considerable number of asset owners and asset managers, indi-
cating the growing interest among mainstream institutional investors in this subject. Finally, 
confronted with an absence of high quality, long-term research on ESG issues, in 2004 the 
EAI79 was founded in collaboration between leading asset owners and asset managers. To 
overcome this gap the initiative incentivized sell-side investment research to take a long-term 
                                                 
73 See Who Cares Wins Initiative (2008, p. 16) 
74 See UNEP FI (2009, p. 67) 
75 See UBS (2007a) 
76 See Viederman (2009) 
77 See www.unepfi.org 
78 See www.UN PRI.org 
79 See www.enhanced-analytics.com 
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view and integrate material ESG by allocating five percent of their members’ brokerage fees 
to those research houses that produce the best ESG related research. Thereby the EAI com-
pensates for additional costs that the brokerage houses incur by conducting enhanced and 
more resource-intensive research on ESG issues. In order to further increase their impact, by 
the end of 2008, the EAI and the UNPRI joined forces under the PRI roof. 
2.3.4. SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Shareholder engagement or activism can be defined as a SRI strategy that encompasses ac-
tions by investors who, in their awareness of social, environmental, ethical or corporate gov-
ernance issues, exercise their shareholder rights to influence corporate practices. Thus, con-
trary to the approaches introduced above, which are about screening companies’ CR perform-
ances to improve asset selection either in ethical or financial terms, shareholder engagement is 
aimed at improving a company’s practices in either ethical or financial terms. Early value-
based forms of shareholder engagement emerged in the U.S. in the late 70s and mid 80s 
among investors who expressed their opposition to the South African apartheid regime and 
the War in Vietnam.80 Later, the underlying objectives of the activist shareholders shifted. As 
in the evolution of screening methods, conventional investors have also increasingly recog-
nized shareholder engagement as an efficient mechanism for initiating structural changes with 
a view to creating a positive impact on the shareholder value of the targeted firm. Again this 
started in the U.S. with the activism of large institutional investors (e.g. public pension funds 
such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS)81), which have 
emerged as majority owners of many large corporations. For these investors, divestment from 
under-performing stocks was no longer an option due to their passive investment strategies or 
simply due to the sheer size of their positions, which rendered engagement more financially 
attractive than selling a disputed stock (see section 2.5.3.2.3). 
One can distinguish different forms of shareholder engagement that involve varying levels of 
communication with a company, including conducting direct dialogue, exercising voting 
rights or filing or co-filing shareholder resolutions at the annual meeting. According to Ryan 
and Schneider, the form of engagement may vary depending on the underlying objective of 
the shareholder (either cooperative or confrontational). Normally, engagement efforts tend to 
start with dialogue behind the scenes with company management. If no agreement can be 
reached, shareholders may threaten to go public including proxy voting and issuing their own 
shareholder proposals accompanied by media campaigns. According to Ryan and Schneider 
such public forms of shareholder engagement should be considered hostile to the extent that 
they signal to the market that management is unwilling to respond to more cooperative nego-
tiation attempts.82 
                                                 
80 See Grossman, Sharpe (1986), Malone, Goodin (1997), Monks, Minow (2001, p. 136) 
81 See Smith (1996) or Barber (2006) for an overview of CalPERS’ shareholder activism. 
82 Ryan, Schneider (2002, p. 555). 
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Historically, shareholder engagement activities have focused on corporate governance issues 
and have mainly been practiced in the U.S. and the U.K. In other countries, such as Japan or 
in Switzerland they have played a minor role. Also, shareholder engagement on environ-
mental or social issues has been less popular but has become more frequent recently.83 Today, 
specialized providers of shareholder engagement services, as well as investor initiatives or 
coalitions such as the UNPRI engagement clearing-house have specialized in providing a fo-
rum for collective engagement on environmental or social issues. For example, since 2002, 
Insight Investment has engaged with companies on a wide range of social, environmental and 
ethical issues (see Table 5 for their 2007 engagement record). Three principal factors guide 
their selection of engagement topics: the materiality or business relevance of a particular 
theme or issue to companies or sectors in which Insight invests (i.e. the business case for 
shareholder engagement); the likelihood that the intervention will significantly affect a com-
pany’s conduct or contribute constructively to an evolving debate and the seriousness of the 
environmental or social impacts at hand. The major themes on which Insight has engaged 
include climate change, consumer health and obesity, emerging technologies (e.g. nanotech-
nology), human rights, natural resource management, responsible supply chain management, 
revenue transparency and sustainable homes. 
TABLE 5 – INSIGHT'S ENGAGEMENT RECORD ON ESG ISSUES IN 2007 
Engagement issues Frequency  Engagement issues Frequency 
Annual General Meetings 2  Doing business in difficult companies 24 
Capital structure 14  Health and safety 1 
Chairman meetings 54  Human rights 6 
Directors’ remuneration 65  New and emerging technologies 22 
Take-overs 3  Principles for responsible investment 24 
Access to medicines 1  Responsible alcohol retailing 9 
Climate change 139  Supply chain issues 28 
CR strategy, governance and reporting 38  Sustainable homes / next generation 26 
Customer-related risks 30  Total 486 
Source: Based on Insight Investment (2009) 
2.3.5. COMMUNITY INVESTMENT AND SOCIAL PRIVATE EQUITY 
Finally, community investment and social private equity is sometimes considered as another 
form of SRI investing, to the extent that it directs funds to socially or environmentally desir-
able activities (e.g. environment pioneers, micro-credit) that are otherwise under-served by 
traditional financial institutions.84 Such products provide access to credit, equity, capital, and 
basic banking products that these communities or projects would otherwise lack. Hence, one 
could consider this form of SRI as a special type of positive screening, as they refer to the 
                                                 
83 According to a report by U.K. based FairPensions (2008, p. 6) U.K. asset managers focus mainly on 
governance issues, whereas environmental and social issues play only a minor role. Among the 22 
asset managers surveyed, 19 consider corporate governance issues, while only three (F&C, Insight and 
Standard Life) also address environmental and social issues. 
84 See Munnell, Sundén (2004, p. 3) 
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application of environmental, social or ethical screens to non-traded assets. Community in-
vestment in principle differs from positive screening only with respect to the concrete asset 
class the screens are applied to. An important element of social private equity lies in the pro-
vision of both capital and management assistance to companies that create innovative solu-
tions to social and environmental problems.85 Whereas community investment plays only a 
minor role in Europe including Switzerland, it plays an important role in North America and 
is also increasingly considered as an integral part of SRI in Japan.86 
2.4. SRI INVESTORS DEFINED 
Research in financial economics often treats investors with a high level of aggregation as a 
rather homogeneous group, particularly with regard to their interest in wealth-maximization. 
This sub-chapter reviews arguments that SRI investors not only differ from other investors in 
a number of ways, but also differ among themselves. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 5 which 
shows different types of investors engaging in the Canadian SRI market, SRI investors are a 
very diverse group of investors, whose entities may also have varying rationales and prefer-
ences for investing in a socially responsible manner (see also Figure 26 for an overview of 
institutional SRI investors dominating in Europe). 
FIGURE 5 – CATEGORIES OF SRI INVESTORS IN CANADA 
 
Source: Social Investment Organization (2007, p. 11) 
In order to get a clearer picture of who is investing in SRI and why, in section 2.4.1, we first 
look at the disposition of individual and institutional investors towards SRI. As it becomes 
clear in this section, investors that engage in SRI may have either ethical or financial motiva-
tions or a combination of both. These underlying motivations will be subject to more detailed 
analysis in section 2.4.2. In section 2.4.3, we use the distinction between ethical and / or fi-
nancial motivations to develop a proper typology of SRI investors by distinguishing between 
varying degrees of how ethical and financial considerations are combined in investment or 
ownership decisions. The general findings of this sub-chapter will later serve as a background 
to analyze the varying motivations of Swiss pension funds for SRI in section 6.1.1.1. 
                                                 
85 See CCRS (2004) 
86 See Sakuma, Louche (2008, p. 434) 
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2.4.1. DISPOSITION OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS TOWARDS SRI 
While the allocation of SRI IA varies across markets, typically institutional investors account 
for the lion's share and individual investors tend to play only a smaller role (see also Figure 
24). This is surprising to the extent that individual investors are obviously less constrained 
than fiduciary investors when engaging in non-standard investment practices or when they 
integrate factors that seemingly run against traditional wealth maximization objectives. As a 
result private investors, but also foundations or family offices, are more likely to engage in 
traditional SRI practices, whereas pension funds are expected to engage more in shareholder 
value creation strategies (see section 3.2.1.4).87 
Among institutional investors, which can basically be defined as organizations with substan-
tial and mostly continuous investment needs and which pool and trade large volumes of secu-
rities88, the question of whether they are allowed, permitted or legally required to engage in 
SRI is complex. To answer this question, institutional investors should be distinguished ac-
cording to whether they invest their own assets in order to finance a long-term stream of dis-
cretionary spending (e.g. foundations or university endowments) or if they invest assets on 
behalf of their clients (e.g. pension funds which invest on behalf of their beneficiaries). The 
former, similarly to individual investors, are basically free to define the scope of their SRI 
engagement within the boundaries of their statutory requirements. Regarding the latter, in 
common law countries this question is usually addressed by making reference to general in-
vestment principles known as fiduciary obligations or duties, since the law rarely specifies 
whether they are legally permitted to invest in SRI on behalf of their beneficiaries. Overall 
fiduciary obligations may vary across different legal regimes89, but in general entail a re-
quirement for trustees to invest beneficiaries’ assets prudently (prudent investor or prudent 
man rule) and in their best interest (duty of loyalty). With regard to the prudent man rule 
Yaron specifies that this principle generally requires fiduciaries “to exercise the care, skill, 
diligence and judgment that a prudent investor would exercise in dealing with the investments 
of another person. Existing judicial commentary has been read narrowly to require that pen-
sion trustees maximize returns on investment and maintain sufficient diversity within the pen-
sion plan’s investment portfolio.”90 Regarding the duty of loyalty, the OECD writes that this 
                                                 
87 Instead of examining the characteristics and practices of individual SRI investors, in this thesis we 
focus on institutional investors and pension funds in particular. For an overview of demographic char-
acteristics of private SRI investors see section 4.1.1.2. 
88 See OECD (2006, p. 159), UBS (2007b) 
89 According to Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2005, p. 10) civil law jurisdictions do not recognize 
fiduciary duties as such. However, investment decision-makers in these jurisdictions are subject to 
obligations that in many circumstances give rise to equivalent duties. 
90 Yaron (2001, p. 5). The OECD defines the prudent man rule (2002a, p. 2) by the following broad 
principle: “A fiduciary must discharge his or her duties with the care, skill, prudence and diligence that 
a prudent person acting in a like capacity would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character 
and aims”. 
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principle “requires the trustee to administer the trust, pension plan or fund solely in the inter-
est of the plan members, often expressed in terms of their “best” interest.”91  
As shown in the previous sections, different types of institutional investors have played spe-
cific roles during the evolution of SRI. For example, institutions such as charities, founda-
tions, endowments, unions or churches (that invest their own assets in an attempt to ensure 
coherence with their organization's underlying purpose or mission) have played a key role in 
the early stage of SRI. In the 1970s and 1980s, the campaigns against the apartheid regime in 
South Africa or the Vietnam War were mostly driven by such organizations together with 
some concerned U.S. universities and public pension funds, which in an attempt to align their 
investments with their missions excluded companies involved in these conflicts. The strong 
preference for exclusion strategies by such investors is shown in Figure 6, which reflects the 
SRI behavior of some of the largest charities and foundations in the U.K. and for which ex-
clusion is the preferred approach. In contrast, more conventional or rational investors, typi-
cally including also fiduciary investors such as pension funds, only started to systematically 
engage in SRI at a later stage. Actually, it was only with the emergence of more positive 
forms that this form of investing has gained greater attention among those investors, for 
whom the overriding investment principle is that an appropriate risk-return relationship must 
hold. 
FIGURE 6 – U.K. CHARITY EQUITY HOLDINGS SUBJECT TO SRI (IN GBP BN) 
 
Source: UKSIF in Eurosif (2003, p. 24) 
Thus over the years, the disposition of fiduciary investors such as pension funds towards SRI 
has been interpreted in different ways. This is reflected in the question whether for pension 
fund SRI is restricted by law, voluntarily permitted or legally required by law. This question 
has been reviewed in detail by two well-known reports from the UNEP FI, commonly known 
as the ‘Freshfields reports’.92 The reports acknowledge that at an early stage, prior to the 
emergence of positive forms of SRI, this form of investment was generally considered to run 
against the principles of prudence and hence against the best interests of their beneficiaries.93 
                                                 
91 OECD (2002a, p. 4). See section 4.1.3 on the varying interpretation of beneficiaries’ best interest. 
92 See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2005), UNEP FI (2009) 
93 E.g. in 1980 Langbein and Posner (1980, p. 96) argued that SRI should be considered to be contrary 
to U.S. trust law and its statutory counterparts to the extent that trustees were sacrificing their benefi-
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In particular, pension fund trustees expected this form of investing to limit investment choices 
and increase portfolio risks, while also imposing divestment or ongoing compliance costs that 
affect overall fund returns.94 An important legal case contributing to this line of thought is 
Cowan v. Scargill (1984), which reviews the decision of a U.K. miners pension scheme not to 
invest in other energy providers or foreign companies. At that time, the court decided that the 
fiduciary duty of a trustee is solely to provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries and as 
such trustees should avoid making investment decisions on the basis of a trustee’s personal or 
political beliefs. For a long time this decision was interpreted to say that non-financial consid-
erations should not be considered by trustees.95 Hence, with regard to SRI, Gold argued that 
this case was a “high water mark of a strict application of fiduciary principles restricting trus-
tees from making investment decisions for moral or ethical reasons”.96 The two Freshfields 
reports argue that this restrictive interpretation of the application of SRI by pension funds has 
become obsolete with the growing evidence that SRI can indeed contribute to risk reduction 
and generate long-term financial value.97 In fact, to the extent that pension trustees increas-
ingly agree with this view, investing in SRI has no longer been considered to conflict with 
their duties and hence could be considered as a legally permitted form of investing.98 In this 
regard a report conducted by Denmark’s Pension Market Council considers SRI as being safe 
from a fiduciary point of view, stating “it is vital to ensure the legal requirement to get the 
highest possible return is met when ethical considerations are taken into account at the same 
time. Pension schemes that take ethical considerations in their investment behavior expect at 
least a return corresponding to the market.”99 Similarly, in a decision by the members from 
the U.K.’s House of Lords it was confirmed that pension funds are allowed to engage in SRI. 
                                                                                                                                                        
ciary's financial well-being. By investing in SRI, trustees were argued to be in breach both of their 
duty of loyalty to their beneficiaries and their duty of prudence. See also Lanoff (1980, p. 391), Hut-
chinson, Cole (1980), Murrmann et al. (1984, p. 360). 
94 Sakuma and Louche report that trustees of Japanese pension funds are reticent to implement SRI 
strategies because of their fiduciary duties and concerns about the financial performance of SRI (2008, 
p. 436). Also, in the U.K. many pension fund trustees still believe that the current law does not allow 
them to consider ethical issues when making investments or divesting from a company purely on SRI 
grounds (see Henderson (2008)). See also Kolb (2007, p. xiii), Langbein, Posner (1980, p. 76), Yaron 
(2001, p. 5), Ryan, Schneider (2002, p. 560), Schumacher-Hummel (2004, pp. 285-287), Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer (2005, p. 6). For example, in 2001, when the National Pension Reserve Fund 
(NPRF) in Ireland was established, it was decided that an ethical investment policy would not be ap-
propriate or practical as it would constrain the fund's investments. Subsequently the NPRF was given a 
commercial investment mandate without an explicit ethical component (see Stewart (2009)). 
95 See Perks et al. (1992, p. 63), Yaron (2001, p. 1) 
96 See Gold (2007, p. 16). On the basis of the same line of argument the Canadian Business Corpora-
tions Act allowed companies to delete any shareowner resolutions that address social matters (see 
World Economic Forum (2005, p. 42)). 
97 In 2005 the authors of the Freshfields report (2005, p. 9) concluded that this case cannot be relied 
upon to support the single-minded pursuit of profit maximization, or indeed any general rule govern-
ing investment decision-making. 
98 See Yaron (2001), Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2005), Richardson (2008), Sakuma, Louche 
(2008, p. 437), Taylor (2008), Martin (2009) 
99 See Fixsen (2007) 
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It has been acknowledged that “there is no reason in law why trustees cannot consider social 
and moral criteria in addition to their usual criteria of financial returns, security and diversifi-
cation. This applies to the trustees of all pension schemes. Of course, disinvesting may not be 
the most appropriate approach for pension scheme trustees looking at the long-term sustain-
ability of their investments.”100 
Today certain SRI proponents even argue that there is significant legal support to consider 
SRI as a requirement for institutional investors such as pension funds, as they will only be in a 
position to meet their fiduciary duties if related risk and opportunities are taken into account. 
Hence, trustees who do not factor these issues into their investment and ownership decisions 
may even be accused of breaching their fiduciary duties. For example, in 2005 the first Fresh-
fields report concluded that institutional investors are obliged to consider ESG factors in as-
sessing risk and return criteria when making their investment decisions.101 Similarly, in the 
second Freshfields report in 2009 the authors considered the integration of ESG criteria as a 
legal responsibility for fiduciaries. They held that fiduciaries that do not incorporate ESG 
considerations into their services face “a very real risk that they will be sued for negli-
gence”.102 Sethi argues that SRI is not merely a discretionary and desirable activity of pension 
funds but rather a necessary imperative “which both the corporations and public pension 
funds, and other large institutional holders, will ignore at serious peril to themselves”.103 
2.4.2. RATIONALES OF SRI INVESTORS 
As the above section indicates, both individual and institutional SRI investors can be distin-
guished to the extent they take financial or ethical considerations into account in their deci-
sion to engage in SRI. The varying rationales of SRI investors should serve as important seg-
mentation criteria for any SRI provider to offer products and services that effectively meet 
client needs. Traditionally, clients, particularly in the wealth management business, are classi-
fied on the basis of total IA104, risk profiles (reflecting risk appetite and capacity), or demo-
graphic characteristics (see review of demographic characteristics related to the SRI behavior 
of individuals in section 4.1.1.2).105 However, within an SRI context, there are severe limita-
tions to using these criteria as the sole distinguishing features, without at the same time exam-
ining the underlying motivations of clients for SRI. To the extent that this is what makes SRI 
investors different from conventional investors, a question any financial client advisor should 
ask is whether potential SRI investors are interested in the financial performance of SRI in the 
                                                 
100 See Henderson (2008) 
101 See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2005, p. 13) 
102 See UNEP FI (2009, p. 15) 
103 Sethi (2005, p. 99) 
104 See Rees (2008) 
105 For example, wealth managers tend to distinguish between retail or private banking clients in terms 
of their invested assets with implications for the types of services offered to clients due to profitability 
considerations (e.g. pooled vehicles such as mutual funds vs. tailor-made mandate solutions). 
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first place or if they invest also out of some ethical rationale.106 Already in 1998, Beal et al. 
stated that there is a growing body of psychological, sociological research within the eco-
nomic discipline itself which suggests that investors do not necessarily behave in the way that 
standard finance models of preferences typically suggest.107 They argue that certain types of 
investors incorporate different types of non-financial goals or ethical concerns in their deci-
sion-making in addition to traditional financial motives (see Figure 7). 
FIGURE 7 – RATIONALES OF SRI INVESTORS 
 
Source: Environment Ministry Japan (2003) 
As a consequence, Cullis and Lewis as well as Williams see a need for the adoption of a 
richer account of patterns of investor behavior than those provided by neo-classical econom-
ics, especially when explaining the behavior of investors who derive some sort of ethical util-
ity from investing in SRI.108 This reference to ethical utility draws an analogy with the ethical 
decision-making of consumers, who are inclined to pay a price premium for products that 
have environmental or social features.109 For example, Statman writes that certain investors 
want more than low risk and high expected returns when they choose investments, eventually 
caring also about additional expressive benefits such as the social responsibility of their in-
vestments. As such, as in the case of ethical consumption, SRI offers self-signaling benefits in 
that it signals its social responsibility to an investor.110 In contrast, Langbein and Posner draw 
an analogy with the owners of art in that SRI may confer a compensating utility. For them, 
despite historically lower rates of return for art investments than for their conventional 
benchmarks, the interest of individuals to invest in art indicates that they obtain some sort of 
extra consumption value from their investment, which when added to the investment return, 
                                                 
106 To the extent that there is often only limited transparency among the suppliers of SRI products with 
regard to these questions (e.g. marketing materials sometimes contain misleading information about 
the destination of these products, see section 2.5.2 on the misuse of the impact terminology), there is 
an opportunity for independent investment consultants especially within the institutional market to 
identify the best suited SRI offering (see role of investment consultants in section 4.1.4). 
107 See Beal, Goyen (1998), Dunfee (2003), Rivoli (2003), Beal et al. (2005), Butz, Pictet (2008) 
Petersen, Vredenburg (2009) Jessen (2009) 
108 See Cullis, Lewis (1992, p. 3), Williams (2007, p. 43) 
109 For an overview of the ethical consumer theory see Thaler (1980), Clark-Murphy, Soutar (2005), 
Freestone, McGoldrick (2008), Carter (2009) 
110 Statman (2004, p. 158) 
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equals or even exceeds conventional investment opportunities. Applying the same line of 
thinking to SRI, which was originally considered inferior in financial terms, Langbein and 
Posner conclude that this form of investing must also provide some sort of extra consumption 
value for investors.111 Fama and French suggest that certain investors are interested in more 
than just pure financial wealth maximization and as such they may derive additional benefits 
or utility from holding SRI products. According to them, they may consider preference for 
SRI products as an “extreme form of tastes for assets as consumption goods that are unrelated 
to returns”.112 In the subsequent sections we will provide a more detailed overview of the dif-
ferent ethical and financial rationales of SRI investors. While pure forms certainly exist, most 
SRI investors probably find themselves somewhere in the middle; that is, they have mixed 
motives in looking for investments that achieve competitive returns while at the same time 
also providing a certain ethical performance.113 
2.4.2.1. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF AN INVESTOR’S ETHICAL MOTIVATIONS 
According to Kinder and Domini one can distinguish between two separate ethical perspec-
tives underlying the ethical decision-making process of SRI investors. These correspond to 
two normative ethical systems of one’s ethical obligations: deontological or teleological eth-
ics.114 The first deontological motivation of SRI investors addressed in section 2.4.2.1.1 is 
self-referential, arising out of a need for personal or institutional consistency. Hence invest-
ment decisions are judged to be ethical if they conform to certain values. In contrast, a teleo-
logical motivation, which corresponds to what Kinder and Domini call the ‘comprehensive 
paradigm’, is the investors’ concept of how corporations should interact with society (see sec-
tion 2.4.2.1.2) and hence the ethicality of investment decisions are judged upon their conse-
quences or the impact they have.115 Lewis and Mackenzie, who carried out a survey among 
clients of U.K. SRI providers, show that most clients combine both ethical systems (see Table 
6).116 The disposition of SRI investors towards these two ethical perspectives has important 
implications for providers of SRI products. As Cullis and Lewis indicate, a predominance of 
                                                 
111 Langbein, Posner (1980, p. 94) 
112 Fama, French (2007, p. 675) 
113 See Lewis (1999, p. 390), Dembinski, et al. (2003, p. 209) This has also been confirmed by 
onValues (2008, p. 11), who looked at the underlying rationales of individual SRI investors in 
Switzerland who have invested in thematic SRI products. The authors of the report note that for such 
investors ‘altruistic’ and financial motives are seen to be almost equally important and their SRI 
engagement tends to be driven by a combination of financial and ‘altruistic’ motives. They however 
argue that the picture would likely be very different if only the motives of institutional investors were 
assessed. 
114 Kinder, Domini (1997, p. 15). In line with this distinction by Kinder and Domini, Cullis and Lewis 
(1992, p. 9) distinguish between ‘consumption investors’, who gain utility from investing ethically, 
and, ‘investment-investors’, who gain utility from the social outcomes of their investments 
115 These two ethical perspectives have been reflected by the evolution of the exclusion policy of the 
Norwegian Global Pension Fund (NGPF), which in its original form tended to exclude companies 
where it deemed there was risk of complicity. In the beginning of 2010, the fund decided to relax its 
controversial exclusion policy in order to watch and lobby for change more effectively (see Wheelan 
(2010a)). 
116 Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a) 
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‘deontological’ driven SRI investors would suggest little interest in the actual effectiveness of 
SRI products to promote change. In return, SRI investors that are primarily driven by teleo-
logical motifs would deny real ethicality to SRI products that do not have an impact on corpo-
rate practices or contribute towards sustainable development at large. 
TABLE 6 – ETHICAL RATIONALES OF SRI INVESTORS 
Motives Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree 
slightly 
In be-
tween 
Agree 
slightly 
Agree 
strongly 
Don’t 
know 
(1)  I want to avoid firms doing harm 0.8 0.4 1.5 9.6 83.9 3.8 
(2)  I want investments to be ethically clean 0.6 0.6 6.4 18.5 68.5 5.4 
(3)  I want my investments to help those 
firms which make a positive contribu-
tion to society 
0.5 0.2 3.0 18.6 73.1 4.6 
(4)  I want money to be used to campaign 
for firms to change 
2.9 6.3 20.7 31.2 31.2 7.7 
(5)  I don’t mind if my investments are in 
firms which are doing bad things, so 
long as they are being used effectively 
to persuade the firm to get better 
33.3 25.6 16.9 13.8 2.4 8.0 
Source: Lewis and Mackenzie (2000b, p. 218) 
2.4.2.1.1. ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH OWN VALUES 
A deontological view suggests that one should adhere to moral values in an investment deci-
sion and thereby act in a way that does not harm others. This kind of ethical motivation corre-
sponds best to early values-based concepts of SRI which sought to align an investor’s faith, 
ethical beliefs or values with his portfolio holdings, traditionally resulting in the exclusion of 
so-called vicious or sin stocks from the investment portfolio. Investors driven by such a ra-
tionale focus primarily on the rightness or wrongness of the investment decision itself, as op-
posed to the rightness or wrongness of the consequences of the investment. By extension, they 
want their investments to be in line with their subjective values and want to avoid being asso-
ciated or being complicit with corporate practices judged as ethically condemnable. Accord-
ing to Schueth117, such investors are sometimes also referred to as “feel good” investors, as 
they presumably feel better about themselves and their SRI engagement by deriving psycho-
logical income from their actions. 
In order to make correct moral choices, such investors have to be explicit about their beliefs 
and understand which relevant ethical values regulate business activities and decide on the 
weight or threshold which a disapproved activity or practice can carry in a company without 
being excluded from the investment sphere.118 A difficulty with this approach is that each 
                                                 
117 Schueth (2003, p. 190) 
118 Dembinski et al. (2003, p. 205) distinguish between two types of arbiters to which an investor re-
fers to in deciding about the rightness or wrongness of an investment decision: the investor’s own 
conscience, moral values or convictions as rooted in the characteristics of the investor himself and 
dependent on his predispositions, as well as the statutory and institutional framework external to the 
investor. 
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individual investor is likely to have subjective ideas about what is right or wrong.119 As such, 
one group of the SRI community may advocate investment policies that are pro-environment, 
anti-defense, anti-tobacco, anti-alcohol and pro-gay, while another segment of the community 
advocates religiously based investing promoting anti-contraceptive and anti-abortion / pro-life 
thinking.120 Thus from a deontological perspective, it is ultimately the values-based reasoning 
system of the individual investor or group of beneficiaries that determines whether a certain 
corporate practice is right or wrong and not the objective investment properties or the impact 
of the investment itself. This involves considerable challenges for fiduciary investors such as 
pension funds, as the plurality of ethical values among their beneficiaries may turn into a con-
siderable barrier when it comes to deriving a normative median position on a specific question 
on behalf of thousands of individuals.121 
Another difficulty for deontologist investors may result from the objective of achieving full 
consistency between their values and their investments. A key challenge in this context refers 
to the question of where exactly to draw the line in order to remain in compliance with values. 
For example, an investor might exclude companies from the nuclear energy sector, while at 
the same time owning a conventional indexed fund including stocks from this sector. Alterna-
tively, an investor may not hold an entire portfolio of SRI funds, but only a minority stake, 
while the rest of the portfolio is not managed according to the same underlying criteria.122 
Furthermore, a deontological investor will need to set a limit or threshold between what is 
considered as being complicit, and what is not (e.g. supplier of parts used by producers of 
cluster munitions). Hence for strictly deontologically motivated investors an assessment of 
costs is obviously not the right approach to determine the boundaries of his or her investment 
universe. Instead this must be based on careful and consistent moral reasoning which may 
eventually result in a considerable narrowing of the investment universe and hence cause a 
certain loss of diversification (see section 2.5.1). 
2.4.2.1.2. PROMOTING CHANGE / HAVING AN IMPACT 
Anecdotal evidence tells us that other SRI investors are more concerned to see a measurable 
or tangible impact from their investment or divestment decision. Investors motivated by such 
a view basically wish to catalyze positive change through their decision (e.g. to improve the 
CR performance of a company).123 This can be aligned with teleological or consequentialist 
ethical theories that point out that the rightness or the moral worth of an action are determined 
by its consequences rather than by its underlying values.124 Examples of investors acting this 
                                                 
119 See Luther et al. (1992, p. 61) 
120 See Kolb (2007, p. 119) 
121 See Hagart in Grene (2008) 
122 See Dunfee (2003, p. 249) 
123 See Schueth (2003, p. 190). As Kinder (2004b, p. 8) recalls, “SRI emerged in the 1960s in North 
America, from two intertwined but distinct motivations: first it sprang from a desire to change the way 
corporations interacted with and affected society. […] Second, it arose from a desire among investors 
to ensure their investments were consistent with their ethics”. 
124 See Cullis, Lewis (1992) 
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way include Sweden’s AP government buffer funds (AP1-4) whose responsible investment 
strategy, apart from generating financial return for its beneficiaries, focuses on driving posi-
tive change in companies associated with violations of international conventions. For this 
purpose, the funds actively engage with companies that have indicated shortcomings with 
regard to a variety of environmental or social issues.125 
In order to make correct ethical choices, such investors need to have a clear understanding of 
the consequences of the allocation of capital. Since their motivation is to promote change, the 
question whether they are acting responsibly ultimately depends upon the effectiveness and 
(cost-benefit) efficiency of an investment to promote change. When they make choices which 
result in the correct consequences, then they are acting responsibly.126 As will be shown in 
more detail in section 2.5.2, SRI investors driven by such a rationale have different options. 
For example depending on the size of the investor or investor coalition they may either avoid 
bad companies or explicitly embrace good corporate practices as such strategies may eventu-
ally create the necessary reputation effects to promote change among their target. Alterna-
tively, investors may also donate to organizations such as NGOs that monitor corporate be-
havior127, invest in pioneering companies or finally, influence firms through different chan-
nels of engagement (e.g. public campaigns or by making active use of their rights as share-
holders). Critics of a teleological perspective argue that it is generally difficult to measure the 
effective impact of SRI on a company or even on society or to balance possible consequences 
of investing in a socially responsible manner as few choices are unequivocally positive. 
2.4.2.2. FINANCIAL MOTIVATIONS: RISK / RETURN CONSIDERATIONS 
Since the early 1960s, classical finance theory considers investors as rational economic actors 
who maximize risk-adjusted financial returns over a given time horizon.128 This implies that 
according to the classic mean-variance analysis of Markowitz the prototypical model of a ra-
tional economic investor cares only about the expected return and risk of their investments 
and aims at an efficient portfolio.129 In line with this theory, Baker and Haslem show in a 
study of decision variables used by individual investors that investment decisions typically 
result from an investor’s expectations about dividends and future returns as well as the firm’s 
financial stability.130 Similarly, in a survey conducted among 500 shareholders, Nagy and 
Obenberger found that the most important criteria underlying investment decisions include 
classical wealth-maximization criteria, such as expected earnings, diversification needs and 
                                                 
125 See Ethical Council (2008, p. 2). The engagement activities in 2007 have focused on issues such as 
the right of employees to sign collective agreements and the adoption of a policy on freedom of asso-
ciation, child labor prevention, adoption of and reporting on compliance with human rights policies, 
improvement in environmental work and greater transparency and guidelines for transactions. 
126 See Dembinski et al. (2003, p. 207) 
127 See Guay et al. (2004) 
128 See Williams (2007, p. 43) 
129 Markowitz (1952) 
130 Baker, Haslem (1974) 
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minimization of risk.131 Hence it could be argued that for these investors criteria such as a 
firm’s environmental track record or ethical reputation play only a role to the extent that they 
affect the risk and expected return of their investment.132 Quoting Beal et al., “if investors 
actually behave as traditional finance theory assumes, [SRI] would exist only because it pro-
vides the opportunity for equivalent return at lower risk or provides higher returns for the 
same level of risk as standard funds”133.  
In fact, various authors argue that institutional investors consider responsible companies as 
being less risky than companies with a lower CR performance, as in the latter case additional 
risks may emerge from changing regulatory frameworks, consumer boycotts, etc.134 Hence, 
for Spicer, investing in a company that is irresponsible could be inefficient compared to a 
responsible company which achieves the same return with a lower level of risk.135 Further-
more, contributing to the solution of social and environmental problems may also open busi-
ness opportunities for proactive companies and generate profits for investors, while ignoring 
these problems could pose risks to profits. Thus, ultimately, rational economic investors may 
end up having a strong incentive to promote higher levels of CR performance by investing in 
SRI. This line of thinking may fit two types of SRI investors. First, investors alarmed by the 
potential costs of certain unsustainable corporate practices or attracted by fast-growing envi-
ronmental technology industries may consider environmental, social or ethical criteria as se-
lection criteria, but not as the motivation itself.136 According to Dembinski et al. such SRI 
investors attach no ethical significance to the act of investing in itself, but assume that com-
panies who respect a certain number of ethical values have a stronger probability of obtaining 
better economic performance than those less strict in this respect (see rational economic in-
vestors described in section 2.4.3.1).137 Second, this disposition also applies to more con-
scious SRI investors that are concerned about harmful corporate practices and that may use 
financial markets as a means to promote ethical values and higher levels of CR to the extent 
that it positively impacts shareholder value. They value CR behavior even if at the end of the 
day they are unwilling to sacrifice financial returns to achieve it (see shareholder value fo-
cused investors described in section 2.4.3.2.3).138 As shown in section 2.5.3, both types of SRI 
investors have different options to engage in SRI. 
                                                 
131 Nagy, Obenberger (1994, p. 64) 
132 See Nagy, Obenberger (1994, p. 64), Statman (2005a, p. 33), Petersen, Vredenburg (2009) 
133 Beal et al. (2005, p. 67) 
134 See Spicer (1978), Graves, Waddock (1994), Cox et al. (2004), Petersen, Vredenburg (2009). 
135 Spicer (1978, p. 96) 
136 See Dembinski et al. (2003, p. 208) 
137 Dembinski et al. (2003, pp. 208-209) 
138 See Rosen et al. (1991, p. 221) 
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2.4.3. TYPOLOGY OF SRI INVESTORS 
As proposed within the previous sections, the assumption that investors care only about the 
financial aspects of their investment is not tenable in reality. In response, different authors 
propose adapting the standard utility function of investor behavior by explicitly inserting an 
ethical performance dimension to reflect the ethical attributes derived from a socially respon-
sible investment decision.139 Using such an ‘enhanced’ utility function, SRI investors could be 
classified based on how they combine profit-making and social responsibility (see Figure 8). 
A first distinction is between ‘rational economic investors’140 that have a standard utility func-
tion (U = f(ER, σR)) and that engage in SRI for purely financial reasons while being indifferent 
about the ethical aspects of their investments (see section 2.4.3.1), and conscious ‘socially 
responsible investors’ that have an enhanced utility function (U = f(ER, σR, e))141 and whose 
rationale to engage in SRI results from a combination of financial and ethical returns (see sec-
tion 2.4.3.2). 
FIGURE 8 – TYPOLOGY OF SRI INVESTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
2.4.3.1. RATIONAL ECONOMIC SRI INVESTORS 
Rational economic investors, who judge SRI exclusively against financial measures while 
being indifferent about the impact of corporate practices, do not derive any ethical utility from 
engaging in SRI. Thus, this group of SRI investors considers SRI only to the extent that they 
are instrumental in the pursuit of their financial objectives. According to Dembinski et al., 
environmental, social or ethical concerns represent only a selection criterion for the invest-
ment portfolio, but not the motivation that inspires the investor’s actions.142 As a 
consequence, such investors attach no ethical significance to the act of investing itself, but 
assume that companies that respect a certain number of ethical values have a strong probabil-
ity of obtaining better economic performance than those less strict in this respect. Hence, they 
favor companies that respect certain values, because this increases the likelihood of reducing 
                                                 
139 See Tippet (2001, p. 171), Beal, Goyen (2005, pp. 73-75), Butz, Pictet (2008, p. 24), Jessen (2009). 
140 Butz and Pictet (2008, p. 8) denote such investors as ‘SRI materialists’. 
141 See Beal et al. (2005, p. 73) 
142 Dembinski et al. (2003, p. 208) 
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risk levels or improving financial returns.143 Applying this distinction, the term 'SRI investor' 
only implies the choice of a distinct financial product or adhesion to a set of criteria bearing a 
certain label, but does not provide any information about the responsibility or the degree of 
ethicality of an investor. In this context Dembinski et al. emphasize that the exercise of re-
sponsibility by an investor cannot be reduced solely to the recourse to a particular investment 
method, or a particular financial product bearing an ‘ethical’ or ‘responsible’ label.144 There-
fore, rational economic investors investing in SRI should not be called ‘socially responsible’ 
or ‘ethical’ investors. 
2.4.3.2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTORS 
In contrast, socially responsible investors or ethical investors are supposed to be truly con-
cerned about harmful corporate practices and the impact business may have on society and 
derive extra utility from investing in an ethical manner. As shown in Figure 8, such investors 
can further be classified into three sub-types depending on their varying disposition to trade 
off financial return against ethical performance.145 First, ethical performance focused inves-
tors are primarily interested in the ethical performance of their investment and are not inter-
ested in the return or risk characteristics. Second, balanced investors are willing to make 
trade-offs between financial and ethical performance but not at any cost. To a limited extent 
they engage in SRI, even if this may be sub-optimal in terms of risk-adjusted returns, since 
higher levels of ethical performance compensate for financial losses. Finally shareholder 
value focused SRI investors, although interested in financial as well as ethical aspects of their 
investments, are unwilling to make such financial trade-offs.146 
A number of studies have tried to track these trade-offs.147 Although different in their meth-
odology and scope, they broadly confirm a limited willingness of the majority of SRI inves-
tors to bear financial losses, which suggests a predominance of shareholder value focused SRI 
investors and attributes only a niche role to investors focused primarily on ethical perform-
ance.148 According to these studies, in most cases their ethical commitment remains highly 
price-elastic, causing SRI investors to reduce their investment rapidly as comparative returns 
fall.149 For example, Rosen et al. found that SRI investors would be willing to forego some 
amount of return on their investment to support social causes, but generally expect SRI to pay 
off as well as any other type of investment.150 Similarly, Sparkes showed that while 35% of 
                                                 
143 Dembinski et al., (2003, pp. 208-209) 
144 Dembinski et al. (2003, p. 205) 
145 See similar typology used by Beal, Goyen (2005, p. 74), Tippet (2001, p. 171), UNEP FI (2007) 
146 Cullis, Lewis (1992, p. 6) 
147 See Rosen et al. (1991), Sparkes (1998), Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a), Statman (2005a). 
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respondents would invest ethically if returns were slightly lower than for comparable conven-
tional funds, this percentage drops rapidly if the return is significantly lower than for conven-
tional investments.151 This also corresponds to the findings of Lewis and Mackenzie, who 
showed that a majority of investors stay with SRI when the return is 8% for an SRI product 
compared with 10% for a conventional investment product. In the case where comparative 
figures are 5% and 10%, the loyalty of SRI investors substantially declines, with 35.8% of 
SRI investors reducing their SRI holdings (see Figure 9).152 
FIGURE 9 – WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT REDUCED FINANCIAL RETURNS TO INVEST ETHICALLY 
 
Source: Lewis and Mackenzie (2000a, p. 184) 
2.4.3.2.1. ETHICAL PERFORMANCE FOCUSED INVESTORS / ETHICAL INVESTORS 
Ethical performance focused investors are primarily focused on the ethical performance of 
their investment and give precedence to ethical over financial considerations following a lexi-
cographic ordering of their preferences.153 A more restrictive definition has been provided by 
Beal and Goyen, who write that this type of investor is eventually completely uninterested in 
the return or risk aspects of their investments and as such the return and risk components from 
their utility function could be removed as they attempt to maximize the ethicality of their in-
vestments subject to any income or budgetary constraints.154 While their description of ethical 
performance focused investors may apply only for very specific groups of SRI investors (e.g. 
NGO activists holding minimum shares to run a campaign at a general meeting ), a wider in-
terpretation may also hold for faith or mission-based organizations, such as churches, founda-
tions, charities NGOs or individuals whose investment decision should complement rather 
than counter personal or organizational values and who may view SRI as a form of charitable 
                                                 
151 Sparkes (1998) in McLachlan, Gardner, (2004, p. 12) 
152 Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a, p. 184) 
153 By lexicographic ordering of investor preferences we mean that investors prefer the fulfillment of 
certain normative values over financial returns. This can be explained by the existence of certain nor-
mative precepts (e.g. the respect of human rights) that are seen by individuals as of great moral signifi-
cance for their personal conduct and consistency. As a result, they become integrated with actors’ eco-
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donation.155 As such they permit only limited trade-offs between their ethical concerns and 
financial profitability and are willing to sacrifice or place less emphasis on financial return in 
their investment decision than other groups of socially responsible investors. According to 
McLachlan and Gardner this “is something that may well be present in a small number of 
hardcore socially responsible investors with stringent principles, but may not be so prevalent 
among less committed socially responsible investors who are willing to apply their principles 
more loosely.”156 Assuming that there is a priori no limit to the expenses one can incur when 
an investment needs to correspond to the investor’s moral concerns, ethical performance fo-
cused investors that follow a strictly ethical objective might risk a considerable part of their 
financial resources in the pursuit of their ethical objectives. Hence for conventional investors 
such as pension funds, which have a legal obligation to meet certain financial objectives, this 
profile is inadequate. 
2.4.3.2.2. BALANCED INVESTORS / ETHICALLY MINDED INVESTORS 
Balanced investors are ready to trade-off financial and ethical performances against one an-
other. As such, they will accept a loss in financial performance for the sake of a higher ethical 
performance in some circumstances, but unlike ethical investors, they will not stand by their 
values at any cost. Beal et al. classify investors that want to achieve close to a market rate of 
return with the additional feel-good factor from the ethical investor label as ‘consumption 
investors’.157 They do not run the same moral dilemmas as 'ethical-performance-focused’ in-
vestors, since their investment decision is also based on financial and not primarily on moral 
considerations. However fiduciary investors such as pension funds applying this run into an-
other dilemma as their propensity to trade off a certain amount of financial performance 
against ethical goals risks the violation of their fiduciary duties. Although pension funds may 
have room for maneuver, such a strategy may turn out more practicable for those funds which 
have made this view an explicit part of their statutory framework (e.g. union or church pen-
sion funds or collective funds with open memberships). 
2.4.3.2.3. SHAREHOLDER VALUE FOCUSED INVESTORS / QUASI ETHICAL INVESTORS 
Shareholder value focused investors give clear precedence to the objective of financial per-
formance over ethical considerations. As such they follow a reverse lexicographic ordering to 
ethical performance focused investors. They are unwilling to trade off financial return against 
the ethical value of their investment, which is why Cullis and Lewis label them “quasi ethi-
cal” investors.158 Similarly to rational economic investors they expect SRI to have returns 
which match other types of investments and therefore seek to identify social and environ-
mental criteria which may affect financial performance and therefore corporate share price or 
shareholder value. They differ from rational economic investors to the extent that they receive 
additional utility from investing in a socially responsible manner. A key implication of their 
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unwillingness to sacrifice financial returns against ethical goals is that companies providing 
SRI products should be aware that such investors will not accept lower returns on their in-
vestment in exchange for social responsibility.159 This probably applies to most pension funds 
interested in SRI, because, they are restricted in trading off financial value for ethical 
performance, while at the same time their beneficiaries may welcome any extra ethical 
benefits derived from investing their retirement capital in line with responsible investment 
standards. The AP1-4 are examples of pension funds reflecting this view. In 2001, the funds 
were assigned to invest their pension capital to achieve the maximum benefit and generate a 
high long-term return at a low level of risk. The funds have the mandate to take account of the 
environment and ethics, but without compromising the overall goal of a high return.160 
2.5. EFFECTIVENESS OF SRI STRATEGIES 
After clarifying what motivates investors who engage in SRI, a follow-up question to be ad-
dressed is to what extent a specific SRI strategy is effective in meeting these underlying ob-
jectives. To answer this, in the following sections we assess the capacity of different SRI 
techniques to meet the investment objectives introduced in the previous sections. Whereas the 
effectiveness of different SRI techniques in guaranteeing non-complicity can be assessed us-
ing simple logic (see section 2.5.1), assessing the capacity of SRI techniques to influence cor-
porate behavior is conceptually more complex and has not been the subject of many studies 
(see section 2.5.2). Finally, the financial attractiveness of different SRI techniques can be de-
rived from financial theory and by reference to empirical research (see section 2.5.3). 
2.5.1. AVOIDING THE RISK OF COMPLICITY 
As defined in section 2.4.2.1.1, a deontologically motivated SRI investor engages in SRI with 
the objective of avoiding being complicit in corporate behavior deemed unethical (i.e. to re-
main ‘ethically clean’161). The effectiveness of SRI techniques in guaranteeing non-complicity 
can be assessed using simple logic as such investors should primarily avoid holding shares of 
companies engaged in activities that are considered problematic. Hence, the effectiveness of 
exclusions or negative screening is relatively straightforward depending on the scope of the 
restrictions applied. A major challenge regarding such exclusion criteria is to define the 
boundaries of the exclusion to retain a certain consistency in its application. For example, 
often such exclusions apply a threshold (e.g. 5 or 10% or more) to focus only on those com-
panies that derive a certain percentage of their revenues from disputed businesses. Also, pro-
viders of such exclusionary screens have to define whether it is limited only to the company 
producing a product or service on which the screen applies directly (e.g. alcoholic beverages) 
or if it should also include other companies involved with the production of a good (e.g. sup-
pliers that derive a certain revenue from the manufacture of products necessary for the pro-
duction of the problematic good, or financial intermediaries involved in the financing of a 
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target company through an initial public offering or project finance). In this light, Simon et al. 
consider it to be hopelessly naive to ensure complete consistency of values, as the intercon-
nectedness of the corporate sector involves the investor in an endless series of arbitrary deci-
sions.162 Certainly, investors that invest through tailor-made mandates are in a better position 
to define at their own discretion the scope of their exclusions in order to meet a certain prede-
fined level of non-complicity. Ultimately, for them it is a matter of financial interest or level 
of economic rationality whether they seek to avoid completely any involvement in a certain 
activity. In contrast investors investing in standardized pooled SRI products have less flexibil-
ity and risk being invested in companies that they would not consider consistent with their 
values.163 Furthermore, passively indexed investors that often hold a broad share of a market 
have clear limits in applying negative screening as an effective mechanism to ensure value 
consistency. 
Positive approaches towards SRI are less effective in avoiding complicity as they provide 
non-complicity in relative terms as the screens usually apply to the overall CR performance of 
a company, rather than to specific behaviors or issues. They therefore allow only for trade-
offs between different CR issues.164 For example, products applying a best-in-class approach 
usually also include investments in leading companies that, although having the smallest im-
pact or footprint in a given sector165, are part of industries that are considered unsustainable or 
unethical (e.g. oil, arms, alcohol, tobacco or nuclear) and that many people would intuitively 
exclude from a SRI portfolio. As a result, often best in class products also combine exclusion 
criteria for certain sectors in order to avoid the worst performing industries. Thematic invest-
ing and integration are not effective in guaranteeing non-complicity, since both approaches 
allow SRI investors to invest in companies that eventually perform badly in terms of certain 
CR issues but which are financially attractive. This can be a serious limitation, as investors 
motivated to ensure non-complicity tend to display preferences for overall high levels of CR. 
Since engagement, by definition, requires the investor to dispose of rights inherent in invest-
ment and ownership, the goal of non-complicity cannot be achieved. Finally, the effectiveness 
of social private equity and community investment to ensure non-complicity with certain un-
ethical practices follows the effectiveness of the screening method applied. 
2.5.2. PROMOTING CHANGE / HAVING AN IMPACT 
As shown in section 2.4.2.1.2, impact driven SRI investors prefer “moral effectiveness to 
moral purity”166. As such, they gain utility from the outcome of their investment and therefore 
are primarily interested in the consequences or the societal impact caused by their invest-
ments. Investors guided by such a rationale should carefully choose SRI strategies that have 
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the capacity to influence companies to improve their CR performance or to promote a better 
societal outcome.167 Whereas the analysis of the effectiveness of different SRI strategies to 
ensure non-complicity has been relatively straightforward, assessing the capacity of SRI 
strategies to influence corporate practices for higher levels of CR or contribute to society at 
large is more complex and has not yet been the subject of many studies. In fact it is relatively 
difficult to check SRI products on their ‘social responsibility’ as measurable ‘social benefits’ 
of SRI strategies tend to be rather vague and the impact of SRI on corporate behavior or sus-
tainable development is hardly ever made evident, nor is it credibly reported on. Nevertheless, 
providers of SRI products and services regularly use this ‘impact-terminology’ in their mar-
keting materials168 to make potential investors believe that by investing in SRI they will make 
a difference by either punishing companies that act irresponsibly or promoting those that act 
in a responsible manner. According to Entine, advocates of SRI referring to this ‘impact-
terminology’ have yet to prove the case that their techniques can effectively promote 
change.169 In the following sections we focus on the effectiveness of the different SRI tech-
niques in generating significant changes in either target companies (see section 2.5.2.1) or by 
contributing to socially responsible objectives in general (see section 2.5.2.2). 
2.5.2.1. EXERTING PRESSURE ON COMPANIES 
SRI Investors may be interested in exerting pressure on companies that pollute or overexploit 
natural resources, violate human rights or undermine social institutions. In theory, they have 
two ways to demand higher levels of CR: either through the possible impact of their invest-
ment decisions on the asset price via the buying or selling of assets (see section 2.5.2.1.1) or 
through directly acting on management by the use of their ownership rights (see section 
2.5.2.1.2). In the following sections we will review these two channels in more detail with the 
objective being to determine which approach is more effective. 
2.5.2.1.1. THROUGH SCREENING 
In the first section we focus on the question of whether investors can influence corporate be-
havior through their investment decisions alone.170 For this purpose, we will assess, by refer-
ring to standard finance theory, whether the buying or selling of an asset has an impact on the 
asset price either through the change in demand (see section 2.5.2.1.1.1) or through the gen-
eration and dispersion of new information about the fundamental value of the stock (see sec-
tion 2.5.2.1.1.2). We presuppose that changing asset prices (together with possible reputation 
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168 See Haigh, Hazelton (2004, p. 69), Hellsten, Mallin (2006, p. 394) 
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effects) resulting from sale or purchase decisions may influence corporate behavior either 
through an effect on executive remuneration packages171 or through impact on cost of capital. 
2.5.2.1.1.1. DEMAND FOR CORPORATE STOCK 
According to standard textbooks in finance, due to perfect substitution of a company’s stocks, 
the demand for stocks is considered as being infinitely elastic as illustrated by the horizontal 
demand curve in Figure 10 (a). In such a situation the efficient market hypothesis suggests 
that the price of a stock is not determined by demand, but by its fundamental or inherent 
value, which equals the present discounted value of expected future cash flows.172 Hence, a 
change in demand for a company’s stock resulting from buying or selling would not affect the 
relative price of the asset due to the dynamics of arbitrage. Accordingly any investment or 
divestment based on SRI screening would not have an impact on the price of the stock and 
would consequently prove inadequate to influence corporate behavior.173 This is because any 
selling or buying pressure that causes the price to deviate from its fundamental value repre-
sents a profitable trading opportunity that indifferent market participants would immediately 
arbitrage on.174 Hence, the inclusion or exclusion of companies will simply end up in a reallo-
cation of asset ownership between SRI investors and indifferent investors without any lasting 
effect on the share price.175 
FIGURE 10 – SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF A GIVEN COMPANY’S STOCK (1) 
(a) Infinitely elastic demand curve   (b) Downward sloping demand curve 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Munnell and Sundén (2004, p. 9) 
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neration packages (see Petersen, Vredenburg (2009, p. 1)). 
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The above argument however assumes that there is a liquid market situation where there is 
always a marginal investor to benefit from arbitrage and to purchase the stock at its present 
value.176 Evidence however suggests that demand curves for corporate stocks are somewhat 
downward sloping, as illustrated in Figure 10 (b) and hence due to limited arbitrage, shifts in 
demand for a given stock may have an impact on the price of the stock. For example, Shleifer 
showed that the inclusion of companies in an index such as the Standard & Poor's 500, al-
though not conveying any new information about changes in the fundamental value of the 
company, has the capacity to affect a company’s share price as fund managers automatically 
purchase such stocks to track the index. To the extent that the inclusion in an index does not 
contain any new information about the fundamental value of the stock, changes in stock prices 
can only be explained by a shift in the downward sloping demand curve.177 It can be argued 
that the more arbitrage is limited, the lower the price elasticity of the demand for an individual 
asset (i.e. the more the demand curves slopes down) and the more the argument that shifts in 
demand for assets can affect asset prices becomes plausible. Accordingly, the key question for 
analyzing the effectiveness of screening methods is how effective arbitrage can be expected to 
be on the market segment where the screening is applied. In this context, critics still consider 
the SRI movement as being too marginal to create any lasting effect on the share price of 
firms since the demand curve is very elastic even if not perfectly elastic.178 In fact, some rare 
event studies (see Table 7) showed that there is no effect in this direction. Other authors, al-
though not testing it empirically, expect screening to have an impact on a company’s share 
price in cases where larger investors or a powerful investor coalition simultaneously screen a 
certain stock from their portfolios179 and / or in cases where the liquidity of the market is se-
verely restricted (i.e. private equity, micro-credit or possibly small capitalization stocks).180 
TABLE 7 – ARTICLES EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF ASSET SELECTION ON ASSET PRICES 
# Authors Title of study Subject of analysis Finding 
1 Teoh, Welch, 
Wazzan (1999) 
The effect of socially activist investment 
policies on the financial markets: evidence 
from the South African boycott 
Effects of a divestment cam-
paign by companies doing 
business in South Africa 
No price effect 
2 Di Bartolomeo 
(2000) 
A view of tobacco divestiture by CalSTRS Effects of the divestiture of 
tobacco stocks by CalSTRS 
No price effect 
Source: Own illustration based on Mercer (2009) 
                                                 
176 See Maug (1998, p. 66), Statman (2000, p. 36), Müller (2002, p. 29), Rivoli (2003). 
177 Shleifer (1986), see also Scholes, (1972, p. 182), Statman (2000, p. 36). Similar price effects could 
also occur in cases where companies are included or excluded from major SRI indexes such as the 
DJSI or the FTSE4good. To the extent that many SRI products are licensed on the basis of these in-
dexes, it is fair to assume that a company's listing in such indices automatically attracts additional 
demand from SRI investors. However, in this case it is difficult to determine whether the resulting 
price effects are a consequence of the change in the demand or the result of the information about the 
firm’s CR performance. 
178 See Statman (2000, p. 36). 
179 See Rudd (1981, p. 57), Perks et al. (1992, p. 44), Webster in Lewis, Mackenzie (2000b, p. 216), 
Gay, Klaassen (2004, p. 3), Munnell, Sundén (2004, p. 14), Hong, Kacperczyk (2009, p. 2) 
180 See Maug (1998, p. 66) 
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2.5.2.1.1.2. INFORMATION ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUE OF THE ASSET 
Another channel to influence asset prices through screening refers to changes in market in-
formation about the fundamental or intrinsic value of the asset that result from an investor’s 
decision to buy or sell. According to Fama, in an efficient market security prices always fully 
reflect all available information and instantly change to reflect new information.181 Hence, 
according to theory, it is impossible to systematically beat the market (i.e. purchase underval-
ued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices) on the basis of existing information. Fama distin-
guishes between three subsets of the efficient market hypothesis. The weak form asserts that 
all past market prices and data are fully reflected in the price of securities.182 The semi-strong 
form asserts that all publicly available information is fully reflected in the asset prices. Under 
this assumption, fundamental analysis is of no use in earning excess returns. However, ac-
cording to Mackey et al. this does not mean that the value of a stock always equals its funda-
mental value, as there may be a great deal of insider information about the value of the as-
set.183 Finally, the strong form asserts that all information (including insider information) is 
reflected in the price of a stock. As for other forms of active investments, the weak-form effi-
ciency is a necessary condition for positive forms of SRI including ESG integration to exist. 
FIGURE 11 – SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF A GIVEN COMPANY’S STOCK (2) 
New information under efficient market conditions (i.e. infinitely elastic demand) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Munnell and Sundén (2004, p. 9) 
As shown in the previous section, if arbitrage functions perfectly asset prices can change only 
as a result of the receipt of new information (see Figure 11). Hence a second channel to im-
pact the price of a corporate stock through either negative or positive screening refers to its 
capacity to generate and diffuse new information, which is indicative of a mispricing gap be-
tween the fundamental values of assets and their prices. For example, the publication of either 
negative or positive CR information through rating agencies or analysts that evaluate the CR 
                                                 
181 Fama (1970, p. 383) 
182 As for other forms of active investing, the weak form of the efficient-market hypothesis is a neces-
sary condition for integrated valuation of ESG factors. In contrast, in a situation of semi-strong-form 
market efficiency, where asset prices adjust instantaneously to all new publicly available information, 
fundamental analysis on ESG factors would not be able to systematically produce excess returns. 
183 See Mackey et al. (2007, p. 820) 
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performance of firms may well trigger negative or positive stock market reactions. In cases 
where SRI indexes such as the FTSE4Good index series or the Dow Jones Sustainability In-
dex (DJSI) series select or deselect companies on the basis of an analysis of a variety of CR 
criteria, being a constituent of such indexes signals a sound CR performance to the market 
(i.e. a proxy for good management) whereas dropping out of the index could be interpreted 
negatively.184 In principle, such information can lead the demand curve to shift as shown in 
Figure 11, since new information may become incorporated by investors into their valuation 
of an asset’s future free cash flows and / or financial risk.185 Thus, rating agencies, data pro-
viders and / or analysts may have an impact on a company’s share price to the extent that they 
generate, process and diffuse raw ESG information which, contrary to conventional financial 
data, is often of only limited quality and comparability and whose accessibility is often re-
stricted due to the lack of quality research and tools. The valuation or ESG integration of such 
information by investors can, at least in principle, be seen to contribute to the generation and 
diffusion of new information, even when at the end of the day they have not directly produced 
the information themselves. The effectiveness of this approach to influence prices then de-
pends on the size of the SRI movement that factors such information in their stock valuation. 
In contrast, simple exclusions of companies based upon existing information about the iden-
tity of the market in which the company operates (e.g. exclusion of an arms manufacturer) 
conveys essentially nothing new about the fundamental value of the respective assets. This 
holds also for positive assets selected from an existing investment universe incorporating only 
companies that perform relatively well on some (arbitrarily) weighted CR benchmark. As-
suming that in both situations all of these criteria are public information, the sole decision by 
an investor to screen a company’s stock against these criteria will not generate any new in-
formation about the fundamental value of the assets and hence will not have the capacity to 
influence share prices.186 However, it could be argued that in certain cases screening decisions 
may still serve as a means to influence the management of a firm mainly for larger institu-
tional investors when they signal their discontent (satisfaction) about certain corporate prac-
tices thereby causing public awareness and reputation risks for the business under considera-
tion.187 According to Shleifer, in cases where major asset owners offer to sell (buy) a large 
                                                 
184 See Sparkes, Cowton (2004, p. 5), Ziegler (2009, p. 7). According to Adam and Shavit (2008, p. 
901) these ratings do not provide incentives to firms excluded from the SRI indices to invest in CSR. 
Curran and Moran (2007) show that there is a trend towards positive and negative announcements 
having the expected effects on daily returns. These movements are not significant however and the 
data do not suggest that a firm's presence on the index brings it any significant financial return for 
signaling its CR practices. 
185 Integrated valuation of ESG factors, by its very definition (see section 2.3.3), is about integrating 
ESG information into the estimated value of companies. This may include ESG information such as a 
company’s CO2 footprint, human rights controversies, employee churn rates, etc. which may impact 
the company’s fundamental value (i.e. through various channels such as enhanced resource competi-
tiveness, litigation costs, employee motivation, customer boycotts, emerging government regulation 
(i.e. global market for CO2) or fines), see Cox et al. (2004, p. 29). 
186 Schepers, Sethi (2003, p. 26) 
187 See Shleifer (1986, p. 579), Schwartz (2003, p. 209) 
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block of assets for whatever reason, this may suffice to signal bad (good) news about the 
stock (i.e. presuming insider information188), eventually resulting in a price decrease (in-
crease).189 For example, given the huge size of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund 
(NGPF) with about USD 400 billion IA as of 2010, Clark and Monk conclude that the process 
of ‘naming and shaming’ by the fund can make headlines around the world.190 Such actions 
may eventually create similar reputation effects, as in the case of well-orchestrated consumer 
boycotts and create pressure among the management to change their practices. Depending on 
the nature of the company, the management of a firm may have a higher propensity to respond 
to this sort of negative publicity. Anecdotal evidence of this comes from by Jeanett Bergan, a 
SRI adviser at KLP who reported that a company that excluded by KLP contacted the firm to 
ask what they could actively do to improve the situation and possibly reverse the exclusion.191 
2.5.2.1.2. THROUGH SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
As defined in section 2.3.4, shareholder engagement refers to investors exercising the rights 
inherent in investment and ownership to directly influence the management of a firm. 
Whereas mechanisms to influence companies through asset selection seem less obvious and 
unlikely to be effective in most cases, shareholder engagement via equity ownership repre-
sents a relatively straightforward approach.192 As a starting point, investors have to hold 
shares in companies that give them the right (or the responsibility in cases where a fiduciary 
has to maximize shareholder value for its beneficiaries) to raise concerns with the company's 
management or the board.193 They can do so through different channels involving varying 
levels of communication. These channels may range from discussions behind closed doors, to 
more public forms of interaction such as exercising voting rights or filing or co-filing of 
shareholder resolutions at the firm's annual shareholder meeting. 
It is generally difficult to evaluate the success of different forms of shareholder engagement, 
as there is only limited transparency on their impact and also no clearly defined criteria of 
success. In many cases the effectiveness of shareholder engagement cannot be assessed sim-
ply because investors prefer to conduct informal discussions behind closed doors rather than 
publicly filing shareholder resolutions.194 Changes in corporate behavior can also rarely be 
attributed to a single engagement effort, as shareholder engagement by an investor is often 
part of a wider campaign also including actions by other stakeholders.195 Related to that com-
                                                 
188 The market may perceive institutional investors as possessing more information than individual 
investors. According to Munnell and Sundén (2004, p. 9), “if potential purchasers believe that the 
seller is disposing of the stock because he knows something adverse they do not, they will revise down 
their assessment of the stock’s value, and the transaction will reduce the price of the stock.” 
189 Shleifer (1986, p. 579), see also Haigh, Hazelton (2004, p. 64) 
190 See Clark, Monk (2009, p. 2) 
191 See Stewart (2008) 
192 See Lewis, Mackenzie (2000b), Gay, Klaassen (2004, p. 3) 
193 See Smith (2005, p. 58) 
194 See Logsdon, Van Buren (2009, p. 354) 
195 See Sparkes, Cowton (2004, p. §581ff), Tkac (2006, p. 13), Rojas et al. (2009) 
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panies also barely disclose or admit that changes were due to pressure from external stake-
holders in order to avoid creating a precedent. Possible criteria of success can be measured 
when shareholder proposals receive a high ratio of votes or if management takes the action 
requested.196 However, such criteria have clear limits. As Tkac shows, there is no clear-cut 
relationship between the vote percentage and the likelihood of subsequent corporate action in 
the U.S. as companies are not bound to implement a shareholder proposal even if it receives a 
majority vote. Also if the management of a company does not change its policies or practices 
this does not mean that the engagement effort by the shareholders had no impact.197 Accord-
ing to Proffitt and Spicer, in cases where no immediate effects can be observed or where 
shareholder proposals have been withdrawn198 this does not mean that engagement has been 
unsuccessful, as the result from these activities may only become discernible over years or 
even decades.199 Such seemingly unsuccessful engagement activities may serve as a catalyst 
for an evolution of expectations and thereby provide the foundation for future change. 
TABLE 8 – ARTICLES ON THE CAPACITY OF SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT TO IMPACT MANAGEMENT 
# Authors Title of study Subject of analysis Measure of success Finding 
1 Smith 
(1996) 
Shareholder activ-
ism by institutional 
investors: evidence 
from CalPERS 
Governance focused 
shareholder activism 
by CalPERS from 
1987 - 1993 
Success rate of achiev-
ing desired changes in 
governance structures 
Effectiveness depends upon 
type of resolution. Takeover-
related resolutions have lower 
success rates than perform-
ance-related resolutions 
2 Del 
Guercio, 
Hawkins 
(1999) 
The motivation and 
impact of pension 
fund activism 
Governance focused 
shareholder proposals 
filed by pension funds 
in the U.S. from 1987 
- 1993 
If managers of firms 
make significant 
changes in policies or if 
proposal mobilizes 
support for further 
governance activity  
Pension funds are more suc-
cessful at promoting change 
in target firms than previously 
recognized 
3 Tkac 
(2006) 
One proxy at a time: 
pursuing social 
change through 
shareholder propos-
als 
US social shareholder 
proposals from 1992 - 
2002 
Final disposition of the 
proposals and if the 
firm meets the requests 
for action 
The total impact is difficult to 
measure but is probably larger 
than the estimates suggest 
4 Klein, Zur 
(2006) 
Entrepreneurial 
shareholder activ-
ism: hedge funds 
and other private 
investors 
Shareholder proposals 
in U.S. publicly 
traded firms, filed 
from 2003 - 2005 
If management acqui-
esces to demands as 
articulated in the initial 
proposal 
High success rate  
5 Rojas et 
al. (2009) 
Bringing about 
changes to corpo-
rate social policy 
through shareholder 
activism 
US social shareholder 
proposals from 1997 - 
2004 
n.s. Shareholder proposals have 
limited but not negligible 
capacity to change corporate 
policies and practices 
Source: Own illustration based on Mercer (2009), non-exhaustive list 
                                                 
196 Del Guercio, Hawkins (1999, p. 307) 
197 See Sparkes, Cowton (2004, p. 7), Tkac (2006, p. 14) 
198 Rojas et al. (2009, pp. 9-10) show that proposals can be withdrawn by shareholders for a number of 
reasons (e.g. due to limited anticipated support or due to concessions preemptively offered by the 
management to avoid voting on a resolution). 
199 See Proffitt, Spicer (2006) in Rojas et al. (2009, p. 2) 
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Despite the difficulties in measuring the impact of shareholder engagement, there is some 
evidence that in the past engagement on governance, environmental or social issues has been 
effective in terms of promoting change among target firms (see Table 8). In particular, these 
studies suggest that the growth of active ownership on specific issues had an impact on man-
agers’ perception about the relevance of these concerns.200 To the extent that SRI IA have 
grown considerably in the past and awareness among corporate executives for the materiality 
of CR issues has increased201, the ability of SRI investors to directly act on companies or even 
instruct corporate executives as majority owners has grown. In this regard Sparkes and 
Cowton write that executives “take notice of their most powerful investors, and if those inves-
tors are embracing SRI in some way, social issues will inevitably find a significant place on 
the corporate agenda.” Rivoli writes that “in general, shareholder support for social policy 
resolutions has been too small to garner a voting majority, but too large for management to 
ignore”.202 
2.5.2.1.2.1. DETERMINANTS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Various factors may enhance the effectiveness of shareholder engagement. In addition to 
characteristics inherent to the target firm (e.g. brand value, responsiveness of management 
with regard to CR issues, ownership structure) or the quality of the shareholder rights attrib-
uted by the legal regime, there are also different factors inherent to the engagement process or 
the activist shareholder which determine whether an engagement strategy is ultimately suc-
cessful or not. An apparently important prerequisite for success is that shareholders dispose of 
a sufficient holding of the respective company’s assets in order to attract the attention of the 
company and to back-up the legitimacy of their request.203 This assumes that shareholders 
owning a large fraction of the outstanding shares of a firm are better positioned to exercise 
pressure on management to promote change than investors with a smaller share.204 Sparkes 
and Cowton state that it has been the growth in pension assets in the past that has endowed 
pension funds with the power to request, and if necessary instruct, corporate executives to 
take account of environmental, social and corporate governance aspects.205 Especially in the 
U.S., where pension funds reportedly jointly own over 50% of all public equity206, share-
holder engagement has been associated with prominent activist pension funds such as 
                                                 
200 See Rivoli (2003, p. 274), Sparkes, Cowton (2004). According to Rivoli (2003, p. 274), since the 
mid-1990s, approximately 250 to 300 shareholder resolutions related to social/ethical issues have been 
introduced by shareholders each year [in the U.S.]. 
201 See Bielak et al. (2007). In a survey conducted by Accenture (2010) among 750 CEOs of compa-
nies that are signatories of the UN Global Compact, 96% of the CEOs believe that sustainability issues 
should be fully integrated into the strategy and operations of a company. This figure increased from 
72% in 2007. 
202 Rivoli (2003, p. 275) 
203 See Davis, Steil (2001, p. 22). According to Tkac (2006, p. 14), in the U.S. there is no relationship 
between the vote percentage and the likelihood of subsequent corporate action as corporations in the 
U.S. are not bound to enact a shareholder resolution even if it receives a majority vote. 
204 See Pound (1992, p. 67), Ryan, Schneider (2002). 
205 Sparkes, Cowton (2004, p. 5) 
206 See Hebb (2006, p. 387) 
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CalPERS207, the California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS) or the New York 
based Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America – College Retirement Equities 
Fund (TIAA-CREF).208 However, apart from these prominent examples, due to passive index-
ing strategies the size of the corporate holdings by individual pension funds often end up be-
ing rather small, thereby restricting their voting power considerably (see section 4.2.5). There-
fore, in order to enhance the effectiveness of their shareholder engagement efforts, pension 
funds may have strong incentives to coordinate their interests by collaborating with other in-
vestors.209 
Another important determinant of the effectiveness of shareholder engagement refers to the 
type of request. According to Mackey et al., as a profit maximizing entity, a company will 
most likely be willing to change its practices to the extent that a proposed change will in-
crease its market value.210 Accordingly, shareholders acting as rational economic investors by 
pursuing shareholder wealth maximization goals (i.e. showing that there is a business case for 
the changes proposed) are more likely to succeed. This suggests that the choice of issues on 
which the shareholder focuses should be guided not only by ethical considerations, but also by 
operational and financial aspects and ultimately by shareholder wealth maximization goals.211 
Barber as well as Rojas et al. claim that shareholders that can show strong theoretical and em-
pirical evidence that the proposed reforms will increase shareholder value provide incentives 
to managers to concede concessions.212 In line with this argument, one could further suggest 
that the identity of shareholders may play a role. For example mainstream shareholders such 
as pension funds that tend to pursue a business imperative may turn out to be more effective 
than mission or values-based investors. This is because the latter may be expected to promote 
activities that have the potential to reduce the present value of a firm’s cash flows, thereby 
eventually also accepting a decline in the value of the targeted firm.213 For example, NGOs 
that acquire only a limited number of shares in a company for the purpose of confronting the 
management via company-related public forums may turn out to be less effective simply be-
                                                 
207 See Smith (1996) and Barber (2006) for an analysis of CalPERS’ shareholder activism. 
208 Kinder (2004a, p. 16) 
209 According to Perks et al. the SRI movement is potentially a powerful coalition of interest particu-
larly if it includes substantial institutional investors such a pension funds (1992, p. 61). 
210 Mackey et al. (2007, p. 831), see also Smith (1996, p. 239) 
211 This suggests that governance related proposals are more successful than proposals relating to envi-
ronmental or social concerns. 
212 See Barber (2006, p. 21), Rojas et al. (2009, p. 4). For example, for the U.K. based asset manager 
Insight Investment which has engaged with companies on a wide range of social, environmental and 
ethical issues, a principal factor that guides its selection of engagement topics includes the materiality 
or business relevance of a particular issue to companies or sectors in which Insight invests (Insight 
Investment, 2009a). 
213 See Gordon, Pound (1993), Del Guercio, Hawkins (1999, p. 295) Sparkes, Cowton (2004, p. 7), 
Tkac (2006, p. 2) or Mackey et al. (2007, p. 818). The same may also hold for universal owners (see 
section 4.2.4) who take a portfolio view when engaging with a particular company that causes nega-
tive externalities. As such, the outcome of the engagement activity may be to the detriment of a tar-
geted company, but at the same time value enhancing for the total portfolio of the universal investor. 
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cause they do not have any financial interest in the companies they invest in and hence have 
only limited capacity to gather support from other shareholders.214 
Another factor that may enhance the effectiveness of shareholder engagement concerns the 
existence of a comprehensive engagement framework that allows for the gradual escalation of 
pressure on the target company. This is best summed up by the example of FairPensions, 
which states that the different stages of shareholder engagement are less effective in isolation. 
“For example, engagement has more influence if there is the option to exercise a relevant 
vote, and voting has more impact if it is associated with communication to explain concerns. 
The ultimate sanction of selling a share may be necessary if the risk is sufficiently large and 
the company unresponsive".215 According to Rivoli, it is common that at the beginning of the 
engagement activities SRI investors conduct informal dialogue with the firm.216 Some funds 
do this behind closed doors, whereas others provide detailed reports on their engagement ac-
tivities right from the beginning. An example of the former concerns APG, the asset manager 
and administrator of the large Dutch pension fund for employers and employees in the Dutch 
government and the educational sector (ABP), which does not initially reveal the names of the 
companies they approach. According to APG, they are in a better position to exercise their 
influence on management within a relationship of trust. "We don’t think that as a first step 
making the names of the companies public will help us to build that trust and to get a com-
pany into a constructive discussion with us.”217 In contrast, AP1-4 have taken a more trans-
parent approach by publishing a list of the companies they are in talks with (i.e. that may be 
used by other investors as a reliable blacklist) as well as outlining progress on the discus-
sions.218 In their annual report the Ethical Council of the buffer funds states that: “Our en-
gagement in a company can also make other companies in the same industry review their pro-
cedures and strategies for acting responsibly. [The Ethical Council] wants to disseminate in-
formation about and establish an understanding of the work we are doing. We have therefore 
chosen to publicize the names of the companies with which we are currently conducting an 
active dialogue and the objectives we want to achieve in each individual case.”219  
Which strategy is more effective is difficult to determine; however, the success of such dia-
logues will be enhanced by including a credible threat to disclose details to the public in cases 
where the outcome of the dialogue is limited. Also both strategies are likely to be more effec-
                                                 
214 See Sparkes, Cowton (2004, p. 7), McLachlan, Gardner (2004, p. 14) 
215 FairPensions (2008, p. 8) 
216 Rivoli, (2003, p. 275) . Regional differences in engagement activities also exist. For example, 
whereas in the U.K. the focus is more on informal dialogue, in the U.S. activities by shareholders are 
more public and also include the issuing of proxy resolutions. 
217 See Bandel (2008a) 
218 See Wheelan (2008b). According to Barber (2006, p. 9) CalPERS originally did not disclose any 
information about targeted companies and information about its engagement activities only became 
apparent when CalPERS formally sponsored a shareholder resolution. In 1992 CalPERS changed its 
approach by publicly announcing its focus list in an effort to apply public pressure to targeted compa-
nies. 
219 See Ethical Council (2008, p. 4) 
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tive in cases where shareholders show their willingness to vote on an issue or eventually even 
file their own shareholder resolution.220 Furthermore, under the specific conditions shown in 
the previous sections the willingness and ability of the shareholder to divest may create fur-
ther incentives for management to consider proposed changes. 
2.5.2.1.2.2. CONTRIBUTION TO THE GENERATION OF NEW INFORMATION 
A special case of shareholder engagement relates to the demand for adequate disclosure of CR 
information. As shown by Amalric, by requiring corporations to disclose such information, 
investors contribute to the generation of public information without directly influencing stra-
tegic decisions.221 This way engagement on issues of transparency may turn out to be an ef-
fective channel to foster the generation and diffusion of market information about the intrinsic 
value of assets with the capacity to adjust asset prices to fundamentals (see section 
2.5.2.1.1.2). According to Davis and Steil, institutional investors in particular seem to con-
tribute significantly to the capacity of markets to mobilize and disseminate such information 
allowing more efficient allocation of resources.222 In fact, in the light of recent corporate 
scandals, Hebb considers such transparency requests as the primary corporate governance 
concern of activist shareholders including pension funds.223 A prominent example of this is 
the request by the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) through which a large number of institu-
tional investors (with combined assets under management of USD 55 trillion as of the end of 
2009) engage with the largest companies (measured by market capitalization) to disclose their 
greenhouse gas emissions as well as details of their climate change strategies including infor-
mation on investment risk and commercial opportunity. The data provided by the companies 
is made available for use by a wide audience including institutional investors and financial 
decision-makers. 
In 2009 a separate CDP report entitled “The Investor Research Project” explored how the data 
is being factored into their assessments by investors. According to the report, 77% of respon-
dents indicated that they take account of climate change information in their investment deci-
sions and asset allocations. Moreover, more than 80% of the respondents who do this indicate 
that climate change is a very or somewhat important factor. There was also general consensus 
amongst respondents that the materiality of climate change has been increasing over time and 
it will continue to do so.224 These results show that coordinated engagement by investors may 
have the capacity to generate and distribute new information that is otherwise not publicly 
available. Moreover in the light of the materiality of climate change the generation of such 
information has the capacity to affect the present value of a firm’s future cash flow. 
                                                 
220 See Del Guercio, Hawkins (1999), Amalric (2004b, pp. 9-10) 
221 Amalric (2004b) 
222 Davis, Steil (2001, p. 21) 
223 Hebb (2006, p. 387) 
224 Carbon Disclosure Project (2009, p. 2) 
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2.5.2.2. HAVING AN IMPACT ON SOCIETY 
While the previous sections looked at how SRI investors can impact companies to promote 
higher levels of CR either through screening, ESG integration or shareholder engagement, it is 
suggested that other impact driven SRI investors may have the objective of directly contribut-
ing to sustainable development or society at large.225 For example, a survey among senior 
representatives in charge of the coordination of SRI at Swiss financial institutions showed that 
the concept of sustainable development and addressing social change in investment decisions 
ranks equally with other financial rationale (see Figure 12). Whether higher levels of CR 
promoted either through screening or shareholder engagement automatically lead to a higher 
societal outcome remains unclear. In fact, one could imagine that self-regulation by compa-
nies or industries can turn out to be an effective mechanism to pre-empt the role of govern-
ments and impede more stringent and effective regulatory requirements that at the end would 
be more beneficial from a societal point of view. 
FIGURE 12 – MOTIVES OF INVESTORS IN SUSTAINABLE THEMES 
 
Source: onValues (2008, p. 2) 
In contrast, an effective means for investors to contribute to sustainable development or soci-
ety at large is to act through thematic and community investing or the provision of social pri-
vate equity capital. Since in all these cases investors directly provide organizations with capi-
tal, it could be argued that through this form of SRI, which is increasingly being labeled as 
impact investing, investors have a direct effect on the corporate and organizational landscape 
within an economy. 
2.5.3. GENERATING FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Barbara Krumsiek, President and CEO of Calvert and co-chair of the UNEP FI, describes SRI 
as a form of investment that not only helps to build a sustainable future and enhance quality of 
life, but also as one that earns competitive returns.226 In contrast, others argue that those who 
                                                 
225 See Wen (2009, p. 308), Beal et al. (2005, p. 71), Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a). While the promotion 
of CR activities could be considered as a vehicle for social change (Amalric, Hauser (2004a, p. 1) 
define CR activities as activities “that lead a company to contribute to society beyond the goods and 
services it produces, the employment it provides, and the returns on investments it generates.”), the 
exact contours of promoting sustainable development through specific CR activities is less clear. 
226 Krumsiek (2010), see also Moskowitz (1972), Luck, Pilotte (1993), Bauer et al. (2002), Derwall et 
al. (2005). 
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invest in SRI often pay a performance penalty for doing so, for example by reducing the op-
portunity set, which could result in a suboptimal risk-return profile.227 Again other findings 
are inconclusive to the extent that there is no statistically significant difference in the financial 
performance of SRI compared to conventional benchmarks.228 While these contradictory find-
ings partly result from operational, methodological and sample-specific differences, they are 
also a direct consequence of the multifaceted approaches to SRI introduced in the previous 
sections. For example, many studies investigate the performance question by focusing on a 
single approach (e.g. negatively screened or best in class products), which may lead to appar-
ently contradictory results. Other studies take a broader view by examining SRI funds in gen-
eral, without controlling for the underlying technique applied, which ultimately results in 
comparing apples and oranges. For example, although Luther et al. found some weak over-
performance for U.K. SRI funds, they argue that the approaches pursued by these funds are 
too varied (certain funds apply an exclusion strategy, while some prefer positive screening, 
and others apply a combination of both strategies) to allow an evaluation of the ethical effect 
on the financial performance of the funds.229  
Thus, in order to answer the question whether SRI is effective from a financial point of view, 
one has to carefully differentiate between varying approaches rather than referring to SRI as a 
one-dimensional concept. In particular, one has to distinguish between traditional forms of 
SRI, which focus on ensuring value consistency in the first place and more modern SRI tech-
niques that are also aimed at achieving competitive returns or even aimed at outperforming 
their conventional benchmarks. Therefore, in the following subsections we differentiate be-
tween norm-based exclusions (see section 2.5.3.1) as well as shareholder value oriented forms 
of SRI (see section 2.5.3.2), including positive screening, ESG integration and certain forms 
of shareholder engagement.230 With the help of basic financial theory and by referring to ex-
isting empirical literature we examine the financial impact of these approaches in terms of 
risk, return and costs. The conclusions drawn in this subchapter with regard to the financial 
effectiveness of different SRI strategies are not dramatic, as one has also to be aware that 
conventional investments have their out and underperformers. Hence it should come as no 
surprise that SRI products are also only as good as their managers and the respective underly-
ing financial analysis. As a result, one can conclude that for SRI as for any other active in-
vestment strategy the challenge is to find the best managers for the respective products. 
 
                                                 
227 See Langbein, Posner (1980, p. 94), Statman (2000), Geczy et al. (2003), Mackey et al. (2007, p. 
831), Stewart et al. (2008). 
228 See Hamilton et al. (1993), Luther, Matatko (1994), Guerard (1997), Hickman et al. (1999), 
DiBartolomeo, Kurtz, (1999), Teoh et al. (1999), Gregory et al. (2003), Bauer et al. (2007), Schröder 
(2007). 
229 Luther et al. (1992), see also Mallin et al. (1995), Cortez et al. (2008). In contrast, Kempf and Ost-
hoff (2007) distinguish in their analysis between different underlying approaches such a negative 
screening and best in class selection. 
230 See also approach applied by Hudson (2006). 
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2.5.3.1. NORM-BASED EXCLUSIONS 
As shown in section 2.3.1, norm-based exclusions or screening constitutes a SRI approach 
where investors exclude certain companies, sectors or regions from their potential investment 
universe. As mentioned earlier, this original form of SRI was the preferred technique by faith 
or values-based investors that engage in SRI with the primary objective of avoiding certain 
corporate practices deemed unethical, rather than to generate long-term financial perform-
ance. In contrast, such values-based exclusions have been rather unpopular among conven-
tional or mainstream institutional investors, for whom this form of investing represents a vio-
lation of traditional investment practices. The main reason for their critique follows from the 
potential loss of diversification that is expected to result from the introduction of norm-based 
restrictions, which according to modern portfolio theory would leave investors with subopti-
mal portfolios in terms of risk-return efficiency.231 It is this argument which typically causes 
mainstream financial practitioners including pension fund trustees to consider SRI to be in-
consistent with their conventional wealth maximization objectives. 
As for any investment restriction, the scope of such a potential diversification loss depends on 
the scope of the restriction applied.232 That is, the broader the screen, the weaker the potential 
diversification of the portfolio. For SRI asset managers this raises the question of how to de-
sign an effective exclusion strategy that meets the values of an investor and also allows them 
to meet their financial objectives. As shown in the previous section, these two objectives often 
contradict each other to the extent that such screens may be designed either more widely in 
order to meet the demand of mainstream investors or more restrictively in order to be credible 
from the point of view of an ethically-oriented SRI investor. A shareholder-value focused 
investor applying an exclusion strategy as a means to eliminate a specific investment risk 
from its portfolio would have to find the tipping point where such exclusion is not material to 
the investment outcome in terms of diversification loss. In contrast, an ‘ethical performance 
focused investor’ who wants to make an ethical statement with his investment strategy could 
go much further. To ensure value consistency such an investor could sacrifice financial return 
by extending the negative screens to suppliers or even financial institutions that provide the 
financing for the production of the screened good or service. 
A further question is how many stocks are needed to construct an efficient portfolio? Accord-
ing to Munnell and Sundén an investor requires only 20-30 stocks to construct a fully diversi-
fied portfolio. Similarly, Entine claims that it should take as few as two dozen stocks to en-
sure diversified performance over an extended period of time.233 Already in the 1980s Lang-
                                                 
231 See Tippet (2001, p. 172), Hudson (2006, p. 82), Geczy et al. (2003) 
232 See Gregory et al. (2003). Using the example of the South African divestment campaign during the 
Apartheid regime, Grossman and Sharpe (1986, p. 6) argue that the magnitude of these costs arising 
from excluding companies from a portfolio depend on the scope of the divestment strategy chosen. 
According to the authors divesting only the stocks of companies not complying with the Sullivan Prin-
ciples had little effect on portfolio characteristics and returns. In contrast a comprehensive divestment 
policy which included all South Africa-related stocks would have had a more substantial impact. 
233 Entine (2007, p. 181) 
59 
 
 
 
bein and Posner wrote that there was debate among financial experts as to the optimal degree 
of diversification. While some believe that careful selection enables the major gains from di-
versification to be exhausted with not more than 100 stocks, others favor portfolios consisting 
of thousands of different stocks, including those sold in foreign securities markets.234 From 
these numbers it becomes clear that due to the large size of the potential investment universe, 
investors will most probably have enough stocks available to construct an efficient portfolio. 
Accordingly, Munnell and Sundén argue that eliminating certain sectors such as tobacco, 
which accounts for about 1% of the market capitalization of the S&P 500, “should leave 
enough securities to construct something very, very close to the market index".235 
Thus, while various authors argue that, if done perfectly, negative screening is probably close 
to costless in terms of diversification losses 236, others add that such strategies may involve 
additional costs in the form of higher management fees, depressed share prices (when selling 
large blocks of assets) or opportunity costs resulting from shunning well performing compa-
nies, sectors or even regions for purely ethical reasons. First, there is a persistent view that 
SRI generally involves higher management fees as information on a company’s CR perform-
ance is usually more difficult to assess and hence more costly to obtain than conventional fi-
nancial data.237 Although any fees from screening will hurt returns, it has to be noted that 
negative screening is a rather low-cost approach to SRI, to the extent that fees from screening 
a portfolio are relatively limited compared to other more research and resource intensive ap-
proaches, such as best in class selection, ESG integration or shareholder engagement. Accord-
ing to Luther et al., it is this low cost characteristic of negative screening that keeps this tradi-
tional form of SRI popular among many SRI investors.238 Second, large block holders divest-
ing a large stake of a company’s assets for purely normative reasons may indeed bear addi-
tional costs from the negative impact on the company’s share price. As mentioned in section 
2.5.2.1.1.1 values-based screening decisions which have the capacity to momentarily cause 
the share price to deviate from its fundamental value represent a profitable trading opportunity 
that indifferent market participants would immediately arbitrage on, leaving the SRI investors 
to bear the costs resulting from a depressed share price.239 In this context Ryan and Schneider 
write that in some cases, investors find themselves in the role of reluctant activists who en-
gage in shareholder engagement rather than selling the disputed assets because of the high 
costs associated with selling their holdings in a portfolio firm.240 Finally, some authors show 
that by excluding companies on the basis of normative values, norm-constrained investors pay 
                                                 
234 Langbein, Posner (1980, pp. 80-81) 
235 Munnell, Sundén (2004, p. 6), see also Drut (2009, p. 9) 
236 See Munnell, Sundén (2004, p. 2), Guerard (1997), Guerard, Stone (2002), Drut (2009) 
237 See Brill et al. (1999) and Gil-Bazo et al. (2008) who find no significant differences regarding fees 
structures between SRI and conventional funds. 
238 Luther et al. (1992, p. 60) 
239 See Johnson, Greening (1999, p. 566), Cox et al. (2004, p. 27) 
240 See Ryan, Schneider (2002, p. 556) 
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a financial cost in abstaining from sin stocks.241 In such situations, attractive opportunities for 
indifferent investors who are not driven by such normative concerns may arise and correctly 
value such ‘sin stocks’. This effect may be greater the larger the group of investors that shun a 
certain sector for purely normative reasons. This has been illustrated recently by a report from 
U.S. pension giant CalSTRS which revealed that by excluding tobacco stocks the fund suf-
fered lost gains of more than USD 1 billion over seven years. As a consequence CalSTRS 
announced that it could no longer justify excluding the stocks on a financial basis and recom-
mended repealing its exclusion policy.242 
In sum, although there are a number of arguments why negative screening may have the po-
tential to negatively impact the financial performance of a portfolio, several empirical studies 
show that investors are still able to add screens to their investment choices without compro-
mising their wealth maximization objectives (see Table 9). In fact, a study by Stenström and 
Thorell, examining the performance of negatively screened SRI funds in the Swedish market, 
showed that such products may even outperform when norm-based screens remove companies 
that do not comply with certain well-established societal standards. Although the findings of 
this recent study are rather an exception and negative screening techniques are mostly found 
to be ineffective in obtaining abnormal returns, it is reasonable to conclude from the existing 
empirical evidence that if done correctly (i.e. not following a radical ethical position) the ex-
clusion of a limited number of companies has very limited financial impact. 
TABLE 9 – SELECTED STUDIES ON THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATION OF NEGATIVE SCREENING STRATEGIES 
# Authors Title of study Period Finding 
1 Grossman, Sharpe 
(1986) 
Financial implications of South Afri-
can divestment 
1984 Financial impact of exclusions depends 
on the scope of the screen applied 
2 Guerard (1997) Is there a cost to being socially re-
sponsible in investing? 
1987 – 
1994  
No evidence of a screening penalty found 
3 Guerard, Stone 
(2002) 
Social screening does not harm per-
formance. 
1984 – 
1997  
There is no significant cost for investors 
from applying exclusion criteria 
4 Geczy et al. (2003) Investing in socially responsible 
mutual funds 
1963 – 
2001  
Cost of exclusion criteria depend on 
beliefs about pricing models and skill 
5 Hemley et al.(2005) Antisocially conscious sectors  1992 – 
2002  
Sin stocks outperform conventional 
stocks 
6 Kempf, Osthoff 
(2007) 
The effect of socially responsible 
investing on portfolio performance 
1996 – 
2005 
Negative screening ineffective to obtain 
abnormal returns 
7 Stenström, Thorell 
(2008) 
Evaluating the performance of so-
cially responsible investment funds 
2001 – 
2007 
Exclusion according to norm-based 
screening can improve performance 
8 Statman, Glushkov 
(2008) 
The wages of social responsibility 1992 – 
2007  
Sin stocks outperform conventional 
stocks 
9 Drut (2009) Sovereign bonds and socially respon-
sible investment 
1994 – 
2008  
SRI screened portfolios of sovereign 
bonds can be built without significant 
diversification loss 
10 Hong, Kacperczyk 
(2009) 
The price of sin: The effects of social 
norms on markets 
1962 - 
2006 
Sin stocks outperform conventional 
stocks 
 Source: Own illustration based on Mercer (2009), non-exhaustive list 
                                                 
241 See Hong, Kacperczyk (2009), Hemley et al. (2005), Statman, Glushkov (2008) 
242 See Wheelan (2010b) 
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2.5.3.2. SHAREHOLDER VALUE FOCUSED FORMS OF SRI 
Contrary to norm-based screening, more recent forms of SRI promote or value higher levels 
of CR in an attempt to create attractive returns for investors. For example, best in class selec-
tion, which involves investing in companies that perform relatively well with regard to certain 
CR criteria while avoiding bad ones, is more economically oriented in the sense that it as-
sumes that in the long run CR leaders will also outperform financially (see section 2.5.3.2.1). 
The same holds for thematic investing or ESG integration, by which investors factor material 
ESG information into their company valuations and trade in situations where flawed valua-
tions are identified (see section 2.5.3.2.2). Regarding shareholder engagement, both values-
based and shareholder value oriented shareholders exist. Whereas the former may well pro-
mote activities that have the potential to reduce a firm’s market value (see section 2.5.2.1.2.1), 
the latter are expected to act upon the existence of a CR business case and corresponding 
changes in market prices and financial out-performance (see section 2.5.3.2.3). 
Prior to analyzing the financial effectiveness of these approaches, this section briefly outlines 
how higher levels of CR may impact a firm’s financial performance and thereby contribute to 
increased shareholder value for investors.243 As in the case of SRI, CR is characterized by the 
lack of a clear-cut or generally accepted definition as academics and practitioners alike have 
provided a wide range of varying definitions over time.244 A useful framework has been de-
fined by Ward, who considers CR as “the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable 
economic development – working with employees, their families, the local community and 
society at large to improve the quality of life, in ways that are both good for business and 
good for development.”245 A key element of this definition is that CR is about the interests 
and expectations of different stakeholder groups, meaning that businesses should not only 
monitor and ensure their adherence to the law, but also to ethical standards and internationally 
accepted norms, as well as the expectations of their stakeholders in general. Thereby, CR 
serves as a self-regulatory mechanism for companies to factor the impact of their activities on 
the environment, clients, employees, communities and other stakeholders. While for many 
this definition is contradictory, with the view that the only responsibility of a business is to its 
shareholders246, Amalric and Hauser counter by arguing that CR is about a company’s com-
mitment to explore and seize opportunities to enhance a firm’s overall contribution to society 
while it pursues its core objective of value maximization for its shareholders.247 It is actually 
this focus on the business case which allows for the differentiation of CR from other non-
profit-seeking corporate activities, such as philanthropy and which is at the heart of Barbara 
Krumsiek's argument that SRI should also be financially sound. 
                                                 
243 These underlying mechanisms also apply to other economically oriented forms of SRI such as ESG 
integration or shareholder engagement. 
244 See Carroll (1999) or Margolis, Walsh (2003) for an overview of the evolution of the concept. 
245 Ward (2004, p. 3) 
246 See Friedman (1970), Crook (2005) 
247 Amalric, Hauser (2004b, p. 3) 
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According to Amalric and Hauser, the foundation of a CR business case comes from two 
sources.248 The first source refers to growing expectations for CR by the immediate stake-
holders of a company (e.g. its clients, investors, employees, public authorities and the public 
at large), while the second source is the prospect that the state will impose new binding regu-
lations. Depending on differing factors, such as the type of company (e.g. its brand value), the 
sector or the country in which it operates, potential business benefits from CR activities may 
arise in various areas such as risk or reputation management249, brand differentiation or hu-
man resources management.250 Correspondingly Ellen Baker states that CR “is an umbrella 
label that covers a range of choices, dilemmas, principles and values. As a result, there can be 
no one business case that covers it – each proposed course of action requires its own rationale, 
will carry with it a degree of judgment, and will require skill in execution in order to achieve 
success.”251 This lack of a single business case for CR is also reflected by the fact that con-
trary to conventional financial reporting, there is no uniform standard or methodology for the 
reporting of CR key performance indicators by industry sector. As a result, practitioners in-
cluding investors as well as providers of SRI products or indexes often consider a firm’s CR 
performance as a simple proxy for good management, indicating a certain ignorance regarding 
underlying value drivers. 
Numerous studies have examined this relationship empirically and have found evidence both 
for and against a positive relationship between a firm’s CR performance and its financial per-
formance.252 In the former, regression studies typically support the hypothesis that companies 
with leading CR practices are better positioned to achieve long-term financial outperformance 
than companies with below-average CR performance. That is, long-term value added from 
CR strategies (e.g. investments in security measures to avoid environmental pollution in case 
of an accident) will be greater than the short-term costs.253 Accordingly, proponents of CR 
typically share the view that while in the long-term there is alignment between a firm's CR 
performance and its profit maximization objectives, there may be a trade-off between the two 
in the short-term.254 Hence in their view, corporate managers that focus on quarterly earnings 
                                                 
248 Amalric, Hauser (2004b) 
249 For example a company’s lack of improvement and refusal to co-operate with regard to certain 
environmental and human standards may put the company's reputation at risk, which may then trans-
late into a financial risk. 
250 See Edmans (2010). Cox et al. (2004, p. 29) and Rauschenberger (2001) provide an overview of 
possible long-term linkages between the CR performance and financial performance of a firm. 
251 Baker (2008) 
252 For substantive critiques of these exercises, see Wood (1991), McWilliams, Siegel (1999), Rowley, 
Berman (2000), Margolis, Walsh (2003). 
253 An important contribution in this regard represents a study by Orlitzky et al. (2003) who conducted 
a large scale meta-analysis of 52 existing studies and which provides statistical evidence for a positive 
correlation between CR performance and financial performance across industries and varying study 
contexts. 
254 See Mills et al. (2001, p. 35). Similarly in its 2008 Yearbook, SAM (2008b, p. 20) argues that for 
example, national regulators determined to internalize the costs of externalities, being an unsustainable 
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may see a CR strategy as an unnecessary expense that impacts on current earnings.255 Even 
though that expense may add value in the longer term, in their view the short-term costs of 
action outweigh long-term benefits. Similarly, long-term risks (e.g. looming regulatory fines 
or reputational damage caused by an accident) become less relevant as their vague implica-
tions will mostly be felt only over the longer term and supposedly do not impact the current 
value of a firm.256 However, long-term investors who are required to optimize portfolio per-
formance over longer term horizons257 should exhibit a preference for higher levels of CR, 
because of the compatibility between their investment horizon and the time needed for CR 
activities to materialize.258 In fact, some authors consider the factoring of CR information to 
be imperative.259 
A necessary condition to be satisfied for different trading horizons to play a role is that mar-
kets are inefficient to the extent that current share prices do not reflect all available 
information in a market (see section 2.5.2.1.1.2).260 Under efficient market conditions (where 
prices depend on expected future earnings) the discounted cash flow model states that no 
tensions exist between long-term gains and short-term performance expectations as any 
information on investments or capital expenditures by a firm that affect future earnings (either 
through future cash flow or investment risk) would also affect current share prices.261 Thus, 
under such conditions, trading horizons would not have an effect on stock prices to the extent 
that prices would constantly adjust and reflect long-term risk evaluation in the current stock 
prices through the discounted current value of future cash flows. Froot et al. write that in such 
an idealized world “prices are forward-looking and accurately reflect all this information 
however far into the future. As a result, the announcement of a new investment project, even 
                                                                                                                                                        
company will increasingly come at a cost to the firm, via taxes, fines, or the purchase of emission al-
lowances, suggesting that the trade-off somewhat suffers from short-termism. 
255 This short-term focus of investors creates incentives for myopic behavior on the part of corpora-
tions (see Kochhar, David (1996, p. 74), Bushee (1998, p. 308), Johnson, Greening (1999, p. 566), 
Statman, Glushkov (2008, pp. 5-6), Makni et al. (2009)). The argument is that confronted with such 
short-term oriented investors company managers have incentives to reduce or limit investments in 
projects such as R&D, marketing or CR issues. Addressing environmental or social issues may entail 
foregoing short-term profits. Instead they rather opt for maintaining a short-term earnings target and 
avoid earnings disappointment on the part of the investors (see Graham et al. (2005)). 
256 This was affirmed by a group of U.S. investors being interviewed in the context of the sixth Carbon 
Disclosure Report (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 88) about the use of CDP data in their invest-
ment decisions. While some affirmed that information on the exposure of firms to climate change is 
still part of the general data ‘noise’ that does not yet provide unique or compelling inputs into the in-
vestment decisions of generalist fund managers, other interviewees acknowledged that this view is 
beginning to change as the quality of information improves and the cost of carbon becomes clearer. 
257 A number of studies have shown that corporate ownership by long term investors, including pen-
sion funds and life assurance companies, is positively related to higher levels of CR performance (see 
Graves, Waddock (1994), Johnson, Greening (1999), Cox et al. (2004, p. 27)) suggesting that there is 
a preference among such investors to select companies with a good CR performance. 
258 See Graves, Waddock (1994, p. 1035), Sethi (2005, p. 99) or Hesse (2008, p. 7) 
259 See Mahapatra (1984), Cox et al. (2004, p. 29), Hillman, Keim (2001, p. 127) 
260 See Fama (1970) 
261 See Froot et al. (1991, p. 4), Graves, Waddock (1994, p. 1035), Sethi (2005, p. 105) 
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one that does not pay off for many years, can have an immediate and positive impact on a 
company's stock price, as investors quickly adjust their forecast of future cash flows. Thus, 
there is no reason for traders with short horizons to shun the stocks of companies making 
long-term investments, and no reason for managers to fret over the presence of such trad-
ers.”262 While under such perfect market conditions, there would be no room for active portfo-
lio management, under imperfect market condictions, however, different investment horizons 
of investors may play a role and provide SRI investors with possible trading opportunities.263 
An efficient market is also characterized by investors that have homogeneous expectations 
(e.g. they have identical opinions about expected returns, volatilities and correlations of in-
vestments).264 Again this assumption requires that all investors have both the same informa-
tion and also identical interpretations regarding that information. However, in cases where 
markets do not understand or follow the investment decisions for a CR program, either 
because they do not possess the right information about strategy or prospects, short-term 
oriented investors may again end up considering such a CR program as an unnecessary 
expense which negatively affects future earnings, leading them to withdraw and eventually 
pushing down the price of the stock and providing SRI investors that factor such information 
with attractive trading opportunities. According to Bushee, this information gap between the 
management of a firm and its shareholders may further widen when the latter simply use cur-
rent earnings as a proxy for their trading decisions rather than engaging in fundamental re-
search that would attest to the true quality of such corporate investments. According to the 
author, the underlying information asymmetry between the management of a firm and its 
shareholders could arise especially if investors have short expected holding periods and focus 
on predicting near-term price movements instead of valuing long-term prospects.265 The det-
rimental effect of such short-term thinking may be that the management of the firm has to 
decide whether it should suit the interest of the long-term oriented investors or those that have 
a more short-term view. Managers whose remuneration is closely linked to the development 
of the current share price may have an incentive not to invest in projects that risk negatively 
                                                 
262 Froot et al. (1991, p. 4) provide an example: “Suppose a manufacturing company announces that it 
intends to spend USD 100 million on plant modernization. The cost savings from the modernization 
will not start to accrue for two years, so the current impact on cash flow is negative. However, once 
the cost savings do come on line, they will have a cumulative present value of USD 300 million. If 
market participants understand the nature of the investment, the company's stock should jump by USD 
200 million (the net value of the investment) in value as soon as the announcement is made. Traders 
do not have to hold the stock until the physical investment in modernization actually pays off to real-
ize a gain - even those with the shortest of holding periods benefit from the company's long term in-
vestment”. 
263 See Clark, Hebb (2004, p. 8) 
264 See Sharpe (1964) 
265 Bushee (1998, p. 309) 
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impacting the share price in the short-term even when their main goal is to create long-term 
shareholder wealth.266 
Thus, one can conclude that under the condition of weak form efficiency certain SRI 
techniques may represent an appropriate strategy to identify stocks that are undervalued or 
overvalued, by including CR aspects in fundamental research and earning profits in the long 
term. Correspondingly, the Marathon Club defines long-term investing as a “fundamental, 
research-oriented investment approach that assesses all risks to the business and which has a 
focused discipline of seeking positive returns over the long-term business cycle”267. In par-
ticular, this involves “a proper assessment of all risks, including threats due to the competitive 
environment, the factors of supply and production, labour, technology, regulation, political 
and economic stability, governance, environmental, social and reputation costs”268. As will be 
shown in the following subsections, best in class selection, thematic investment, ESG integra-
tion, as well as certain forms of shareholder engagement all have in common that they factor 
such information into their investment and ownership decisions in an attempt to benefit from 
market inefficiencies. 
2.5.3.2.1. BEST IN CLASS SELECTION AND ESG INTEGRATION 
Regarding potential costs, best in class selection and ESG integration can be considered to be 
similar to the extent that both approaches use sustainability research to identify, integrate and 
manage CR value drivers in the selection of assets, so that under the condition of weak market 
efficiency investors can benefit from mispriced assets. The costs of information gathering and 
assessing and ranking the overall performance of companies according to a long-list of criteria 
are relatively high and have to be covered by sufficient IA. However, in both cases, the pur-
pose of research is to improve the selection of assets. The benefits expected to balance the 
costs of research stem from expected out-performance and possibly also higher fees.269 In 
terms of portfolio risk, best in class products typically select those companies from a broad 
market index that demonstrate leading CR practices within their sector, thereby avoiding a 
priori exclusions of whole sectors from the investment universe. As a result a best in class 
portfolio is usually broadly diversified, involving only a low risk differential with regard to a 
benchmark portfolio and therefore is also suited to being a core investment strategy. Hence, in 
terms of risks, potential diversification losses are not as severe as in negative screening, where 
                                                 
266 Bushee (1998, p. 307) shows that shareholder ownership by short-term oriented investors character-
ized by high portfolio turnover and momentum trading strategies (buy/sell firms with good/bad earn-
ings news) significantly increases the likelihood that managers cut R&D to manage earnings. Simi-
larly, Graham et al. (2005) showed that the majority of managers avoid initiating even positive net 
present value projects if this resulted in falling short of the current quarter earnings. 
267 Marathon Club (2007, p. 5) The Marathon Club is a London-based collaboration of pension fund 
trustees and industry specialists in long-term investment issues. 
268 Marathon Club (2007, p. 5) 
269 One could argue that the effectiveness of these techniques are different to the extent that best in 
class products often use CR ratings as a simple proxy for good management whereas ESG integration 
explicitly searches for the underlying value drivers. 
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whole sectors or regions may be excluded. Similarly, to the extent that ESG integration does 
not exclude specific companies or sectors from a portfolio, there are no diversification losses 
involved with this strategy. Instead, to the extent that ESG integration is about correctly fac-
toring material environmental and social risks into the stock valuation process ESG integra-
tion aims to reduce overall investment risk. 
In cases where ESG integration and best in class selection contribute to the generation and 
diffusion of material information and thereby are effective in changing asset prices, the asset 
manager’s financial performance will likewise be attractive. The more this is so, the more 
timely his actions are relative to those of other investors. If asset prices do not change in the 
short run, financial performance will nevertheless tend to be attractive in the long run once the 
true value of CR activities materializes. Sethi specifies that such forms of SRI “can best be 
characterized as investing in companies that conduct their operations with an eye on causing 
the least amount of harm to the environment and sustainability of our habitat. They are con-
scious of their responsibility to various stakeholders from the unintended consequences of 
corporate actions. In economic terms, these companies minimize negative externalities and 
accentuate positive externalities. [...] Consequently, these companies also minimize future 
financial risks emanating from imprudent or unsafe business practices. Thus, companies con-
ducting their operations in a socially responsible manner should be viewed as comparatively 
better and relatively safer long-term investment choices.”270 As such, both strategies can be 
considered to be forms of active portfolio management, where asset managers try to beat con-
ventional benchmarks by trading on mispriced securities assuming that such information is 
not sufficiently reflected in the company valuation.271 According to Schäfer and Stederoth this 
is analogous to the active selection of attributes such as value, growth, small, mid and large 
cap, certain sectors or regions.272 Hence investors applying this strategy assume that markets 
are inefficient in the sense that they do not sufficiently factor such extra-financial information 
into stock valuations and therefore provide an investment opportunity.273 
Although there are only a few studies that explicitly investigate the financial performance of 
best in class products274, various studies have provided evidence that firms with higher levels 
of CR also outperform financially, which indicates that in certain situations financial markets 
do not sufficiently value this kind of information (see Table 10). For example, whereas Stat-
man and Glushkov find that norm-based screening results in a return disadvantage relative to 
conventional investors, they also find that portfolios composed of companies with strong CR 
records provide a return advantage relative to conventional investors. Similar evidence has 
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271 The assumption is that certain risks or opportunities that relate to a company’s responsibilities are 
completely overlooked by mainstream financial analysts causing the corresponding share price of a 
company not to be fairly valued by the market. 
272 Schäfer, Stederoth (2002) 
273 See Dembinski et al. (2003, pp. 208-209), see Edmans (2010) 
274 For example Derwall et al. (2005) 
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been provided by Moskowitz, Vance, Orlitzky et al., Derwall et al., Kempf, Osthoff, Edmans 
or Hoepner et al. whose findings support the hypothesis that certain CR factors are material to 
company value and hence investors may take advantage in cases where the market has not yet 
caught up with new information. By factoring such information SRI investors contribute to 
the distribution of new material information which results in greater market efficiency. 
TABLE 10 – SELECTED STUDIES ON THE PERFORMANCE OF BEST IN CLASS & ESG INTEGRATION 
# Authors Title of study Period Finding 
1 Moskowitz 
(1972) 
Choosing socially responsible 
stocks 
1972 Firms with higher levels of CR also outper-
form financially 
2 Vance (1975) Are socially responsible corpora-
tions good investment risks? 
1972 – 
1975 
Discusses the relationship between CR and 
corporate performance 
3 Orlitzky et al. 
(2003) 
Corporate social and financial 
performance: a meta-analysis 
meta-
analysis 
CR and to a lesser extent, environmental 
responsibility is likely to pay off 
4 UNEP FI (2004) The materiality of social, environ-
mental and corporate governance 
issues to equity pricing 
meta-
analysis 
There was agreement that environmental, 
social and corporate governance issues affect 
long-term shareholder value. In some cases 
these effects may be profound. 
5 Derwall et al. 
(2005) 
The eco-efficiency premium puzzle 1995 – 
2003 
Mean return of best in class portfolios outper-
forms conventional benchmarks 
6 Kempf, Osthoff 
(2007) 
The effect of socially responsible 
investing on portfolio performance 
1996 – 
2005 
Stocks of companies ranked high on commu-
nity, diversity, employee relations, environ-
ment, human rights and products did better 
than stocks that ranked low 
7 Statman, Glush-
kov (2008) 
The wages of social responsibility 1992 – 
2007  
Stocks of companies with high CR ratings 
outperformed companies with low ratings 
8 Edmans (2008) Does the stock market value intan-
gibles? Employee satisfaction and 
equity prices 
1984 – 
2006  
Employee satisfaction is positively related to 
corporate performance 
9 Makni et al. 
(2009) 
Causality between corporate social 
performance and financial perform-
ance: evidence from Canadian firms 
2004 – 
2005  
Note a significant negative impact of the 
environmental dimension of CR performance 
and the financial performance of the firms 
examined 
10 Hoepner et al. 
(2010) 
Corporate social responsibility 
across industries: when can who do 
well by doing good? 
2005 – 
2008 
CR has substantial value for corporations in 
the health care, industrial and consumer 
discretionary sectors. 
Source: Own illustration based on Mercer (2009), non-exhaustive list 
2.5.3.2.2. THEMATIC INVESTMENTS 
As defined in section 2.3.2.2, thematic or pioneer investing refers to the selection of compa-
nies of the future that derive market opportunities from the wider challenges society faces and 
are expected to be strong in the market by driving performance over the medium to long-term 
(e.g. companies that offer solutions or technologies to address climate change, water scarcity, 
ageing populations, infrastructure, clean technology, forestry, etc.). As such thematic SRI 
products typically have more concentrated portfolios to the extent that they exclude large ar-
eas of the stock market and often focus also on small and mid-cap companies (rather than 
large caps that have only a small proportion of their business exposed to a specific sustainabil-
ity theme). In the past, this strong bias caused thematic products to experience relatively high 
volatility, which qualified them rather for satellite than a core investment strategy. In terms of 
fees, thematic products do not necessarily generate similar costs to those best in class products 
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in cases where no sustainability analysis is involved in the portfolio construction. In contrast, 
where constituents also have to fulfill sustainability criteria, fees could achieve similar levels 
to the best in class products. 
The underlying motivation of thematic investment is to look at areas of the market which are 
the most fruitful to find stocks that will outperform. Assuming weak market efficiency, this 
means that thematic investments focus on structural changes with regard to regulation, tech-
nology, demographics or societal expectations and recognizing companies that benefit from 
these changes can lead to excess returns for investors. As a result of the growing concerns of 
consumers and investors as well as governments on issues of sustainability and the fact that 
these issues will exert a growing influence on the economic performance of companies, the-
matic investments around themes such as clean tech, renewable energy, water, etc. have re-
cently become attractive investments.275 SRI investors identified these themes at an early 
stage and therefore can be assumed to have had a first mover advantage to capitalize on this 
trend ahead of other mainstream investors. 
2.5.3.2.3. SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Because of the potential costs associated with excluding large blocks of assets, institutional 
investors such as pension funds often engage with companies before excluding them from 
their investment portfolio. Obviously such engagement efforts are not free. In addition to the 
costs of acquiring information (which is similar to other SRI forms such as best in class selec-
tion or ESG integration) shareholder engagement also carries the direct costs of interacting 
with companies (e.g. dialogue with companies, participation in a general meeting). These 
costs may be reduced by pooling votes and engaging collectively with other shareholders or 
by engagement overlays where the shareholder delegates his rights to an external manager 
who bundles the rights of many investors and thereby eventually achieves sufficient power to 
influence the management of a firm. Although extra costs may be incurred to compensate the 
manager for his engagement activities, economies of scale will help keep these costs at a 
lower level than if managed by each shareholder separately. On the risk side, there is no loss 
of diversification as shareholder engagement in principle can be offered without requiring a 
change in the composition of portfolios. However in order to become effective in terms of 
improving a company’s practices (see section 2.5.2.1.2), investors applying engagement 
strategies are better positioned when they hold a larger number of stocks of an individual 
company, which in return may negatively impact portfolio diversification. 
As stated by Smith, among other things institutional investors who are involved in share-
holder advocacy for CR and good governance usually petition companies in an attempt to 
preserve long-term shareowner value by promoting companies to adopt good governance 
practices and act as good corporate citizens or socially responsible business entities.276 Thus 
                                                 
275 Typically, thematic products do not compare returns to any specific benchmark as in the case of 
best in class products. 
276 Smith (2004) 
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costs resulting from shareholder engagement may be recovered given careful selection of tar-
get companies based upon the existence of a business case and corresponding changes in 
market prices and financial out-performance as a result of the engagement efforts. As for 
other SRI strategies, diverging views exist regarding the effectiveness of this strategy to gen-
erate increasing shareholder value (see Table 11).277 While some studies find positive effects, 
others argue that there is no long-term financial benefit from engaging with firms. Again oth-
ers even suggest that companies that are being targeted by activist shareholders suffer from a 
decline in the share price due to signaling effects to the market that the management of a firm 
is unwilling or unable to negotiate a settlement with its shareholders, raising doubts about the 
effectiveness of shareholder engagement as a strategy to increase shareholder value. Accord-
ing to Munnell and Sundén, a reason for these diverging findings is that it is generally hard to 
evaluate the success of shareholder engagement strategies using survey data because so many 
factors affect the bottom line.278  
TABLE 11 – SELECTED STUDIES ON THE PERFORMANCE OF ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
# Authors Title of study Period Finding 
1 Smith 
(1996) 
Shareholder activism by institu-
tional investors: evidence from 
CalPERS 
1987 – 
1993 
Finds that shareholder wealth increases for firms 
that adopt or settle issues raised by CalPERS and 
decreases for firms that resist. 
2 Wahal 
(1996) 
Pension fund activism and firm 
performance 
1987 – 
1993 
No evidence of significant long-term improve-
ment in either stock price or accounting measures 
of performance in the post-targeting period. 
3 Gillan, 
Starks 
(1999) 
Relationship investing and share-
holder activism by institutional 
investors 
 There is a significant wealth gain from engage-
ment in the short-term that is not sustained in the 
long-term 
4 Del Guer-
cio, Haw-
kins (1999) 
The motivation and impact of pen-
sion fund activism 
1987 –
1993 
Found no evidence that activism had a significant 
effect on stock returns over the three years fol-
lowing the proposals. 
5 Prevost and 
Rao (2000) 
Of what value are shareholder 
proposals sponsored by public 
pension funds  
1988 – 
1994 
Firms experience negative wealth effects, when 
targeted. Firms, being targeted several times by 
public pension funds experienced permanent 
declines in market value. 
6 Gillan, 
Starks 
(2000) 
Corporate governance proposals 
and shareholder activism: the role 
of institutional investors 
1987 –
1994 
The nature of the stock market reaction, while 
typically small, varies according to the issue and 
the sponsor identity. 
7 English et 
al. (2004) 
The “CalPERS effect” revisited 1992 – 
1997  
Find evidence of some improvement limited to 6 
months from the announcement of the targeting. 
8 Klein, Zur 
(2006) 
Entrepreneurial shareholder activ-
ism: hedge funds and other private 
investors 
2003 – 
2005 
Find that activism benefits existing shareholders 
of the targeted firms. 
9 Barber 
(2006) 
Monitoring the monitor: evaluating 
CalPERS’ activism 
1992 – 
2005 
Estimates the total wealth creation from CalPERS 
activism on focus list firms to be USD 3.1 bn 
10 Becht et al. 
(2009) 
Returns to shareholder activism: 
evidence from a clinical study of 
the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund 
1998 – 
2004  
Abnormal returns by the Hermes U.K. Focus 
Fund are largely associated with engagements 
rather than stock picking. 
Source: Own illustration based on Mercer (2009), non-exhaustive list 
                                                 
277 Typically these studies focus on engagement strategies around corporate governance issues (e.g. 
shareholder rights, executive remuneration). No evidence has been found on the effectiveness of en-
gagement practices around wider CR issues including environmental and social aspects. 
278 Munnell, Sundén (2004, p. 26) 
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Contrary to other SRI strategies such as screening or integrated valuation that focus on asset 
selection, in the case of shareholder engagement, any positive impact on the financial per-
formance of a targeted firm has to be shared among all investors (see section 4.2.5). Thus 
while costs for monitoring and engaging have to be borne only by the activist shareholders, 
benefits are also shared with passive minority shareholders that free ride on the efforts of the 
larger activist shareholder.279 Hence activist shareholders need to hold sufficient assets of a 
company to ensure that their engagement strategy is also effective from a financial point of 
view. 
2.5.3.3. SOCIAL PRIVATE EQUITY / COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS 
From a financial perspective, investments in social private equity only make sense if there is a 
business case for the products developed. Like the differing effects between the two screening 
methods and ESG integration, financial performance will be a matter of chance if the concrete 
business case is merely assumed to exist a priori but not analyzed and valued accordingly. In 
addition, since the financial performance will depend on the fund’s exit opportunities, there 
will be a need to communicate the value created by the investee companies to the investors 
taking over the private equity fund’s stake upon exit. It may also pay to consider network or 
cluster effects that emerge when investee companies’ or organizations’ activities benefit – 
without full compensation – other companies in the portfolio of the pension fund. Clearly, 
pension funds can only consider investments in social private equity and community invest-
ments as a relatively small addition to their overall portfolio, otherwise there would be large 
losses in diversification. 
                                                 
279 See Shleifer, Vishny (1986, p. 462), Monks (1995, p. 2), Froot et al. (1991), Pound (1992, p. 67), 
Barber (2006, p. 5) 
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3. THE SRI BEHAVIOR OF SWISS PENSION FUNDS 
Although there are indications of an increasing participation of Swiss pension funds in SRI, 
only few details are known about their specific SRI behavior and attitudes. This restricted 
picture largely results from the fact that only few pension funds publicly disclose information 
on their SRI behavior, which makes systematic analysis of their SRI practices challenging. It 
could be argued that they are at an early stage in developing a consistent and comprehensive 
SRI strategy and that therefore most Swiss pension funds keep a low profile with regard to 
this non-standard investment practice and abstain from actively communicating with their 
beneficiaries and external stakeholders. This low-key approach is also reflected in the limited 
number of Swiss funds taking a public position on this topic within the UNPRI framework. 
Whereas Swiss-based asset managers play a key role in this field (see Table 13), Swiss pen-
sion funds are mostly absent. As of mid 2009, only two pension funds have signed up to the 
principles out of a total of 182 asset owners (see Table 12).280 In contrast, in countries such as 
Australia, the U.S., Brazil, the Netherlands, Denmark, the U.K. or Sweden, pension funds 
have taken a much more active and public position.  
As will be shown in more detail in chapter 4, at the level of a single pension fund there are a 
variety of reasons to explain why there is greater awareness for SRI among certain funds. At a 
macro level, pension fund regulation plays an important role in promoting SRI practices and 
can be used to explain why in some countries SRI is more prominent among pension funds 
than in others.281 The first example of SRI related regulation targeted at pension funds came 
into force in July 2000 in the U.K. The U.K. Pension SRI Disclosure Regulation required trus-
tees of occupational funds to disclose in their statement of investment principles (SIP) the 
extent (if at all) to which social, environmental and ethical considerations are taken into ac-
count (even if their position is that they do not consider such issues) and to disclose the policy 
(if any) directing the exercise of shareholder rights. According to Lydenberg “this require-
ment has been remarkably effective in prompting pension funds to recognize their responsi-
bilities in these areas”.282 Similar disclosure requirements for pension funds exist in Austra-
lia283, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden.284 In addition, in some countries, public 
funds have been legally required to take account of SRI. For example, according to 
Bengtsson, the rise of SRI among various Scandinavian public pension funds can largely be 
attributed to such regulatory incentives.285 The same holds also for the French Pensions Re-
serve Fund (FRR) the largest public pension fund in France, which has been mandated to con-
                                                 
280 The four asset owners reported in Table 12 include two pension funds (CIA and the pension fund of 
the Cantonal Bank of Zurich) one reinsurance company and one foundation. 
281 See OECD (2007) for an overview of regulatory developments regarding SRI. 
282 Lydenberg (2002, p. 68) 
283 See Rajagopal (2009)  
284 In Switzerland regulation exists regarding the disclosure of voting practices (see article 49a § 2, 
BVV2). 
285 Bengtsson (2008, p. 976) 
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sider ethical criteria in its investment policy. In the U.S. an important factor for the high num-
ber of funds engaging in SRI under the 401(k) framework is that defined contribution (DC) 
plans respond to a growing demand from beneficiaries.286 
TABLE 12 – NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONAL ASSET OWNERS SIGNATORY TO THE UNPRI, BY COUNTRY 
UNPRI Signatories Number of Asset Owners  UNPRI Signatories Number of Asset Owners 
Australia 28  Canada 6 
USA 22  France 4 
Brazil 18  Switzerland 4 
Netherlands 15  Norway 4 
Denmark 15  Japan 3 
U.K. 14  Iceland 3 
Sweden 10  Germany 2 
New Zealand 9  Belgium 2 
Spain 7  South Africa 1 
Finland 7  Italy 1 
Source: List of UNPRI signatories as of July 2009 
A difficulty in gaining a better understanding of the practices of Swiss pension funds with 
regard to SRI relates to the fact that no comprehensive aggregated data exists on their SRI 
behavior. Whereas onValues provide data that give an adequate picture on the supply side of 
the Swiss SRI market, it is not fully instrumental to assess the total assets invested by Swiss 
investors as they may also demand SRI products managed by foreign asset managers. In con-
trast, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO), which publishes a comprehensive survey 
every two years on the Swiss pension market and in which all pension funds participate, does 
not address SRI as a specific subject. The best source of information is provided by 
Swisscanto through its annual Swisscanto Pension Fund Survey (SPFS), which covers up to 
280 funds in its sample and provides a partial view of the Swiss pension market. The first 
version of the SPFS was issued in 1999 and has become established as one of the most recog-
nized annual sources of information on the Swiss pension system.287 The underlying survey 
instrument consists of two sections. A standard section includes questions addressing general 
issues about the pension funds (e.g. name, contact details, legal and administrative form, 
number of beneficiaries), balance sheet information (e.g. assets and liabilities), profit and loss 
accounts (e.g. administrative costs, performance data) and contributions. A second section 
addresses current topics from ongoing political discussions. In the past, this included ques-
tions on pension governance (2007), SRI (2008) or the impact of the financial crisis on the 
funding level of the pension funds (2009). Importantly, since 2002 the survey instrument has 
included a specific question on SRI in its standard section asking for the share of the pension 
portfolio that is invested according to SRI criteria (see Figure 27). In addition to this specific 
                                                 
286 See Social Investment Forum, Mercer Investment Consulting (2007) 
287 See Ammann, Zingg (2008b, p. 6) 
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SRI related question in the standard section, in its 2008 edition the SPFS also contained a 
separate and extensive section on SRI.  
Both the single question from the standard part as well as the specific section on SRI provide 
the basis for our subsequent description of how and why Swiss pension funds engage in SRI 
(see section 5.3).288 To answer these two questions, in this chapter we begin with a general 
review of the Swiss SRI market on the basis of onValues data for the period 2006 – 2009 (see 
section 3.1). To the extent that no comprehensive picture on the SRI behavior of Swiss pen-
sion funds exists, looking at the market from a different angle (supply side) allows for a better 
overall understanding of their role. Based on demand-side data gathered by Swisscanto at the 
end of 2007, in section 3.2 we then explore what pension funds effectively do when they en-
gage in SRI by looking at the specific SRI behavior and attitudes of a restricted sample. This 
rather descriptive chapter is followed by the empirical analysis of the determinants of the SRI 
behavior of Swiss pension funds (see chapters 4 – 6). 
3.1. SWISS SRI OFFERING 
A difficulty in describing regional SRI markets arises from the rather loose definitional 
boundaries for SRI described in section 2.1, which cause considerable problems in the genera-
tion of precise and comparable figures. Regional SRI industry associations such as Eurosif or 
the U.S. based Social Investment Forum (SIF) have made a considerable effort in the past to 
standardize the compilation of SRI data and can generally be considered the best source of 
information. However, it has to be noted that reported figures on the size of SRI markets are 
usually only an approximation and are dependent on the willingness of market participants 
(i.e. asset managers) to disclose such information.289 For the Swiss market, onValues,290 a 
Zurich-based investment consultancy firm provides an aggregation of SRI data since 2005 by 
collecting the information directly from local asset managers via customized data sheets. 
Since the data incorporates only those assets from domestic asset managers participating in 
the survey, onValues suggests that the reported figures should be seen as an approximation 
and that the true volumes of SRI are probably larger.291 
Eurosif considers Switzerland as one of the leading countries in Europe in terms of total assets 
invested in SRI.292 As shown in Figure 13, the Swiss market has continuously grown in recent 
years, reaching a maximum by the end of 2007 with a total of IA of CHF 34 billion, which 
                                                 
288 For a copy of SPFS 2008 see section 8.1. The separate part on SRI is included in sub-section E. 
289 Such reports usually include only assets of those asset managers who are located and managed 
within a country. As such they combine assets from domestic as well as foreign investors managed by 
domestic asset managers but not those that are managed abroad by a foreign asset manager. Further-
more, such reports do not include those assets that are with a domestic asset manager but managed in a 
foreign jurisdiction. 
290 See www.onValues.ch. The same set of data is also used by Eurosif, which aggregates national SRI 
trends on a European level. 
291 onValues (2009, p. 3) 
292 See Eurosif (2008, p. 45) 
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corresponds to an increase of 67% in 2007. According to Eurosif, this growth rate has been 
well beyond the growth rate of the overall Swiss market, positioning the Swiss SRI market as 
one of the fastest growing markets in Europe. In 2008, this trend was reversed by the impact 
of the financial crisis, which caused the SRI market to shrink by 38.7% down to CHF 20.9 
billion at the end of 2008.293 This drop in IA can mostly be attributed to severe corrections in 
the global equity markets as equity is the preferred asset class of SRI products in Switzerland 
(see Figure 15). Interestingly, net sales have proved rather stable, as according to onValues 
asset inflows in existing and new SRI products, particularly in lower-risk broadly diversified 
equity, strategy and fixed-income funds more than compensated for asset outflows that were 
especially pronounced for higher-risk theme funds.294 The relative success of SRI can be at-
tributed to different factors, such as the continuous awareness of investors about corporate 
scandals or issues such as climate change and the view that SRI represents an appropriate 
means to address these challenges. In addition, various sources consider SRI investors to have 
a higher degree of loyalty than conventional investors, which is accentuated in periods of eco-
nomic downturn.295 
FIGURE 13 – SRI IA FROM DECEMBER 1996 TO AUGUST 2008 
 
Source: onValues (2009) 
Despite considerable growth rates over recent years and a strong relative performance during 
the crisis, the market share of SRI products in the overall financial market remains at a low 
                                                 
293 According to onValues (2009, p. 4) conventional fund categories of Swiss providers decreased by 
40.2% year to year, suggesting that SRI still performed relatively well during that period. 
294 onValues (2009, p. 8) 
295 According to Brown (2007, p. 13) there is evidence that SRI investors are more loyal to their in-
vestment choice than the average mainstream investor, citing a study from 1997, which showed that 
SRI investors stayed ‘loyal’ to a SRI investment, even if it performed badly. According to Brown, this 
finding has been confirmed by another survey in 2001 by a U.K. based provider of SRI funds. Fur-
thermore, an investor survey conducted by Citigroup during the market fallout in 2008 reinforced the 
hypothesis that SRI investors are more loyal than conventional investors (see Davis, Tyrrell (2008)). 
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level with only 3% of total IA296, which confirms that SRI still represents a niche market in 
Switzerland. In contrast, in other countries SRI is reported to achieve a much higher market 
share (e.g. 20% in Canada297, 11% in the U.S.298 and above 6% in the Netherlands). 
3.1.1. MAIN PROVIDERS OF SRI PRODUCTS 
According to Eurosif, Swiss banks and asset managers were among the first to offer SRI and 
to develop expertise in this field.299 Today, they are also among the most active in providing 
SRI products and services, as illustrated by the number of signatories to the UNPRI (see 
Table 13). As of mid July 2009, 18 asset managers and 10 professional service partners300 
have signed up to the UNPRI, ranking Switzerland 5th behind the U.S., Australia, the U.K. 
and France. 
TABLE 13 – SIGNATORIES TO THE UNPRI, BY COUNTRY 
UNPRI signatories Asset managers Professional service partners Total 
United States 50 19 69 
Australia 43 16 59 
United Kingdom 35 11 46 
France 24 6 30 
Switzerland 18 10 28 
South Africa 19 4 23 
Netherlands 13 4 17 
Canada 11 5 16 
Brazil 9 2 11 
Sweden 8 2 10 
Source: UNPRI list of signatories as of July 2009 
The main providers of SRI which have participated in the onValues 2008 market survey in-
clude (in alphabetical order): Coop Bank, Care Group, Credit Suisse, Dr. Höller, EPS Value, 
Ethos, LODH, Migros Bank, Pictet, Raiffeisen, responsAbility, SAM, Sarasin, Swisscanto, 
UBS, Vontobel, Zegora and ZKB.301 They can be broadly classified into four groups accord-
ing to their varying commitment to SRI: (i) fully committed SRI specialists like Ethos or 
SAM including, (ii) alternative and niche distributors such as Alternative Bank Switzerland, 
Coop Bank or Migros Bank, (iii) banks with no stock or private ownership structure and with 
a stakeholder-oriented company mission and strong retail client base like Raiffeisen, 
Swisscanto or ZKB and (iv) other banks including large global players such as Credit Suisse 
                                                 
296 Eurosif (2008, p. 11) 
297 See Social Investment Organization (2009, p. 5) 
298 See Social Investment Forum (2007, p. iv) 
299 See Eurosif (2008, p. 45) 
300 This group includes a large variety of SRI service providers such as analysts, investment consult-
ants, risk managers, etc. 
301 onValues (2009, p. 5) 
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and UBS as well as private banks like Sarasin, Pictet and Vontobel. For this latter group the 
SRI offering represents only a small fraction of their total IA (see Table 14). 
TABLE 14 – SRI SHARE TOTAL ASSETS BY MAIN SRI PROVIDERS IN CH 
Name of Asset Manager IA m USD SRI IA m USD SRI as % of IA SRI share by 2010302 
SAM  6‘986 6‘986 100 100 
Ethos 1‘266 1‘266 100 100 
Sarasin & Cie 73‘259 7‘056 9.63 15 
Swisscanto 55‘516 2‘355 4.24 10 
Zurich Cantonal Bank 105‘472 878 0.83 2 
Pictet Asset Management 125‘732 10‘765 8.56 - 
Vontobel 70‘168 1‘942 2.77 5 
UBS AG 2‘814‘656 34‘298 1.22 - 
Credit Suisse 1‘372‘200 2‘194 0.16 30 
Source: Responsible Investment (2008, p. 4)303 
The Swiss SRI market is dominated by a group of committed SRI specialists as well as banks 
with a clear strategic commitment towards SRI and sustainability (see Figure 14). In compari-
son, large universal banks like UBS and Credit Suisse struggle with a relatively low market 
share, which suggests that they are not associated with SRI to the same degree as specialized 
SRI providers and that their expertise in sustainability or SRI is not considered as their core 
competence. In addition, major banks eventually also suffer from a bad image among poten-
tial SRI investors, as they are more likely to be involved in controversial issues and scandals 
(e.g. exposure to subprime lending, excessive executive pay, controversial lending through 
their investment banking arms). Niche distributors such as Alternative Bank Switzerland, 
Coop Bank or Migros Bank accounted only for 3% of the total market volume in 2006.304 
FIGURE 14 – MARKET SHARE OF SWISS ASSET MANAGERS, 2008 
 
Source: onValues (2009, p. 5) 
 
                                                 
302 Expected share of SRI IA by the end of 2010 
303 These figures do not only include SRI IA within Switzerland but also assets held by clients abroad. 
304 See onValues (2007, p. 4) 
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3.1.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF SRI OFFERINGS 
Equity has traditionally been the most important asset class, whereas fixed income plays only 
a minor role and the share of liquidity or private equity-based products is negligible (see 
Figure 15). As a result of the financial crisis, the share of equity-based products has dropped 
significantly, from 83% of total SRI IA in 2007 to 67% by the end of 2008. Accordingly, the 
share of less risky fixed income-based products increased from 11% to 21% by the end of 
2008.305 Asset allocation has become more aligned with average allocation in Europe, where 
by the end of 2007 equity accounted for only 50% of SRI IA and fixed income for 39%.306 
FIGURE 15 – EVOLUTION OF ASSET CLASSES IN SRI PRODUCTS BY SWISS-BASED ASSET MANAGERS 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
The majority of SRI is invested in mutual fund products, which account for approximately 
CHF 12.2 billion, representing 59% of the total by the end of 2008 (see Figure 16). They are 
followed by individual mandate solutions with up to CHF 8.1 billion (38.9%) and structured 
products accounting for only CHF 556 million (2.7%).307 As shown by the graph, SRI funds 
experienced a steeper growth rate prior to the crisis, reflecting the important role of retail and 
private banking clients in the Swiss SRI market (see Figure 25) and their demand for standard 
vehicles rather than tailor-made solutions (see Figure 17). 
FIGURE 16 – EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT VEHICLES 2005 – 2008 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
                                                 
305 See onValues (2009, p. 6); according to the study in 2008 six new fixed income funds have been 
launched in the Swiss market. 
306 Eurosif (2008, p. 15) 
307 See onValues (2009, p. 9) 
78 
As shown in Figure 17, funds are the preferred vehicle for retail and private bank clients, ac-
counting for 61.2% of their total holdings. In contrast, mandate solutions that allow investors 
to take account of their own criteria are the preferred investment vehicle for institutional in-
vestors, accounting for 60.4% of their total holdings (compared to only 19.5% of retail and 
private banking client holdings, which presumably can mostly be attributed to HNWIs). 
FIGURE 17 – INVESTMENT VEHICLES BY INVESTOR TYPES, 2008 
 
Source: onValues (2009, p. 9) 
3.1.2.1. SRI MUTUAL FUNDS 
The volume of SRI funds offered by asset managers in Switzerland has continuously in-
creased in the past years peaking at the end of 2007 with a total of CHF 18.6 billion (see 
Figure 16). In the course of 2008, fund volumes collapsed by 35.3%, down to CHF 12.2 bil-
lion at the year end. As shown in Figure 18, this impact was particularly severe due to the 
equity focus of these funds (69.5% compared to 24.3% of fixed income SRI products and 2% 
money market funds). To the extent that the equity share of all Swiss funds is considerably 
lower (23.2%), the market share of SRI funds has declined from 2.8% in 2007 to 2.5% in 
2008.308 
FIGURE 18 – ASSET ALLOCATION OF SWISS SRI FUNDS 2005 – 2008 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
                                                 
308 According to data from onValues surveys 2008 and 2009 and www.swissfunddata.ch 
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Despite the severe decline in assets in 2008, the number of SRI mutual funds available to the 
Swiss market has further grown, showing a continuous belief by asset managers in the poten-
tial of this market.309 This holds also for other markets. For example the number of publicly 
available SRI funds in Germany, Austria and Switzerland has increased from September 2008 
to March 2009 by 16% from 254 to 294 funds.310 In Switzerland 93 funds were available by 
June 2009, of which the 20 largest are included in Table 15. 
TABLE 15 – TOP 20 SRI FUNDS IN SWITZERLAND BY IA 
Fund name IA CHF m, July 2009 
1. SAM Sustainable Water Fund 1‘174.6 
2. Pioneer Funds - Global Ecology (Activest Lux Eco Tech) 1‘020.9 
3. responsAbility Global Microfinance Fund (EUR) 582.1 
4. UBS (Lux) Equity Fund - Global Innovators 460.9 
5. Pictet Funds (LUX) Clean Energy-P Cap 426.5 
6. DWS Invest New Resources LD 328.2 
7. Swisscanto (LU) Portfolio Fund Green Invest Equity A 296.9 
8. Swisscanto (CH) Equity Fund Green Invest 296.7 
9. Sarasin New Power Fund 289.6 
10. Swisscanto (LU) Portfolio Fund Green Invest Balanced A 287.9 
11. Sarasin OekoSar Portfolio 251.3 
12. Sarasin OekoSar Equity - Global 250.9 
13. Impax Environmental Markets (Ireland) Fund 247.3 
14. Raiffeisen Futura Swiss Franc Bond 246.0 
15. SAM Smart Energy Fund 239.2 
16. Raiffeisen Futura Swiss Stock 234.0 
17. Fortis L Fund Equity Brazil 232.9 
18. New Energy Fund 211.4 
19. Swisscanto (LU) Portfolio Fund Green Invest Balanced (EUR) A 198.7 
20. ZKB Fonds Zinsertrag Nachhaltigkeit 180.6 
Source: Sustainable Business Institute311  
Surprisingly, in 2007 and 2008 the main SRI approach applied for SRI mutual funds was 
negative screening, followed by positive approaches and shareholder activism. To the extent 
that pooled vehicles are the preferred investment vehicles for retail and private banking clients 
(see Figure 17) the wide application of negative screens in this category suggests that asset 
managers still consider ethical considerations as a dominant motive for private investors to 
engage in SRI. Despite this continuous interest in negative screening, asset managers have 
also provided a growing share of funds that apply positive selection. Whereas the best in class 
                                                 
309 For the Swiss market onValues (2009, p. 8) reported the launch of a range of new products in 2008 
including 14 new equity funds, 3 new strategy funds and 6 new fixed income funds. 
310 See Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2009) 
311 The list also includes funds provided by foreign asset managers, which are not counted in the an-
nual onValues survey as the fund management takes place abroad (see database maintained by the 
Sustainable Business Institute of the European Business School www.nachhaltiges-investment.org). 
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offering has been remarkably stable over the years, thematic investing experienced a substan-
tial boom in 2007, returning to lower levels again in 2008. Finally, shareholder engagement 
practiced by mutual funds (including proxy voting and conducting dialogue) has remained 
relatively stable at rather moderate levels. 
FIGURE 19 – PREFERRED SRI APPROACHES FOR MUTUAL FUNDS 2005 – 2008 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
3.1.2.2. SRI MANDATES 
Separated accounts or mandates are usually managed on behalf of institutional investors or 
private banking clients.312 Similarly to pooled vehicles, the assets held in SRI mandates have 
grown in recent years and also experienced a severe decline in the course of the financial cri-
sis (see Figure 16) which can also be attributed to their extensive equity bias as shown in 
Figure 20. 
FIGURE 20 – COMPOSITION OF SRI MANDATES 2005 – 2008 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
Contrary to SRI mutual funds where negative screening played a major role, in the case of 
SRI mandates best in class has been the preferred approach ahead of negative screening (see 
Figure 21). To the extent that products that pursue a best in class approach display similar risk 
and return characteristics to traditional portfolios this form of SRI seems more appropriate for 
                                                 
312 Because mandates generally require a relatively high minimum initial investment personal clients 
tend to be high-net-worth investors, see Social Investment Forum (2008, p. 16). 
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fiduciary investors including pension funds.313 This is in line with the finding that SRI man-
dates are predominantly held by institutional investors or HNWI unlike SRI mutual funds, 
which are in large part held by individual investors, (see Figure 17). Contrary to pooled vehi-
cles, sustainable themes do not yet seem to play a major role in the case of mandate solutions, 
whereas demand for shareholder engagement (especially in the form of proxy voting) seems 
more common than in the case of mutual funds. 
FIGURE 21 – PREFERRED SRI APPROACHES FOR MANDATES 2005 – 2008 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
3.1.2.3. SRI STRUCTURED PRODUCTS 
Compared to SRI mutual funds and individual mandates, SRI structured products have a 
rather small market share and therefore can be considered to represent only a niche in the SRI 
market. By the end of 2008 they accounted for only 2.7% of total SRI IA (see Figure 16). As 
for SRI mutual funds and mandates, SRI structured products are largely equity-based, which 
is why they experienced substantial corrections in the course of the financial crisis (see Figure 
22). To a limited extent, fixed income solutions have emerged only in the past year. 
FIGURE 22 – COMPOSITION OF SRI STRUCTURED PRODUCTS 2005 – 2008 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
SRI structured products usually include a variety of baskets and certificates that have been 
issued on different sustainability themes such as renewable energy and water (see Figure 23). 
                                                 
313 See Ambachtsheer (2006b, p. 8) 
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Despite recent corrections, further growth in this area can be expected due to the increased 
popularity of theme-based products among SRI investors. 
FIGURE 23 – PREFERRED SRI APPROACHES FOR STRUCTURED PRODUCTS 2005 – 2008 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
3.2. SRI BEHAVIOR OF SWISS PENSION FUNDS 
Institutional asset owners dominate most SRI markets, whereas retail and private banking 
clients usually play only a minor role. As shown in Figure 24, this holds for most European 
countries, where on average 94% of SRI IA can be attributed to institutional investors and 
only 6% to retail investors. It is also true for other markets such as the U.S.314, Australia315 
and Canada316. In contrast in Italy317 and Japan318 the market for SRI is largely dominated by 
retail investors. In Switzerland, demand for SRI is more evenly balanced between these two 
groups of investors, with retail investors accounting for 51% of the total SRI market com-
pared to 49% for institutional investors.319 
FIGURE 24 – SRI HOLDINGS BY INSTITUTIONAL & RETAIL INVESTORS IN EUROPE 
 
Source: Eurosif (2008, p. 14) 
                                                 
314 See Social Investment Forum (2008) 
315 See Responsible Investment Association Australasia (2008, p. 11) 
316 See Social Investment Organization (2009, p. 10) 
317 According to Eurosif (2008, p. 33) the prevalence of the retail component, as opposed to the institu-
tional one is mainly due to the relatively recent start of the pension system. Signori (2009, p. 160) 
expects a significant increase in SRI among pension funds due to the recent reform of legislation. 
318 Although no exact figures exist, the presence of institutional investors in the Japanese SRI market 
is relatively small. In 2007 the total SRI market was estimated at ¥ 840 billion of which ¥ 747 billion 
was in retailed SRI mutual funds (Social Investment Forum Japan, 2007, pp. 13-17). 
319 See Eurosif (2008, p. 45) 
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The data for the Swiss market shows that prior to 2007, SRI holdings by institutional inves-
tors outstripped those of individual investors. It was only in 2007 that individual investors 
surpassed institutional investors (see Figure 25). According to onValues, the increase in IA by 
individual investors results from the growing demand of HNWI investors and the increased 
effort by providers of SRI products to market such products among individual investors.320 In 
particular the growing demand for theme-based products that are accompanied with an easy to 
sell story (e.g. on climate change) attracted a significant number of clients in the period from 
2006 to 2007 (see evolution of sustainable themes in Figure 19). To the extent that such 
theme-based products often involve above average risk profiles they declined again dispropor-
tionately in the course of the recent crisis.321 
FIGURE 25 – SHARE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND RETAIL SRI INVESTORS 
 
Source: Based on data from the onValues annual surveys 2006 – 2009 
Pension funds play a key role within the group of institutional SRI investors. In its 2006 re-
port, Eurosif writes that in Switzerland public pension funds and the reserve fund of the Fed-
eral old-age insurance (AHV) are the most prominent institutional SRI investors. According 
to the report, almost 80% of the asset managers active in the SRI market segment carry out 
investments for this client segment. The second largest investor group includes NGOs and 
foundations, followed by corporate pension funds, churches and insurance companies.322 In 
the wider European context the picture differs slightly, as shown in Figure 26. Here religious 
institutions and charities are the main source of institutional SRI investments, followed by 
public pension funds or reserve funds, NGOs, foundations and corporate pension funds.323 
There is abundant evidence that pension funds have been the driving force for SRI not only in 
different European markets, but also in the U.S., Australia or Canada. For example, the Neth-
erlands is considered to be the leading SRI market mainly due to the presence of PGGM (Pen-
sion Fund for Health, Mental and Social Interests) or ABP.324 Other high profile pension 
                                                 
320 See onValues (2008, p. 8) 
321 See onValues (2009, p. 6) 
322 Eurosif (2006, pp. 33-34) 
323 See Eurosif (2008, p. 14). This ranking by Eurosif is representative of the main type of investors 
involved, and not necessarily of the volume of SRI assets they represent. 
324 Eurosif (2006, p. 5) 
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funds dominating their respective SRI markets include FRR or the Etablissement de Retraite 
Additionnelle de la Fonction Publique (ERAFP) in France, the Universities Superannuation 
Scheme (USS) or the Environment Agency in the U.K., the AP1-4 pension funds in Sweden, 
NGPF in Norway325, or CalPERS, CalSTRS and TIAA-CREF in the U.S. 
FIGURE 26 – TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL SRI INVESTORS ENGAGING IN SRI IN EUROPE 
 
Source: Eurosif (2008, p. 15) 
3.2.1.1. NUMBER OF PENSION FUNDS ENGAGING IN SRI 
Reviewing the Swisscanto data for the period of 2002 to 2008 shows that in Switzerland most 
pension funds do not take into account environmental, social or ethical considerations in their 
investment decisions. According to the official data, the total number of funds that reported 
investing in SRI increased from only 18 funds in 2002 to 34 in 2008, with a peak of 45 funds 
in 2005 (see Table 27). For 2008, Swisscanto reports that out of 265 pension funds only 34 
pension funds invest in SRI, which represents 12.8% of the total.326 This number is based on 
the answer to the standard question on SRI asking for the percentage share of the portfolio 
invested in SRI, which has been included in each survey instrument from 2002 onwards.327 A 
more detailed review of the responses that have been provided to the separate SRI section 
included in the 2008 survey leads however to different and more encouraging results. All in 
all we found 81 pension funds that report to engage in SRI in one or another way, of which 48 
did not provide any response to the standard question in the 2008 survey (see 2008(2) in Fig-
ure 27). In total this corresponds to 30.6% of all funds included in the sample. As this figure is 
considerably higher than the figure officially reported, there seems to be a substantial bias in 
this data from which it can be assumed that the estimated number of unreported cases in the 
past has also been considerably higher.328 
                                                 
325 According to Clark and Monk (2009, p. 1), the Norwegian Government Pension Fund is not a tradi-
tional pension fund in the sense that it has designated beneficiaries with clearly defined retirement 
obligations but should rather be considered as a sovereign wealth fund instead. 
326 Swisscanto (2009, p. 44) 
327 For the SPFS 2008 this corresponds to question 13.22, see section 8.1. 
328 This figure is used as a response variable in the analysis of the relationships between pension fund 
characteristics and their SRI behavior (see section 5.3.1). 
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FIGURE 27 – NUMBER OF SWISS PENSION FUNDS ENGAGING IN SRI 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund surveys 2003 – 2008 
3.2.1.2. TOTAL SRI INVESTED ASSETS 
Of the 81 funds that reported investing in SRI, 53 funds provided details on the share of their 
portfolio invested according to SRI criteria.329 In total these assets add up to approximately 
CHF 55 billion, which would mean that ca 32% of the total pension fund assets would be in-
vested according to SRI criteria. A sound note of caution is necessary here as two of the larg-
est pension funds participating in the survey claimed to invest their whole portfolio according 
to SRI criteria while failing to provide sufficient evidence for this in either the detailed section 
of the questionnaire, on their websites or in their annual reports. This suggests that these funds 
either considerably overstate their SRI engagement or they have misinterpreted the survey 
question and consider the ‘sustainable’ management of pension assets to be synonymous with 
socially responsible investments. Dropping these two funds leads to a considerably lower, but 
also more reasonable figure of approx. CHF 18 billion, which would also be more in line with 
the supplier-based figure generated in section 3.1.330 
Among these 53 funds different levels of SRI integration exist. Most funds allocate only a 
very small proportion of their portfolio to SRI (see Figure 28), which shows that SRI is not 
interpreted as an all or nothing undertaking. In most cases, SRI is implemented only at the 
level of a single SRI product such as a best in class or thematic investment fund. Examples of 
funds that apply a comprehensive SRI strategy across all asset classes, such as the pension 
fund of the Canton of Geneva (CIA) or collective funds such as Abendrot or NEST (neither of 
which are part of the sample) are still the exception rather than the rule. The reluctance to 
allocate a larger share of the portfolio to SRI is consistent with the general practice of indi-
vidual investors that according to Brown tend to hold only a minor part of their assets in 
                                                 
329 This includes the 43 funds that have responded to the standard question and 10 additional funds that 
have provided information to a related question in the SRI part of the questionnaire. 
330 As shown in section 3.1, the total SRI invested assets held by asset managers located in Switzerland 
account for about CHF 34 billion, of which about half are held by institutional investors. 
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SRI.331 Despite the low number of funds that engage in a comprehensive SRI strategy, 11 
funds support the view that SRI criteria should be applied to the whole portfolio and across all 
asset classes, 32 funds disagree with this and 38 funds have no opinion. 
FIGURE 28 – PERCENTAGE OF PENSION FUND PORTFOLIO INVESTED IN SRI 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 (n = 54) 
3.2.1.3. PREFERRED ASSET CLASSES 
Swiss pension funds traditionally focus their investment strategies on bonds and equities. By 
the end of 2007, the FSO reported that debt instruments were the largest asset class, account-
ing for up to 37% of the funds’ IA followed by equities, which accounted for only 27.8%.332 
In the SRI domain the situation is the opposite. As depicted in Figure 29, most of the 42 pen-
sion funds which report on their asset allocation indicate that they invest in equities followed 
by fixed income. Thus, as already earlier, SRI is almost entirely equity or fixed income based. 
However, there is anecdotal evidence that during recent years and in line with the general 
attempt to diversify their portfolios, Swiss pension funds have also moved to other asset 
classes such as real estate or alternative assets. Although there is little evidence for this move 
in the Swisscanto data, there are some notable cases reported on the funds’ websites or in their 
annual reports. 
FIGURE 29 – PREFERRED ASSET CLASSES AMONG SWISS PENSION FUNDS 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 (n = 42) 
                                                 
331 Brown (2007, p. 13) cites a survey by Friends Provident from 2001, which showed that 51% of 
individual SRI fund holders had less than a quarter of their money invested in SRI, and only 12% have 
more than 75% of their money invested in SRI. 
332 See Federal Statistical Office (2009, p. 16) 
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3.2.1.4. PREFERRED SRI APPROACHES 
Figure 30 reveals that among the 66 funds that provide details on their SRI strategy, thematic 
investment is the most commonly applied SRI approach (37 funds) followed by negative 
screening and shareholder engagement (34 funds each). The best in class approach, although 
less frequently used, is still important and used by 26 pension funds. ESG integration and 
community investment have not been considered by the Swisscanto questionnaire as they are 
not typically considered by Swiss SRI investors. 14 funds do not disclose any details on their 
preferred SRI technique. The majority of the funds (45) report that they apply a combination 
of two or more approaches. In contrast, 23 funds focus their SRI strategy on a single ap-
proach. Among them, 9 funds invest exclusively in thematic products, while another 6 funds 
apply different sets of exclusions. 
FIGURE 30 – PREFERRED SRI APPROACH AMONG SWISS PENSION FUNDS 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 (n= 66) 
Thematic investing, which has started to play a role only recently, appears to be the most 
popular SRI strategy. It was named by 57.8% of all funds in the sub-sample suggesting that 
there is considerable awareness by pension funds of issues such as climate change, renewable 
energy or water scarcity.333 The ongoing need for diversification is expected to lead to more 
thematic investments by pension funds in the future. However, to the extent that thematic in-
vestments tend to involve higher risks, investors usually allocate only a small part of their 
assets to such products. Thus although many funds indicate investment in thematic invest-
ments, they probably attribute only a minor fraction to this category. This would also explain 
a seemingly contradictory finding by onValues, which concluded that in terms of total IA in-
stitutional investors are rather hesitant to engage in thematic investment, whereas it has been 
more popular among retail and private banking clients.334  
                                                 
333 This corresponds with earlier results from an asset manager survey, where 53% of the asset owners 
are mostly interested in thematic funds (see Responsible Investment (2008, p. 14)). 
334 According to onValues (2008, p. 11) sustainable themes gained ground in 2007 especially in SRI 
mutual funds (see Figure 19) and structured products (d products among SRI investors. 
Figure 23), which were mainly held by retail and private banking clients and played a minor role for 
mandate solutions (see Figure 21). 
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Second, 34 funds apply one or more negative criteria to exclude companies and whole sectors 
from their portfolio, despite the fact that such values-driven exclusions bear a heightened risk 
of underperformance (see 0). As shown in Figure 31, the most prominent exclusions include 
screens concerning controversial weapons industries335 and arms manufacturers (29 funds), 
followed by restrictions on tobacco (21) and nuclear energy (18). A possible explanation for 
the strong interest in such exclusions is that avoidance is a relatively straightforward approach 
that can be more easily implemented and monitored at lower costs than other SRI tech-
niques.336 On the other hand, a considerable challenge for pension funds applying exclusion 
strategies refers to the question of who decides which screens are relevant and on what basis 
(see also section 4.1.1). In this context Sethi comments that it is inappropriate for pension 
funds to use such screens for selecting or rejecting individual companies as they usually re-
flect the beliefs or social values of small minorities. In the context of a large pool of benefici-
aries it is however likely that both individuals who subscribe to these screens, as well indi-
viduals that are adamantly opposed to them are included.337 While certain funds apply such 
exclusion strategies with the objective of avoiding certain companies, it is fair to assume that 
the funds that do not apply such strategies are very likely to hold stocks in their portfolio that 
would be considered as sin stocks by a large number of their beneficiaries. However, to the 
extent that pension funds in Switzerland do not provide any transparency on their individual 
holdings, there is little accountability towards the beneficiaries on this issue. This holds also 
for other countries. The composition of a fund’s stock ownership is seldom exposed to public 
scrutiny (see section 6.2.3.3). 
FIGURE 31 – PREFERRED NEGATIVE SCREENS 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 (n = 34) 
                                                 
335 The screens date prior to the signature of the Oslo Convention by the Swiss government which 
prohibits the use, transfer or stockpile of cluster bombs. The ratification of the convention by the 
Swiss parliament may lead to increased application of such screens among Swiss pension funds.  
336 See Luther et al. (1992, p. 60) 
337 Sethi (2005, p. 108). Kolb (2007, p. xiii) illustrates this by referring to the example of the pharma-
ceutical sector, writing that “some pension funds may be withheld from pharmaceutical firms that 
manufacture contraceptives, and such a policy is sure to annoy some fund beneficiaries, just as the 
decision to invest in such a firm would irritate other beneficiaries covered by the plan.” 
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Shareholder engagement on environmental, social and governance issues is also popular (34 
funds). As outlined in section 2.3.4 one can distinguish between different forms of share-
holder engagement, such as conducting dialogue with the management, proxy voting or filing 
or co-filing of shareholder resolutions. The Swiss Pension Act introduced in 2002 requires 
Swiss pension funds to define the rules that they apply in the exercise of their shareholders' 
rights, which at the end of the day requires them simply to disclose if they have a policy di-
rected at the exercise of shareholder rights or not.338 Although this is only a disclosure re-
quirement and not a requirement to effectively have a voting policy in place, one could expect 
that this had a positive impact on the voting practices of Swiss pension funds in the past, par-
ticularly with regard to corporate governance issues. As shown in Figure 32, out of the 34 
funds practicing shareholder engagement, 31 funds exercise their voting rights while 21 funds 
conduct direct dialogue with the company management. 18 funds pursue both approaches in 
combination. Furthermore, there is a strong preference towards collaborative activism to en-
gage more effectively with the companies and eventually benefit from shared costs. An im-
portant forum for such collective forms of shareholder engagement in Switzerland has been 
initiated by Ethos in 2004.339 In the name of its members, the pool engages in direct dialogue 
with the management of Swiss companies on material ESG issues with the aim of enhancing 
long-term shareholder value for their beneficiaries. The costs for the engagement activities are 
fully borne by the members of the pool in proportion to their holdings in Swiss companies. 
Pool members choose the engagement topics annually. For 2009, the pool has focused not 
only on improving corporate governance practices (e.g. executive remuneration), but also on 
environmental and social concerns (e.g. sustainability reporting, codes of conduct and corpo-
rate principles, reporting on corporate strategy relating to climate change and CR along the 
supply chain). 
FIGURE 32 – FORMS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM / ENGAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 (n= 34) 
                                                 
338 See article 49a § 2, BVV2 
339 See Ethos (n.s.) and www.ethosfund.ch/e/products-services/ethos-dialogue.asp  
Shareholder activism 
(n = 34) 
Shareholder voting 
(n = 31) 
Shareholder dialogue / 
engagement (n = 21) 
Collectively (n = 17) 
On their own (n = 9) 
N.s. (n = 5) 
Collectively (n = 16) 
On their own (n = 4) 
N.s. (n = 1) 
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Best in class selection ranks only fourth (26 funds) among the SRI techniques most often se-
lected by the pension funds. At first sight this is surprising as contrary to negative screening, 
this approach does not rule out specific sectors and has therefore displayed risk and return 
characteristics similar to those of traditional actively managed products, making it more ap-
plicable for fiduciary investors including pension funds. A fund that applies such a best-in-
class strategy is the pension fund of the City of Lucerne, which is a public fund with CHF 
1.14 billion IA and slightly more than 4’600 beneficiaries at the end of 2007. In 2007, the 
fund reports to have broadened its existing SRI strategy by investing CHF 27.14 million in 
Sarasin Sustainable Equities Global mutual fund (2.4% of its portfolio). This best in class 
fund invests in companies on the assumption that companies performing well with regard to 
environmental and social criteria will also outperform financially. 
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4. DETERMINANTS OF THE SRI BEHAVIOR OF SWISS PENSION FUNDS 
The analysis in the previous sections showed that the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds is 
very diverse. Out of the 249 funds included in our sample 168 funds report not to engage in 
SRI, whereas 81 funds show a positive attitude towards SRI.340 Among the latter, the SRI 
behavior varies considerably, ranging from satellite investing in thematic SRI products with 
the primary objective of benefitting from the growth trend in this market, to the exercise of 
shareholder engagement in order to impact firm behavior on specific SRI related issues and to 
the more traditional application of negative screens to meet the normative expectations of 
their beneficiaries. This variety is also reflected in other areas of pension fund management 
such as the general investment policies of the funds, their institutional set-up or the level of 
benefits and contributions they provide to their beneficiaries, etc. According to Queisser and 
Vittas, a main reason for this variety in the Swiss system is that the Federal Law on Occupa-
tional Old-age, Survivors’ and Disability Benefit Plans (BVG) imposes only minimum legal 
requirements, leaving most of the terms and conditions and operational elements of pension 
funds to be determined by the pension funds themselves.341 
In the SRI context, there has been little systematic attention placed on the question of why 
some pension funds act as SRI investors while others do not. To better understand the reason-
ing for this, the following sections try to explore empirically to what extent the SRI behavior 
of pension funds can be explained by referring to specific pension fund characteristics. That 
is, we summarize a number of propositions that specify the conditions under which pension 
funds are more likely to engage in SRI. We therefore challenge conventional wisdom that 
pension funds are a homogeneous group of investors. For example, Monks and Minow write 
that “pension funds have many of the qualities necessary to play [the] role [of the perfect 
owner]. Their ownership, by virtue of their size and their time horizons, is as close to perma-
nent as possible. And because of this near-permanent stake, their interest should be far-sighted 
enough to incorporate the long-term interests of the corporation and (as an essential element 
of those interests) the interests of the employees, customers, suppliers, and the commu-
nity.”342 Although this level of generalization may be somewhat misleading for pension funds 
as a whole, one can argue that those funds that engage in SRI indeed share several common 
characteristics some of which can specifically be attributed to pension funds, while others 
may also hold for other institutional investors. 
In order to get an understanding of these characteristics, we propose an analytical framework 
in which the relationships between these characteristics and the SRI behavior of the funds are 
explored. To the extent that there is no comprehensive theoretical model available that ex-
plains the SRI behavior of pension funds, we reference different strands of literature, such as 
stakeholder and agency theories, theories of investor types, ethical consumer behavior or 
                                                 
340 For a list of the participating pension funds see section 8.2. 
341 Queisser, Vittas (2000, p. 29) 
342 Monks, Minow (2001, p. 154) 
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demographic profiling. Also, we recall the work of Gasper and Schweig, Ryan and Schneider, 
Schumacher-Hummel, Cumming and Johan, Williams and Nilsson that identified mechanisms 
of SRI decision making by investors.343 Based on their preliminary research, we propose three 
sets of characteristics that are related to a fund’s investment decision process and that we be-
lieve offer the greatest explanatory power to distinguish between pension funds that engage in 
SRI and those that do not. First, in section 4.1 we explore the influence of different stake-
holders on the SRI behavior of pension funds. In section 4.2 we analyze how specific portfo-
lio characteristics affect the capacity of a fund to engage in SRI, and finally section 4.3 as-
sesses the role of a number of institutional characteristics. In the following subsections, each 
characteristic is analyzed in relation to the potential SRI behavior of a pension fund, followed 
by a short review and synthesis of the existing literature and concluding with the formulation 
of testable hypotheses. This way the chapter forms the background to the empirical analysis in 
chapter 5, where we introduce the data from a 2008 survey of Swiss pension funds, the meth-
odology and the variables used for testing the hypotheses, followed by an overview of the 
results alongside summary statistics. In chapter 6 we present a discussion of the results. 
4.1. STAKEHOLDER CHARACTERISTICS 
A first set of determinants that may influence whether a pension fund engages in SRI or not 
concerns the disposition of different pension fund stakeholders towards this form of invest-
ing.344 As shown in Figure 33, a variety of stakeholders exist both within (e.g. the central 
governing body of the fund, the management or the internal committees) and outside a pen-
sion fund (e.g. the fund’s sponsoring entities, service providers, regulatory and supervisory 
authorities, auditors as well as the companies in which the funds are ultimately invested in). In 
the following sections we will place special focus on those stakeholders who are supposed to 
have a stake in the investment decision making of a fund and hence may also influence a pen-
sion fund to engage in SRI. 
First, in section 4.1.1 we examine the role of the central governing body that determines a 
fund’s investment strategy and interacts with the management of the fund and the members of 
the investment committee. Second, we explore the role of external stakeholders such as the 
employer (see section 4.1.2) and the beneficiaries of a fund (see section 4.1.3) that both pro-
vide the financing of the retirement obligations. Finally, investment consultants (see section 
4.1.4) that act as an entry gate for external asset managers may either facilitate or impede an 
SRI engagement of the fund through their advice. As shown in Figure 33, other stakeholders 
exist such as supervisory authorities, auditors, or pension fund experts who support the gov-
erning body of a pension fund, but whose role in the investment decision process is rather 
limited and can therefore be ignored. The role of the regulators is not considered because in 
                                                 
343 See Gasper, Schweig (1985), Ryan, Schneider (2002), Schumacher-Hummel (2004), Cumming, 
Johan (2007), Williams (2007), Nilsson (2008) 
344 Clarkson (1995, p. 106) defines stakeholders as persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, 
rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present or future. 
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Switzerland there is no regulation which promotes the integration of SRI into a fund’s in-
vestment or ownership decisions. The question whether the reliance on external asset manag-
ers has an impact on the SRI behavior of a pension fund will be examined under institutional 
characteristics in section 4.3.1. 
FIGURE 33 – STAKEHOLDERS OF PENSION FUNDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Who Cares Wins Initiative (2009, p. 8), Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 11) 
4.1.1. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
In Switzerland pension funds either take the form of private institutions (foundations or coop-
erative societies) or an institution incorporated under public law345, of which foundations are 
by far the most common organizational form. In the case of foundations, the pension fund 
board of trustees is the central governing body.346 The board is responsible for jointly manag-
ing and overseeing the fund’s assets.347 As such it has to formulate the fund’s investment pol-
icy and monitor and guide the management of the assets in line with the market. In particular, 
it has to define the objectives and guiding principles for the asset management and to establish 
the organizational set up and processes for the adequate management of the pension fund as-
sets. It also defines the principles which govern the exercise of the fund’s voting rights in the 
companies in which the pension fund is invested.348 In this role the central governing body 
can delegate certain actions or functions to the management of the fund or to respective sub-
committees, the ultimate responsibility however cannot be delegated and always remains with 
the central governing body.349 To the extent that board members are usually only part-time 
                                                 
345 See article 48, § 2, BVG and article 331, § 1, OR. Only funds of federal, cantonal or communal 
institutions or public employers can be incorporated under public law. 
346 For cooperative societies the highest organ is the assembly of delegates which elects the board of 
the pension fund. See Konrad (2009, p. 126). 
347 See article 51 § 1 and 2, article 53a and 71 § 1, BVG and article 49a § 1, BVV2. See Frauenlob 
(1998, p. 206), Sigg et al. (2005, p. 21), Queisser, Vittas (2000, p. 35). 
348 See article 49a § 2, BVV2 
349 See Vetter-Scheiber (2009, p. 218), Ammann, Zingg (2008a, p. 5), Konrad (2009, p. 127) 
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and sometimes not even elected on the basis of their professional qualifications, they may rely 
on additional internal pension fund capabilities or external advisers to assist them in making 
fully informed decisions.350 Other internal organs that may play a role in the investment deci-
sion-making process include the pension fund management which is in charge or the day-to-
day operational management of the fund and the investment committee.351 Regarding the for-
mer Sigg et al. write that the influence of the fund management on the investment process 
largely depends on whether it is actually part of the investment committee or not.352 The in-
vestment committee is usually composed of members of the governing body and may also 
include representatives from the pension fund management as well as external experts.353 Al-
though there are no regulatory requirements regarding the role of the investment committee, 
Ammann and Zingg suggest that it should first and foremost be in charge of selecting external 
asset managers or deciding on tactical asset allocation.354  
Due to this central role, the disposition of pension fund trustees regarding SRI is crucial to 
whether a pension fund engages in SRI or not (see section 4.1.1.1). Second, we suggest that 
the composition of the board may also have an influence on the propensity of a fund to engage 
in SRI. More specifically based on a set of literature which examines the behavior of indi-
viduals regarding SRI, we hypothesize that the socio-demographic characteristics of the trus-
tees influence the SRI behavior of a fund (see section 4.1.1.2). Finally, in section 4.1.1.3 we 
argue that the size of the boards may impact the decision to promote SRI as an investment 
option as a larger group of trustees within a board may distract trustees from promoting SRI 
as an investment option. 
4.1.1.1. FINANCIAL PERCEPTION OF SRI 
According to modern portfolio theory, under efficient market conditions rational investors are 
only concerned with expected return and risk characteristics when constructing optimal in-
vestment portfolios and should be indifferent to any non-financial factors.355 As shown in 
section 2.4, we expect this view to hold among pension fund trustees that invest the retirement 
capital of their beneficiaries as fiduciaries. Article 71 of the BVG requests pension fund trus-
tees to manage assets prudently to “ensure the security of assets, achieve a reasonable return 
on investments, maintain a suitable diversification of risks, and allow for the liquidity re-
quirements of the plan”.356 As such it could be argued that they are expected to maximize the 
financial returns of their investments at a specified level of risk to finance pension obliga-
tions.357 As a consequence, their perception of an investment in terms of financial perform-
                                                 
350 See Bingham (2008) 
351 See Frauenlob (1998, p. 207) 
352 Sigg et al. (2005, p. 22) 
353 For example the investment committee of the public pension fund of the Canton of Grisons in-
cludes also representatives of external investment consultants. 
354 Ammann, Zingg (2008a, p. 7) 
355 See Markowitz (1952) 
356 See article 71, BVG. In addition, articles 49-60, BVV2. See Frauenlob (1998, pp. 64-65). 
357 See Boasson et al. (2004, p. 56) 
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ance and risk involved is likely to influence their perception of an investment opportunity. 
Obviously, this should apply to SRI, meaning that the likelihood that a pension fund engages 
in SRI is a function of the trustees’ perception of SRI in terms of risk-adjusted return.358 That 
is, the propensity of a pension fund to invest in SRI is expected to increase or decrease de-
pending on a trustee’s perception of the performance of SRI.359 To the extent that pension 
fund trustees differ substantially with regard to their perception of SRI and because their fidu-
ciary duties outlined in section 2.4 require them act as a rational economic investor, we hy-
pothesize that: 
H1.1  A positive perception of pension fund trustees regarding SRI in terms of long-term 
performance will positively impact the SRI behavior360 of the pension fund. 
H1.2  A negative perception of pension fund trustees regarding costs resulting from SRI will 
negatively impact the SRI behavior of the pension fund. 
H1.3  A negative perception of pension fund trustees regarding risk levels resulting from SRI 
will negatively impact the SRI behavior of the pension fund. 
4.1.1.2. BOARD DEMOGRAPHICS 
Different studies suggest that individuals that engage in SRI differ from other conventional 
investors in a number of socio-demographic characteristics.361 Typically, this includes charac-
teristics such as education, age, gender, income level or personal lifestyle.362 Although the 
results of these studies are in part inconclusive and sometimes contradictory, limiting them to 
general findings363, they are widely used as segmentation criteria within the consumer and 
financial industries.364 In the following sections we will explore potential relationships be-
tween personal characteristics of board members and the SRI behavior of their pension fund. 
Although there is relatively little information available on the composition and diversity of 
                                                 
358 See Schumacher-Hummel (2004, p. 197), Cumming, Johan (2007, p. 412), Williams (2007, p. 48). 
359 See Nilsson (2008, p. 312). See also Ambachtsheer (2006a) who showed in a survey among U.S. 
institutional investors that roughly 60% agree that the belief that SRI helps reducing risks and improve 
returns is an important driver among trustees. This is consistent with findings that many pension trus-
tees still refuse SRI on the basis that the inclusion of SRI criteria necessarily hurts financial perform-
ance or increases risks (see Kinder (2004a, p. 15)). Mills et al. (2001, p. 31) show that a main explana-
tion why environmental information does not feature in investment decision-making among Australian 
investment professionals lies in the negative perceptions of the relationship between environmental 
and financial performance and  the absence of reliable information on environmental performance. 
360 SRI behavior is used as a response variable and is defined in section 5.3.1. 
361 See Rosen et al. (1991), Harrison (1995), Beal, Goyen (1998), Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a), Tippet, 
Leung (2001), McLachlan, Gardner (2004), Williams (2007), Nilsson (2008) 
362 According to Brown (2007, p. 15) ethical investors are educated, conscientious individuals with a 
higher degree of financial literacy and above-average income. Research by Rosen et al. (1991) and 
Green (2001) suggest that compared to conventional investors, socially responsible investors tend to 
be younger with higher levels of education. 
363 Differences may depend on data quality, sample size, varying research designs, the regional focus 
of the studies or the date when the studies have been conducted. 
364 See Nilsson (2008, p. 312) 
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Swiss pension fund boards, anecdotal evidence suggests that they represent a rather homoge-
nous group of middle-aged or older men who do not typically correspond to the profile of the 
average SRI investor identified by these socio-demographic studies. 
A first demographic characteristic relates to the level of qualifications of board members and 
how this relates to their inclination to engage in SRI. In Switzerland there is no explicit re-
quirement by law regarding the level of education or financial and investment background of 
pension fund trustees, although the complexity of their task has certainly increased in recent 
years.365 However, some funds do select their board members on the basis of their profes-
sional qualifications.366 The term ‘professional qualification’ is not defined in more detail, but 
may involve competencies from different disciplines such as law, finance, actuarial mathe-
matics, business administration and others. In cases the capabilities of board members are 
limited, article 51, paragraph 6 of the BVG requires representatives of the pension fund board 
to seek to enhance their knowledge via appropriate training in order to be up to their role as 
trustees.367 Surveys of individual SRI investors consistently find that compared to other con-
ventional investors SRI investors tend to have higher levels of education.368 For example, 
Rosen et al. conclude that SRI investors are better educated than investors in conventional 
mutual funds, with 60% of the former having a graduate degree compared with 22% for the 
latter.369 Similarly, Nilsson shows that education proved to be a significant predictor of SRI 
investment behavior, as individuals without a university degree invested less in SRI.370 From 
this Schueth concludes that growth in demand for SRI results from investors being much bet-
ter educated and informed today than in the past.371 In particular, as SRI is an issue that is 
fraught with considerable prejudice and considered as a complex field requiring specific ca-
pabilities and know-how to process ethical, environmental or social information, a higher 
level of education seems beneficial.372 McLachlan and Gardner add that better educated indi-
viduals might be “better informed about and hence more influenced by issues of social re-
sponsibility when they invest”373. Diamantopoulos et al., who have reviewed a large number 
of studies on the impact of education on environmental consciousness, show that these find-
ings are relatively consistent, proposing a significant positive relationship between the level of 
education and the propensity to invest according to SRI criteria. From this they hypothesize 
that better educated investors understand the issues involved more fully and are also more 
                                                 
365 See Ammann, Zingg (2008a, p. 5) 
366 According to Burkhard (2007, p. 31) such funds have outperformed financially in the past. 
367 See Konrad (2009, p. 136) 
368 See Rosen et al. (1991), Tippet, Leung (2001), Beal, Goyen (1998, p. 141), Brown (2007, p. 13) 
369 Rosen et al. (1991, p. 226) 
370 See Nilsson (2008, p. 319) 
371 See Schueth (2003, p. 192) 
372 For example Maloney et al. (1975) argue that “the very nature of ecology with its complex interac-
tions between organisms and environment serves to make its subject matter difficult to understand and 
assimilate” (see Diamantopoulos et al. (2003, p. 472) suggesting that ethical consumers tend to be 
better educated than conventional consumers. 
373 See McLachlan, Gardner (2004, p. 20) 
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concerned about issues such as the environment. 374 To the extent that SRI is a non-standard 
investment approach for pension fund trustees, we suggest that those trustees that have the 
necessary professional qualification to act as trustees also have a better understanding of the 
underlying mechanisms of SRI. Accordingly we hypothesize that: 
H2.1 Pension fund boards that are composed of members that are elected on the basis of 
their professional qualifications are more likely to promote SRI criteria. 
A second demographic characteristic relates to the age of the trustees of a pension fund. In 
Switzerland, pension fund boards must be made up of employee and employer representatives 
in equal measure.375 The latter may consist of representatives of the workforce or the retirees 
who according to Weber et al. may have different concerns as a function of their status or age. 
For example, whereas the employee representatives who are building up benefits in the 
scheme tend towards a maximum increase of wealth during the years when they contribute to 
their pension assets, retirees who are receiving a pension from the scheme may be primarily 
interested in the security of their pension savings.376 Thus depending on their age and hence 
their status pension fund trustees may have varying preferences regarding their fund’s invest-
ment decisions. Although little information exists on the age structure of the boards of trus-
tees, it s fair to assume in the light of the qualifications required that they are mostly middle-
aged or older individuals.377 
In the literature on the demographic characteristics of individuals engaging in SRI, different 
studies have explored the relationship between the age of an investor and their SRI behavior, 
ending up with contradictory results. For example in a survey among 4’000 investors Rosen et 
al. found that SRI investors tend to be younger than other investors.378 Within their sample the 
median age of individual SRI investors is 39 years compared to 52 years for conventional 
investors. An explanation provided by McLachlan and Gardner is that compared to older in-
vestors, younger investors tend to place environmental protection and corporate citizenship 
ahead of money making.379 In another study, Lewis and Mackenzie found that SRI investors 
are frequently middle-aged. In their sample the majority of SRI investors examined were over 
45 (68.2%) and 20% were 65 years of age or more.380 Again others found that SRI investors 
                                                 
374 See Diamantopoulos et al. (2003, p. 472) 
375 Article 51, § 1, BVG 
376 Weber et al. (2009, p. 57) 
377 According to Ryter (2007, p. 10) in 21% of the pension funds participating in the 2007 Swisscanto 
survey include retirees in their boards (16% are attributed with voting rights) and they account for 
27% of pension fund beneficiaries. 
378 See Rosen et al. (1991). 
379 See McLachlan, Gardner (2004). According to research conducted by KPMG “80% of 25-39 year 
olds as compared to 72% of 40-59 year olds would consider investing ethically” (see Matterson (2000) 
in McLachlan, Gardner (2004, p. 12). 
380 See Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a, p. 182) 
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are generally older than conventional investors.381 According to Lewis and Webley, this sim-
ply results from the fact that although young people have the most developed and positive 
attitudes towards social, environmental or ethical issues they lack the opportunity and the 
money to invest in this way.382 Thus to the extent that younger individuals seem more aware 
of environmental, social or ethical issues and that pension fund trustees do not invest their 
own funds but those of the pension fund, we hypothesize that: 
H2.2 Pension funds that include also younger representatives of the workforce in their gov-
erning body are more likely to engage in SRI. 
Another demographic characteristic, which may influence the investment behavior of a pen-
sion fund, relates to gender distribution within the board of trustees. Although a significant 
portion of Swiss pension fund assets have been contributed by women, they make up only a 
small fraction of the trustees on pension fund boards. This holds also for our sample, where 
mainly males sit on the boards of the funds. Although according to Weber et al. the economic 
literature has not found a direct relationship between presence of women in boards and the 
performance of companies,383 other research shows that men and women show differences in 
terms of their investment behavior. With regard to the SRI behavior of individual investors, 
various authors conclude that women are more likely to invest in SRI then men.384 For exam-
ple Nilsson reports that men have a tendency to invest a smaller proportion of their invest-
ments in SRI.385 Similarly, Schueth estimates that roughly 60% of the SRI investors in the 
U.S. are women.386 While a review of studies by Diamantopoulos et al. on the demographic 
characteristics of ethical consumers find that men generally have higher or better knowledge 
of environmental issues, women are reported to exhibit both greater concern for environ-
mental issues and participate more frequently in various types of environmental activities 
such as energy conservation, recycling, or political action.387 Applied to the behavior of SRI 
investors, one could suggest that women are more likely to take account of environmental, 
social or ethical concerns and therefore are more inclined to invest in SRI than men. From 
this, we hypothesize that: 
H2.3 Pension funds that include a higher percentage of women in their governing body are 
more likely to engage in SRI.388 
                                                 
381 See Beal, Goyen (1998, p. 141), McLachlan, Gardner (2004), Brown (2007, p. 13) 
382 See Lewis, Webley (1994, p. 173). See also Wall (1995, p. 297) and Diamantopoulos et al. (2003, 
p. 475) who suggest that younger individuals tend to be more environmentally or ethically concerned. 
383 Weber et al. (2009, p. 59) 
384 See Beal, Goyen (1998), Nilsson (2008), Tippet, Leung (2001) 
385 Nilsson (2008, p. 319) 
386 Schueth (2003, p. 192) 
387 Diamantopoulos et al. (2003, p. 470) 
388 See Amacker (2000) 
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A fourth characteristic, which is also assumed to be related to the SRI behavior of individuals 
concerns the level of income of investors. For example several studies conclude that SRI in-
vestors tend to have lower income levels than other conventional investors.389 Rosen reports 
that individual SRI investors earn on average up to 15% less than conventional investors. 
While there is some consistency in these results, the authors provide varying explanations. 
Rosen et al. explain lower income levels of SRI investors with the fact that they are younger 
and therefore in earlier stage of their career. In contrast, Beal and Goyen argue that SRI inves-
tors have lower household income, but generally higher household assets than conventional 
investors, as they also tend to be older including many retired or semi-retired investors who 
have lower cash incomes, but higher levels of household assets.390 Other sources find that SRI 
investors are frequently middle-income professionals391 or that SRI investors have even 
higher levels of income than conventional investors.392 Regarding the latter, one possible ex-
planation is that individuals who invest in SRI are relatively wealthy and therefore able to 
bear a financial cost that is associated with some forms of SRI.393 This finding is partly sup-
ported by the growing interest of HNWIs for SRI. For example, in a report by Merrill Lynch 
and Capgemini394 the authors claim that HNWIs are increasingly conscious of social and envi-
ronmental concerns and hence are looking to invest in companies and financial products that 
are in line with their values. According to them, HNWIs and Ultra-HNWIs play a key role 
when it comes to SRI as a form of philanthropic giving. 
H2.4 To the extent that pension funds trustees do not invest their own money but the money 
of a fund’s beneficiaries, we suggest that income levels of the members of pension 
fund boards are not related to the SRI behavior of a fund. 
Finally, another hypothesis is that for SRI investors this type of investing is a continuation of 
their wider personal lifestyle. For example, Rosen et al. show that individual investors engag-
ing in SRI are often activists who also engage in other cause-related activities.395 They show 
that 88% of SRI investors surveyed also donate money to other cause-related groups and 
some 48% spend time volunteering. Similarly, Lewis and Mackenzie report that SRI investors 
often take an active part in political parties, religious and charitable institutions, or pressure 
                                                 
389 See Rosen et al. (1991), Beal, Goyen (1998, p. 141), McLachlan, Gardner (2004) 
390 See Beal, Goyen (1998, p. 141) 
391 See Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a) 
392 According to Brown (2007, p. 13) SRI investors are likely to be affluent individuals who also have 
a greater willingness to purchase financial products with added ethical features, in some cases even if 
they have to pay more than for conventional investments. 
393 According to Brown (2007, p. 13) on average, SRI investors are from a higher income bracket, to 
the extent that SRI requires a greater degree of wealth and financial sophistication. To the extent that 
equity ownership in the U.K. is skewed towards the most affluent socio-economic group, SRI is as-
sumed to “appeal to a greater number of well-off individuals with the interest and resources to commit 
to high-impact social investment”. 
394 See Merrill Lynch, Capgemini (2007). High net worth individuals (HNWI) are defined as having 
investable assets (financial assets not including their primary residence) in excess of USD 1 million. 
395 Rosen et al. (1991, p. 228) 
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groups.396 Brown further adds that SRI investors by definition have a high level of interest in 
social and environmental issues, and therefore seek to reflect their views in their invest-
ments.397 Hence their investment practices are just a natural part of their way of life or life-
style as they usually act in a cause-related manner.398 Furthermore O'Neil and Pienta describe 
an ethical person as someone who is “other” centered, caring about the impact that their ac-
tions have on others,399 rather than someone who engages in SRI to compensate for an other-
wise hedonistic lifestyle400. Although the duty of loyalty obliges pension fund trustees to act 
in the best interest of the beneficiaries of a fund (which includes the avoidance of conflicts of 
interest or the consideration of personal values or beliefs in investment decisions) the evi-
dence above suggests that: 
H2.5 Pension fund boards that are composed of members who engage in cause-related ac-
tivities or that have a high level of interest in social and / or environmental issues are 
more likely to engage in SRI. 
4.1.1.3. BOARD SIZE 
According to the Who Cares Wins (WCW) initiative, prevailing skepticism among fiduciaries 
regarding the non-standard investment approach associated with SRI (for many of them in-
vesting in SRI runs against conventional investment practices of pension funds) requires 
strong beliefs on the part of trustees to effectively promote SRI.401 Similarly, Johnson and de 
Graaf expect that pension funds are often reluctant to pursue non-traditional investment 
strategies (with unproven track records) that although prudent are not widely used by other 
pension funds, for fear of exposure to liabilities arising through breaching conventional in-
vestment practices.402 As a result of this, the WCW initiative expects that the need for demon-
strable compliance and questions around compatibility with fiduciary obligations leads trus-
tees to favor conventional approaches.403 In this situation we hypothesize that being exposed 
to a larger group of decision-makers may deter trustees from promoting SRI as an investment 
option. Following the same line of argument, Cumming and Johan suggest that among institu-
tional investors SRI is more common when the decision to invest in this way is centralized in 
                                                 
396 Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a) 
397 Brown J. (2007, p. 13) 
398 See Rosen et al. (1991, p. 228), Lewis, Mackenzie (2000a, p. 183). In addition Lewis and Webley 
(1994, p. 180) showed that people with green attitudes reveal a greater enthusiasm for SRI. From this 
Nilsson (2008, p. 310) concludes that investors that have more involvement with the pro social issues 
that are addressed in SRI should be more likely to engage in SRI. 
399 O'Neil, Pienta (1994, p. 74) 
400 See Rosen et al. (1991, p. 230). Statman (2004, p. 158) concluded that unlike responsible consumer 
goods that benefit from signaling social responsibility to other people, SRI products mainly offer self-
signaling benefits, in that investors signal their social responsibility to themselves. 
401 Who Cares Wins Initiative (2009, p. 39) 
402 Johnson, de Graaf (2009, p. 5) 
403 Who Cares Wins Initiative (2009, p. 39) 
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the hands of a single chief investment officer, as opposed to a broader group of individuals.404 
From this we hypothesize that: 
H3 Pension funds with smaller boards are more likely to invest in SRI than funds gov-
erned by larger decision-making bodies that require more transparent decision-making. 
4.1.2. DISPOSITION OF EMPLOYERS 
Another characteristic that may help to explain why certain funds engage in SRI while others 
do not, relates to the disposition of the employer towards environmental, social or ethical con-
cerns. The question is to what extent the values of the employer impact the investment strat-
egy of the pension fund. In Switzerland, although pension funds are legally separate from 
employers, employers can influence the investment decisions of a fund through their represen-
tation on the board of trustees. According to Weber et al. employee representatives have an 
interest in augmenting or preserving their pension assets, whereas representatives of the em-
ployer are mainly interested in avoiding making any extra contributions and in avoiding po-
tential reputation issues that could backfire.405 Accordingly, one can argue that employers 
from a more sophisticated socio-cultural background are more likely to promote SRI in the 
investment strategy of their pension fund. Pension funds for which this line of thinking is 
most straightforward include mission-based organizations such as churches, unions or other 
nonprofit organizations but also companies with a strong commitment to CR issues. Accord-
ing to the mission hypothesis formulated by Schäfer, the investment policy of such organiza-
tions is not only geared towards performance, but also towards the organization’s princi-
ples.406 For them the coordination between the mission of the employer and the investment 
practices of its pension fund is ultimately a matter of the credibility of the employer’s com-
mitment towards their mission.407 In fact, in a study of pension funds in the U.S. the align-
ment with an employer’s mission was considered as the single most important driver for the 
offering of a SRI pension option (this holds particularly for healthcare organizations and gov-
ernment funds).408 
In Switzerland, Oesch finds evidence that an employer’s mission plays a certain role for mis-
sion-based organizations, as well as organizations that have a strong affiliation with social or 
environmental concerns (i.e. employers from the health sector, social services, education or 
employers with a cultural background).409 Although the primary objective of church or union 
pension funds is similar to any conventional fund and is to meet the fund’s liabilities towards 
their employees, they should have a special interest in doing this in a way that is consistent 
                                                 
404 Cumming, Johan (2007, pp. 396-397) 
405 See Weber et al. (2009, p. 57) 
406 Schäfer (2004, pp. 274-275) 
407 A poll conducted in 1999 by EIRIS (1999, p. 4) in the U.K. showed that 83% of pension scheme 
members agree that a company wishing to be seen as “ethical” should make sure its pension scheme 
has an ethical investment policy. 
408 See Social Investment Forum, Mercer Investment Consulting (2007, p. 2) 
409 Oesch (2000, p. 30), see also Williams (2007, p. 49) 
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with the organization’s principles. For example church funds such as the fund of the Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Finland410, the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of 
the United Methodist Church (U.S.)411 or the pension fund for pastors and preachers of the 
Dutch protestant church412 have engaged in SRI with the objective of ensuring that their in-
vestments are in line with their teachings. The Evangelical Lutheran Church writes “Ethics is 
not merely a supplementary aspect of discretion; the ethical viewpoint predominates through-
out the investment process. The overall guideline is that only ethically well-justified solutions 
are rightful and acceptable. Church investments are based on the criteria of profitability, a 
controlled risk level and sufficient liquidity, but the ethical criterion is always emphasized 
alongside these. [...] The goal in responsible investment is not maximum profit but sufficient 
returns on ethically acceptable investments. Sufficient returns here mean adequate from the 
standpoint of the activity of the Church. Profit seeking is restricted in such a way that also the 
selection of the means forms an ethical issue as well. If the achievement of the goal calls for 
ethically questionable means, the end itself does not justify the use of such means”. […] Ac-
cordingly, a conventional shareholder-based approach to investment would lead the fund to 
act in contradiction to the Church’s own ethical principles, which in practice means separating 
the operation of the Church, on one hand, and the management of its finances, on the 
other”.413  
A similar line of argument holds for union funds, where due to close links beween many 
social issues and traditional union concerns, the trustees of a union pension fund may have an 
interest in investing in companies that oppose established labor practices, such as collective-
bargaining rights or child labor etc.414 As an example, UNISON,415 Britain’s biggest public 
sector union with more than 1.3 million members, considers investments of its pension fund 
in arms manufacturing to be incompatible with the union’s aims and objectives.416 As in the 
case of church funds, union funds promote their values not just for purely ethical reasons but 
also with a focus on the long-term health of corporations. For example, the American Federa-
tion of Labor Congress of Industrial Organizations417 engages with companies on pro-worker 
and corporate governance issues418 on the assumption that this fosters the overall sustainabil-
                                                 
410 See evl.fi/EVLen.nsf 
411 See www.gbophb.org/sri_funds 
412 The fund has engaged in SRI by investing in an equity fund that aims to achieve returns in line with 
the market, while at the same time avoids businesses that produce land mines, cluster munitions, or 
atomic, biological or chemical weapons. Additional categories that are excluded by the fund are busi-
nesses found to be involved in gross violations of human rights such as the use of child and forced 
labor, corruption and major environmental pollution (see Bandel (2008b)). 
413 See Takala, Kaariainen (2003) 
414 In the U.S. union pension funds have become one the most active of all institutional shareholders, 
also on corporate governance issues – see Schwab, Thomas (1998). 
415 See www.unison.org.uk 
416 See UNISON (2007) 
417See www.aflcio.org.This is the largest federation of trade unions in the U.S. combining pension 
funds assets of around USD 400 billion (in 2003). 
418 See Wheelan (2008e). 
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ity of the firm and increases its shareholder value, thereby helping the fund to meet its fiduci-
ary duties.419 
Based on the above lines of argument, one can conclude that employers that are exposed to 
social and environmental concerns or interest group pressure (e.g. organizations from the edu-
cation or health sector; social services or cultural institutions) are more inclined to consider 
SRI issues within the investment decisions of their pension fund.420 To the extent that em-
ployees in these sectors share a common system of beliefs and values this may influence em-
ployers to also promote these values in the investment strategies of their pension fund. Hence, 
it is not surprising that the most active SRI investors include funds from the educational sector 
such as CalSTRS, TIAA-CREF421 or U.K. based USS to name just a few. From this we hy-
pothesize that: 
H4.1  SRI is more likely among pension funds where the employer has a religious, union, 
educational, health, social or cultural background. 
The mission hypothesis can be expanded to explicitly include those corporate pension funds 
where the employers have an established CR agenda in place that addresses environmental, 
social or ethical stakeholder concerns. In this context the mission hypothesis suggests that 
companies that are committed to such CR principles are also more likely to invest in SRI 
through their pension arm than those institutions that are neither aware nor responsive to such 
issues. This hypothesis finds some empirical support in a report by UKSIF, which examined 
the SRI practices of pension funds of U.K. companies that can be considered as leaders with 
regard to CR issues. In this study, out of 34 funds participating in the survey, nearly 75% in-
dicate that they have some sort of SRI policy in place for their pension fund.422 Among them 
21% attribute “great significance” to the alignment of their SRI behavior with the plan spon-
sor’s CR or sustainability policy, while 42% give “some significance”, meaning that together 
nearly two thirds attribute at least “some significance”. These figures show that for some cor-
porate pension funds the employer’s CR commitment is an important driver for their SRI be-
havior. From this we hypothesize that: 
H4.2  Among private pension funds SRI is more likely when the sponsoring employer has 
established a CR agenda. 
H4.3  SRI is less likely among private pension funds whose employer is active in a sector 
which is targeted by SRI investors, such as arms, alcohol, gambling, genetically modi-
                                                 
419 See Baue, Thomsen (2003) 
420 See Oesch (2000, p. 32) 
421 TIAA-CREF (2008, p. 2) is a fund in the academic, medical, cultural and research fields, which 
founds its commitment for SRI on its nonprofit heritage and mission to serve those who serve the 
greater good. 
422 See UKSIF (2007b). 
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fied organisms (GMO) and nuclear energy or involved in controversies around envi-
ronmental (e.g. asbestos) or social issues (e.g. human rights violations). 
In many countries, public pension funds have traditionally been among the most active SRI 
investors.423 On one hand, this could be because trustees of public funds feel more exposed to 
serve the greater good than trustees of private funds and therefore feel a need to also align 
their investments with the public view. There are several public funds that follow this line of 
argument. For example, in 2008, the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF) announced 
to divest from companies associated with the manufacturing of cluster munitions. The ban 
came after New Zealand together with other countries ratified the international agreement 
banning the production of cluster bombs. According to the fund’s chief executive officer such 
divestments have been necessary in order to “avoid prejudice to New Zealand’s reputation as 
a responsible member of the world community”.424 Other public funds that have divested 
from companies on this basis include the NGPF, the Irish National Pension Reserve Fund 
(NPRF), the British Environment Agency425 or AP1-4426. Rosén from AP2 explained that the 
job of AP’s ethical council is to “make the interpretation of the conventions that the Swedish 
state have signed and make a judgment on how the companies can be associated with any 
violations of the conventions that Sweden has signed.”427 In addition the chief executive of 
AP2 further added that in order to keep track of the ethical viewpoint in its around 2’000 in-
vestment holdings, the conventions and treaties signed by the Swedish state have become 
their guidelines. On the other hand it has also been argued that public funds are more active in 
SRI as they are less exposed to conflicts of interest than private funds, meaning that they are 
not restricted by commercial relationships when they engage with the management of a com-
pany on an issue of concern.428 From this we generally hypothesize that: 
H4.4 Public pension funds are more likely to engage in SRI than private pension funds. 
                                                 
423 In contrast, in Japan private pension funds are far more active in SRI than their public counterparts. 
424 See Wheelan (2008f) 
425 Howard Pearce, from the pension fund for the British Environment Agency, said, "Quite simply, 
we decided that we should do this because our investment strategy was not linked to our mission” (see 
Rosenthal (2008)). 
426 The ethical and environmental policies of the four buffer funds in the Swedish pension system 
AP1–4 are based on the core values of the Swedish State as they are expressed in international con-
ventions signed by Sweden and decisions on foreign policy (see Ethical Council (2008, p. 2)). 
427 Rosén added: “We have the same ethical guidelines as the Swedish state has. [...] The Swedish state 
has signed the non-proliferation treaty on nuclear arms, meaning that according to this treaty it is al-
lowed to have nuclear weapons only within a couple of countries. And the companies that we are talk-
ing about here are selling products and services to maintain the nuclear arms within the limits of the 
treaty” (see Bandel, Stewart (2008)). 
428 See Prevost, Rao (2000, p. 179), Monks, Minow (2001, p. 125), Wong et al. (2008, p. 42). Black 
(1990, p. 599)adds that ‘‘public fund managers don’t solicit business from corporate managers, so they 
aren’t directly concerned with whether corporate managers like how they vote”. Similarly Ryan and 
Schneider (1990, p. 599) classify public pension funds as pressure resistant institutions to the extent 
that they are not involved with the firms they hold in their portfolio. 
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4.1.3. ROLE OF BENEFICIARIES 
Beneficiaries of a pension fund include those individuals that are entitled to receive a payment 
of retirement benefits from the pension fund. They are usually not the legal owner of the as-
sets of their pension fund, but have legal or beneficial rights or some other contractual claims 
against the assets of the pension fund.429 In Switzerland where pension funds are mostly es-
tablished as foundations, the legal ownership is vested in the trustee or the board of the foun-
dation. Beneficiaries therefore have only a contractual claim to retirement payments rather 
than alienable claims to the equity or debt instrument itself. Contrary to other countries such 
as the U.K. or the U.S., in Switzerland beneficiaries have neither a choice within the system 
nor a direct say in where their assets are invested, although parity management theoretically 
allows the employee representatives put forward their position. As outlined in section 2.4, in 
cases where the ultimate responsibility for investing the assets is with the pension fund trus-
tees, trustees are obliged by their fiduciary duties to invest the retirement assets prudently in 
the best interests of their beneficiaries (duty of loyalty). In this situation the traditional view 
among trustees is that the best interest of the beneficiaries is the best interest financially, 
which is defined as maximizing returns for a specified level of risk.430 Sethi affirms in this 
context that “conventional wisdom argues that the fiduciary responsibility of the pension 
funds’ trustees must be solely focused on their beneficiaries and therefore, their investment 
criteria must be based strictly on narrowly defined financial measures.”431 
Critics add here that beneficiaries are usually neither surveyed on their best interests, nor on 
what should be done in their view with their retirement capital.432 In the light of the evidence 
that other investment drivers exist for individuals rather than purely risk and return considera-
tions (see section 2.4.2), one could expect that in cases where beneficiaries would have a say 
in how their retirement assets are invested, individual differences and preferences would lead 
some of them to define their best interest other than with regard to pure wealth maximization 
considerations. This has been shown by the results of a number of surveys that indicate that 
investing retirement assets in line with ethical, environmental or social criteria is a real con-
cern for many beneficiaries. From this it can be assumed that the typology of SRI investors 
developed in section 2.4.3 also applies to the beneficiaries of a pension fund. 
• A British opinion poll conducted for the Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS) in 
1997 found that 73% of the 700 adults surveyed wanted ethical pensions. 44% stated that 
their pension plan should include a SRI policy if that could be done without any reduction 
                                                 
429 See OECD (2005, p. 16), Hawley (2000) 
430 For example, regarding the famous U.K. court case Cowan v. Scargill, Langbein and Posner (1980, 
p. 97) write that it was established that the best interest of the beneficiaries generally means their best 
financial interests. Similarly, in section 404 (a) of ERISA the U.S. pension law it is established that 
fiduciaries shall discharge their duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants 
and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their benefici-
aries, defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan (see Lanoff (1980, p. 389)). 
431 Sethi (2005, p. 99) 
432 See Barber (2006, p. 20), Caerlewy-Smith et al. (2006, p. 1586) 
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in financial return and a further 29% felt that their pension plan should adopt ethical poli-
cies even if this would lead to reduced returns. In contrast, only 19% of those surveyed 
thought that pension funds should ignore ethics and concentrate exclusively on financial 
returns.433 
• A survey conducted in June 2000 showed that nearly 66% of beneficiaries wanted their 
trustees to actively apply SRI criteria to their pension assets.434 
• A national survey conducted between 2001 and 2002 by the Canadian Democracy and 
Corporate Accountability Commission showed that 51% of the surveyed individuals (in-
cluding retirees and people approaching retirement age) want their pension plans to invest 
in companies with a good CR record.435 Contrary to the survey conducted by EIRIS, the 
individuals further stated that their pension funds should not only invest in companies that 
make the highest profits and generate the highest return, but also apply such criteria even 
if it means somewhat lower benefits for themselves. 
• In Switzerland a survey conducted in 2005 among 800 individuals regarding their expec-
tations of the societal responsibility of companies and pension funds showed that 56% of 
interviewees want their pension fund assets to be invested in SRI as long as these products 
achieve comparable market returns. 22% of interviewees would even accept their pension 
fund engaging in SRI in cases where this leads to somewhat lower returns.436 
• In the U.K. a survey by the Department for Work and Pensions showed a particular inter-
est in SRI among younger respondents (aged 20-34) who wished to have the choice to in-
vest in SRI. In cases where they would not have a choice, they would like to see some re-
assurances that the fund itself would be ethical and compliant with certain standards.437 
Some pension funds have indeed surveyed their beneficiaries on their preferences with regard 
to SRI. TIAA-CREF438, which interviewed its beneficiaries in 2006, found that while finan-
cial return is a strong priority for their participants they also want social values to be reflected 
in their investments and that there is a need for more information about SRI strategies and 
accounts.439 Some of the funds that have surveyed their beneficiaries have done so only after 
being targeted by external pressure. For example, in 2007, the Liverpool City Council voted 
unanimously that as a democratic organization a pension fund should reflect the ethos of its 
members and as such it requested the Merseyside pension fund to ballot its beneficiaries in 
order to determine whether they wish to see the fund's SIP amended to include SRI.440 In 
                                                 
433 See Sparkes (2000, p. 2), Yaron (2001, p. 1) 
434 See Brown J. (2007, p. 13) 
435 See the Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission (2002, p. 41) 
436 See Furrer, Seidler (2006) 
437 See Department for Work and Pensions (2006, p. 69), Hall et al. (2006, p. 46) 
438 TIAA-CREF is provider of retirement services in the academic, medical and cultural area, and one 
of the largest private pension plans in the world. 
439 See Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research (2006) 
440 See Henderson (2007) 
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other cases pension funds have been targeted directly by their beneficiaries.441 For example, 
before becoming a promoter of SRI TIAA-CREF faced ongoing actions from the “Make 
TIAA-CREF Ethical” coalition.442 Similarly, in the U.K., university teachers launched the 
“Ethics4USS Campaign” to promote SRI within USS.443 Both campaigns show that when 
consulted, beneficiaries do not just care about maximum returns but also about where their 
funds are invested. However, although such surveys indicate a considerable interest in SRI 
among pension fund beneficiaries, this must be interpreted carefully as a social desirability 
bias may lead to a gap between the attitudes and the actual behavior of investors, meaning that 
investors included in a focus group do not want to admit that they do not care about the ethics 
of the companies with regard to investment decisions.444 This gap between initial interest and 
a final investment decision is reflected in a survey conducted by UBS in 2005 (see Figure 34), 
which shows that among the individuals that have heard of SRI and that show a certain inter-
est, only a small fraction finally invested in SRI. 
FIGURE 34 – CLIENT AWARENESS OF SRI, INTEREST AND SALES 
 
Source: UBS (2005), n = 1’704 
Although the fraction of investors that ultimately engage in SRI seems rather small in the 
above example, other examples show that there is a real demand by beneficiaries in cases 
where they are offered SRI options. For example, in the U.S. a report commissioned by the 
SIF showed a strong increase of SRI options among DC plans in the U.S. According to the 
report, 19% of respondents to the survey offered one or more SRI options in 2007, while an 
additional 41% planned to add such an option within 3 years in order to respond to the grow-
ing demand from their beneficiaries. According to the report staff recommendations and direct 
requests raised by beneficiaries have been an important factor determining whether SRI op-
tions are offered.445 Similar evidence also exists in Switzerland where under the private pen-
sion pillar the current market offering includes SRI products from Sarasin, Raiffeisen and 
                                                 
441 See Fuhrmann (2007, p. 164) 
442 See www.maketiaa-crefethical.org 
443 The campaign was initiated by USS members in coordination with the Association of University 
Teachers (see Szczesny, Wilhelm (2005, p. 16), Sparkes (2000, p. 2)). 
444 See Nilsson (2008, p. 316) 
445 See Social Investment Forum, Mercer Investment Consulting (2007, p. 2) 
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Swisscanto (see Table 16). These figures show that there is a real demand by individuals for 
SRI in a pension fund context. Although being launched only recently compared to the con-
ventional 3a-products, these funds have managed to attract considerable asset levels in a rela-
tively short period of time, partially even surpassing their conventional peers. This success 
can partly be attributed to their excellent performance compared to other products. 
TABLE 16 – SRI FUNDS AVAILABLE UNDER THE PRIVATE PENSION PILLAR 
Funds  Total IA in CHF m, end of Q3 2009 Year of inception 
Sarasin/BVG-Wachstum 237.49 1992 
Sarasin/BVG-Rendite 41.89 2000 
Sarasin/BVG Nachhaltigkeit* 95.67 2001 
Sarasin/BVG-Zukunft 28.77 2006 
Sarasin/BVG-Nachhaltigkeit Rendite* 6.63 2007 
Raiffeisen/Pension Invest 50 682.00 1998 
Raiffeisen Pension Invest Futura 50* 186.00 2006 
Swisscanto/BVG 3 Portfolio 45 1'670.65 1986 
Swisscanto/BVG 3 Portfolio 25 637.40 1992 
Swisscanto/BVG 3 Portfolio 10 556.85 1992 
Swisscanto/BVG 3 Oeko 25* 677.11 2000 
Source: Fund websites; (*) SRI products 
Based on the variety of preferences among beneficiaries, it can be hypothesized that: 
H5.1 Pension funds that have been confronted by an explicit request to engage in SRI by 
their beneficiaries are more likely to invest in SRI. 
H5.2 Pension funds whose representatives view SRI as being in the best interest of their 
beneficiaries will be more likely to invest in SRI. 
4.1.4. RELIANCE ON INVESTMENT CONSULTANTS 
Another stakeholder-related characteristic that may influence the propensity of pension funds 
to engage in SRI, relates to the role of investment consultants within a fund’s investment de-
cision-making process. According to Lydenberg, investment consultants that serve as inter-
mediaries and gatekeepers between institutional investors and asset managers (see Figure 33) 
have immense influence on the institutions and their investment behavior.446 As such Lyden-
berg considers their familiarity with SRI to be a crucial factor for the institutions’ position 
towards SRI. Clark and Urwin distinguish between three main responsibilities of investment 
consultants447 where the familiarity with regard to SRI can be beneficial for the SRI behavior 
of pension funds. First, investment consultants may assist pension funds in the formation and 
clarification of a fund’s organizational strategy, mission statements or SIP. Second, they may 
play a role in asset manager selection (e.g. via a request for proposal) and act as facilitator 
between the pension fund and its asset managers (see section 4.3.1. for the role of external 
                                                 
446 Lydenberg in Kropp (2009), see also Frauenlob (1998, p. 233) 
447 Clark, Urwin (2008), see also Juravle, Lewis (2008, pp. 291-292) 
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asset managers on the decision of pension funds to engage in SRI).448 Finally, this may even 
go as far as their management of the relationship between the pension fund and the asset man-
agers over the whole investment process (e.g. including investment advice, consultancy use 
for risk management or performance measurement). Within this framework, abundant space 
exists for investment consultants with sufficient SRI expertise to respond to client demand 
and integrate SRI within their services (e.g. integration of SRI into the fund’s organizational 
strategy, mandate design, manager selection and identification of appropriate investment ve-
hicles or performance evaluation, etc.).449 
In Switzerland, there seems to be no fully developed SRI expertise across the main consulting 
institutions.450 At best consultancies occasionally address SRI on an ad hoc basis in cases 
where there is an explicit request by a pension fund. Knight and Dixon consider as “follow-
ers” (contrary to thought-leaders), in the sense that they are reluctant to promote SRI due to 
their limited expertise and conceptual confusion about what this form of investing entails.451 
In fact in reality, the limited SRI capabilities of the existing investment consultants may even 
evolve into a severe obstacle for the application of SRI by pension funds.452 In contrast, the 
investment consultants that Knight and Dixon define as thought-leaders have higher levels of 
expertise and knowledge, which strengthens their ability to take a leadership position in this 
adviser-client relationship.453 As such, they can build more influential relationships with their 
clients and overcome systemic and cultural barriers that exist among trustees especially re-
garding new investment approaches such as SRI.454 Thus, given the relative novelty and con-
tinuous skepticism among trustees in Switzerland with regard to SRI, the uptake of SRI by 
pension funds would be to some extent contingent on the willingness and ability of invest-
ment consultants to advise their clients in this field.455 From this we hypothesize that: 
H6 Pension funds that employ investment consultants and which have no established SRI 
capabilities are more unlikely to engage in SRI. 
4.2. PORTFOLIO CHARACTERISTICS 
In addition to the above characteristics that relate to the stakeholders of pension funds, the 
likelihood that a pension fund engages in SRI may also depend upon a number of underlying 
portfolio characteristics that may impact the capacity or ability of the trustees to engage in 
SRI. This includes characteristics such as the size of the investment portfolio of a pension 
                                                 
448 See Frauenlob (1998, p. 26) 
449 See Eurosif (2009, p. 6) 
450 See Schumacher-Hummel (2004, p. 264) 
451 Knight, Dixon (2009, pp. 18-19). Although the authors focus on ESG integration, their line of 
thinking can also be extended to the general disposition of investment consultants towards SRI. 
452 Schumacher-Hummel (2004, pp. 264-265), Eurosif (2009, p. 6), Berezin, Wood (2009, p. 1) 
453 Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 3) 
454 Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 16) 
455 Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 9) 
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fund (see section 4.2.1), its risk taking capacity, which is closely related to the past perform-
ance of a pension fund (see section 4.2.2), a fund’s investment horizon (see section 4.2.3), the 
level of portfolio diversification (see section 4.2.4) and finally the degree of portfolio concen-
tration i.e. the size of corporate holdings of which the pension fund portfolio is composed (see 
section 4.2.5). 
4.2.1. PORTFOLIO SIZE 
The first characteristic that has been repeatedly suggested to be positively related to the pro-
pensity of a fund to engage in SRI concerns the size of a pension fund portfolio. Various au-
thors argue that larger funds are more inclined to engage in SRI than smaller ones.456 This is 
consistent with earlier findings that larger funds more frequently engage in SRI457 as well as 
that some of the largest funds which are signatories to the UNPRI act as SRI thought-leaders 
(see Table 17). 
TABLE 17 – THE WORLD'S LARGEST PENSION FUNDS IN TERMS OF IA 
Pension fund Country IA in USD bn UNPRI signatory 
Government Pension Investment Japan 1’059 - 
TIAA-CREF  USA 386  
ABP Netherlands 231  
NGPF Norway 207  
CalPERS USA 168  
Local Government Officials Japan 164 - 
Federal Retirement Thrift USA 141 - 
National Pension Service Korea 135  
New York State Common USA 117 - 
Pension Fund Association Japan 117 - 
CalSTRS USA 117  
Postal Savings Fund Taiwan 110 - 
General Motors USA 107 - 
Florida State Board USA 103 - 
Source: Based on Watson Wyatt (2005) and the list of UNPRI signatories as of mid 2009 
An explanation for the preference of larger investors for SRI is supported by the underlying 
assumption that compared to conventional investments SRI creates additional costs as it re-
quires a special set of skills from investors to process often inaccessible and difficult to ana-
lyze information on a firm’s CR performance. Scale effects may mean that larger pension 
funds have internal capabilities to address these challenges, whereas smaller funds would 
need to rely on external capabilities.458 In this context Green writes: “for many institutional 
                                                 
456 See Rudd (1981), Tippet (2001), Szczesny, Wilhelm (2005), Cumming, Johan (2007),(2007), 
Scheibelhut (1997, p. 34), Davis, Steil (2001, p. 9), Ellis (2008) 
457 See Mathieu (2000), UKSIF (2007b, p. 5), Williams (2007, p. 46), UKSIF (2009, p. 10), Preesman 
(2010) 
458 See Heiner (1983), Black (1992, p. 822), Szewczyk et al. (1992), Kochhar, David (1996, p. 74), 
David et al. (1998, p. 201) 
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shareholders, the main obstacle to doing so [SRI] is not opposition to the idea, which can of-
ten make good business sense, but the apparent difficulty of putting it into practice with the 
limited resources available.”459 Larger investors may be in a better position to reap economies 
of scale in terms of acquiring and analyzing CR information or engaging with a large number 
of firms since they are capable of doing so at lower unit costs compared to smaller funds.460 
Thus, fund size may play a role to the extent that, according to Müller, building up respective 
in-house capabilities involves considerable initial investment in manpower, know-how, data-
bases and information gathering to develop the expertise to screen and analyze companies 
according to a specific predefined CR framework.461 However, once set up, economies of 
scale may emerge in gathering and analyzing SRI information for a large number of firms in a 
portfolio, thereby reducing per-company research costs.462 Thus, once a system has been de-
veloped, volumes could be increased without a corresponding increase in costs as many proc-
ess and structural issues arise in a similar form at many companies.463 According to Black, the 
same holds for shareholder engagement activities, noting that a shareholder who makes the 
same proposal at a number of companies can reduce per-company solicitation costs, while 
preserving the per-company benefit from success. Similarly, voting on the same proposal 
many times make it worthwhile to invest time and attention in casting an informed vote.464 
In contrast smaller pension funds, which do not have the resources to build up their own man-
agement capabilities, may need to rely on external service providers (see section 4.3.1).465 
While the increased availability of pooled products and information from specialized rating 
agencies has certainly enhanced their access to SRI466, it could be argued that the great diver-
sity of the current SRI offering, as well as the lack of transparency of SRI products still re-
quires them to attribute considerable resources to establishing the necessary expertise in this 
area. This may cause them to abstain from engaging in such non-conventional products. From 
this we hypothesize that overall: 
H7 Larger pension funds are more likely to engage in SRI than smaller funds. 
                                                 
459 Green, Duncan (2001) 
460 See Norges Bank (2001), Davis, Steil (2001, p. 13). Such economies of scale may arise from the 
ability to transact in large volumes, which typically leads to a lowering of commission charges. Inves-
tors share the costly services of expert investment managers and thereby save in advisory fees. 
461 See Müller (2002, p. 21) 
462 See David et al. (1998, p. 201), Black (1992, p. 822) 
463 See Black (1992, p. 822). Conversely Alchian and Demsetz (1972) suggest that large investors may 
also turn out to be less committed to monitoring managerial behavior as their ownership becomes dis-
persed (e.g. as a result of an indexing strategy). In such cases the marginal costs for monitoring an 
individual company in the portfolio are larger than if they would hold more concentrated equity. 
464 Shareholder coordination among AP1-4, the four buffer funds in the Swedish pension system, dem-
onstrates how combining both resources and votes of companies helped reduce costs for monitoring 
and engaging with companies and increased company dialogue, see Ethical Council (2008, pp. 1-2). 
465 See Caerlewy-Smith (2006, p. 1586) 
466 See Ellis (2008) 
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4.2.2. RISK-TAKING CAPACITY 
As stated earlier, article 71 of the BVG requires that pension fund assets be managed pru-
dently to ensure the security of assets, achieve a reasonable return on investments, maintain a 
suitable diversification of risks and allow for the liquidity requirements of the pension plan. 
Based on this article, we conclude that pension funds should opt for SRI, either on the basis of 
purely financial considerations or on the basis of ethical considerations, as long as they are 
balanced with reasonable returns. Evidence however suggests that some pension funds engage 
in SRI although they do not expect SRI to outperform in financial terms over the long run. 
Moreover, some funds even engage in SRI although they consider it to involve higher costs 
and cause higher levels of risks than their conventional benchmarks.467 This is even more sur-
prising as the trustees in charge of the management of the fund’s assets are legally liable for 
any losses or damages caused willfully468 – involving decisions that are inconsistent with the 
obligations imposed by the rule of prudence. 
The room to maneuvre for pension fund trustees in Switzerland to engage in SRI is 
considerably larger as they are assumed to be basically free in their investment decisions as 
long as they are able to meet their financial obligations at any time.469 In situations where 
funding gaps exist, trustees are obliged to undertake adequate measures to return to a situation 
where they are fully funded.470 Trustees are therefore expected to have strong incentives to 
minimize any risks that could get them into a situation where their liquidity requirements can-
not be covered anymore. In other words, differences in the funding level and therefore the 
risk-taking capacity of pension funds are likely to have an impact on their flexibility to take 
on more risk. Hence it can be assumed that underfunded pension funds will not invest as ag-
gressively as fully funded ones and have only limited preference for higher risk strategies, 
both in terms of asset allocation and in demand for non-standard products.471 Correspond-
ingly, better performing and hence better funded pension funds are more likely to engage in 
non-standard products such as SRI if this form of investing is expected to incur a financial 
penalty (see section 4.1.1.1 for the perception of pension fund trustees regarding SRI).472 
Trustees who are skeptical of SRI, but feel being pressured to consider this as an investment 
option (e.g. due to the request by their beneficiaries) will only invest in SRI if they can actu-
ally afford it. In contrast, for underfunded pension funds that consider SRI on the basis of 
sound financial considerations (e.g. as they expect SRI to impact long-term financial value), 
this form of investing may serve as a prudent means to achieve increased returns and to over-
come the funding gap. From this we hypothesize that: 
                                                 
467 See Lusenti (2009) 
468 See article 52, § 1, BVG. See Vetter-Scheiber (2009, p. 156) 
469 See Queisser, Vittas (2000) 
470 See Queisser, Vittas (2000), Frauenlob (1998, pp. 66, 206) 
471 According to Rauh (2007), poorly funded pension funds generally allocate a greater share of pen-
sion fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas well-funded pension 
funds invest more heavily in equity. 
472 See Schumacher-Hummel (2004, pp. 217, 269) 
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H8.1 Pension funds without a positive perception of SRI with regard to long-term financial 
performance will be more likely to invest in SRI when they are fully funded. 
H8.2 Underfunded pension funds will be more likely to invest in SRI when they have a 
positive perception of SRI. 
4.2.3. INVESTMENT HORIZON 
As outlined in section 2.5.3.2, sustainability often requires a long-term perspective.473 Thus, a 
third portfolio characteristic, which is often associated with the specific role of pension funds 
as SRI investors, concerns their long-term investment horizon. According to Knight and 
Dixon, with their exposure to a wide variety of asset types and geographies over a long time 
horizon, pension funds may have the potential to improve their overall returns by taking SRI 
considerations into account in their investment and ownership choices.474 Long-term investors 
are typically characterized as investors that have a long investment horizon, which according 
to Davis and Steil relates to the planned liquidation date of an investment475 and which is 
measured by the concept of effective maturity or duration of an investment. That is the hold-
ing period of an asset. Using this definition, pension funds are considered as typical long-term 
investors. For example, in the 2008 CDP report sovereign and public pension funds are de-
fined as those investors that have the longest investment horizons, while hedge funds have 
among the shortest (see Figure 35). As such, they are expected to have a natural interest in 
SRI as it has the potential to affect the performance of a portfolio of a pension fund in the 
long run. For example, ABP, the Dutch civil service pension fund engages in SRI on the as-
sumption that companies with high CR performance will also deliver higher long-term finan-
cial performance.476 Similarly, the preamble to the UNPRI states that “as institutional inves-
tors, we have a duty to act in the best long-term interests of our beneficiaries. In this fiduciary 
role, we believe that [ESG] issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios”.477 
                                                 
473 See section 2.5.3 for an overview of how ESG integration may help investors to reduce risks and 
seize opportunities in the long run. 
474 Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 8) 
475 See Davis, Steil (2001, p. 53) 
476 See Brooksbank (2005) 
477 See UNPRI (2006) 
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FIGURE 35 – LENGTH OF INVESTMENT HORIZON FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008, p. 86) 
The relatively long holding period of pension funds results from the simple fact that pension 
funds have to finance long-term liabilities of 20 years or more.478 In the case of a defined 
benefit (DB) plan, these liabilities consist of a specific level of benefits at a point in time 
when the retirement falls due, whereas for a DC plan trustees have the duty to preserve their 
beneficiaries' contributions until retirement. In contrast, mutual funds’ primary investment 
objective is to achieve a high current return, which leads mutual funds to adopt an active 
management style or trader strategy in order to take advantage of short-term opportunities. As 
a consequence, this leads to a higher trading rate and to a reduction in the average holding 
period of shares.479 In addition, pension funds also benefit from the predictability of their 
long-term in and outflows of capital, which are similar to those of life insurance companies, 
some charitable funds or endowments.480 As such they have a high level of control over what 
will be paid out or when a position will have to be liquidated,481 allowing them to make pre-
cise investment decisions over a relatively long period of time. In contrast, mutual funds have 
an instant repurchase clause offering short-term liquidity either via direct redemption of hold-
ings (open-end fund) or via the ability to trade shares in the funds on exchanges (closed-end 
fund). Since their beneficiaries may redeem shares at any time, mutual funds are confronted 
                                                 
478 See Drucker (1976, p. 71), Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2005, p. 7), Hesse (2008, p. 4). Hesse 
(2008, p. 22) examined the investment horizon of a number of pension funds concluding that on aver-
age their investment horizon is 23 years (answers varied between 10 and 30 years). 
479 See Johnson, Greening (1999, p. 566). Kempf and Osthoff (2008, p. 1279) showed that the turnover 
of SRI funds is lower than for conventional funds. 
480 See Frauenlob (1998, p. 67), Ryan, Schneider (2002, p. 560) 
481 Since 1995 the predictability of in- and outflows of pension assets in Switzerland has been some-
what restricted due to the full portability of assets (see Queisser, Whitehouse (2003, p. 11)). 
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with greater liquidity requirements and shorter time horizons.482 The relatively long holding 
period of pension funds is also confirmed empirically by Gilson and Kraakman, as well as 
Hawley and Williams who showed that on average pension funds hold their assets for longer 
periods than other institutional investors.483 According to the authors, this largely results from 
the fact that due to their size and the number of individual portfolio holdings, they have a 
strong preference for passive indexation strategies which naturally lead to a lower rate of asset 
turnover and hence to a longer average holding period.484 On the basis that genuine long-term 
investors should be positively inclined towards addressing environmental, social and corpo-
rate governance concerns within their investment decisions and that the effective long-term 
orientation of pension funds differs among pension funds, we hypothesize that: 
H9 Pension funds with longer investment horizons tend to engage more in SRI than those 
funds with shorter investment horizons. 
4.2.4. PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION 
Another fund characteristic that is increasingly linked with the SRI behavior of pension funds 
refers to their level of diversification and hence the number of individual holdings they have 
in their portfolio. The underlying argument is that an investor who owns a widely diversified 
portfolio with broad market exposure (so-called universally diversified investors) will maxi-
mize their overall portfolio return by minimizing negative externalities that emanate from 
companies in the portfolio, while at the same time promoting positive ones.485 Whereas a 
normal owner of a company may benefit when a company externalizes its costs to third par-
ties486, a so-called universally diversified investor may end up with a reduction in overall port-
folio wealth as those externalities could adversely affect other holdings in the portfolio or the 
economy as a whole. This means that finally a universally diversified investor adopts a per-
spective close to that of a public planner and is attentive to the impact of externalities on other 
actors and on society as a whole as these may result in outcomes that are sub-optimal from a 
portfolio point of view.487 According to Hawley and Williams, investors qualify as universally 
diversified when they hold a large number of assets that represent a cross section of the econ-
omy. More precisely, they specify that a universally diversified investor should hold between 
                                                 
482 See Davis, Steil (2001, p. 12), Cox et al. (2004, p. 31), Ryan, Schneider (2002, p. 560) 
483 See Gilson, Kraakman (1991). Hawley and Williams (2000, p. 7) report that among U.S. institu-
tional investors, public pension funds had the lowest turnover rate of all institutions, which suggests 
that they were holding assets for a longer period than other institutional investors such as banks, insur-
ance companies, corporate pension funds, mutual funds, and money managers. 
484 See Gilson, Kraakman (1991), Johnson, Greening (1999, p. 567), Hawley, Williams (2000, p. 7) 
485 See Monks, Minow (2001), Hawley, Williams (2000), Hawley, Williams (2002), Amalric (2004a), 
Thamotheram, Wildsmith (2006), Department of the Environment and Heritage (2003) 
486 See Monks, Minow (1996, p. 121). For example, for a conventional investor holding only a single 
company in its portfolio, externalizing costs to other stakeholders may be consistent with wealth 
maximization considerations. In contrast, issues such as pollution control may be considered as caus-
ing unacceptable expenses. 
487 According to Cullis and Lewis (1992, p. 7) the existence of SRI investors factoring negative exter-
nalities suggests (partial) private willingness to provide a public good. 
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1’500 and 4’500 different stocks to make them own a representative fraction of the econ-
omy.488 Based on this somewhat vague definition, pension funds such as the NZSF with total 
assets of € 13.5 billion and 3’000 portfolio holdings (as of mid 2008)489 or the NGPF, with € 
252.7 billion of IA and over 7’000 individual holdings (as of end 2007) would both qualify as 
universally diversified investors.490 Although pension funds vary substantially with regard to 
their level of diversification, we expect that larger pension funds that apply passive indexing 
strategies can be considered as universally diversified according to the definition by Hawley 
and Williams. This is because through passive indexing strategies they end up being diversi-
fied across a wide range of companies and eventually owning a representative sample of the 
economy. 
SRI proponents propose that universally diversified investors should have a natural interest in 
SRI. For example Hawley and Williams see convergence between many of the aims of the 
SRI community and portfolio wide issues that should be of interest for universally diversified 
investors.491 In fact, assuming that financial markets may not always ensure that environ-
mental, social or corporate governance issues are adequately factored in company valuations, 
the integration of such aspects through SRI may be an effective means to address such short-
comings. An issue which has gained considerable attention in this context is climate change, 
which for some can be considered as the greatest market failure and the single most important 
issue facing humanity.492 It can be argued that companies that contribute to climate change 
through their CO2 emissions are not regulated in a way such that the prices of their products 
or services fully reflect the costs they impose on society in the long run through their CO2 
emissions. Authors such as Wong et al. write that it should be in the direct interest of univer-
sally diversified investors to address climate change related externalities that arise from the 
activities of companies included in their portfolios.493 Similarly, the authors of the 2008 CDP 
report write that it would make sense for such investors to identify ‘carbon laggards’ and to 
engage with them with the objective of reducing carbon-related risks and thereby minimizing 
the negative impact of subprime carbon investments on their portfolio494 The same rationale 
may also apply for other SRI themes such as good corporate governance, executive pay, cor-
ruption, education, environment, water use, biodiversity or health issues such as obesity or 
tobacco consumption.495 
Public policy makers may use taxes, levies and tradable permits to hold companies account-
able for negative externalities and force them to internalize costs. Instead, universally diversi-
                                                 
488 Hawley, Williams (2002, p. 152) 
489 See O'Connor (2008) 
490 See Norwegian Government Pension Fund (2007) 
491 Hawley, Williams (2002, p. 152) 
492 See Stern (2007a), Schöchli (2008), UNEP FI (2009, p. 5) 
493 Wong et al. (2008, p. 8) 
494 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008, p. 87) 
495 For the identification of issues see Hawley (2000), Amalric (2004a), Syse (2008), Hebb (2006) 
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fied investors theoretically also have different channels to factor such externalities and influ-
ence the management of a firm. For example, they can put pressure on companies that exter-
nalize their costs by threatening to exclude them from the portfolio or by directly interacting 
with the management in the form of shareholder activism.496 Alternatively, they can actively 
promote companies that act in a socially responsible manner, either by directing capital to-
wards new technologies or factoring such costs into the valuation process of the company.497 
However, there are also obstacles for such investors in applying strategies that may result 
from the fact that they are indexed and therefore own only a small fraction of any target com-
pany. For example, with regard to shareholder engagement the level of diversification of the 
investments of such an investor and hence the limited percentage of voting rights resulting 
from indexing would prohibit a universally diversified investor from exerting a significant 
influence on the management of a target company. Furthermore, due to their size it could be 
argued that they can neither select only the best in class companies to promote positive exter-
nalities nor disinvest from large portions of the market to punish for negative ones.498 Thus at 
the end of the day, shareholder engagement may still be the most effective strategy in situa-
tions where universally diversified investors collaborate among each other and end up with 
what Monks and Minow call the paradoxical result of passive investing, which is active own-
ership.499 
H10 The more a pension fund portfolio is diversified, the higher the interest of the fund in 
factoring in externalities that impact the value of the other assets in the portfolio by 
engaging in SRI. 
4.2.5. SIZE OF CORPORATE HOLDINGS 
Contrary to the previous section, another portfolio characteristic that is often considered as a 
precondition for investors to invest in SRI builds on the assumption widely discussed in cor-
porate governance literature that shareholders owning a large block of a company have a lar-
ger say and therefore are better positioned to exercise pressure on management to promote 
good corporate governance practices.500 Based on this line of argument, proponents of SRI 
argue that pension funds, by virtue of the scale of their corporate ownership, have the neces-
                                                 
496 Straightforward exclusion would be ineffective to the extent that as soon as the assets are sold in-
vestors can no longer interact as shareholders with the management of the firm while the portfolio 
wide impact persists. 
497 See section 2.5.2 for the effectiveness of these strategies to impact the management of a firm. 
498 In this regard, John Oliphant, actuarial and investments head of the South Africa’s R 711 billion 
(USD 69 bn) Government Employees Pension Fund states that “unlike smaller funds, we cannot sim-
ply buy and sell specific shares to avoid systematic social, environmental and governance issues that 
affect share prices across the board. The only option available to us is to influence corporate behavior” 
(Wheelan, 2008h). Similarly Hawley and Williams (2000, p. xiv) argue that widely diversified inves-
tors making use of indexing strategies are not in a position to pick individual stocks as they are too 
large to selectively purchase only the best performing stocks. Their size ultimately demands that they 
buy what is essentially a cross section of the whole market. 
499 Monks, Minow (2001, p. 121) 
500 See Pound (1992, p. 67), Ryan, Schneider (2002), Bainbridge (2005) 
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sary investment power to promote CR issues, either through screening or by directly engaging 
with the management of a target firm (see section 2.5.2).501 In fact, pension funds have 
emerged in the past decades as one of the greatest sources of institutional equity ownership.502 
Boerner writes that in the U.S. “pension fund trustees and managers, along with their outside 
advisors and money managers, have arguably become the most powerful investment force. 
Their combined influence on individual companies and in the capital markets is considerable, 
as corporate finance executives well know.”503 
As shown in section 2.5.2.1, investors have basically two ways to act on the management of a 
firm: either by threatening or actually divesting themselves of their shares or by exercising 
their shareholder rights and directly engaging with management. In both cases they are as-
sumed to be more effective the larger the corporate holdings are. From a financial perspective 
however, shareholders with majority stakes in a company should have a clear preference for 
shareholder engagement rather than for excluding companies from their portfolio.504 With 
regard to shareholder engagement this is because shareholders with large concentrated owner-
ship have a greater incentive to monitor the activities of the firm than shareholders who own 
only a minority stake.505 The latter tend to be passive, as the costs for monitoring or engaging 
exceed the benefits. Thus they end up free riding on the efforts of the larger shareholder be-
cause costs for monitoring and engaging with the company are fully borne by larger activist 
shareholders, whereas the benefits are shared among all.506 In contrast, majority shareholders 
can overcome such collective action problems as the relative benefits of monitoring or engag-
ing increase, thereby reversing the cost benefit ratio and making monitoring or engagement 
                                                 
501 See Monks (2001, p. 9), EIRIS (2003, p. 3). In a survey among 456 of the Fortune 500 firms, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986, p. 462) found that large shareholders of these companies include families 
(149 cases), financial firms such as banks, insurance companies, or investment funds (117 cases), 
firms and family holding companies with large stakes who do not have board seats (100 cases) but 
also pension and profit-sharing plans (90 cases). 
502 See Drucker (1976), Graves, Waddock (1994, p. 1034), Brown (1998, p. 804), Monks (2001, p. 9), 
Sethi (2005, p. 100) 
503 Boerner (2005, p. 39). Brown reports that in the U.S. in 1996 pension funds accounted for 25% of 
total assets held by institutions (in 1946 the figure was only 3%). Pension and mutual funds together 
controlled 37% of corporate equity in 1996. 
504 At a first glance the proposed relationship between shareholder engagement and the concentration 
of ownership runs against what we have proposed in section 4.2.4 with regard to the relationship be-
tween shareholder engagement and dispersed ownership – where we have argued that shareholder 
engagement is a reasonable strategy for universally diversified investors who, due to passive indexing 
strategies, own small holdings in a large number of companies. The difference between the two views 
is that while in the former the investor has a perspective limited to a particular company or industry, a 
universally diversified investor has a portfolio perspective taking account of the impact a company has 
on society, because this impact may bear on the value on their portfolio in the middle to long term. 
Hence for a universally diversified investor the value added from engagement is not measured by the 
impact on the shareholder value of the target company (which in this case would be negative) but by 
the minimization of negative spillover effects across the portfolio. 
505 See Shleifer, Vishny (1986, p. 462), Black (1992, p. 821), Pound (1992, p. 67) 
506 See Shleifer, Vishny (1986, p. 462), Froot, Perold, Stein (1991), Pound (1992, p. 67), Monks (1995, 
p. 2), Barber (2006, p. 5) 
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cost effective.507 From this, one can hypothesize that a pension fund that owns a larger per-
centage stake in a company is more likely to engage in monitoring and shareholder activism 
engagement than a fund that owns only a minor position. In section 2.5.2.1.1 we showed that 
a larger holding in a company may increase the effectiveness of negative screening on the 
share price of a company and thereby increase leverage. However, pension funds that own 
large positions have only limited flexibility to exit their investments as selling could create 
substantial transaction costs (e.g. depress the company’s share price)508 and thereby ultimately 
affect returns to their beneficiaries. This effect may further be amplified as market partici-
pants assume large block holders to have close relationships with the firm. As such, they are 
assumed to have access to information or insights that are not available to other shareholders. 
In such a situation, a fund’s decision to divest itself of shares may attract significant market 
attention.509 Accordingly, large shareholders could act as price makers, signaling to other 
market participants that a firm is unwilling to negotiate with its shareholders.510 Ultimately it 
may turn out to be cheaper for a large and concentrated owner to become proactive in an at-
tempt to change corporate practices rather than by selling the firm’s assets or remaining pas-
sive.511 From this we hypothesize contrary to hypothesis H10 that: 
H11 Pension funds with large and concentrated holdings in a single company are more 
likely to engage in SRI than dispersed shareholders. 
4.3. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
In addition to the previous fund characteristics, pension funds can be further classified by sev-
eral institutional characteristics, some of which can be argued to have an impact on the fund’s 
propensity to engage in SRI. In the following sub-chapter the key institutional variables col-
lected are the degree of external asset managers used (see section 4.3.1), the level of commu-
nication on investment decisions between the pension fund and its beneficiaries (see section 
4.3.2), whether the funds are closed or open to external membership (see section 4.3.3) or the 
type of the pension plan, (DC or DB plan) (see section 4.3.4).512 
                                                 
507 See Smith (1996), Prevost, Rao (2000, pp. 178-179), Romano (1993). As a response to the ineffi-
ciencies caused by free riding a levy among investors has been suggested to support effective share-
holder engagement and tackle the problem of 'free riders' which also discourages more widespread 
engagement among investors (see Steward (2009)). 
508 See Shleifer (1986, p. 579), Pound (1992, p. 87), Brown (1998, p. 806), Johnson, Greening (1999, 
p. 566), Cox et al. (2004, p. 27) 
509 See Honghui (2003, p. 4) 
510 See Gillan, Starks (2000, p. 301), Hesse (2008, p. 29) 
511 See Forstmoser (2005, p. 805), Graves, Waddock (1994, p. 1036) 
512 The role of the legal form of pension funds (private and public sector funds) has been examined 
under stakeholder characteristics in section 4.1.2. 
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4.3.1. RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL ASSET MANAGERS 
A first institutional characteristic of pension funds relates to the question of whether fund as-
sets are managed ‘in-house’ or by an external asset manager. As for conventional pension 
fund assets, SRI IA can be either managed by the pension fund itself or outsourced to an ex-
ternal asset manager providing specialist SRI services (e.g. by the employer or an external 
asset manager).513 Contradictory views exist of the role of external asset managers with regard 
to a fund’s propensity to engage in SRI. Del Guercio and Hawkins argue that “funds that 
delegate investment functions to external managers effectively disconnect their activism ef-
forts from their investment actions, thus preventing them from profitably trading on any pri-
vate information that results from their activism”514. Similarly, Knoepfel supports the view 
that investors that have outsourced their investment management face restrictions in directly 
influencing decisions, as the ultimate investment decision is made by the portfolio manager 
and not by the investor. They are less likely to take into account ESG issues in both active 
ownership activities and portfolio management.515 In contrast, it could also be argued that 
those funds that outsource their asset management may benefit from the growing SRI offering 
that is available from either specialist SRI asset managers or conventional asset managers 
with separate SRI capabilities.516 Pension funds rarely have their own internal SRI capabilities 
in place to manage SRI themselves. To the extent that this holds also for Swiss pension funds 
which rarely have their own in-house SRI capabilities we hypothesize that: 
H12 Pension funds in which investment decisions are delegated to outside professionals 
will be more likely to invest in SRI. 
4.3.2. LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE 
Another institutional characteristic that may relate to the SRI behavior of a pension fund re-
fers to the level of disclosure of a fund with regard to its investment decisions. For example, 
in the U.K. in 2000, an amendment to the 1995 Pensions Act required occupational pension 
funds to disclose how they take account of SRI in their SIP, if at all.517 It is important to note 
that under this legal requirement, trustees still have the option to state that they do not take 
SRI into account. However, it is argued that the sole fact that they are required to disclose 
information on their SRI behavior puts a certain pressure on them to justify their position and 
to look into this topic. In Switzerland, no such regulation exists for pension funds – although 
they are required to disclose whether they take account of their shareholders’ rights or not. 
Assuming that pension funds with higher levels of disclosure regarding their investment prac-
tices and policies are more accountable to their beneficiaries, we hypothesize that pension 
                                                 
513 Due to economies of scale it is mainly larger pension funds that have their assets managed inter-
nally, see Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 9), Investment & Pensions Europe Magazine (2009, p. 26). Accord-
ing to Weber et al. (2009, p. 59) In Switzerland most pension funds do not have internal asset man-
agement capabilities. 
514 Del Guercio, Hawkins (1999, p. 301) 
515 Knoepfel (2009, p. 11). See also Cumming, Johan (2007, p. 412), Stapledon (1996, p. 34) 
516 See Juravle, Lewis (2008, pp. 290-291), Schumacher-Hummel (2004, p. 245) 
517 See Mathieu (2000). Similar legislation exists in France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden. 
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funds which inform their beneficiaries of their general investment practices are more exposed 
to potential requests by their beneficiaries. This also takes account of the evidence outlined in 
section 4.1.3 that there is a growing interest among beneficiaries to invest their pension 
money in line with certain SRI criteria. 
H13 Pension funds that inform their beneficiaries of their investment strategy and decisions 
are more likely to engage in SRI. 
4.3.3. ADMINISTRATIVE FORM 
Another institutional characteristic of pension funds that we want to explore relates to whether 
a pension fund is closed or open to external membership. In Switzerland, larger companies 
usually establish their own single employer pension fund, while smaller employers tend to 
join a collective or group pension fund in order to avoid the administrative burden of estab-
lishing and running their own fund or simply because they do not have the financial expertise 
to profitably invest their pension assets.518 With regard to such collective or group pension 
funds, one can distinguish between pooled foundations where the pension funds of the affili-
ated companies keep their own contribution and benefit rules and investment committee, and 
joint foundations where a joint board, composed of representatives of the pension funds of the 
affiliated companies and the managing firm, is in charge of the management of the fund (in-
cluding investment decisions).519 In principle, collective foundations are open funds with no 
restriction on membership. However, in certain closed cases collective funds support only 
pension funds of related employers (e.g. companies that are members of a specific industry or 
community).520 To the extent that the open funds have to compete for clients / members and 
that there is greater attention among companies regarding CR issues, one could suggest that 
the existence of a SRI strategy may be a positive differentiating factor to attract companies 
that want to invest their pension money according to environmental, social or ethical princi-
ples.521 From this we hypothesize that: 
H14 Open funds (pooled or open joint foundations) are more likely to invest in SRI than 
pension funds with only restricted membership (closed joint foundations or single em-
ployer funds). 
4.3.4. PLAN TYPE 
In this section we will explore the relationship between the funding obligation of a pension 
fund and its propensity to engage in SRI. Generally, one can distinguish between two catego-
ries of pension funds with regard to benefits: DB and DC plans. In the former case, the spon-
soring employer is committed to a specific payout, independent from the contribution made 
by the employee and from the performance of the investments over time. To the extent that 
                                                 
518 See Queisser, Whitehouse (2003, p. 8) 
519 See Queisser, Whitehouse (2003, p. 9) 
520 See OECD (2002b, p. 7) 
521 See Szczesny, Wilhelm (2005, p. 16) 
122 
the primary investment objective of the employer is to meet a specific level of retirement 
benefits at a point in time when the retirement falls due, the financial risk is borne by the em-
ployer. In contrast, in the case of a DC plan the benefits to members are based “solely on the 
amount contributed to the plan by the sponsor or member plus the investment return 
thereon”.522 To the extent that returns to members depend on market developments, benefici-
aries end up bearing the investment risks.523 In recent years, the Swiss pension landscape has 
experienced a continuous shift from DB to DC plans as employers have sought to minimize 
the risks of their obligations. As a result, by the end of 2007 the large majority of funds are 
DC plans, accounting for 2’265 pension funds as compared to 278 funds that pursue a DB 
plan. This holds especially for the corporate sector, where around 90.7% of the funds run a 
DC plan (2’218 / 227). In contrast public funds are more balanced to the extent that 48% have 
a DC plan and 52% a DB plan (47 / 51).524 
In section 4.2.2, we explored the role of a fund’s risk taking capacity on its propensity to en-
gage in SRI, contingent on the fund’s underlying perception of SRI. The distinction between 
the types of plans has similar implications on the propensity of pension funds to engage in 
SRI. This is mainly because in the case of a DB plan, most of the financial risk involved with 
investing falls back on the employer whereas under a DC plan it has to be borne by the bene-
ficiaries.525 Davis and Steil write that DB funds generally need to hedge or hold more cautious 
portfolios than DC funds in order to allow for the risk of going below minimum solvency lev-
els.526 Hence, in this setting, the propensity of a DB plan to engage in SRI is largely a function 
of the fund’s perception with regard to the financial viability of SRI. That is, a DB plan is 
more likely to engage in SRI on the basis of sound financial considerations where larger ex-
pected long-term returns would reduce the risk of additional contributions from the sponsor-
ing company.527 Thus a DB plan that believes in the financial value added by SRI should have 
an interest to factor material ESG issues either through its investment decisions or by engag-
ing with companies. In contrast, in cases where SRI is considered without regard to the pru-
dence of the investment, DC plans are more likely to engage in SRI than DB plans as for a 
DB plan such an investment would be at the cost of the sponsoring company, while under a 
                                                 
522 See OECD (2002b, p. 4) 
523 See Weber et al. (2009, p. 57), Ryan, Schneider (2002, p. 562), OECD (2002b, p. 4) 
524 See Federal Statistical Office (2009, p. 13) 
525 See Bank for International Settlements (2007, p. 4). It is important to note that in Switzerland DC 
plans have also a DB component as the Swiss pension law requires pension funds to provide minimum 
contributions, a minimum rate of return and a factor for converting accumulated capital into an annuity 
(see Queisser, Whitehouse (2003, p. 8), Ammann, Zingg (2008b, p. 5)). In some countries (e.g. the 
U.K. and the U.S.), DC plans offer their beneficiaries a short list of funds from which they can select 
the investments and allocations for their contribution. In such cases it is up to the beneficiaries to de-
fine their preferences with respect to risk and return and the composition of assets held in other ac-
counts (see Queisser, Whitehouse (2003) 
526 Davis, Steil (2001, p. 11), see also Rauh (2007) 
527 See Ryan, Schneider (2002, p. 562) 
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DC plan the risk involved with this form of investing would finally be borne by the benefici-
aries.528 From this we conclude that: 
H15.1 Pension funds with a DB plan are more likely to engage in SRI when they have a posi-
tive perception of SRI. 
H15.2 Among the funds without a positive financial perception of SRI, DC plans are more 
likely to invest in SRI than DB plans. 
                                                 
528 See Langbein, Posner (1980, p. 91), Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 26) 
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5. METHODOLOGY AND SURVEY RESULTS 
In this chapter we first address the sources of the data used in the empirical analysis (see sec-
tion 5.1) followed by a discussion on the representativeness of the sample (see section 5.2). 
Section 5.3 provides detailed background on the variable descriptions for both the dependent 
variable and the independent variables. Finally, section 5.4 introduces the methodology used 
to examine the determinants of the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds and provides sum-
mary statistics. 
5.1. DATABASE 
To analyze the determinants of the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds, primary data used in 
was obtained from SPFS 2008, (see chapter 3 where we first used the data to describe the 
general SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds). Where gaps exist, we complemented the SPFS 
2008 data with data from SPFS 2007 and from 2007 annual reports (where available).529 
5.2. SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Except for data obtained through SPFS 2007, all variables are measured at the end of Decem-
ber 2007. To obtain data Swisscanto contacted about 2’000 representatives of autonomous or 
semi-autonomous pension funds by mail. Participants were asked to respond to an online 
questionnaire available at www.swisscanto-pk-studie.ch. 265 pension funds provided valid 
responses that were used for the analysis in the official Swisscanto report.530 For our analysis, 
after removing invalid data we obtained a sample of 249 pension funds, of which 81 funds 
indicate some sort of SRI behavior. As shown in Table 18, compared to the overall pension 
fund universe determined by the FSO, the selected sample cannot be considered a close ap-
proximation to a random sample as it is biased towards fund size, legal form and plan type. 
TABLE 18 – SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS531 
Parameters Federal Office of Statistics (end 2007) SPFS 2008 sample  
Number of funds 2’543 249 
Total IA (CHF bn) 605.5 385.9 
Average pension fund size (CHF bn) 0.24 1.57 
Legal form: private / public 2’445 / 98 203 / 46 
Plan type: DC / DB 2’265 / 278 186 / 58 
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2009, pp. 13,15), Swisscanto 2008 
By the end of 2007, the overall Swiss pension fund population consisted of 2’543 funds with 
a combined value of CHF 605.5 billion.532 The 249 funds included in the sample account for 
CHF 385.9 billion in invested assets. The sample therefore covers 63.7% of the market. As 
                                                 
529 For a copy of the SPFS 2008 see section 8.1. 
530 See Swisscanto (2009) 
531 Data from the Federal Statistical Office and Swisscanto Survey date both from the end of 2007. 
532 See Federal Statistical Office (2009, p. 15) 
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shown in Figure 36, pension fund assets are concentrated in a relatively small number of very 
large pension funds. This holds for both the total pension fund population determined by the 
FSO as well as for our sample. However, with an average pension fund size of CHF 1.57 bil-
lion533 compared to the average size of the total pension fund population of only CHF 0.24 
billion our sample is clearly biased towards larger institutions. 
FIGURE 36 – IA BY SURVEYED PENSION FUNDS 
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2009, p. 11) and Swisscanto 2008 
Also, in our sample public pension funds, which on average are larger than their private coun-
terparts, are over-represented. According to the FSO, private institutions account for the large 
majority of pension funds in Switzerland, with a total of 2’445 funds at the end of 2007 com-
pared to only 98 public funds. In contrast, our sample consists of 203 private funds (8.3% of 
all private funds) and 46 public institutions (46.9% of all public funds). Thus, whereas public 
institutions account for only 3.9% of all pension funds, they account for 18.5% in our sample. 
Similar disparities exist with regard to the preferred plan type. Whereas in the population 
there are 2’265 pension funds that operated a DC plan and only 278 funds with a DB plan534, 
in our sample there are 186 funds with a DC plan (8.2% of all DC plans) and 58 pension 
funds with a DB plan (20.9% of all DB plans).535 Whereas DB plans account for only 10.9% 
of all pension funds, they account for 23.3% in our sample. Partly this overrepresentation of 
DB plans can be explained by the overrepresentation of public funds of which 58.7% apply a 
DB plan in contrast to only 15.7% of private pension funds (see Table 19). In order to take 
account of the overrepresentation of public funds, in the following bivariate analysis (see sec-
tion 5.4.2) we distinguish between public and private institutions. In addition, we control for 
these three aspects in the multivariate logistic regression analysis in section 5.4.3. 
                                                 
533 This figure only includes the 245 funds that have reported their portfolio size. 
534 See Federal Statistical Office (2009, p. 13) 
535 Five pension funds have not reported a specific plan type. 
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TABLE 19 – SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF PLAN TYPE BY LEGAL FORM 
Plan type Public pension funds Private pension funds 
Frequency 19 167 
DC plan 
In percent 41.3 84.3 
Frequency 27 31 
DB plan 
In percent 58.7 15.7 
Source: based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 
Another difficulty related to the data concerns a potential response bias, which may influence 
the quality of the data and its comparability. For example, the answers to the questionnaire 
have been provided by individuals employed in differing functions within the pension funds 
(e.g. board members, representatives of the management or the administrative body) and with 
different levels of seniority. This may impact the quality and comparability of the responses. 
However, to the extent that they have been requested to answer the questionnaire on behalf of 
the pension fund, we can assume that their views represent the views of the governing body of 
the pension fund board and not their own personal views. Also, it has to be noted that the sur-
vey has not included any background or guidance material which would have introduced SRI 
as a topic (e.g. SRI definition or glossary of terms), thereby presuming a substantial knowl-
edge of SRI among survey participants. In cases where no familiarity with SRI exists, this 
lack of guidance could have lead to misinterpretations of what is meant by this form of invest-
ing.536 In cases where outliers have been identified, they have (where possible) been corrected 
or excluded from the final sample. Another difficulty related to the data refers to missing val-
ues, as various questions have been answered by only a small number of funds. This holds 
especially for the SRI-related questions, which have mainly been answered by funds that ex-
hibit positive SRI behavior. For those variables where additional data has been derived from 
the funds’ website or annual reports, we have only a limited number of cases since not all 
funds disclose the required information externally. To the extent that there has been little op-
portunity to complement the missing data through additional interaction with the survey par-
ticipants, we will insert a number of assumptions for those measures where we have a low 
response rate in order to be in a position to conduct a multivariate logistic regression analy-
sis.537 
5.3. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
Taking consideration of the richness of the data, the following sections provide a detailed de-
scription of the dependent variable and the explanatory variables that we use as proxies for the 
determinants described in chapter 4. We also include a description of their corresponding met-
rics as well as the sources of information on which the variables are based. Since the underly-
ing survey used was not specifically designed for our project, some of the hypotheses we have 
                                                 
536 As can be evidenced by some of the responses, some funds misunderstood what was meant by SRI 
537 It was agreed with Swisscanto that no follow up interviews would be carried out with the participat-
ing funds in order to avoid general questionnaire fatigue. 
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developed in chapter 4 cannot be tested by relying on this set of data. Also, it has to be noted 
that some of the measures chosen are rather rough approximations of the described pension 
fund characteristics, which limits the capacity to derive clear-cut conclusions in chapter 6. 
5.3.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
We defined SRI investors as those pension funds which indicated in their response to question 
13.22 and questions 33.1 – 33.59 in the 2008 SPFS that they practice SRI in some form (see 
section 3.2.1.1). As such our dependent variable “SRI behavior” is not numerical but cate-
gorical in nature and consists of two mutually exclusive outcomes: Yi = 1 indicating positive 
SRI behavior and Yi = 0 the absence of any sort of SRI behavior. 
5.3.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
We have a mixture of regressors measured at the interval level and categorical (dichotomous) 
regressors. 
5.3.2.1. STAKEHOLDER VARIABLES 
To measure the financial expectations of pension fund representatives with regard to SRI we 
referred to three questions from SPFS 2008 which address expectations on the long-term per-
formance, costs and risks characteristics of SRI. Question 33.54 asked participants if they 
think that the consideration of SRI criteria will lead to higher long-term performance. Ques-
tions 33.55 and 33.56 ask if the participants think that costs and risks resulting from SRI are 
too high. For each question Swisscanto provided predetermined answers (‘agrees’, ‘does not 
agree’, ‘no response’), which we transferred into a nominal scale of 1 if the pension fund 
agrees and 0 if it does not. Unfortunately, out of the 249 funds in the sample on average only 
about a fifth answered these questions (20.5%, 19.3% and 21.3%), of which most are from the 
SRI investors group (88.2, 87.5 and 88.7%). In order to increase the overall number of cases 
for our subsequent analysis, some assumptions were made for the non-SRI investing pension 
funds. As their view can generally be expected to be more negative than the view of those that 
engage in SRI (see Figure 37) those non-SRI investing funds that have not responded were 
reclassified to “does not agree” for question 33.54 and “agree” for question 33.55 and 56 (see 
Table 21).538 In addition, in order to be able to consider the performance related variable in 
our multivariate analysis, we adjusted two funds that have positive views with regard to costs 
and risks but did not answer the performance related question, by changing their responses 
with regard to the long-term performance expectations from “no response” into “agree”. 
As there is no information included in SPFS 2008 on the size of pension fund boards or the 
demographic characteristics of board members, we derived data from additional sources. To 
measure the size of pension boards and board membership qualifications we include data from 
SPFS 2007 (37.1, 37.12) assuming continuity from 2007 to 2008 regarding these two vari-
ables. For the latter we use the criteria if board members are elected on the basis of their pro-
fessional qualifications as a proxy for their level of education and understanding of SRI. 
                                                 
538 Results will be tracked separately prior to these adjustments.  
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Thereby, we assume that trustees hired on the basis of professional qualifications are more 
familiar with the characteristics of SRI than trustees who are not. As a measure, we use an 
ordinal scale with the value of 0 if board members are not elected on the basis this criteria and 
1 if employer and / or employee representatives are. Data on the percentage of women in pen-
sion fund boards was retrieved from the 2007 annual reports of the funds where available. 
Finally, no data exists on the age of board members, income level and their personal lifestyle, 
as a result of which these cannot be tested. 
The influence of the employer on the SRI behavior of the pension fund was assessed by refer-
ence to a question in SPFS 2008 (33.51), which asks participant funds with a SRI strategy if 
their SRI engagement is a consequence of the disposition or the mission of their employer. 
Unfortunately, the response rate to this question was very low, which suggests that this factor 
does not play any role. For verification purposes, a series of alternative measures was devel-
oped. First, based on the answers to question 11 of SPFS 2008 and additional information 
from the websites of the employers, a dummy variable was defined that takes on the value 1 if 
an employer has a religious, union, educational, health, social or cultural background and 0 
otherwise. Second, another dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a corporate employer has a 
CR strategy. Here, the focus is only on private funds with closed membership, as in the case 
of open membership funds it is unclear who the corresponding pension funds are and if they 
have a CR strategy. In order to test for the inverse relationship, a third variable takes the value 
of 1 if the company can be considered as “sin-company” according to traditional exclusion 
criteria (e.g. involved in alcohol, gambling, tobacco, nuclear, see also section 2.3.1) or has 
been confronted with controversies around environmental or human rights issues539. Again the 
focus is only on private funds with closed membership. Finally, a fourth dummy variable re-
lated to the disposition of the employer takes the value of 1 if it is a private and 0 if it is a pub-
lic fund. 
To examine the postulated hypotheses regarding the role of beneficiaries in the decision of 
pension funds to engage in SRI, we refer to two variables based on questions included in 
SPFS 2008. A first variable measures if the SRI behavior of a fund is the result of an explicit 
request by its beneficiaries (33.52). A second variable refers to the perception of trustees of 
whether SRI is in the best interest of their beneficiaries (33.53). As for the above question on 
performance, costs and risks related to SRI, Swisscanto provided predetermined answers 
(‘agrees’, ‘does not agree’, ‘no response’), which we transferred into a nominal scale of 1 if 
the pension fund agrees and 0 if it does not. Again, responses involve a self-selection bias as 
mainly pension funds with a positive SRI behavior answered these questions.540 As in the case 
of the variable on the long-term financial performance of SRI (33.54), for the variable cover-
                                                 
539 To check for an employer’s exposure to environmental or social controversies, we used RepRisk 
(www.reprisk.com) a web-based database allowing for the identification of environmental and social 
controversies around companies. 
540 The way question 33.52 is formulated only pension funds that engage in SRI are able to provide an 
answer. 
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ing the question whether SRI is deemed to be in the best interest of the beneficiaries, we ad-
just non-SRI investors that have not answered into “does not agree”. 
Finally to measure the impact of the reliance of pension funds on external investment consult-
ants, we refer to data included in their 2007 annual reports (where available). It has to be 
noted that the quality of the resulting measure is limited as by the end of 2007 there was no 
reporting requirement for pension funds with regard to the employment of external investment 
consultants.541 As a result, it is not clear whether those funds that do not report about the use 
of investment consultants really abstain from using such services. Despite this shortcoming, 
we include a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if there is evidence that a fund relies 
on the services of an investment consultant and 0 if there is no evidence for this. To the extent 
that none of the consultants referenced in the reports is known for their SRI expertise, we 
suggest in line with hypothesis 6 that their presence acts as an obstacle for pension funds to 
engage in SRI.542 To the extent that for a large number of pension funds we do not have any 
information to verify their reliance on such consultancy services we do not include these 
funds in our analysis. 
5.3.2.2. PORTFOLIO VARIABLES 
The measure for pension fund size is determined by the natural logarithm of fund total assets 
in order to minimize the impact of extreme values. Information on the size of pension funds 
was derived from the standard section of SPFS 2008 (8.1). The risk taking capacity of pension 
funds is measured by referring to the coverage ratio of the funds defined in SPFS 2008 as total 
assets divided by liabilities (15.1). The long-term thinking of pension funds could be meas-
ured in different ways, such as the average duration of pension fund liabilities543, the fre-
quency of performance evaluation within which investment returns are considered, the rate of 
asset turnover (that is, the average holding period of corporate stock or investment products) 
or by the discount rate at which pension funds price assets over the long term. Unfortunately, 
neither SPFS 2008 nor 2007 nor the annual pension fund reports contain information on these 
measures. Instead, we refer in SPFS 2008 to the extent the portfolio is indexed (13.21) to get 
an alternative measure for whether a fund has a long-term investment perspective.544 This 
assumes that pension funds applying a passive indexing strategy (which consist of a buy and 
hold approach) are more long-term oriented than pension funds following an active strategy 
which consists of buying and selling assets on the assumption of beating the market. 
                                                 
541 At its first session in 2010, the Swiss parliament agreed that in the future Swiss pension funds will 
be required to name their asset managers and advisers in their annual reports. 
542 Apart from a few specialized consultancies (e.g. onValues or Conser Invest), there is very little 
evidence that investment consultants working with pension funds have such expertise and proactively 
offer corresponding services. 
543 See Ryan, Schneider (2002), Cox et al. (2004, p. 30), Hesse (2008) 
544 See Hawley, Williams (2000, p. 7) 
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The same measure could also be used to test for the influence of the level of portfolio diversi-
fication on the SRI behavior of pension funds. That is, instead of determining the average 
number of corporate holdings included in a pension portfolio (for which no information ex-
ists) one could alternatively refer to the fraction of the portfolio that invested passively. This 
measure builds on the assumption that passively indexed portfolios tend to cover a greater 
number of companies, eventually representing a cross section of publicly traded equities, con-
trary to actively managed portfolios that are usually restricted to a limited number of stocks. 
Finally, the degree of leverage a pension fund has on the management of a firm would best be 
measured as the average percentage of stock ownership held by pension funds. However, nei-
ther SPFS 2007 nor SPFS 2008 disclose such information, nor do pension funds generally 
report their individual corporate holdings on their websites or within their annual reports.545 
Alternatively, one could again refer to the percentage of the indexed portfolio to get a meas-
ure of the size of corporate holdings, assuming that a large fraction of the portfolio indexed 
leads pension funds to own a relatively large number of stocks and consequently to own only 
small fractions of each company’s outstanding stock. 
5.3.2.3. INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
To measure the reliance of a pension fund on external asset managers we refer to the level of 
the portfolio managed externally reported in SPFS 2008 (13.43). For the other institutional 
variables we again construct different binary measures representing an either / or condition. 
For the level of disclosure attributed to the beneficiaries of a pension fund, we refer to an item 
included in SPFS 2007 (38.3) which asks whether the pension fund regularly informs the 
beneficiaries of its investment practices (1) or not (0). Regarding the role of the administrative 
form, we include a dummy variable based on question 6 in SPFS 2008 that takes 1 in the case 
of open membership (pooled or open joint foundations) and 0 if a fund has closed member-
ship (single employer funds, closed collective foundations). Finally to assess the role of the 
funding obligations we distinguish between DB (1) and DC (0) plans based on question 9 in 
SPFS 2008. 
 
                                                 
545 Rare examples of pension funds which provide detailed information on their corporate holdings 
include the NGPF and the two large Dutch funds ABP and PGGM. 
  
 
TABLE 20 – TESTABLE VARIABLES 
Characteristics Hypothesis Metric Source of data 
H1.1   A positive perception of PF trustees regarding SRI in terms of long-term perform-
ance will positively impact the SRI behavior of the PF. 
Dummy = 1 if PF agrees SPFS 2008, 33.54 
H1.2   A negative perception of PF trustees regarding costs resulting from SRI will nega-
tively impact the SRI behavior of the PF. 
Dummy = 1 if PF agrees SPFS 2008, 33.55 
SRI perception of 
the board of trus-
tees 
H1.3   A negative perception of PF trustees regarding risk levels resulting from SRI will 
negatively impact the SRI behavior of the PF. 
Dummy = 1 if PF agrees SPFS 2008, 33.56 
H2.1  PF boards that are composed of members that are elected on the basis of their profes-
sional qualifications are more likely to promote SRI criteria. 
Dummy = 1 if election of employee and / 
or employer representative is based on 
professional qualifications 
SPFS 2007, 37.12 Board demograph-
ics 
H2.3  PFs that include a higher percentage of women in their governing body are more 
likely to engage in SRI. 
Percentage of women in PF boards 2007 PF annual reports 
Board size H3  PFs with smaller boards are more likely to invest in SRI than PFs governed by larger 
decision-making bodies that require more transparent decision-making. 
Number of board members SPFS 2007, 37.1 
H4.1   SRI is more likely among PFs where the E has a religious, union, educational, health, 
social or cultural background. 
Dummy = 1 if E has a mission background SPFS 2008, 11 and E web-
sites 
H4.2   Among private pension funds SRI is more likely when the sponsoring employer has 
established a CR agenda. 
Dummy = 1 if the E has a CR strategy or 
program 
E websites 
H4.3   SRI is less likely among private PFs whose E is active in a sector which is targeted 
by SRI investors or involved in controversies around environmental or social issues. 
Dummy = 1 if E is active in a sector which 
is targeted by SRI investors 
E websites 
Disposition of 
employer (E) 
H4.4  Public PFs are more likely to engage in SRI than private PFs. Dummy = 1 if PF is a private institution SPFS 2008, 2.1 - 2.4 
H5.1  PFs that have been confronted by an explicit request to engage in SRI by their bene-
ficiaries are more likely to invest in SRI. 
Dummy = 1 if PF agrees SPFS 2008, 33.52 Role of beneficiar-
ies 
H5.2  PFs whose representatives view SRI as being in the best interest of their beneficiaries 
will be more likely to invest in SRI. 
Dummy = 1 if PF agrees SPFS 2008, 33.53 
Role of investment 
consultants 
H6  PFs that employ investment consultants and which have no established SRI capabili-
ties are more unlikely to engage in SRI. 
Dummy = 1 if there is evidence that a PF 
uses investment consultants and 0 if there 
is no evidence for this. 
Data derived from 2007 
annual reports  
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 Characteristics Hypothesis Metric Source of data 
Portfolio size H7  Larger PFs are more likely to engage in SRI than smaller PFs. Log of total IA SPFS 2008, 8.1 
H8.1  PFs without a positive perception of SRI with regard to long-term financial perform-
ance will be more likely to invest in SRI when they are fully funded. 
Risk-taking capac-
ity 
H8.2  Underfunded PFs will be more likely to invest in SRI when they have a positive 
perception of SRI. 
Coverage ratio defined as total assets di-
vided by the fund’s liabilities 
SPFS 2008, 15.1 
Investment horizon H9  PFs with longer investment horizons tend to engage more in SRI than those PFs with 
shorter investment horizons. 
Percentage of portfolio indexed SPFS 2008, 13.21 
Portfolio diversifi-
cation 
H10  The more a PF portfolio is diversified, the higher the interest of the PF in factoring in 
externalities that impact the value of the other assets in the portfolio by engaging in 
SRI. 
Percentage of portfolio indexed SPFS 2008, 13.21 
Investment concen-
tration 
H11  PFs with large and concentrated holdings in a single company are more likely to 
engage in SRI than dispersed shareholders. 
Percentage of portfolio indexed SPFS 2008, 13.21 
Reliance on exter-
nal asset managers 
H12  PFs in which investment decisions are delegated to outside professionals will be 
more likely to invest in SRI. 
Percentage of portfolio managed externally SPFS 2008, question 
13.43 
Level of disclosure H13  PFs that inform their beneficiaries of their investment strategy and decisions are 
more likely to engage in SRI. 
Dummy = 1 if PF informs beneficiaries on 
investment practices 
SPFS 2007, question 38.3 
Administrative 
form 
H14  Open PFs are more likely to invest in SRI than PFs with only restricted membership. Dummy = 1 if PF is a fund with only re-
stricted membership 
SPFS 2008, question 6 
H15.1  PFs with a DB plan are more likely to engage in SRI when they have a positive 
perception of SRI. 
Plan type 
H15.2  Among the PFs without a positive financial perception of SRI, DC plans are more 
likely to invest in SRI than DB plans.. 
Dummy = 1 if PFs is a DB fund SPFS 2008, question 9 
This table presents the selected stakeholder, portfolio and institutional variables, metrics and corresponding sources of data. It does not include those hypotheses for which no 
information is available (e.g. H2.2 (age) and H2.4-5 (income level and personal disposition towards cause related activities). 
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5.4. METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Within the following sections, we test the hypotheses developed in chapter 4 by exploring 
which variables affect the probability of a fund to engage in SRI. We start with a short discus-
sion of how an ideal experiment would look to best determine the predictive capability of cer-
tain pension fund characteristics on the SRI behavior of pension funds, taking account of the 
limitations in the data available (see section 5.4.1). To analyze the differences between pen-
sion funds that engage in SRI from those that do not, we apply a stepwise approach starting 
with bivariate analysis of the individual relationships between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable (see section 5.4.2). Although the bivariate tests give initial insight into 
the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds, they do not provide clear-cut evidence of the extent 
to which the characteristics described influence the decision to engage in SRI. The insights 
gained from the bivariate analysis will be used as a basis to conduct a multivariate regression 
analysis in which we simultaneously examine a selection of possible determinants of the SRI 
behavior of Swiss pension funds (see section 5.4.3). In order to give a more detailed view of 
our sample, each step is accompanied by summary statistics of the variables used. Based on 
the findings in this sub-section, a detailed discussion of the empirical results is undertaken in 
chapter 6. 
5.4.1. STRATEGY OF INQUIRY 
To examine possible determinants of the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds causal relation-
ships have been investigated by means of quantitative methodologies (e.g. case studies and 
interviews).546 In contrast, quantitative strategies which construct statistical models explaining 
or predicting pension fund behaviors do not exist in the Swiss context. To a large extent this is 
due to limited disclosure by Swiss pension funds in the past, but is also due to the low number 
of reported cases that effectively engaged in SRI, making quantitative analysis difficult. Al-
though there are some good reasons for using qualitative research (e.g. by providing a more 
in-depth and rich description of causal relationships and exploration of processes), for the 
purpose of measuring the predictive capability of certain pension fund characteristics quanti-
tative methodologies seem more appropriate.547 
Under a quantitative approach, the ideal way to explore such relationships would be to build 
the analysis on multi-dimensional or panel data containing observations on multiple pension 
fund characteristics observed over a defined time frame. Here, the combination of time series 
with cross-sections would be best suited to investigate the behavior of pension funds as it of-
fers advantages in the analysis of possible causal relationships by studying the dynamics of 
change over time548. It avoids the problem of endogeneity by using lagged explanatory vari-
ables. However, although the thesis research questions show a strong rationale for pursuing a 
                                                 
546 See Schumacher Hummel (2004), Oesch (2000), Sigg et al. (2005), UNPRI (2009) 
547 Despite this preference for quantitative methods, in this thesis findings from existing qualitative 
studies have been used in to formulate the testable hypotheses (see chapter 4). 
548 See Gujarati (2003, p. 638) 
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panel data strategy, a number of reasons related to the data quality support the choice of a 
one-dimensional cross section of data instead. First, as indicated in Figure 27, the participa-
tion rate of pension funds in the Swisscanto survey instrument has been rather unstable, re-
sulting in a varying set of pension fund responses over time and only a small number of pen-
sion funds that have consistently responded to all annual surveys.549 Obviously, focusing on 
only those cases would render an empirical analysis difficult. Furthermore, many of those 
funds that have responded to all questionnaires have done so in an inconsistent way, resulting 
in numerous missing values. To the extent that we require a set of collectively exhaustive 
events in order to conduct our analysis (meaning that only cases with non-missing values will 
be used), applying a panel data approach would lead to even lower numbers of valid cases. 
Finally, there was a substantial measurement error in the response variable prior to the 2008 
survey, which would cause the explanatory power of any model based on panel data to be 
severely limited. As shown in section 3.2.1.1 this measurement error results from the fact that 
many funds that actually engage in SRI have not responded to the respective question in the 
survey instrument during 2003 to 2008. This can be evidenced by referring to the more de-
tailed SRI section included exclusively in SPFS 2008 (see questions 33.1 to 33.59) and which 
shows that the SRI behavior of the funds is much more developed than indicated solely by the 
responses to the standard SRI question (13.22) included in the survey instruments since 2002. 
Therefore, in order to preserve a sufficient number of cases and to avoid a reduction of the 
explanatory power of the model, we abstain from using a panel data approach and instead 
apply a cross-sectional approach, which focuses exclusively on the data from SPFS 2008.550 It 
must however be acknowledged that this approach also has limitations, to the extent that inter-
temporal linkages in the statistical associations that are important for the causal understanding 
of the influence of pension fund characteristics of the SRI behavior of a fund are ignored. 
Thus, except for some specific variables where respondents explicitly report on the internal 
drivers of SRI (e.g. trustee perception of SRI, role of the sponsoring institution and the fund 
beneficiaries) we lack evidence for causality. 
5.4.2. BIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In a first stage we use bivariate regression analysis to study the dependence of the SRI behav-
ior of pension funds on each of the independent variables developed in chapter 4 without con-
trolling simultaneously for other factors. Using a set of linear models, we are saying that the 
probability of pension funds to engage in SRI is a linear function of various explanatory vari-
ables. As in Cumming and Johan, we use this initial step to gain initial insight into the rela-
                                                 
549 Partly this can be explained by the general consolidation of the Swiss pension fund market, which 
led various funds to disappear or to merge with other funds over time and (although to a lesser extent) 
new ones to be created. 
550 Another reason to focus on a cross-section approach is that there is a lack of data prior to 2008, as 
various independent variables are measured on the basis of the data generated by the special section in 
SPFS 2008. Furthermore, following a panel data approach would substantially impact the number of 
cases in the sample available for our analysis which would further reduce the explanatory power of the 
model. 
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tionship between the variables prior to conducting the multivariate analysis.551 As such it 
helps us to determine which variables can be used for the multivariate analysis and which 
variables have to be omitted due to either a limited number of cases or low levels of signifi-
cance. Moreover, it also tells us which variables have to be treated separately in a multivariate 
stage due to problems of collinearity between the independent variables. As a consequence of 
the overrepresentation of public pension funds in our sample, the subsequent bivariate analy-
sis distinguishes between private and public pension funds. Table 21 and Table 22 provide a 
detailed overview of the overall sample and the two sub-samples by summarizing the fre-
quency of observations and presenting correlations and the statistical significance. Table 23 
provides the correlation matrix of the relationships examined. 
Results included in Table 22 show that an engagement in SRI is observed more often among 
pension funds that have a positive perception of SRI in terms of long-term financial perform-
ance (H1.1), costs (H1.2) and the risks involved (H1.3). The relationship is particularly robust 
with regard to the of long-term performance expectations for SRI. That is, whereas results for 
H1.2 and H1.3 became significant only after the additional assumptions were included (for 
those non-SRI investors that have not responded to the respective question, see section 
5.3.2.1), the result for H1.1 was already significant in its original form (see values included in 
squared brackets in Table 22). With regard to board characteristics, findings are less clear. 
First, no significant relationship can be identified between the qualification of board members 
(H2.1) and the SRI behavior of the pension funds. In contrast, we find a significant positive 
relationship between female representation (H2.3) with pension fund boards and the SRI be-
havior of the funds. In addition, SRI is observed more often among funds with larger deci-
sion-making bodies (H3). Both relationships are significant for the overall sample and the 
public funds, but are not significant for the private sub-sample. With regard to the role of the 
employer, no significant relationship can be determined between the mission background of 
the employer (H4.1) and the SRI behavior of the fund or whether the company concerned can 
be considered as a sin stock from the perspective of a traditional SRI investor (H4.3). How-
ever, it has to be noted that in both cases the results seem to be impacted by the relatively low 
number of cases. Interestingly and rather strikingly, results are significant for H4.2, which 
shows that among private pension funds with closed membership, SRI is observed more often 
in cases where the corresponding employer displays some sort of CR strategy or practices. 
Finally, the result for H4.4 shows that SRI is more common among public pension funds than 
among private funds. With regard to the role of the beneficiaries, results for H5.1 and H5.2 
show that an engagement in SRI is observed more often among those pension funds that have 
either been explicitly requested by their beneficiaries to engage in SRI, or where trustees con-
sider SRI to be in the best interest of the beneficiaries.552 For both variables, results were al-
ready significant prior to the additional assumptions being made. Finally, we find a negative 
                                                 
551 Cumming, Johan (2007, p. 403) 
552 The latter item is independent of whether trustees interpret the best interest in financial or ethical 
terms (see section 6.1.3). 
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statistical association between the presence of investment consultants (H6) and the disposition 
of pension funds towards SRI. However, except for the public subsample, these relationships 
are not statistically significant. 
Second, the results for the proposed portfolio variables are also interesting, as SRI is observed 
more often among larger pension funds (H7) and those funds that have part of their portfolio 
indexed (H9 – 11). Regarding the latter, the proposed relationship holds for the entire sample 
and the public subsample but not for private institutions. Concerning the role of the funding 
levels of pension funds, an inverse significant relationship exists for the overall sample, indi-
cating that SRI is observed more often among those funds that are underfunded. The result for 
H8.1 shows that among those pension funds that do not have a positive perception of SRI 
(which we call ‘skeptics’), SRI is more common among underfunded funds, which goes 
against the proposed relationship. Finally, despite the very low number of cases, the result for 
H8.2 shows that among underfunded pension funds SRI is more frequent when they have a 
positive perception of this form of investing. For both H8.1 and H8.2 the relationships are 
only significant for the overall sample but not for the subsamples. 
Third, results regarding the institutional variables show that SRI is observed more often 
among those funds that do not rely on external asset managers (H12). This result also holds 
for the private funds, but not for the public institutions. No overall significant relationship is 
determined for the level of disclosure of pension funds (H13) and whether the funds are open 
or closed for external membership (H14). However, regarding H13, the relationship is signifi-
cant with regard to the public subsample. Finally, SRI is more common among DB plans. 
Here, the result for H15.1 further shows that in line with the hypothesis for the overall sample 
as well as the private sub-sample SRI is more common among DB plans when they have a 
positive perception of SRI. Also the result for H15.2 shows that among the ‘skeptic’ pension 
funds SRI is observed more often when they have a DC plan in place. However, this last rela-
tionship holds only for the public sample, but not for the overall or the private sub-sample. 
 
  
 
TABLE 21 – SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Total sample Public pension funds Private pension funds 
non-SRI investors SRI investors non-SRI investors SRI investors non-SRI investors SRI investors 
Hypotheses 
 
Response categories 
 N In % N In % N In % N In % N In % N In % 
 SRI behavior  168 67,5 81 32,5 12 26,1 34 73,9 156 76,8 47 23,2 
does not correspond 142 [6] 90,4 [28,6] 15 9,6 [71,4] 7 [1] 53,8 [14,3] 6 46,2 [85,7] 135 [5] 93,8 [35,7] 9 6,3 [64,3] 1.1 Performance ex-
pectations corresponds 2 [0] 6,3 [0] 30 93,8 [100] 0 0 17 100 2 [0] 13,3 [0] 13 86,7 [100] 
does not correspond 4 10,3 35 89,7 0 0 19 100 4 20 16 80 1.2 Cost  
expectations corresponds 164 [2] 95,9 [22,2] 7 4,1 [77,8] 12 [0] 85,7 [-] 2 14,3 [100] 152 [2] 96,8 [28,6] 5 3,2 [71,4] 
does not correspond 5 10,4 43 89,6 0 0 23 100 5 20 20 80 1.3 Risk  
expectations corresponds 163 [1] 97,6 [20] 4 2,4 [80] 12 [0] 92,3 [0] 1 7,7 [100] 151 [1] 98,1 [25] 3 1,9 [75] 
no 27 54,0 23 46,0 3 20,0 12 80,0 24 68,6 11 31,4 2.1 Qualification 
yes 83 66,4 42 33,6 7 31,8 15 68,2 76 73,8 27 26,2 
no 161 68,5 74 31,5 10 23,8 32 76,2 151 78,2 42 21,8 4.1 Mission 
yes 7 50,0 7 50,0 2 50,0 2 50,0 5 50,0 5 50,0 
no 79 86,8 12 13,2 0 - 0 - 79 86,8 12 13,2 4.2 CR agenda (only 
privates / closed) yes 48 67,6 23 32,4 0 - 0 - 48 67,6 23 32,4 
no 129 79,1 34 20,9 0 - 0 - 129 79,1 34 20,9 4.3 Sin stock  
(only privates / 
closed) yes 
11 68,8 5 31,3 0 - 0 - 11 68,8 5 31,3 
public 12 26,1 34 73,9 12 26,1 34 73,9 0 - 0 - 4.4 Legal form 
private 156 76,8 47 23,2 0 - 0 - 156 76,8 47 23,2 
does not correspond 144 [8] 85,2 [24,2] 25 14,8 [75,8] 7 [1] 46,7 [11,1] 8 53,3 [88,9] 137 [7] 89,0 [29,2] 17 11,0 [70,8] 5.1 Requested by 
beneficiaries 
 
corresponds 0 0,0 18 100,0 0 0,0 12 100,0 0 0,0 6 100,0 
does not correspond 143 [8] 92,3 [40] 12 7,7 [60] 7 [1] 53,8 [14,3] 6 46,2 [85,7] 136 [7] 95,8 [53,8] 6 [6] 4,2 [46,2] 5.2 Beneficiaries inter-
est corresponds 1 2,6 37 97,4 0 0,0 20 100,0 1 5,6 17 94,4 
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Total sample Public pension funds Private pension funds 
non-SRI investors SRI investors non-SRI investors SRI investors non-SRI investors SRI investors 
(continued) 
 
Hypotheses 
 
Response categories 
 N In % N In % N In % N In % N In % N In % 
no evidence for ICs  15 39,5 23 60,5 0 0,0 14 100,0 15 62,5 9 37,5 6 Use of investment 
consultants (IC) evidence for ICs 
found 
11 44,0 14 56,0 5 29,4 12 70,6 6 75,0 2 25,0 
underfunded 7 30,4 16 69,6 4 21,1 15 78,9 3 75 1 25 8 Coverage ratio 
fully funded 157 71,4 63 28,6 8 29,6 19 70,4 149 77,2 44 22,8 
underfunded 7 46,7 8 53,3 4 33,3 8 66,7 3 100 0 - 8.1 ‘Skeptics’ 
fully funded 155 79,1 41 20,9 8 47,1 9 52,9 147 82,1 32 17,9 
‘skeptics’ 3 60,0 2 40,0 1 33,3 2 66,7 2 100 0 - 8.2 Underfunded funds
‘convinced’ 0 - 8 100 0 - 7 100 0 - 1 100 
no 131 75,3 43 24,7 10 43,5 13 56,5 121 80,1 30 19,9 9 - 11 Portfolio indexa-
tion553 partly indexed 37 49,3 38 50,7 2 8,7 21 91,3 35 67,3 17 32,7 
does not inform  50 70,4 21 29,6 7 50,0 7 50,0 43 75,4 14 24,6 13 Level of disclosure 
informs beneficiaries 64 56,6 49 43,4 3 11,5 23 88,5 61 70,1 26 29,9 
open membership 15 53,6 13 46,4 0 0,0 6 100,0 15 68,2 7 31,8 14 Administrative 
form closed membership 152 69,4 67 30,6 12 30,0 28 70,0 140 78,2 39 21,8 
defined contribution 137 73,7 49 26,3 8 42,1 11 57,9 129 77,2 38 22,8 15 Plan type 
defined benefit 27 46,6 31 53,4 4 14,8 23 85,2 23 74,2 8 25,8 
‘skeptics’ 20 80 5 20 0 - 5 100 20 100 0 - 15.1 Defined benefit 
‘convinced’ 1 6,3 15 93,8 0 - 11 100 1 20 4 80 
defined benefit 20 80 5 20 0 - 5 100 20 100 0 - 15.2 ‘Skeptics’ 
defined contribution 118 92,9 10 7,8 7 87,5 1 12,5 111 92,5 9 7,5 
This table presents distributions for the dichotomous variables grouped by the legal form of the pension funds. Values in squared brackets represent results prior to the assump-
tions made for those non-SRI investors that have not responded to the corresponding questions (see 5.3.2.1). Responses for H8.1 and H15.2 focus on all funds that do not have a 
positive view with regard to the long-term outperformance of SRI (see H1.1). This also includes those funds that have not responded to this question (see Figure 37). By ‘con-
vinced‘ funds, we refer to those funds that have a positive view regarding the long-term outperformance of SRI. 
                                                 
553 In this table, portfolio indexation has been included in the dichotomous form. 
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TABLE 22 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Variable name Sample Cases Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Correlation Exact sig. (2-sided) 
SRI behavior  249 0 1 ,33 ,469   
1.1 Performance expectations all funds 189 [51] 0 1 ,17 [,59] ,376 [,497] ,741 [,436] ,000 [,003] 
  public / private funds 30 / 159 0 1 ,57 / ,09 ,504 / ,293 ,631 / ,681 ,001 / ,000 
1.2 Cost expectations all funds 210 [48] 0 1 ,81 [,19] ,390 [,394] -,833 [-,141] ,000 [,312] 
  public / private funds 33 / 177 0 1 ,42 / ,89 ,502 / ,317 -,881 / -,752 ,000 / ,000 
1.3 Risk expectations all funds 215 [53] 0 1 ,78 [,09] ,417 [,295] -,878 [-,088] ,000 [,465] 
  public / private funds 36 / 179 0 1 ,36 / ,86 ,487 / ,348 -,941 / -,809 ,000 / ,000 
2.1 Qualification all funds 175 0 1 ,71 ,453 -,116 ,166 
  public / private funds 37 / 138 0 1 ,59 / ,75 ,498 / ,437 -,131 / -,051 ,481 / ,662 
2.3 Female representation all funds 69 ,0 50,0 16,06 11,72 ,265 ,027 
  public / private funds 30 / 39 ,0 / ,0 37,5 / 50,0 17,33 / 15,08 10,52 / 12,61 ,384 / ,137 ,036 / ,407 
3 Board size all funds 200 3 39 8,77 4,151 ,311 ,000 
  public / private funds 44 / 156 4 / 3 39 / 24 11,52 / 8 5,70 / 3,22 ,331 / ,152 ,028 / ,059 
4.1 Mission background all funds 249 0 1 ,06 ,231 ,091 ,238 
  public / private funds 46 / 203 0 1 ,09 / ,05 ,285 / ,217 -,168 / ,145 ,276 / ,054 
4.2 CR agenda only private & closed funds 162 0 1 ,44 ,498 ,232 ,004 
4.3 Sin stock only private & closed funds 179 0 1 ,09 ,286 ,072 ,347 
4.4 Legal form all funds 249 0 1 ,82 ,389 -,420 ,000 
5.1 Request by beneficiaries all funds 187 [51] 0 1 ,10 [,35] ,296 [,483] ,597 [,319] ,000 [,039] 
  public / private funds 27 / 160 0 1 ,44 / ,04 ,506 / ,191 ,529 / ,482 ,008 / ,000 
5.2 Beneficiaries interest all funds 193 [58] 0 1 ,20 [,66] ,399 [,479] ,819 [,491] ,000 [,000] 
  public / private funds 33 / 160 0 1 ,61 / ,11 ,496 / ,317 ,644 / ,813 ,000 / ,000 
6 Use of investment consult-
ants all funds 63 0 1 ,60 ,493 -,045 ,796 
  public / private funds 31 / 32 0 1 ,45 / ,75 ,506 / ,440 -,398 / -,114 ,048 / ,681 
7 Portfolio size all funds 245 -1,00 4,45 2,463 ,884 ,339 ,000 
  public / private funds 46 / 199 1,00 / -1,00 4,45 / 4,35 3,05 / 2,33 ,804 / ,847 ,477 / ,142 ,001 / ,045 
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  Variable name Sample Cases Minimum Maximum Mean S.D. Correlation Exact sig. (2-sided) 
8 Coverage ratio  all funds 243 57,90 176,40 112,63 13,65 -,201 ,002 
  public / private funds 46 / 197 57,90 / 79,30 133,70 / 176,40 99,04 / 115,80 16,64 /10,63 -,158 / ,008 ,293 / ,908 
8.1 ‘Skeptics’ / -fully funded all funds 196 0 1 ,93 ,258 -,197 ,008 
  public / private funds 17 / 179 0 1 ,59 / ,98 ,501 / ,128 -,137 / ,060 ,703 / 1,000 
8.2 Underfunded / ‘convinced’ all funds 8 0 1 ,62 ,506 ,683 ,035 
  public / private funds 7 / 1 0 1 ,70 / ,33 ,483 / ,577 ,509 / 1,000 ,300 / ,333 
9-11 Portfolio indexation  all funds 249 ,0 87,50 6,56 15,10 ,224 ,000 
  public / private funds 46 / 203 ,00 / ,00 80,00 / 87,50 13,07 / 5,08 21,79 / 12,74 ,359 / -,094 ,014 / ,184 
12 Use of external managers all funds 186 ,00 100 51,49 40,98 -,266 ,000 
  public / private funds 35 / 151 ,00 / ,00 100 / 100 49,24 / 52,01 35,01 / 42,33 -,271 / -,275 ,116 / ,001 
13 all funds 184 0 1 ,61 ,488 ,138 ,064 
 
Level of disclosure 
public / private funds 40 / 184 0 1 ,65 / ,60 ,483 / ,491 ,424 / ,058 ,018 / ,570 
14 Administrative form all funds 247 0 1 ,89 ,318 -,107 ,132 
  public / private funds 46 / 201 0 1 ,87 / ,89 ,341 / ,491 -,230 / -,075 ,317 / ,290 
15 Plan type all funds 244 0 1 ,24 ,427 ,246 ,000 
  public / private funds 46 / 198 0 1 ,59 / ,16 ,498 / ,364 ,306 / ,026 ,049 / ,817 
15.1 DB / ‘convinced’  all funds 16 0 1 ,39 ,494 ,720 ,000 
  public / private funds 11 / 5 0 1 ,69 / ,20 ,479 / ,408 - / ,873 - / ,000 
15.2 ‘Skeptics’ / DC all funds 128 0 1 ,16 ,371 ,152 ,073 
  public / private funds 8 / 120 0 1 ,38 / ,14 ,506 / ,351 ,854 / -,107 ,005 / ,358 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables defined in Table 20. For the categorical data and due to small sample sizes a Fisher's exact test is used as a statistical 
significance test and Pearson's correlation reflects the degree of linear relationship between the SRI behavior and the independent variables. For the interval variables a Pear-
son’s chi-square test is used instead and Spearman's rho is used to determine the degree of linear relationship between the variables. Values in squared brackets represent results 
prior to the assumptions made for those non-SRI investors that have not responded to the corresponding questions (see section 5.3.2.1). The original values are not included for 
the sub-samples of public and private funds. H4.2 and H4.3 include only private funds with restricted membership. Responses for H8.1 and H15.2 focus on all funds that do not 
have a positive view of the long term outperformance of SRI (see H1.1). This also includes those funds that have not responded to this question (see Figure 37). 
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TABLE 23 – CORRELATION ACROSS VARIABLES 
 # Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 SRI behavior 1.00                     
2 Performance expectations 0.78 1.00                    
3 Cost expectations -0.83 -0.68 1.00                   
4 Risk expectations -0.88 -0.75 0.88 1.00                  
5 Qualification -0.09 -0.07 0.12 0.08 1.00                 
6 Female representation 0.27 0.13 -0.23 -0.26 0.14 1.00                
7 Board size 0.31 0.26 -0.35 -0.26 0.07 -0.02 1.00               
8 Mission background 0.09 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.06 0.21 0.07 1.00              
9 CR agenda 0.19 0.17 -0.16 -0.17 0.03 -0.13 0.27 -0.07 1.00             
10 Sin stock -0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.15 0.07 -0.06 0.14 1.00            
11 Legal form -0.42 -0.48 0.43 0.45 0.07 -0.12 -0.35 -0.06 -0.09 0.13 1.00           
12 Request by beneficiaries 0.60 0.54 -0.64 -0.57 -0.25 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.08 -0.08 -0.49 1.00          
13 Beneficiaries’ interest 0.82 0.70 -0.62 -0.75 -0.14 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.12 -0.12 -0.47 0.65 1.00         
14 Use of investment consultants 0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.21 0.31 0.04 -0.06 1.00        
15 Portfolio size 0.34 0.31 -0.30 -0.30 0.11 0.23 0.63 -0.03 0.33 0.17 -0.33 0.25 0.29 0.15 1.00       
16 Portfolio indexation 0.22 0.21 -0.30 -0.23 0.07 0.20 0.27 0.07 0.07 0.05 -0.21 0.14 0.11 -0.05 0.37 1.00      
17 Coverage ratio -0.20 -0.30 0.27 0.31 0.00 0.07 -0.31 -0.13 -0.07 0.13 0.42 -0.22 -0.25 0.15 -0.29 -0.17 1.00     
18 Level of disclosure 0.14 0.17 -0.21 -0.24 0.08 0.22 0.18 0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.20 0.15 0.25 0.24 0.13 -0.15 1.00    
19 Use of external managers -0.27 -0.23 0.21 0.23 0.06 0.12 -0.02 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.04 -0.10 -0.26 -0.20 0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.04 1.00   
20 Administrative form 0.05 0.19 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.07 1.00  
21 Plan type 0.25 0.31 -0.19 -0.32 -0.06 0.19 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.12 -0.40 0.32 0.27 0.04 0.31 0.10 -0.21 0.17 -0.03 0.06 1.00 
This table presents correlation coefficients (Spearman's rho) across selected variables as defined in Table 20. The grey shaded correlations are significant at the 5% level. 
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5.4.3. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
As an extension of the above two-variable case, in this section, a series of binary logistic re-
gressions were used to predict the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds from the continuous 
and / or dichotomous characteristics hypothesized in chapter 4. That is, we estimate the prob-
ability that a pension fund engages in SRI against the probability of not engaging in SRI by 
making use of several predictor variables while at the same time controlling for different fac-
tors. Table 24 provides an overview of the allocation of variables for the different models.  
TABLE 24 – VARIABLES USED FOR MULTIVARIATE STAGE 
Variables Number of cases Level of significance Model constituents 
1.1 Performance expectations 187 ,000 [,003] included in model 1 
1.2 Cost expectations 210 ,000 [,312] included in model 2 
1.3 Risk expectations 215 ,000 [465] included in model 3 
2.1 Qualification 175 ,166 – 
2.3 Female representation 69 ,027 – 
3 Board size 200 ,000 included in all models 
4.1 Mission background 249 ,238 – 
4.2 CR agenda 162 ,004 included in model 6 
4.3 Sin stock 179 ,347 – 
4.4 Legal form 249 ,000 included in model 1 – 5 
5.1 Request by beneficiaries 187 ,000 [,039] – 
5.2 Beneficiaries interest 193 ,000 [,000] included in model 4 
6 Investment consultants 63 ,796 – 
7 Portfolio size 245 ,000 included in all models 
8 Coverage ratio 243 ,002 included in all models 
9-11 Portfolio indexation 249 ,000 included in all models 
12 Use of external managers 186 ,000 included in all models 
13 Level of disclosure 184 ,064 – 
14 Administrative form 247 ,132 – 
15 Plan type 244 ,000 included in all models 
This table presents the selection criteria for the variables to be used in the multivariate analysis. The grey 
shaded areas represent those variables that will not be considered in the subsequent analysis. 
To the extent that logistic regression analysis requires a set of collectively exhaustive events, 
meaning that only cases with non-missing values will be used, in a preliminary step those 
variables were excluded from the analysis which have a large number of missing values and 
whose inclusion would cause the overall valid number of cases to decline below feasible lev-
els. This restriction mainly concerns H2.3 and H6, where we have information for only 69 and 
63 cases (see second column in Table 24). Furthermore, H5.1 drops out for the multivariate 
analysis since the underlying question in the survey instrument has been phrased in such a 
way that we have no positive responses for the non-SRI investors and thus their inclusion 
would lead to non-meaningful results. Moreover, to the extent that the regression models be-
low should not include any irrelevant predictors, we can further increase the number of valid 
cases (a minimum of ten cases per independent variable is recommended) by omitting those 
variables which were already insignificant in the previous section. This concerns H2.1, H4.1, 
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H4.3, H13 and H14 (see third column in Table 24). Finally, to the extent that highly corre-
lated independent variables may affect the results of the multivariate logistic models, we ab-
stain in our model selection strategy from simultaneously including these variables in the 
same models. As shown in in Table 23, the problem of collinearity exists mainly for those 
items where we have inserted additional assumptions for those non-SRI investors that have 
not provided answers to the respective question (see H1.1 – H1.3, and H5.2).  
A search for the best model specification was performed by attributing the above selected 
variables to different models, each with a different combination of explanatory variables. For 
all models the selected terms are entered in one step. The results of the estimations are pro-
vided in Table 25 and are discussed in chapter 6. In total results are displayed for seven dif-
ferent models. Models 1 – 5 focus on the entire sample, whereas models 6 and 7 target spe-
cific subsamples. It must be noted that the cases included in the models vary considerably, as 
we have to exclude cases with missing values from the analysis. As a result, each model has a 
different number of cases and is therefore based on a different set of pension funds, which 
partly explains difficulties in comparing results across the different model specifications. 
The first three model specifications separately include the variables H1.1 – H1.3 in the regres-
sion models in order to cope with the problem of collinearity across these variables. Not sur-
prisingly, the results for these models, which have varying numbers of cases (107 / 115 / 119), 
are very similar, to the extent that the respective coefficients are overwhelmingly significant. 
This indicates that pension funds that have positive expectations about the financial perform-
ance (in terms of long-term returns, costs and risks involved) are also more likely to engage in 
SRI. In addition, for all these models the legal form also presents a statistically significant 
coefficient, suggesting that public institutions are more likely to engage in SRI. In model 4, 
instead of controlling for the financial perception of pension fund trustees regarding SRI, an 
alternative variable which addresses whether trustees consider SRI to be in the best interest of 
their beneficiaries (H5.2), is added to the regression model. The variable is introduced sepa-
rately as there is a problem of collinearity with H1.1 – H1.3. The model which contains 109 
cases suggests that pension funds that consider SRI as being in the best interest of their bene-
ficiaries and that manage a larger proportion of their assets internally are more likely to show 
a positive SRI behavior. Interestingly, model 4 differs from models 1 – 3 (and also 5) to the 
extent that the legal form has a statistically insignificant coefficient. The result suggests that 
the interpretation of SRI as being in the best interest of pension fund beneficiaries leads the 
legal form to lose its statistical significance. Thus this variable appears to be more important 
than the legal form. Model 5 differs from the previous model to the extent that it does not in-
clude any of the variables H1.1 – H1.3 nor H5.2. When we do not control for any of these 
characteristics the regression model (which has 147 cases) suggests that public institutions are 
more likely to exhibit positive SRI behavior. In addition, the model proposes that the larger 
pension funds are and the lower the percentage of assets they manage externally, the greater 
the probability that they engage in SRI. 
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TABLE 25 – LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable name 
marginal 
effect t-stat 
marginal 
effect t-stat 
marginal 
effect t-stat 
marginal 
effect t-stat 
Constant 2,905 ,467 1,924 ,182 -1,860 ,198 -1,465 ,089 
1.1 Performance expec-tations 4.984 16.791
       
1.2 Cost expectations   -6,680 19,106     
1.3 Risk expectations     -6,548 22,817   
5.2 Beneficiaries’ inter-est       5,553 20,615
 
3 Board size -,182 ,768 -,076 ,157 ,096 ,355 ,042 ,115 
4.4 Legal form -1,999 4,535 -2,281 3,620 -2,656 4,438 -1,494 2,289 
7 Portfolio size ,620 ,734 -,015 ,000 ,194 ,063 ,587 ,783 
8 Coverage ratio -,025 ,622 ,043 1,253 ,062 2,838 -,005 ,018 
9-11 Portfolio indexation ,013 ,285 -,040 1,938 -,007 ,102 ,026 1,179 
12 External managers -,016 2,601 -,015 1,627 -,020 2,079 -,021 3,425 
15 Plan type ,355 ,193 ,888 ,872 -,973 ,622 -,709 ,435 
Total cases / missing cases 107 / 142 115 / 134 119 / 130 109 / 140 
Cases dep. variable = 0 /1 74 / 33 86 / 29 86 / 33 74 / 35 
Model 0 / overall % 69,2 / 93,5 74,8 / 95,7 72,3 / 95,0 67,9 / 94,5 
Adjusted R2  ,708 ,784 ,821 ,781 
Log likelihood function 57,557 42,864 40,331 47,819 
Chi-square statistics 74,657 87,020 100,183 89,019 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Variable name 
marginal 
effect t-stat 
marginal 
effect t-stat 
marginal 
effect t-stat 
Constant ,269 ,014 -3,631 1,069 2,785 ,381 
3 Board size -,006 ,006 -,070 ,439 1,005 1,370 
4.2 CR Agenda   1,124 3,824   
4.4 Legal form -1,752 9,162   -2,023 3,941 
7 Portfolio size ,723 3,937 ,572 1,229 1,005 1,370 
8 Coverage ratio -,004 ,039 ,019 ,525 -.029 .750 
9-11 Portfolio indexation -,003 ,047 -,022 ,513 ,008 ,088 
12 External managers -,017 9,947 -,018 7,332 -,016 2.287 
15 Plan type ,354 ,558 -,367 ,326 ,014 ,000 
Total cases / missing cases 147 / 102 97 / 82 83 / 74 
Cases dep. variable = 0 /1 86 / 61 69 / 28 73 / 10 
Model 0 / overall % 58,5 / 75,5 71,1 / 75,3 88,0 / 91,6 
Adjusted R2  ,352 ,241 ,237 
Log likelihood function 155,029 98,641 50,134 
Chi-square statistics 44,484 17,942 10.935 
This table presents different logistic regression models that estimate the probability of Swiss pension funds to 
adopt a SRI strategy. The marginal effects are the coefficients of the independent variables.  Indicates signifi-
cance at the 10% level,  indicates significance at the 5% level, and  indicates significance at the 1% 
level. The grey shaded areas represent the variables that have not been included in the respective model. Over-
all % reflects the predicted values of the dependent variable based on the full logistic regression model. Under 
adjusted R2 we report Nagelkerkes R2. Chi-square statistics with a significant p-value indicate a better model fit 
than the empty model (Model 0). 
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Model 6, which is only about the private institutions with closed membership, explicitly ad-
dresses the role of the CR of the employer on the SRI behavior of the corresponding pension 
fund [H4.2]. The results of this model (which includes only 97 cases) show that the existence 
of an employer CR agenda is a significant determinant of the SRI behavior of private pension 
funds with closed memberships. Also, pension funds that use services provided by external 
asset managers to a lesser extent are more likely to engage in SRI. The model specification 
does not include the variables H1.1 – H1.3 and variable H5.2, which explains the lower over-
all model fit compared to models 1 – 5. 
Finally in model 7, which has only 87 cases, we target only the ‘skeptics’, that is those funds 
that do not have a positive view of the long-term performance of SRI, in order to examine the 
role of the funding level (H8.1) as well as the plan type (H15.2) on the disposition of the pen-
sion funds towards SRI.554 Results for this model show that neither the funding level nor the 
plan type can be considered as statistically significant factors for the SRI behavior of Swiss 
pension funds. As in model 6, the model specification does not include the variables H1.1 – 
H1.3 or variable H5.2, which explains the lower overall fit of the model. 
                                                 
554 There are no separate models for H8.2 and H15.1 as the corresponding variables contain an insuffi-
cient number of cases. 
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6. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
In this chapter we analyze the empirical findings introduced in section 5.4. The following 
sections contain a summary of the findings from the descriptive statistics as well as the results 
from the bivariate and multivariate logistic regression analysis. It has to be noted that as a 
result of the data availability (number of cases) and quality the depth of the analysis varies 
considerably between the different pension fund characteristics examined. While some pen-
sion fund characteristics can be analyzed only at a general level (e.g. the long-term time hori-
zon, degree of portfolio diversification and size of corporate holdings), others can be analyzed 
more by also considering bivariate results (e.g. female representation, reliance on investment 
consultants, level of disclosure or administrative form), while others can be also explored in a 
multivariate setting (e.g. financial perception of SRI, role of beneficiaries and employers, 
portfolio size, risk taking capacity, and the reliance on external asset managers). Despite this 
uneven playing field in terms of the quality of the results, in the following sections we attempt 
to provide an interpretation of the data as well as including recommendations on how demand 
for SRI can be increased by the various stakeholders concerned. 
6.1. STAKEHOLDER CHARACTERISTICS 
6.1.1. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
To better understand their role on the propensity of a fund to engage in SRI, we have estab-
lished different measures including how trustees perceive SRI financially, whether members 
of pension fund boards are selected on the basis of their professional qualifications, the per-
centage of female representation as well as the size of the pension fund board. As mentioned 
earlier, pension fund boards have a key role in the decision of how pension funds finally in-
vest their money. As will be shown in the following subsections, the same is also the case 
when it comes to the decision of a pension fund to engage in SRI. 
6.1.1.1. FINANCIAL PERCEPTION OF SRI BY PENSION FUND TRUSTEES 
As shown in Figure 37, out of the 81 funds that engage in SRI, two thirds of those that re-
sponded (45) expect SRI to outperform financially in the long-term. The remaining third do 
not share this view. However, the way the question is phrased does not mean that they expect 
SRI to underperform. This rather positive view of SRI among SRI investors is even more pro-
nounced when it comes to expectations about costs and risks. 83.7% of the responding funds 
(43) do not consider SRI to involve higher costs, while in terms of risk a total of 91.6% do not 
expect risk to increase when engaging in SRI. Obviously, expectations are different when we 
look at those funds that do not engage in SRI. Although the response rate among non-SRI 
investors concerning long-term performance expectations is very low (only 6 funds out of a 
total of 168), it shows that they are more skeptical which may serve as an explanation for their 
abstention from SRI.555 Surprisingly they are less skeptical with regard to costs and risk char-
                                                 
555 See Cumming, Johan (2007, p. 400) 
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acteristics. The few funds that responded display a rather positive view, although still at a 
lower rate than for SRI investors.556 
FIGURE 37 – FINANCIAL PERCEPTION OF PENSION FUNDS REGARDING SRI (1) 
(i) Pension fund has the view that SRI products outperform in the long term 
 
(ii) Pension fund has the view that costs for SRI products are too high 
 
(iii) Pension fund has the view that risks involved with SRI products are too high 
     
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 
Together with the results from the bivariate (Table 22) and multivariate analysis (Table 25, 
models 1-3) this shows that financial expectations are a significant factor for pension fund 
trustees engaging in SRI. This is especially so with regard to the views of trustees about the 
long-term performance of SRI and to a somewhat lesser extent for their views about costs and 
risks.557 The long-term performance aspect can probably be considered the most clear-cut 
indicator on the list of reasons why pension funds pursue SRI strategies. It confirms that trus-
tees that engage in SRI largely do this in line with the traditional meaning of their fiduciary 
                                                 
556 The responses reported in Figure 37 for non-SRI investing pension funds refer to the actual re-
sponses prior to the additional assumptions being made. 
557 As indicated in section 5.3.2.1, in order to increase the overall number of cases (allowing for the 
inclusion of these variables in the multivariate analysis) we assume that non-SRI investing pension 
funds are generally more skeptical than those that engage in SRI. We therefore reclassified non-SRI 
investors that have not responded regarding long-term performance expectations of SRI into “does not 
agree” and those that have not responded on the cost and risk related questions into “agree”. Although 
for the whole sample the significance levels of the cost and risk variables change substantially upon 
the inclusion of the different assumptions, in the light of earlier evidence cited in 4.1.1.1 we consider 
these realistic assumptions, which help to increase the overall quality of the results. 
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duties. As shown in section 2.4.1, in theory the fiduciary obligations of pension fund require 
trustees to invest pension assets in a prudent manner, which is traditionally interpreted as 
maximizing returns on investment, while maintaining sufficient diversity within their portfo-
lio. As such, in line with the typology of SRI investors developed in section 2.4.3, pension 
funds that engage in SRI this way would typically be classified as either rational economic 
investors (see section 2.4.3.1) or as socially responsible investors that have a clear focus on 
shareholder value creation (see section 2.4.3.2.3). This means that in both cases they factor 
ethical considerations only to the extent that this is expected to generate financial value in 
return. Hence, trustees’ perception of SRI in terms of performance, costs and risk is likely to 
fundamentally influence their propensity to engage in SRI.558 Inversely, and in line with 
Cumming and Johan, one could conclude that a major reason for hesitancy on the part of pen-
sion funds entering the SRI arena may include the fear that by investing in SRI optimal re-
turns may be forfeited.559 As has been shown in section 2.5.3, today there is sufficient evi-
dence that this view no longer holds. It is therefore the role of the SRI asset management in-
dustry to overcome this barrier and make the case for a financially convincing SRI strategy. 
Although most pension funds that engage in SRI have a positive view about the financial per-
formance of SRI, the above figures suggest that in some cases pension funds engage in SRI 
despite being rather skeptical or indifferent about possible financial implications. To get a 
better view about the individual fund’s perception with respect to performance, costs and 
risks, in Figure 38 we display the detailed responses as a decision tree. While the figure shows 
a rather fragmented picture, which makes it difficult to derive clear cut conclusions, one can 
at least distinguish between three broad groups in terms of how pension funds perceive SRI 
financially. There is a larger group of 45 funds which either have an entirely positive (group 
1) or largely positive (groups 2 – 7) view about SRI and hence whose perception can be con-
sidered as a driver for their SRI engagement. At the other extreme there is a smaller group of 
4 rather skeptical pension funds that either have a completely negative (group 14) or mostly 
negative (groups 12 – 13) view.560 In between there are 32 funds (groups 8 – 11) that are in-
different or have not responded to these questions (e.g. are assumed to have no opinion). One 
can conclude that for the skeptics as well as those funds that are indifferent, the financial ar-
gument does not serve as an explanation for their SRI behavior. 
 
                                                 
558 See Schumacher-Hummel (2004, p. 197), Cumming, Johan (2007, p. 412), Williams (2007, p. 48), 
Nilsson (2008, p. 312). See comment by Ambachtsheer (2006a) regarding a survey conducted among 
institutional investors in the U.S. which showed that roughly 60% of the interviewees agree that the 
belief that SRI helps in reducing risks and improving returns is an important driver for SRI among 
trustees. This explanation is also consistent with empirical findings that many pension fund trustees 
are still refusing SRI on the ground that the inclusion of SRI criteria necessarily hurts financial per-
formance or increases portfolio risks (for example see Kinder (2004a, p. 15)). 
559 Cumming, Johan (2007, p. 400) 
560 This finding is actually in line with conclusions by Lusenti (2009) who concludes that in some 
cases Swiss pension funds engage in SRI although they do not believe in the financial quality of SRI. 
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FIGURE 38 – FINANCIAL PERCEPTION OF PENSION FUNDS REGARDING SRI (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 
What seems to contradict with the funds' fiduciary duties may actually also serve as an indica-
tion that the motivation for SRI differs even among pension funds and that pension funds in-
terpret their fiduciary duties differently. It also indicates that although the financial argument 
seems to be a dominant driver, pension funds that engage in SRI are not all the same in terms 
of their underlying objectives. That is, while for the groups 1 – 7 the SRI engagement can be 
explained by making reference to financial arguments, the ‘indifferent’ groups (8 – 11) and 
especially the ‘skeptics’ (12 – 13) must be attracted by other reasons, eventually including 
also ethical rationales like those outlined in section 2.4.2.1.561 For the SRI asset management 
industry this implies that although the majority of pension funds are primarily interested in 
financially successful products, one has to be aware that there are also funds that are driven by 
non-financial rationales. From this it becomes clear that providers of SRI services to pension 
funds should make an effort to explore in detail the specific interest of pension funds with 
regard to SRI and transform them in a functioning investment strategy aimed at meeting the 
specific investment objectives. 
                                                 
561 Alternative explanations for the SRI behavior of these funds will be examined in section 6.1.3 when 
it comes to the role of the beneficiaries. 
Pension funds have the 
view that SRI outperforms 
in the long term 
Pension funds have the 
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above average costs 
Pension funds have the 
view that SRI involves 
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6.1.1.2. PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION OF PENSION FUND TRUSTEES 
As stated in section 4.1.1.2, in Switzerland no explicit legal requirement exists regarding the 
level of education or financial and investment qualifications of pension fund trustees. Never-
theless, among the 175 funds that responded to this question, 125 funds either selected the 
employer or employee representatives or both according to their specific professional qualifi-
cation, while the remaining 50 funds do not. On average trustees of pension funds that engage 
in SRI show a lower level of qualification than trustees of those funds that do not engage in 
SRI, which would run against our hypothesis. Although this relationship is not significant (see 
Table 22), one could argue that pension fund trustees with a higher level of professional quali-
fication are more likely to follow a conservative investment approach and stick to standard 
investment practices than trustees with a less solid financial background and who eventually 
are driven by other non-financial motives. As a result, for the former, entering the SRI arena 
may seem to be breaking new ground, which means that they have to invest additional effort 
(time and expertise) and from a traditional finance perspective may be considered to bear also 
additional fiduciary risks. This would be in line with Caerlewy-Smith, who found that the 
higher the trustee's professional qualifications, the more likely he or she was to believe that 
there were significant barriers to the implementation of a SRI strategy.562 Clearly pension 
fund trustees tend to lack appropriate incentives to overcome such barriers and they normally 
need to have additional motivations (e.g. personal motives, explicit requests raised by the 
beneficiaries, SRI mandate explicitly included in a fund’s statutory framework) to make this 
move. Providers of SRI products as well as consultancies may contribute here by proving the 
long-term business case for SRI. 
6.1.1.3. FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN PENSION FUND BOARDS 
Looking at other demographic characteristics of boards shows that pension trustees are a 
rather homogenous group of individuals characterized by limited diversity in terms of age or 
sex. For example, the boards of the pension funds included in our sample are generally char-
acterized by a low level of female representation, comprising on average only 16.1%. When 
distinguishing between public and private funds, the data shows that public institutions on 
average have a higher female representation of 17.3% against only 15.1% for private institu-
tions, which suggests greater awareness of achieving adequate female representation among 
public pension funds. Among the 69 documented cases in our sample, only two funds, both 
private institutions, achieve gender parity. In contrast, 11 funds report having no women on 
their board at all. A similar picture holds also for other pension bodies, such as the manage-
ment of the fund or fund committees confirming that investment oversight at pension funds 
remains largely a male domain. Interestingly, in Switzerland this underrepresentation of fe-
male board members is not subject to a similar public debate as in the corporate sector or the 
political arena, which suggests that there is only limited interest among women for this role. 
Accordingly, Amacker argues that pension funds have difficulty finding interested and quali-
fied female candidates, because this field is traditionally seen as rather complex and technical, 
                                                 
562 See Caerlewy-Smith (2006, p. 1586) 
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requiring specialist knowledge and involving personal liability, which according to Amacker 
are deterrents for many women. However, to the extent that, female employees fund a large 
proportion of the pension assets, pension funds may need to rethink their entry criteria and 
implement appropriate incentives to increase diversity in the supervision of pension assets.563 
Looking at the potential relationship between female representation and SRI behavior of pen-
sion funds, the data provides evidence that with a mean value of 18.4% pension funds that 
engage in SRI have higher female representation than funds that do not, where the value is 
only 13.0% (see Figure 39). The bivariate results included in Table 22 show that this relation-
ship is significant for the overall sample as well as for the public subsample but not for the 
private institutions (although going in the same direction), which suggest that this relationship 
applies to public funds. In line with the literature introduced in section 4.1.1.2, which suggests 
that women are generally more interested in wider CR issues and more likely to take account 
of such factors in their investment decisions, we conclude that this finding is consistent with 
our hypothesis that pension funds that include a higher percentage of women in their govern-
ing body are more likely to engage in SRI as well. However, in order to gain further insights 
on the role of women regarding the general investment practices of pension funds and 
whether their percentage representation can be considered as determinant of the SRI behavior 
of pension funds, one would need to also include this variable in a multivariate stage, which 
would require a more comprehensive set of data. 
FIGURE 39 – FEMALE REPRESENTATION IN PENSION FUND BOARDS 
 
Source: Based on own data obtained from annual pension fund reports 
 
                                                 
563 Based on anecdotal evidence this holds also for younger employees where due to limited data 
available we have not examined this variable empirically. Furthermore, according to Swisscanto 
(2008, p. 55) boards also include retired employees in only 26% of cases. 
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6.1.1.4. BOARD SIZE 
Based on SPFS 2007 Weber et al. calculate that on average pension fund boards of private 
funds are composed of 8 to 10 trustees. Around 16% of private institutions have only 4 or less 
trustees in their governing body, whereas 10% have more then 10. In contrast more than half 
of the boards of public institutions have more than 10 trustees.564 On average the pension fund 
boards included in our sample are composed of 8.8 trustees. Whereas the smallest board con-
sists of only 3 trustees, the largest board has 39 members (both cases are public institu-
tions).565 As is shown in Figure 40, in our sample SRI is observed more often among funds 
with larger decision-making bodies, which runs against our hypothesis that SRI is more com-
mon among pension funds with smaller boards that are assumed to require less transparent 
decision-making. Whereas the average size of a pension fund board of SRI investors consists 
of 10.3 trustees, the average board of non-SRI investors is composed of only 7.9 trustees. The 
bivariate analysis in Table 22 shows that this relationship is significant for the overall sample 
as well as for the public funds, but not for the private institutions, which indicates that the 
hypothesized relationship between board size and SRI behavior holds for public funds. In 
contrast, the multivariate analysis then shows that the size of a pension fund board does not 
play a role in any of the proposed models 1 – 7 (see Table 25). An explanation for the limited 
explanatory power of this characteristic for the SRI behavior of pension funds can be found 
by referring to the legal form of pension funds. Boards of public funds are generally larger (on 
average 11.5 trustees) than boards of private funds (on average only 8 trustees). As shown in 
section 6.1.2.3, the legal form can be considered a key factor for both the bivariate and multi-
variate analysis, confirming our hypothesis that public funds are more likely to engage in SRI. 
FIGURE 40 – SIZE OF PENSION FUND BOARDS 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 and annual fund reports 
                                                 
564 Weber et al (2009, p. 59) 
565 The uneven numbers, which appear to contradict the legal requirement of equal representation of 
employee as well as employer representatives, can be explained by the fact at the time of the reporting 
some funds have not yet replaced trustees that have retired or resigned from their function. 
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6.1.2. DISPOSITION OF EMPLOYERS 
Surprisingly, only 5 funds out of the 81 pension funds with positive SRI behavior report that 
their SRI strategy is a direct consequence of the employer’s disposition towards environ-
mental, social or ethical concerns. 40 funds report no such disposition, while the remaining 36 
funds have not responded to this question. Although these figures indicate that for a limited 
number of funds there is a convergence between the disposition of the employer and the SRI 
behavior of the respective pension fund, for a majority of Swiss pension funds they rather 
indicate the opposite, namely a disparity between the two which adds to the legal separation 
between the pension fund and its sponsoring institution. In order to examine this question in 
more detail we have established additional measures including the mission background of the 
employer, the existence of a CR agenda in the case of private employers as well as the legal 
form of the pension funds. 
6.1.2.1. MISSION BACKGROUND 
Looking in a first step at the employers which can be attributed with a specific mission back-
ground (e.g. employers that have a religious, union, educational, health/social, cultural back-
ground) the non-significant bivariate results disclosed in Table 22 support the initial finding 
that there is no relationship between an employer’s disposition towards environmental, social 
or ethical concerns and the SRI behavior of its pension fund (see also section 6.3.3), which 
runs against earlier findings by Oesch.566 Although the bivariate results are impacted by the 
low number of cases (14), they show that in some cases where one would naturally expect a 
strong propensity to engage in SRI no such strategies yet exist (see Table 26).567 However, 
rather than having explicitly erected a wall between the investing practices of their pension 
fund and their organizational commitment for good works (which often exists among founda-
tions and universities568), we assume that this separation is rather the result of trustees’ un-
awareness or lack of knowledge about the subject and the potential need for organizational 
consistency.569 For example, without having access to detailed data on the composition of the 
portfolio of these funds, we assume that several mission-oriented employers in Switzerland 
are very likely to be invested through their pension funds in companies that directly violate 
their organizational commitment (e.g. health-oriented funds investing in tobacco companies 
or church funds investing in companies involved in the production of anti-personnel mines, 
cluster munitions and/or depleted uranium intended for military purposes). Hence SRI asset 
managers or consultancies should make a special effort to create awareness among these pen-
                                                 
566 Oesch (2000). This variable has been included only at a bivariate stage but due to its non-
significance not been considered in the multivariate analysis. 
567 Regarding church pension funds this somewhat disillusioning result has been confirmed by an ear-
lier study by Hoppe et al. (2007). According to the authors there is a certain lack of credibility among 
these types of mission oriented organizations in cases where they do not consistently invest their pen-
sion fund assets in line with their own organizational values. 
568 See Rosenthal (2008) 
569 The same also holds for those funds that engage in SRI as only one fund (*) reports that its SRI 
engagement is a direct consequence of the employer’s commitment towards the subject. 
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sion funds of mission-related investing and explore opportunities whereby employers can 
adapt the investment strategies of their pension funds in a way to ensure organizational con-
sistency and avoid reputational risks. 
TABLE 26 – MISSION BACKGROUND OF PENSION FUNDS 
 Mission background Do not engage in SRI in % Engage in SRI in % Total 
Church 1 50 1 50 2 
Culture - - 1 100 1 
Education 2 50 2 (1)* 50 4 
Health 4 60 3 40 7 
Total 7 50 7 50 14 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008; (*) in a single case SRI 
is reported to be the direct consequence of the employer’s commitment towards the subject. 
6.1.2.2. CR AGENDA AND SIN STOCKS 
Looking in more detail at the subsample of the private pension funds with closed membership, 
it can be seen that in cases where employers have an established CR strategy or indicate that 
they address environmental opportunities and / or risks (suggesting that they are aware of the 
subject), the respective pension funds are more likely to engage in SRI. This finding turns out 
to be significant in the bivariate analysis (see Table 22), as well as for multivariate analysis 
(see Table 25, model 6). Thus despite the fact that in Switzerland, strictly speaking, pension 
funds are separate legal entities from the employer, in the case of private funds employers 
seem to influence the investment strategies of their pension funds to a certain degree. How-
ever it is not clear if it is the employer who actively influences the investment strategy of the 
pension funds or if the board members themselves (including employee representatives) con-
sider organizational consistency as a relevant factor. In any case, companies that have a strong 
CR commitment, but whose pension fund does not yet adhere to similar principles should be 
aware that in the future they might be confronted with greater pressure to address this incon-
sistency. For example, such inconsistencies could emerge in the case of financial institutions 
which do not provide finance to companies involved in certain unethical practices (e.g. use of 
child or forced labor) or companies that due to their CR strategy do not source from suppliers 
with a bad track record, but where the corresponding pension fund is in fact invested in such 
controversial firms. In the U.K. context, Robert Barrington from ISIS argues that this particu-
lar case may well be an “emerging area for pressure groups and an emerging risk for company 
reputation, especially if the pension fund has the same brand as the company”.570 
Inversely, we have not found a significant relationship between the employer’s classification 
of sin stocks and the propensity of its pension fund not to engage in SRI.571 Among the 16 
funds that can be classified as sin stocks or as companies that have been subject to major con-
                                                 
570 McCallin (2003) 
571 Due to its insignificance at the bivariate stage this variable was not included in the multivariate 
analysis. 
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troversies in the past, 11 pension funds do not engage in SRI, whereas 5 funds nevertheless 
engage in this sort of investment practice. This finding is again hampered by the low number 
of cases that can be classified as sin stocks (16). In addition, the finding seems further influ-
enced by the fact that although some of the companies can be considered sin stocks, they 
seem well aware of their corporate responsibilities as established by their CR strategies (see 
figures in brackets in Table 27). Interestingly, this holds for all funds of sin stocks that engage 
in SRI (100%), but to a much lesser extent for those funds that do not engage in SRI (45.5%). 
Regarding the former, this concerns mostly larger firms that although being active in contro-
versial sectors address environmental and social risks and opportunities. In contrast, among 
the latter, companies that are active in the arms and tobacco business are at least consistent, to 
the extent that they show no socially responsible behavior in the case of their pension fund. 
TABLE 27 – SRI BEHAVIOR OF SIN STOCKS 
Sin Stocks Do not engage in SRI in % Engage in SRI in % Total 
Arms 3 (0) 100 - - 3 
Chemistry & pharma 1 (1) 50 1 (1) 50 2 
Controversies 2 (1) 40 3 (3) 60 5 
Fossil fuels 1 (1)  100 - - 1 
GMO - - 1 (1)  100 1 
Nuclear 2 (2) 100 - - 2 
Tobacco 2 (0) 100 - - 2 
Total 11 (5) 68.75 (45.45) 5 (5) 31.25 (100) 16 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008; figures in brackets 
refer to entities that have an established CR strategy. 
6.1.2.3. LEGAL FORM 
Finally, as stated in section 4.1.2, public pension funds have traditionally been among the 
most active SRI investors in many countries. This is also the case in Switzerland, where a 
large majority (73.9%) of all public institutions included in the sample (46 funds) engages in 
SRI. In contrast, only a minority (23.2%) of all private pension funds (203 funds) apply SRI 
investment principles. This confirms earlier findings by Lusenti, who showed public pension 
funds made up the largest share of SRI-applying pension funds.572 As shown in Table 22 and 
Table 25 (models 1-3, 5 and 6), the legal form of a pension fund is a significant factor con-
firming our hypothesis that public pension funds are more likely to engage in SRI than private 
pension funds. 
There are different explanations why public pension funds are more inclined to engage in SRI 
than their private counterparts. Lusenti argues that the boards of public pension funds often 
also include union officials, as well as political representatives who bring certain dynamics to 
                                                 
572 See Lusenti (2009) 
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decisions on asset allocation.573 The boards of public pension funds are therefore often more 
political in nature than the boards of private pension funds. Indirectly this is confirmed by 
Queisser and Vittas, who state that in Switzerland the pension funds of public sector entities 
are often multi-employer funds, which combine different public entities from the same region. 
By nature they therefore tend to also include public employers with a social, cultural, educa-
tional, ethical/religious or health background and therefore, as argued in section 6.1.2.1, are 
more inclined to engage in SRI.574 An alternative, but closely related explanation has been 
provided by Gérard Fischer, CEO of the Swisscanto Group, who considers public pension 
funds simply as being more exposed to the public and therefore as being under greater pres-
sure to address SRI related issues.575 
Dominique Biedermann, director of Ethos, argues that the higher propensity of public funds 
engaging in SRI holds especially in the context of responsible shareholder engagement prac-
tices.576 This is confirmed by the Swisscanto data which shows that with 58.8%, public funds 
are more likely to practice shareholder engagement than private funds where only 29.8% re-
port similar SRI practices (Table 28). The higher propensity of public pension funds to con-
duct shareholder engagement is typically explained by the fact that due to the small size of the 
Swiss market and the strong interrelation between firms, private funds tend to refrain from 
making active use of their voting rights in order to interfere in the governance of other com-
panies. In contrast, this conflict of interest does not exist in the case of public institutions. 
TABLE 28 – SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT PRACTICES BY SWISS PENSION FUNDS 
 Public funds in % Private funds in % Total 
Total 46 18.47 203 81.53 249 
Non-SRI investors 13 7.69 156 92.31 169 
SRI investors  34 41.98 47 58.02 81 
Conduct shareholder en-
gagement / no shareholder 
engagement practices 
20 / 14 58.82 / 41.18 14 / 33 29.79 / 70.21 34 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey, 2008 
To conclude, one could argue that although only five funds have explicitly reported that their 
decision to engage in SRI is a consequence of the employer’s disposition, for some categories 
of pension funds stronger links nevertheless seem to exist between the employer and the pro-
pensity of pension funds to engage in SRI. In particular, this link is significant in the case of 
public employers, but also for corporate institutions, which have already engaged in CR prac-
tices. In contrast, surprisingly, in mission-oriented institutions, which one would expect to 
pursue a SRI strategy through their pension arm, this link seems rarely to be established. 
                                                 
573 This would further confirm hypothesis H4.1, but also H2.5 which due to the lack of data has not 
been tested empirically. 
574 Queisser, Vittas (2000, p. 33) 
575 Ottawa (2008) 
576 Ottawa (2008), see also Oesch (2000, p. 31) 
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6.1.3. ROLE OF BENEFICIARIES 
As already shown in section 4.1.3, contrary to other countries such as the U.K. or the U.S., 
within the Swiss mandatory system beneficiaries have no choice on how their retirement as-
sets are invested.577 Nevertheless, analysis of the Swisscanto data shows that beneficiaries 
play a significant role in whether their pension funds engage in SRI. As introduced in section 
5.3.2.1, in order to measure the role of the beneficiaries, we have established two separate 
variables. The first variable measures if the SRI behavior of a fund is the result of an explicit 
request by its beneficiaries, whereas a second variable refers to the perception of trustees as to 
whether SRI is in the best interest of their beneficiaries. 
For the first variable, among the 81 pension funds that show a positive SRI behavior in our 
sample, 18 funds report that they have introduced their SRI strategy in response to an explicit 
request made by their beneficiaries. This relationship turns out to be significant in the bivari-
ate analysis (see Table 22578), confirming our hypothesis that pension funds that have been 
confronted with an explicit request by their beneficiaries to engage in SRI are indeed more 
likely to invest in SRI. Although this relationship seems evident, it is nevertheless surprising 
to the extent that apart from access to employee representatives, beneficiaries have no institu-
tionalized mechanism to voice their concerns or interact with their trustees on how pension 
assets as a whole or how a particular holding should be managed. As a consequence it could 
have been expected that beneficiaries are rarely concerned about their fund’s investment poli-
cies and barely vocal on how their funds should actually be managed. This has been con-
firmed by a survey by Furrer and Seidler among Swiss pension fund beneficiaries, which 
showed that they seldom direct requests for SRI towards their pension funds.579 
This limited role of pension fund beneficiaries is further aggravated by the fact that they gen-
erally only have limited information on the funds’ investment strategy on individual portfolio 
holdings of their pension fund (see section 6.2.3.3), which raises questions about the general 
transparency of Swiss pension funds (see 6.3.2). As a result, beneficiaries are not aware when 
their pension assets are invested in controversial companies or projects. Certainly, increased 
portfolio transparency would raise the attention of beneficiaries as well as other stakeholders 
and might lead pension fund trustees to rethink certain investment decisions. To the extent 
that Swisscanto data shows that some pension funds are responsive to specific requests, bene-
ficiaries should definitely seize opportunities (e.g. via email, phone calls, events and meet-
ings, participating in pension fund surveys) to raise their concern with their trustees regarding 
SRI. A particular issue to start with concerns the transparency of pension funds towards their 
participants in terms of portfolio constituents. 
                                                 
577 Queisser, Whitehouse (2003, p. 7) 
578 For the multivariate analysis we have included only the measure regarding the beneficiaries’ best 
interest but not if the beneficiaries have explicitly requested SRI. This variable drops out from the 
multivariate analysis since the underlying question in the survey instrument has been phrased in a way 
that we have no positive responses for the non-SRI investors. 
579 Furrer, Seidler (2006) 
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In this context it has to be also stressed that it is not only the responsibility of the beneficiaries 
to raise their voices, but also the responsibility of the trustees to better understand what the 
best interest of their beneficiaries is. As shown in section 4.1.3, beneficiaries’ best interest is 
normally interpreted as being in the best financial interest, which is defined as maximizing 
returns for a specified level of risk. However, it has also been shown in the same section there 
is abundant evidence that a substantial number of beneficiaries have a different view of their 
best interests and some would even accept their pension fund engaging in a SRI strategy that 
leads to somewhat lower returns. Whichever interpretation pension funds apply, it should 
have become clear from section 2.5.3 that both interpretations allow for the introduction of a 
SRI strategy. The Swisscanto data shows that 37 of the 81 funds that engage in SRI actually 
consider this to be in the best interest of their beneficiaries. 12 funds do not share this view, 
while 32 funds have no view. Again this result is significant for the bivariate as well as for the 
multivariate analysis (see Table 22 and Table 25, model 4), confirming our hypothesis that 
pension funds whose representatives see SRI as being in the best interest of their beneficiaries 
will be more likely to invest in SRI. 
Interestingly, the 37 funds that consider SRI to be in the best interest have varying views re-
garding the financial performance of SRI. As shown previously in Figure 38, the funds that 
show positive SRI behavior can be categorized into three different groups with regard to their 
financial perception of SRI. The first group considers SRI to be financially sound; a second 
group is ‘indifferent’, whereas a third group has been labeled as ‘skeptic’. As shown in sec-
tion 6.1.1.1 the ‘indifferent’ and the ‘skeptics’ must be attracted by other reasons than purely 
financial ones. In eight cases, we find that the beneficiaries actually play a role in the decision 
of a fund to engage in SRI (see Table 29).580 In fact, two pension funds classified as ‘indiffer-
ent’ report that their SRI engagement is a direct consequence of requests by their beneficiar-
ies. In another six cases (four ‘indifferent’ and two ‘skeptics’), trustees consider SRI to be in 
the best interest of their beneficiaries although they do not see any added financial value. As 
already stated, these figures confirm that some funds interpret the meaning of their fiduciary 
duties differently by applying a broader interpretation of their beneficiaries’ best interests, 
which goes beyond pure wealth maximization objectives. The 'skeptics' trustees even seem to 
accept a financial trade-off in order to meet the ethical expectations of their beneficiaries. 
Thus, although in Switzerland, article 71 of the BVG instructs pension trustees to manage 
assets prudently to ensure the security of assets, achieve a reasonable return on investments, 
maintain a suitable diversification of risks and allow for the liquidity requirements of the 
plan581, in reality it seems that some funds engage in SRI although they consider this to be 
inappropriate from a prudent perspective. From this we can conclude that some funds would 
also qualify as balanced or ethically minded investors according to the typology developed in 
section 2.4.3.2.2, showing that the fiduciary framework leaves trustees enough room for ma-
neuver to follow a wide range of strategies. 
                                                 
580 The background or mission of the employer does not play a role in either of these cases. 
581 See article 71, BVG and articles 49-60, BVV2. See Frauenlob (1998, pp. 64-65) 
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TABLE 29 – ETHICAL RATIONALES FOR SRI BEHAVIOR 
Cases* Total number 
of funds 
Q33.52: SRI has been requested  
by the beneficiaries 
Q33.53: SRI is expected to be in the 
best interest of the beneficiaries 
8 1 1 0 
9 28** 1 1 
10 1 0 1 
‘I
nd
iff
er
en
ts
’ 
11 2 0 2 
12 2 0 1 
13 1 0 0 
‘S
ke
pt
ic
s’
 
14 1 0 1 
Total 36 2 6 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008; * cases refer to the 
classification defined in Figure 38. ** includes pension funds that have not responded to the 
questions which address the role of the beneficiaries. 
Whereas pension funds that engage in SRI primarily for financial purposes do not need to 
liaise with their beneficiaries on the boundaries of their SRI strategy (as this is based on a 
conventional investment rationale and in line with wealth maximization objectives), it could 
be argued that trustees that are indifferent or even skeptical about the financial performance of 
SRI, but nevertheless want to engage in SRI, should seek the views of their plan beneficiaries 
when they engage in SRI. This means that they must open lines of communication with their 
beneficiaries in order to better understand how they stand on ethical issues that might affect 
the investment policy.582 Clearly it is very challenging to survey the preferences of thousands 
of beneficiaries and their values and beliefs may vary widely, since each individual has a dif-
ferent approach to what is ethical or should be considered in a SRI strategy. For example, the 
exclusion of companies by a pension fund trustee based on some distinct beneficiaries’ val-
ues, may confer utility on some beneficiaries while at the same time impose restrictions on 
others.583 Correspondingly, it will become difficult for trustees to set up a purely norm based 
SRI strategy that reflects the plurality of values of the beneficiaries – also because according 
to Langbein and Posner, pension funds do not dispose of required mechanisms by which they 
could make the calculations necessary to decide which principles they should adopt in order 
to maximize the overall utility of the fund beneficiaries.584 
                                                 
582 Barber (2006, p. 20) 
583 See Langbein, Posner (1980, p. 95) 
584 Langbein, Posner (1980, p. 95). See also Grene (2008). Instead of asking for input individually and 
to avoid the difficulty of conflicting values, participants in the 2004 competition by USS entitled “In-
vesting Pension Funds as if the Long-term Really Did Matter” (see Hewitt Bacon, Woodrow Limited 
(2004, p. 14)) suggested that trustees should segment the beneficiaries into different groups or clusters 
in order to analyze preferences for each group. Then the liabilities for each group would be calculated 
and the investment policy for the corresponding pool of assets managed in line with each group’s 
characteristics and preferences. To the extent that this does not work under the mandatory Swiss pen-
sion fund system, alternatively the pension funds could set up a committee to identify the major issues 
of concern for their scheme members. 
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6.1.4. RELIANCE ON INVESTMENT CONSULTANTS 
In Switzerland, PPCmetrics (30%), Complementa (30%), Ecofin (10%) and Coninco (10%) 
are the leading investment consultants for pension funds in terms of market share.585 Accord-
ing to Dominique Ammann, partner at PPCmetrics, about half of all pension funds make use 
of such consultancy services.586 An earlier report by ASIP/Swissca even states that 63% of all 
funds use independent consultancies, mainly for developing their investment strategies.587 
After reviewing websites and annual reports of these consultancies, it is fair to conclude that 
none of them shows evidence of specific SRI expertise.588 Other institutions that are active in 
the Swiss market include foreign consultancy firms such as Mercer and Watson Wyatt, which 
have established SRI competencies in a global context. It is however unclear if these services 
are also offered to their Swiss clients.589 Finally, specialist providers of SRI related consul-
tancy services and which play a niche role in the market include onValues or Conser Invest. 
We have found no evidence that any of the pension funds included in our sample has made 
use of these specialist providers in the past. 
Within the bivariate analysis we find a negative statistical association between the presence of 
investment consultants and the disposition of pension funds towards SRI, which would con-
firm our hypothesis. However, except for the public subsample, this relationship is not statis-
tically significant (see Table 22), which could partly be explained by limited data quality.590 
Despite this, in the light of the central role that many investment consultants have in terms of 
developing a fund’s investment strategy, it is still fair to conclude that additional competence 
and activism on the part of the consultants would help increase demand from pension funds. 
However as shown, it seems that mainstream investment consultants have not yet been at-
tracted to this market and refuse to invest additional resources to increase their capacity. 
Partly this reluctance could be explained by the low demand reported by different studies (in-
cluding the annual Swisscanto surveys) and which, as shown in section 3.2.1.1 considerably 
underestimated the market potential. Accordingly, to the extent that so far none of the big 
players discloses any specific SRI capabilities, additional competence, including the provision 
of access to information and advice on SRI investments could serve as a differentiating factor, 
which may help open up additional business opportunities and generate new revenue streams. 
6.2. PORTFOLIO / INVESTMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
6.2.1. PORTFOLIO SIZE 
As shown in section 5.1, with an average pension fund size of CHF 1.57 billion compared to 
the average size of the total pension fund population of only CHF 240 million our sample is 
                                                 
585 See Ferber (2010) 
586 See Ferber (2010) 
587 See in Schumacher-Hummel (2004, p. 241) 
588 According to Schumacher-Hummel (2004, p. 266) Ecofin has included SRI criteria in the past in 
the selection of external asset managers. 
589 Eurosif (2009, p. 19) 
590 Due to the low number of cases (63) this variable has not been included in the multivariate analysis. 
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clearly biased towards larger institutions. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 41 the sample still 
consists of mostly smaller institutions. Whereas the smallest fund, a private institution, ac-
counts only for CHF 0.5 million, the largest fund, a public institution, manages CHF 28.4 
billion. This considerable disparity in terms of IA shows that pension funds are often wrongly 
considered by definition as large investors that have enough market power to influence corpo-
rate decision makers (see also section 6.2.3.3). 
FIGURE 41 – DISTRIBUTION OF SIZE OF PENSION FUNDS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 
As shown in section 4.2.1 considerable evidence exists from other studies that larger pension 
funds are more likely to engage in SRI than smaller funds. This is also the case for our sam-
ple. The bivariate results disclosed in Table 22 show that the results are significant not only 
for the entirety but also, after controlling for the legal form, for the public and private sub-
samples. This would initially appear to confirm our underlying argument that investors with a 
larger asset base can benefit from economies of scale in analyzing or engaging with compa-
nies. In return, this leads to lower marginal costs in acquiring and analyzing information or 
directly engaging with management, shifting the cost return calculus for SRI. However a 
closer look at the data raises questions about this line of argument. In fact the results of the 
multivariate analysis included in Table 25 conclude that except for model 5 (where we have 
omitted all variables regarding the financial performance of SRI, as well as the question about 
the beneficiaries’ best interest) the size of a pension fund does not play a role. 
An initial explanation for the limited explanatory power of the size variable can be provided 
by referring to the cost aspect of SRI, which has been closely linked with the size argument in 
section 4.2.1. In reality, however, the cost argument seems not to play a role in relation to 
pension fund size. As shown in Figure 37, the rather negative view about additional costs 
from SRI holds only for the non-SRI investing pension funds591, but not for the SRI investors. 
Actually for the latter, only 7 funds consider SRI to be too costly, whereas 36 do not. More-
over, out of the 7 funds, 4 funds share the view that SRI will outperform in the long run (see 
Figure 38), which means that the additional costs from conducting enhanced research will be 
                                                 
591 The figure for the non-SRI investors is flawed to the extent that the large majority of non-SRI in-
vestors have not responded to this question. 
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compensated in the long-term by financial outperformance. This largely corresponds with the 
view of second generation or ‘rational’ SRI investors who start from the assumption that the 
higher the costs committed to make an informed investment decision (e.g. through an ESG 
analysis), the greater should be the value added from this information – where value added is 
measured as the likelihood to increase portfolio returns or reduce risk.592 Thus, as a general 
rule, a rational investor will engage in SRI only if it has a positive impact on earnings – mean-
ing that the value added of doing so exceeds its costs. For them, factoring such information 
must pay off over the long-term, either through potential equity premia or risk reduction. 
Hence, from a rational investor’s point of view, the costs associated with using such informa-
tion should always be linked to the specialist managers’ genuine contribution to value added. 
This rule should be independent of whether a pension fund has its own in-house SRI capabili-
ties or relies on external SRI asset managers. This said, it becomes clear that the propensity of 
a pension fund to invest in an SRI is not necessarily a function of its size (and hence its ability 
to bear costs), but rather a function of the trustees’ view about the asset managers’ capabilities 
to add value and legitimate higher fees. Although, smaller funds may indeed lack sufficient 
capacity to manage SRI assets internally (see section 6.3.1), it is important to note that they 
are equally capable of engaging in SRI by recourse to external asset managers. 
6.2.2. RISK-TAKING CAPACITY 
Within our sample pension funds have an average coverage ratio of 112.6%. 23 funds are un-
derfunded, with one fund achieving just about 57.9%. 220 funds are fully funded with one 
fund achieving a maximum of 176.4%. As shown in Figure 42, pension funds that engage in 
SRI have on average a lower coverage ratio than funds that do not engage in SRI. The bivari-
ate results show that an inverse significant relationship exists for the entire sample, confirm-
ing that SRI is observed more often among those funds that are underfunded (see Table 22). 
However, the results turn out to be statistically insignificant after taking account of the legal 
form, which is in line with the finding by Swisscanto that public funds generally have lower 
funding levels than their private counterparts.593 Thus, overall one can conclude that the fund-
ing level itself does not serve as a determinant of the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds. 
Combining the funding level with the financial perception of pension fund trustees regarding 
SRI as proposed in H8.1, the results in Table 22/8.1 show that among those pension funds that 
can be considered ‘skeptics’ (see section 6.1.1.1), SRI is more likely among underfunded pen-
sion funds, which would be against the proposed relationship. Again, for the bivariate analy-
sis, this finding is significant for the entire subsample but turns out to be insignificant after 
taking account of the legal form.594 Also, this factor is not significant at a multivariate stage as 
                                                 
592 This cost-benefit calculus can vary substantially depending on whether a rational investor uses the 
information for trading/screening or for direct engagement with a firm (see section 2.5.3 for a detailed 
analysis of the financial effectiveness of different SRI approaches). 
593 See Swisscanto (2009, p. 50) 
594 For the bivariate analysis this finding is significant for the entire subsample, but insignificant for 
the private and public subsample, which seems to be a consequence of the low number of cases after 
controlling for the legal form. 
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shown in Table 25, model 7, which looks only at the role of the ‘skeptics’. Despite the statis-
tical insignificance of this relationship, the reported cases included in Table 21 and Table 22 
deserve a closer look, as they suggest that although being skeptical with regard to the finan-
cial performance of SRI, as well as underfunded, some funds still engage in SRI. Partly this 
contradiction can be explained by referring again to the role of the beneficiaries (see section 
6.1.3). In fact, the data shows that the two ‘underfunded skeptics’ that nevertheless engage in 
SRI report that they do this in the best interest of their beneficiaries. This shows that for some 
funds, even if they are under pressure to meet their annual funding level, they are ready to 
sacrifice part of their annual return in an attempt to meet some vague normative expectations 
of their beneficiaries.  
FIGURE 42 – COVERAGE RATIO OF SWISS PENSION FUNDS 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 
In contrast, despite the very low number of cases, the result in Table 22/8.2 shows that among 
underfunded pension funds SRI is more frequent when they have a positive perception of SRI, 
in line with our proposed relationship. For the bivariate analysis this finding is significant for 
the entire subsample but turns out to be statistically insignificant after taking account of the 
legal form (see Table 22).595 Nevertheless, it could be argued that for those funds that are un-
derfunded but still engage in SRI, economic pressures can be a driver in those cases where 
SRI is expected to provide better long-term returns. 
6.2.3. PORTFOLIO INDEXATION 
In our sample, 174 funds (69.9% of all funds) do not pursue an indexing strategy. The other 
third has an average rate of indexation of 21.8%, ranging from 0.1% to a maximum of 87.5%. 
In terms of the influence of the level of indexation on the SRI behavior of pension funds we 
find somewhat mixed results. As shown in Table 22, initially there is a positive significant 
relationship between the level of indexation and the SRI behavior of pension funds, which 
holds for the overall sample as well as for the public subsample. In contrast, for the private 
                                                 
595 Due to the low number of cases this hypothesis has not been tested in multivariate setting. 
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subsample we find a negative but insignificant relationship. Finally in the multivariate analy-
sis stage included in Table 25, the level of indexation turns out not to be a relevant factor in 
any of the models we have proposed. 
Due to the limitation of the data and hence the limited availability of alternative measures, we 
used the level of portfolio indexation as a combined measure for three different pension fund 
characteristics including the long-term investment horizon of pension funds, their level of 
portfolio diversification, as well as the size of their individual company holdings which is 
expected to determine the influence a pension fund has on the management of a firm. Based 
on the above findings, our hypotheses 9 – 11 are not confirmed. This means that pension 
funds that can be characterized as having a longer investment horizon (due to the larger per-
centage of their portfolio that is indexed) are not necessarily more likely to engage in SRI 
than pension funds with a shorter time horizon. Also, pension funds with a larger degree of 
portfolio diversification are not more likely to engage in SRI to address negative or positive 
externalities that impact the overall performance of their portfolio. Finally, pension funds with 
larger holdings in individual companies and which can be considered as having more invest-
ment power to promote CR issues either through screening or directly engaging with the man-
agement of a target firm, are neither more likely to engage in SRI than funds with smaller 
average holdings. Clearly these findings require a sound note of caution, as the results may 
differ considerably in a case where better measures would have been available.596 However, 
as will be shown in the following subsections, there is also reasonable doubt whether Swiss 
pension funds as a group actually meet these characteristics typically associated with pension 
funds. That is, if they can be classified as long-term investors or universal owners or if they 
own large enough corporate holdings to influence corporate managers through their owner-
ship or investment decisions. 
6.2.3.1. INVESTMENT HORIZON 
As mentioned in section 5.3.2.2, the long-term thinking of pension funds can be measured in 
different ways, such as the average duration of pension fund liabilities597, the frequency of 
performance evaluation within which investment returns are considered, the rate of asset turn-
over (the average holding period of corporate stock or investment product), or by the discount 
rate at which pension funds price assets over the long-term. Unfortunately, this sort of data 
has not been included in the Swisscanto pension fund survey. Despite the limited value of the 
data, looking at the Swiss pension fund system in general it could be suggested that the capac-
ity of Swiss pension funds to truly act as long-term investors is substantially restricted. The 
main reason for this is that in Switzerland pension funds not only have to finance long-term 
liabilities, but they must also achieve a minimum annual return on the mandatory savings 
capital of active contributors and ensure that the liabilities of the fund are covered at all 
                                                 
596 Alternative measures for future research are proposed in section 5.3.2.2. 
597 See Ryan, Schneider (2002), Cox et al. (2004, p. 30), Hesse (2008) 
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times.598 To the extent that pension fund trustees or fund managers are evaluated against these 
targets they face pressure to report a certain level of earnings, which creates incentives to 
benefit from short-term opportunities rather than looking at long-term value creation.599 This 
is consistent with the findings of O'Barr et al. who studied the behavior of U.S. pension funds, 
concluding that quarterly performance evaluation of trustees leads to short-term thinking 
among pension funds.600 As a result, it is not surprising that pension funds have much shorter 
holding periods than their long-term investment horizon would suggest. For example, Hesse 
showed that while the pension funds included in his survey on average have an investment 
horizon of 23 years, they hold assets on average only for six years. For trading purposes some 
assets were even kept only for a few days, hours or minutes.601 
Thus one could argue that whilst pension funds are about generating long-term performance, 
ultimately this long-term may be made up of short-term gains. It could be argued that what 
holds for corporate asset managers who are driven by quarterly profits (see section 2.5.3.2) 
holds also for pension fund trustees. For example, certain corporate managers may see a CR 
strategy as an unnecessary expense that impacts current earnings, even when over a period of 
years that expense may add value. In their view, short-term costs from taking action outweigh 
long-term benefits. Similarly short-term targets set by pension fund trustees with perform-
ance-based fees may incentivize short term gains and obstruct the integration of long-term 
SRI considerations into portfolio construction. As a result of their annual performance re-
quirement, Swiss pension funds may not ultimately be in a position to act as truly long-term 
oriented investors and wait until material SRI criteria affect the long-term shareholder value 
of the companies they are invested in.602 
6.2.3.2. PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION 
As mentioned in section 5.3.2.2, the degree of portfolio diversification is best measured by the 
average number of corporate holdings included in a pension portfolio. However, for the pen-
sion funds in our sample no such information was available, nor could we judge if any of the 
funds examined would qualify as a universal owner as defined by Hawley and Williams. Even 
if such information was available, the value of such data would be rather limited as it is 
unlikely that the funds included in the sample have what Hawley calls universal owner con-
                                                 
598 See article 15, § 2, BVG. DC plans therefore combine features of both a DC and DB plan (see 
Queisser, Whitehouse (2003, p. 8)). 
599 See Graves, Waddock (1994, p. 1035), Greening (1999, p. 567), Mills et al. (2001, p. 35) Ryan, 
Schneider (2002, p. 560), Hesse (2008, p. 11), Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 24), Johnson, de Graaf (2009, 
p. 5). Insight Investment states that if fund performance is evaluated over relatively short time hori-
zons, fund managers may be less interested in how longer-term issues such as climate change adapta-
tion affects the companies in which they invest (see Sullivan (2009)). 
600 See O'Barr et al. (1992). A pension fund that acts differently in this regard is the FRR created in 
2001, which has both a strong commitment to SRI and an explicit long-term view. In line with the 
FRR’s long-term orientation, fund managers are assessed over five years to overcome short-term focus 
(Institute for Sustainable Futures, 2005, p. 23). 
601 See Hesse (2008, pp. 4-5) 
602 See Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 25) 
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sciousness.603 Examples of pension funds in other countries that have this universal owner 
consciousness in the sense that they try to factor negative and positive externalities of indi-
vidual companies, which may impact the overall performance of their portfolio include 
mainly very large pension funds such as FRR, PGGM, ABP, NGPF, CalPERS, CalSTRS or 
USS. Although this debate seems way ahead of Swiss pension funds, recent events related to 
the financial crisis suggest that applying this perspective could have provided a mechanism to 
address the detrimental portfolio-wide effects of certain errant investment banking activities. 
However, according to Knight and Dixon it is still questionable whether pension funds are 
actually capable of effectively employing their strength as universal owners, and thus have the 
capacity to effect broader changes in investment practice and financial market operation.604 In 
particular, as argued in the next section, a possible reason for the limited capacity of pension 
funds to act as universal owner is that even when large, they seldom have sufficient holdings 
in a single company to effectively influence the management of the firm. 
6.2.3.3. SIZE OF CORPORATE HOLDINGS 
As mentioned in section 5.3.2.2, the degree of leverage a pension fund has on the manage-
ment of a firm would best be measured as the average percentage of corporate ownership by a 
pension fund. Unfortunately there are only two funds in our sample that provide details of 
some of their individual investments.605 To the extent that corporate holdings by pension 
funds can be included in various investment vehicles (e.g. indexed products), we agree with 
Monks who assumes that most pension funds do not even know themselves how much they 
own in a particular company.606 
According to Monks and Minow, the holdings of pension funds as a whole are large enough 
to alleviate the free-rider problem that makes shareholder information and action economi-
cally non-rational and therefore imprudent for smaller fiduciaries.607 However, looking at the 
Swiss case suggests that very few individual pension funds have sufficiently large holdings of 
a single company to make shareholder engagement strategies or the threat to divest from a 
company credible. This can be illustrated by referring to the official data provided by the 
FSO. From 2004 to 2007 the Swiss pension fund market grew from CHF 484.2 billion to CHF 
605.5 billion, which corresponds to 116% of GDP. Over the same period the proportion in-
vested in equities has increased from 27.1 to 27.8%.608 From this, the share of domestic equi-
ties held by the 2’543 Swiss pension funds accounted for CHF 67.2 billion, which corre-
                                                 
603 Hawley (2000) 
604 Knight, Dixon (2009, p. 3) 
605 The level of disclosure is also limited among foreign pension funds. Prominent examples of funds 
that disclose their holdings in detail include the Norwegian Government Pension Fund and the two 
large Dutch funds ABP and PGGM. According to a report by VBDO (2007), the Dutch Association of 
Investors for Sustainable Development, only five pension funds in the Netherlands publish an over-
view of the companies they invest in. 
606 See Monks (2001, p. 87) 
607 See Monks, Minow (2001, p. 122) 
608 See Federal Statistical Office (2009, pp. 14-17) 
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sponds to approximately 13.4% of the total market capitalization of the Swiss Market In-
dex.609 Although these assets tend to be concentrated among a relatively small number of lar-
ger funds (see Figure 36), an individual fund, even if larger, will probably hold only a minor-
ity of the shares in an individual company.610 This is shown in Table 30. With a combined 
value of CHF 21.76 billion assets under management, the pension fund of the Canton of Zu-
rich is the third largest fund in our sample. Nevertheless, it holds only 0.1 to 0.4% of the total 
market equity of the Swiss Market Index companies listed below. Therefore, taking the lead 
as an activist investor would mean its beneficiaries would bear all the costs of failure and 
stand only to be rewarded with 0.1 to 0.4% of the gains. According to Monks, this free rider 
problem would considerably challenge the requirement for prudence by the trustees.611 
TABLE 30 – THE TEN LARGEST HOLDINGS OF THE CANTON OF ZURICH 
Corporate 
holding 
Percentage of Swiss equity 
portfolio (CHF 2’110.4 m) 
Assets invested in companies 
(in CHF m) 
Percentage holdings of com-
panies’ market capitalization
Novartis 20.1 424.19 0.28 
UBS  19.1 403.09 0.40 
Nestlé  16.5 348.22 0.28 
Roche  12.3 259.58 0.30 
Swiss Re  2.4 50.65 0.19 
Richemont 2.0 42.21 0.27 
Zurich 1.6 33.77 0.13 
Swisscom  1.4 29.55 0.11 
Syngenta  1.3 27.44 0.29 
Holcim 1.1 23.21 0.20 
Source: Annual report of the pension fund of the Canton of Zurich/ Beamtenversicherungs-
kasse des Kantons Zürich (2003, p. 27) 
This individual case, as well as the size of the combined assets under management by pension 
funds in Switzerland, clearly shows that pension funds would benefit from coordinating their 
efforts when engaging in SRI – both in terms of shareholder engagement and screening.612 On 
an international level, institutional investors have already realized this. Prominent initiatives 
that coordinate their SRI activities include the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility 
(ICCR)613, Ceres614, CDP or the UNPRI. For example, within the PRI framework the signato-
ries coordinate their activities on a wide range of issues such as climate change, human rights, 
                                                 
609 See Swiss Market Index (2008) 
610 According to Von Arx and Schäfer (2006) another reason for the low size of corporate holdings lies 
in the fact that for diversification reasons even a sizeable pension fund only holds an individually mi-
nor stake in a specific company. See also Oesch (2000, p. 7ff). 
611 See Monks (1995, p. 4) 
612 See Brown (2007, p. 25), Wong et al. (2008, p. 28), Thamotheram, Wildsmith (2006, p. 4) 
613 The ICCR is an association of faith-based investors, including pension funds, that aim for a more 
just and sustainable world by integrating social values into corporate and investor actions. 
614 Ceres is a network of mainly U.S. based investors and other interest groups working with compa-
nies and investors to address sustainability challenges such as global climate change. 
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water, corporate governance, executive remuneration, sustainability reporting. According to 
the PRI: “there are relatively few institutional investors in the world that have the power and 
legitimacy to individually influence corporate performance on [SRI] issues through the size of 
their own institutional shareholding alone. The primary objective of the clearing house is to 
provide signatories with a collaborative forum that can transform one voice into the voice of 
many”615. In Switzerland similar efforts exist in the case of the Ethos Engagement Pool (see 
section 3.2.1.4). The program engages in the name of its members, in dialogue with the man-
agement of Swiss companies on ESG issues, with the aim of enhancing long-term shareholder 
value for their beneficiaries. Recent cases relating to excessive executive remuneration show 
that Ethos has become a credible and effective mechanism to hold companies accountable. 
6.3. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
6.3.1. RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL ASSET MANAGERS 
In our sample, 133 funds (53.4% of all funds) report that they have part of their portfolio 
managed externally. In contrast, 53 funds indicate that they manage all of their funds inter-
nally. 63 funds did not provide any response to this question. Among the former, the share of 
the assets managed externally ranges between 2% of the portfolio and 100%. Interestingly, 
there is an aggregation of 30 funds that have their portfolio completely managed by external 
asset management services (see Figure 43). These includes not only smaller funds (min CHF 
0.02 billion) but also, according to Figure 41, some midsized pension funds (max CHF 2.56 
billion). In line with this, but surprisingly, there is no significant relationship between the size 
of a fund and its reliance on external asset management services (see correlations reported in 
Table 23). Based on this general finding, but also to the extent that we have no information 
whether pension funds that engage in SRI manage their SRI assets internally or externally, we 
cannot conclude as proposed in section 4.2.1 that pension funds that manage their SRI assets 
internally tend to be larger because economies of scale for establishing the requisite skills and 
capabilities become relevant. 
FIGURE 43 – PERCENTAGE OF PENSION ASSETS MANAGED EXTERNALLY 
 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 
                                                 
615 See UNEP FI (2008b) 
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SRI is observed more often in those funds that do not rely on external asset managers. At a 
bivariate stage, this result is significant for the overall sample, as well as for the private sub-
sample but not for the public institutions. At the multivariate stage the result is a significant 
factor in models 4, 5 and 6 (see Table 25). One can conclude that the survey reveals another 
distinction between pension funds that engage in SRI and those that do not. While pension 
funds that engage in SRI rely to a lesser extent on external asset managers, non-SRI investors 
tend to delegate a larger part of the implementation of their investment strategy to their fund 
manager. Thus, this finding would be in line with the view of a number of authors who think 
that investors that outsource a large part of their investment functions to external managers 
face restrictions in acting as an activist investor or addressing SRI principles.616 As for the 
case of the investment consultants (see section 6.1.4) one could argue that for Swiss pension 
funds, external investment managers act as a deterrent for the wider implementation of a SRI 
strategy. One could imagine that some external investment managers may explicitly avoid 
promoting SRI due to their limited expertise in this field, while others may simply not be 
aware that SRI could be of interest to their clients. Especially larger asset managers who have 
established in-house SRI capabilities, but who have not yet leveraged this expertise in their 
interaction with their clients should rethink their approach and call more proactively for SRI. 
6.3.2. LEVEL OF DISCLOSURE 
In our sample 113 funds (45.4% of all funds) report that they inform their beneficiaries about 
their investment decisions, whereas 71 funds do not. For another 65 funds we do not have any 
information. Typically the funds that inform their beneficiaries provide this information in the 
form of an annual report.617 These reports usually contain information regarding decisions by 
the board of directors and pension fund governance, the consolidated financial statement in-
cluding pension assets and liabilities and coverage ratio, investment management including 
performance of the portfolio, changes in the statutory framework, accounting policies, actuar-
ial statement and the auditor’s report, etc. The scope of these sections varies substantially 
among the different funds. For example, in terms of information on investment management 
some funds provide detailed information on investment returns by asset classes (incl. back-
ground information on market developments that positively or negatively impacted the per-
formance), strategic portfolio weightings and changes in portfolio composition. Some funds 
also provide detailed information on individual investments (e.g. specific types of funds or 
mandates), or in very rare cases on individual corporate holdings (see Table 30). The level of 
disclosure of funds that engage in SRI also differs considerably when disclosing their own 
SRI practices. While some funds disclose their approach, including their rationale and strat-
egy in detail, (e.g. Canton of Zurich, Canton of Geneva, Nest, Abendrot) other funds include 
                                                 
616 See Stapledon (1996, p. 34) Del Guercio, Hawkins (1999, p. 301), Cumming, Johan (2007, p. 412) 
Knoepfel (2009, p. 11) 
617 In addition, 72 funds have also their own internet presence where further information can be ob-
tained (28.9% of all funds). This is particularly so for larger institutions as well as collective funds 
with open membership. 
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only minimal (e.g. mentioning an individual SRI fund they are invested in) or even no infor-
mation. 
The majority of the funds that engage in SRI provide their beneficiaries with details of their 
investment management. Thus the results disclosed in Table 22 partly confirm our hypothesis 
that pension funds with more transparency regarding investment management practices and 
decisions are also more likely to engage in SRI. This relationship however is significant only 
for the public subsample, but not for the overall sample or for the private subsample.618 De-
spite these mixed results, one could argue that those public funds that are more transparent 
tend to be more accountable to their beneficiaries and therefore more likely to respond to spe-
cific issues raised by them. To some extent this is supported by the fact that of the 18 funds 
that report introducing SRI in response to an explicit request of their beneficiaries (see section 
6.1.3), 16 funds (88.9%) actually inform their beneficiaries of how they manage their invest-
ments. In the light of these results, one could expect that an explicit requirement for greater 
transparency on how pension funds integrate SRI similar to the U.K. Pension SRI Disclosure 
Regulation619 would substantially increase attention among plan participants and as Lyden-
berg suggests, put pressure on pension funds to recognize their responsibilities in this area.620 
In fact an earlier survey among Swiss pension fund beneficiaries by Furrer and Seidler 
showed that a considerable majority of the interviewees would welcome additional regulation 
that would enhance transparency regarding pension funds’ investment strategies and prac-
tices.621 
6.3.3. ADMINISTRATIVE FORM  
In Switzerland the large majority of pension funds are funds with closed membership. This is 
also the case for our sample. As shown in Figure 44, the great majority (88.7%) of funds are 
characterized by a closed membership (i.e. single employer pension funds or joint foundation 
funds with closed membership). In contrast only 11.3% of the funds are open to new members 
(i.e. pooled or open joint foundations). As we have hypothesized in section 4.3.3, we expect 
open funds to engage more often in SRI to the extent that for them SRI could be a positive 
differentiating factor to attract employers that want to invest their pension money according to 
such principles. According to Nest, a pooled foundation with a total of CHF 217 million of 
assets under management (as of the end of 2007) and which has invested more than 90% of its 
assets in SRI, the single most important reason for employers to join their institution is the 
ethical and environmental focus of the fund.622 Through their strict SRI strategy Nest reflects 
                                                 
618 The variable has not been tested in the multivariate analysis, see section 5.4.3. 
619 Similar disclosure requirements exist in Australia, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Sweden. 
620 Lydenberg (2002, p. 68) 
621 Furrer, Seidler (2006) 
622 See Pfeifer (2008). According to Nest’s investment guidelines, its negative investment criteria in-
clude nuclear energy, genetic engineering in farming, "disputed" medical genetic engineering, links to 
the arms trade, money laundering, support of violent regimes, corruption, child labor, alcohol, tobacco, 
pornography and gambling, violation of fundamental labor and human rights, and insufficient remu-
neration for indigenous populations (see Bandel (2007)). In addition to the application of negative 
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the social orientation of the constituent companies (mainly small and medium-sized inde-
pendent companies from the social work and life sciences sectors) and their wish for competi-
tive returns. Felix Pfeifer, Nest CEO, reports that in recent years the fund has outperformed 
many competitors and normally ranks above relevant benchmarks such as the Pictet BVG93 
for Swiss pension funds. As a result, the number of members grew by 10% to approximately 
8’000 in the first half of 2007 alone and by mid 2008 the fund managed assets for about 1’600 
companies, including also clients from the high tech sector.623 
One could expect that the same line of reasoning to also hold for other open funds in Switzer-
land. However, the data provided by Swisscanto does not confirm that open membership itself 
is a significant determinant for the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds. Although the propor-
tion of pension funds with open membership that engage in SRI (46.4%) is on average larger 
than for those funds with restricted membership (30.6%), bivariate analysis shows (see Table 
22) that no significant relationship exists.624 Thus, one could argue that although SRI may be 
a differentiating factor for some open funds, which have a clearly defined client base which is 
responsive to these issues, other funds may be less responsive and may shy away from the 
initial effort associated with engaging in SRI. However, looking at the evolution of stake-
holder expectations with regard to CR, one can see that such concerns are gaining in impor-
tance among different stakeholder groups and that it is unlikely that concerns about environ-
mental and social issues will decrease in the future. In this light it could be argued that it is 
only a matter of time until beneficiaries and/or their employers take account of such factors 
and integrate them in their evaluation and selection of future pension fund service providers. 
Pension funds with open membership that address this subject at an early stage may be seen 
as more credible among prospective clients and profit from a first mover advantage in that 
area. 
FIGURE 44 – DISTRIBUTION OF SWISS PENSION FUNDS WITH CLOSED AND OPEN MEMBERSHIP 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
screening criteria for its stock selection, the company also invests in cleantech and renewable energy 
and manages its real estate portfolio according to sustainability criteria. 
623 Wheelan (2007) 
624 This variable has not been tested in the multivariate analysis, see section 5.4.3. 
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6.3.4. PLAN TYPE 
As already shown in section 5.1, our sample consists of 186 funds with a DC plan and 58 pen-
sion funds with a DB plan. In Figure 45 it is clear that on average DB plans are more likely to 
engage in SRI (53.5%) than DC plans (26.3%). This is confirmed by the bivariate analysis, 
which shows that a positive significant relationship for the entire sample and the public sub-
sample exists (see Table 22/15). However, the results turn out to be statistically insignificant 
after the inclusion of this variable in a multivariate setting, suggesting that the plan type itself 
does not serve as a determinant for the SRI behavior of Swiss pension funds (Table 25). 
FIGURE 45 – DISTRIBUTION OF SWISS PENSION FUNDS BY PLAN TYPE 
 
Source: based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 
Combing the plan type with the financial perception of pension fund trustees regarding SRI, 
the results for 15.1 (see Table 22/15.1) shows that there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship that pension funds with a DB plan are more likely to engage in SRI when they 
have a positive perception of SRI. This confirms our hypothesis that to the extent that for DB 
plans the investment risk falls mainly back on the employer; DB pension funds are only about 
to engage in SRI when they see the financial value added from doing this. Unfortunately this 
relationship has not been tested in a multivariate setting due to the low number of cases.  
Finally the results in Table 22/15.2 show that among those public pension funds that can be 
considered as ‘skeptics’ in terms of the financial performance of SRI (see section 6.1.1.1), this 
form of investing is more likely among DC plans, which would confirm our proposed rela-
tionship. However, this relationship is not significant for the entire sample. Moreover the pri-
vate subsample shows a statistically insignificant negative coefficient. To conclude, including 
the plan type in model 7 (Table 25) of the multivariate stage (which looks only at the ‘skep-
tics’), shows that the plan type does not serve as a determinant to explain the SRI behavior of 
Swiss pension funds. 
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7. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH OUTLOOK 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the issue of corporate governance and CR has received 
renewed attention. Excessive executive pay, predatory lending practices and the creation of 
dubious credit and debt products all point to a growing gap between what executives do, and 
what is in shareholders’ interests, and thus a failure of existing monitoring arrangements by 
external auditors or Boards of Directors. It is in this context that renewed attention has been 
given to the role that active shareholders could play in increasing transparency and account-
ability. Yet, shareholders including pension funds have until recently been rather reluctant to 
directly address companies and engage with management over corporate behavior that is con-
sidered unethical, even when this is detrimental to their financial interest. Instead, individual 
shareowners dissatisfied with management have traditionally found it easier to sell their 
shares than to express their discontent. Even for large investors who may find it more difficult 
to pull out of a company, cost-benefit analysis rarely supports the case of an isolated engage-
ment strategy. The portfolio-wide effects of the current crisis show however that divestment is 
not always an effective option and that investors need to develop strategies to improve the 
monitoring of corporate behavior. 
In this thesis we have shown that the financial sector has a special role in this context to pro-
mote CR. In particular, by controlling a large share of societies’ savings and promising to 
provide pension income, pension funds find themselves at the core of the debate on CR. We 
showed that by their very purpose, pension funds are strongly inclined to address CR issues 
and concerns, a tendency which has been reinforced by recent pieces of legislation passed in 
the UK, Australia or Germany. In the light of the financial crisis, recurring events such as the 
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or the impact of climate change, we expect that public concerns 
about the capacity of pension funds to meet their long-term liabilities will increasingly go 
hand-in-hand with concerns about the societal impact of their investment decisions. While 
there is growing awareness among many foreign pension funds which has led to the introduc-
tion of comprehensive SRI strategies, in Switzerland pension funds are still reluctant to take 
on this role in a strategic way. Although data from Swisscanto showed that considerable di-
versity of approaches and views exist among Swiss pension funds, few funds have so far de-
veloped a comprehensive strategy that affects all asset classes. The majority of the SRI inves-
tors still restrict their commitment to a small part of their equity portfolio, which either sug-
gests that there is limited understanding among the funds on how to achieve consistency be-
tween their SRI practices and their underlying objectives for SRI or that SRI is merely a mar-
keting hoax to please part of the plan participants. Whichever interpretation applies based on 
this evidence we see considerable market potential for the providers of SRI products and ser-
vices that are able to address the specific needs of pension funds to set up an effective strat-
egy. 
In order to benefit from this market potential, a provider of SRI services needs to understand 
what drives pension funds when they engage in SRI. In our analysis we challenged conven-
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tional wisdom that pension funds are a homogeneous group of investors and showed that they 
differ in various ways. However in terms of their SRI behavior, one could argue that Swiss 
pension funds share certain common characteristics which can be used by providers of SRI 
products and services to predict the probability that pension funds engage in SRI. As shown, a 
key determinant in this regard concerns the perception of pension fund trustees with regard to 
the long-term performance, costs and risks involved in investing in SRI. Although there are 
also some funds that are driven by purely normative reasons, the majority of the funds that 
engage in SRI do so in an attempt to create long-term added value. The role of the employer 
also turns out to be a significant factor. In particular, by examining the role of the legal form 
of pension funds shows that public institutions are more likely to engage in SRI than private 
institutions, thereby confirming earlier evidence. Although the existence of a mission-related 
background is not a significant factor, providers of SRI products and services should still 
make the case for organizational consistency among pension funds where the sponsoring in-
stitution has such a background. The same holds for private institutions where pension funds 
seem more likely to engage in SRI in cases where the employer is committed to similar prin-
ciples through an established CR strategy. Furthermore, pension funds are also more likely to 
engage in SRI in cases where beneficiaries actively raise the need for SRI among their trus-
tees (i.e. have better access to decision-making bodies) or when pension fund trustees inde-
pendently consider SRI as being in the best interest of their plan participants (i.e. independ-
ently of their financial perception of SRI). In contrast, the presence of investment consultants 
or reliance on external asset managers seems to act as an obstacle to the development of a SRI 
strategy, which again would open up additional opportunities for specialist providers of SRI 
services. The results show that certain characteristics that are commonly considered as key 
factors for the SRI engagement of pension funds, such as their size, coverage ratio or plan 
type apparently do not play a role in the Swiss context. In particular, with regard to size the 
data showed that also smaller and mid-sized funds successfully managed to implement a 
comprehensive SRI strategy and that this is not restricted to a small circle of large or very 
large institutions that have sufficient resources to address the subject. To the extent that the 
Swiss pension fund market consists mainly of many smaller institutions, this again makes the 
case that there is abundant market potential in this area. 
Based on these summary findings it becomes clear there are different stakeholder groups, in-
cluding pension fund trustees themselves, regulators, beneficiaries and employers that can 
contribute to the promotion of greater awareness among pension funds in their role as respon-
sible investors and overcome existing hurdles. At the forefront however, we believe asset 
managers and consultancies should develop a convincing business case for SRI and in cases 
where pension funds are also driven by normative rationales, appropriately factor ethical con-
siderations into such a SRI strategy. SRI does not sell itself, but requires active as well as pro-
fessional support from the suppliers of the respective products. 
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7.1. RESEARCH OUTLOOK 
Apart from addressing the shortcomings of the present study, the conclusions made in this 
thesis can be helpful in making predictions about appropriate SRI investment strategies for 
pension funds based on their specific motivation or rationale for SRI. In particular, one could 
use the general framework developed in sections 2.4.2 and 2.5, which described the different 
motivations of SRI investors, as well as the effectiveness of different SRI strategies in meet-
ing these motivations, as a benchmark for evaluating the plausibility of the specific SRI be-
havior of Swiss pension funds in response to the ethical and financial motivations underlying 
their decision to invest in SRI. As has been shown empirically throughout this thesis, there is 
a considerable diversity of motivations, as well as SRI practices available among Swiss pen-
sion funds. Although the financial rationale clearly dominates, we provided evidence that in 
some cases there are also normative motivations underlying their SRI engagement. In addi-
tion, we showed that Swiss pension funds apply a wide range of different strategies including 
those which have been traditionally preferred by ethically minded investors, rather than con-
ventional institutional investors such as pension funds. While we have conceptually sketched 
out the effectiveness of different SRI products and services in response to these motivations, it 
is still unclear to what extent pension funds that engage in SRI are actually aware of the effec-
tiveness of their SRI strategy in meeting their own objectives. Greater transparency with re-
gard to this question will most likely also show that specific pension fund characteristics (e.g. 
size, investment horizon) are directly related to the degree of effectiveness of certain SRI 
strategies. 
Aside from purely academic interest, this question is also crucial for providers of SRI prod-
ucts, who too often attract clients by promising them that they can put their money to work to 
build a better future, as well as to understand the contribution that SRI can make to the pursuit 
of sustainability. If SRI is to fulfill investors’ expectations and not bring about disillusion-
ment, greater clarity about what it can actually deliver is required. Thus answering this ques-
tion could provide a significant contribution to the further strengthening and development of 
SRI, by improving the design of SRI strategies of pension funds, identifying instruments that 
are compatible with the specific motivations that drive a particular SRI strategy and designing 
innovative and more effective SRI products. 
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8. APPENDIX 
8.1. SWISSCANTO PENSION FUND SURVEY 2008 
 
A: STRUKTURANGABEN DER VORSORGEEINRICHTUNG  
1. Name und Adresse der VE  
2. Rechtsform Ja 
2.1 Öffentlich-rechtliche VE mit voller Garantie des Arbeitgebers  
2.2 Öffentlich-rechtliche VE mit teilweiser Garantie des Arbeitgebers  
2.3 Öffentlich-rechtliche VE ohne Garantie des Arbeitgebers  
2.4 Privat-rechtliche VE (Stiftung oder Genossenschaft)  
3. Registrierung  
3.1 Die VE ist registriert gemäss Art. 48 BVG  Ja / Nein 
4. Anzahl der Arbeitgeber (AG)  
4.1 Anzahl der angeschlossenen Arbeitgeber (Firmengruppe gilt als 1 AG) 2006 / 2007 
5. Wichtigster Arbeitgeber Ja 
5.1 Bund  
5.2 Kanton  
5.3 Gemeinde/Stadt  
5.4 Sonstiger öffentlich-rechtlicher Arbeitgeber  
5.5 Privat-rechtlicher Arbeitgeber  
5.6 Keine Angabe möglich  
6. Verwaltungsform / Risikoträger  
6.1 Pensionskasse oder geschlossene Gemeinschaftsstiftung einer Firmengruppe 
(Konzern) / eines Gemeinwesens 
6.2 Offene Gemeinschaftsstiftung 
6.3 Sammelstiftung autonom 
autonom 
teilautonom 
voll rückgedeckt 
 
7. Sammel- und Gemeinschaftsstiftung Ja 
7.1 Gründer  
7.11 Firma oder Firmengruppe  
7.12 Versicherung  
7.13 Bank  
7.14 Beratungsunternehmen  
7.15 Verband  
7.16 Gemeinwesen  
7.17 Andere welche: 
7.2 Anzahl Anschlussverträge  
8. Vorsorgevermögen / Anzahl Versicherte  
8.1 Vorsorgevermögen gemäss Art. 44 BVV2 (inkl. Rückkaufswerte aus Versi-
cherungsverträgen) in Mio.CHF 
2006 / 2007 
8.2 Anzahl aktiv Versicherte  
8.3 Anzahl Bezüger von Altersrenten  
8.4 Anzahl Bezüger von Invalidenrenten  
8.5 Anzahl Kinderrenten  
8.6 Anzahl Ehegatten -und Partnerrenten  
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9. 
Primat der Vorsorgepläne (Falls mehrere Vorsorgepläne angeboten 
werden: Primat des wichtigsten P) 
 
9.5 Wieviele Vorsorgepläne gibt es neben dem Standardplan?  
9.51 Welcher Prozentsatz der Versicherten hat einen vom Standardplan abwei-
chenden Plan gewählt? 
in % 
10. Gründungsjahr  
10.1 Gründungsjahr der VE  
11. 
Wirtschaftsbranche des Arbeitgebers gemäss Eidg. Betriebszählung 
(Wichtigste Branche angeben, wenn stark diversifiziert, „Diverse“ an-
kreuzen) 
Ja 
11.01 Bank  
11.02 Bau  
11.03 Beratung, Planung  
11.04 Chemie, Pharma  
11.05 Detailhandel  
11.06 Elektrizität, Energie  
11.07 Elektroindustrie  
11.08 Elektronik  
11.09 Energieversorgung  
11.10 Erdöl  
11.11 Gesundheitswesen  
11.12 Handel  
11.13 Holding  
11.14 Informatik  
11.15 Kirche  
11.16 Kosmetik  
11.17 Kunststoffverarbeitung  
11.18 Lebensmittel  
11.19 Maschinen  
11.20 Metallindustrie  
11.21 Öff.rechtl. Institution  
11.22 Papierindustrie  
11.23 Telekommunikation  
11.24 Textilindustrie  
11.25 Transport  
11.26 Übrige Dienstleistungen  
11.27 Übrige Industrien  
11.28 Verlag, Druckerei, Grafik  
11.29 Vermögensverwaltung  
11.30 Verpackung  
11.31 Versicherung  
11.32 Werbung  
11.32 Andere Branche  
11.34 Diverse  
B: BILANZ / TECHNISCHE ANGABEN  
12. Bilanz / technische Angaben  
12.1 Bilanz per  
12.11 Aktiven  
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12.12 Passiven  
13. 
Anlageformen und Vermögensverwaltung* (in % der gesamten Anla-
gen; muss nicht 100% geben) 
% / n.v. 
13.01 Anlagestiftungen  
13.02 Anlagefonds  
13.03 Beteiligungsgesellschaften  
13.11 Kategorienmandate  
13.12 Gemischte Mandat.  
13.21 Indexanlagen  
13.22 Nachhaltige Anlagen  
13.23 Strukturierte Produkte   
13.31 Immobilien Schweiz: direkte Anlagen   
13.32 Immobilien Schweiz: indirekte Anlagen  
13.33 Immobilien Ausland: direkte Anlagen  
13.34 Immobilien Ausland: indirekte Anlagen Interne / Externe Verwaltung  
13.41 Anteil des intern verwalteten Vermögens (VE)  
13.42 Anteil des beim Arbeitgeber verwalteten Vermögens   
13.43 Anteil des extern verwalteten Vermögens  
 Falls Fragestellung nicht sinnvoll, bitte n.v. (nicht verfügbar) wählen  
14. Ist / Ziel-Struktur der Vermögensanlagen * Ist / Ziel in % 
14.1 Flüssige Mittel  
14.2 Anlagen beim Arbeitgeber  
14.21 Forderungen   
14.22 Aktien und sonstige Beteiligungen   
14.3 Obligationen und Kassenscheine  
14.31 in CHF   
14.32 in Fremdwährungen   
14.4 Hypotheken   
14.5 Liegenschaften  
14.51 Immobilienanlagen in der Schweiz   
14.52 Immobilienanlagen im Ausland   
14.6 Aktien  
14.61 Inland   
14.62 Ausland   
14.7 Alternative Anlagen  
14.71 Private Equity   
14.72 Hedge Funds   
14.73 Rohstoffe   
14.74 Andere   
14.8 Übrige Aktiven  
 Total Aktiven  
14.9 n.v. (Stiftungen mit voller Rückdeckung)  n.v. 
15. 
Deckungsgrad (bei mehreren Vorsorgewerken DG für gesamte VE 
angeben) 
31.12.2006 / 
31.12.2007 
15.1 Deckungsgrad gemäss BVV2  
15.2 Wertschwankungsreserven in % des Vorsorgevermögens 
15.3 
Privatrechtliche oder öffentlich-rechtliche VE ohne Staatsgarantie: Zielde-
ckungsgrad (100% plus Sollwert der Wertschwankungsreserven in % des 
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Vorsorgevermögens) 
15.4 VE mit Staatsgarantie: Zieldeckungsgrad inkl. Wertschwankungsreserven 
16. Technischer Zinssatz (nicht BVG-Zinssatz) 
16.1 Leistungsprimat: technischer Zinssatz (für Altersleistungen) 
16.2 Beitragsprimat: Zinssatz der Rentnerdeckungskapitalien (Wenn unterschied-
liche Tarifgenerationen gleichzeitig angewendet werden, bitte Zinssatz der 
neuesten Generation angeben) 
31.12.2006 / 
31.12.2007 
17. Biometrische Grundlagen Ja 
17.1 EVK 2000  
17.2 VZ 2000  
17.3 BVG 2000  
17.4 BVG 2005  
17.5 GRM / GRF  
17.6 Eigener Tarif  
17.7 Andere welche? 
18. Rückstellungen(Zuschlag pro Jahr auf den Barwerten für die erwartete 
Zunahme der Lebenserwartung); falls Angaben nicht verfügbar, bitte 
n.v. wählen 
 
18.1 für Aktive % des Altersguthabens bzw. Deckungskapitals / n.v. % / n.v. 
18.2 für Rentner % des Deckungskapitals / n.v. % / n.v. 
19. Vorsorgekapital (gebundenes Kapital); (Deckungskapital plus techni-
sche Rückstellungen, ohne Wertschwankungsreserven); *) falls Anga-
ben nicht verfügbar, bitte n.v. wählen 
CHF / n.v. 
19.1 Höhe des Vorsorgekapitals per Ende 2006 (Vorjahr)   
19.2 Vorsorgekapital der aktiven Versicherten per Ende 2007   
19.21 davon Altersguthaben gemäss BVG   
19.3 Vorsorgekapital der Rentenbezüger per Ende 2007   
19.4 Passiven aus Versicherungsverträgen   
19.5 Technische Rückstellungen (soweit nicht in obigen Vorsorgekapitalien ent-
halten)  
 
19.6 Ausserordentliche Veränderungen im Jahre 2007 beim Vorsorgekapital (z.B. 
Verteilung freier Mittel, ausserordentliche vorzeitige 
Pensionierung etc.) 
 
C: BETRIEBSRECHNUNG  
20. Durchführung der Verwaltung und Kostenträger (AG=Arbeitgeber, 
VE=Vorsorgeeinrichtung, EX=Extern) 
 
20.1 Versichertenverwaltung vorwiegend durch AG 
VE / EX / Versiche-
rungsges. 
20.2 Rechnungswesen vorwiegend durch AG 
VE / EX / Versiche-
rungsges 
20.3 VE trägt Kosten der Verwaltung ganz 
Teilweise Kosten 
trägt AG 
21. Verwaltungskosten und Marketing (gemäss Swiss GAAP FER 26) CHF / n.v. 
21.1 Kosten für die allgemeine Verwaltung (technische Verwaltung, Rechnungs-
wesen, Beratung)  
 
21.2 Kosten für die Vermögensverwaltung  
21.21 wovon für Wertschriften   
21.22 wovon für direkte Immobilienanlagen   
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21.3 Aufwand für Marketing (Werbung, Akquisition)   
22. Beiträge, Ein- und Auszahlung von Vorsorgemitteln (falls nicht in Jah-
resrechnung, bitte schätzen oder nicht verfügbar (n.v.) angeben) 
2006 in CHF / 2007 
in CHF / n.v. 
22.1 Beiträge der Arbeitnehmer (inkl. Nachzahlungen)   
22.11 davon für die Altersvorsorge   
22.2 Beiträge des Arbeitgebers (inkl. Nachzahlungen)   
22.21 davon für die Altersvorsorge   
22.3 Einkäufe   
22.4 Eingebrachte Freizügigkeitsleistungen   
22.5 Ausbezahlte Leistungen in Rentenform   
22.6 Ausbezahlte Leistungen in Kapitalform   
22.7 Ausbezahlte Freizügigkeitsleistungen   
22.8 Ausbezahlte Vorbezüge für Wohneigentum   
22.9 Ausbezahlte Vorbezüge für Scheidung  
23. Performance auf dem Gesamtvermögen (inkl. Immobilien und nach 
Abzug der Vermögensverwaltungskosten) 
 
23.1 Jährliche Performance % / n.v. 
23.11 Performance 2000  % / n.v. 
23.12 Performance 2001 % n.v. % / n.v. 
23.13 Performance 2002 % n.v. % / n.v. 
23.14 Performance 2003 % n.v. % / n.v. 
23.15 Performance 2004 % n.v. % / n.v. 
23.16 Performance 2005 % n.v. % / n.v. 
23.17 Performance 2006 % n.v. % / n.v. 
23.18 Performance 2007 % n.v. % / n.v. 
23.2 Zielrendite (angestrebte Performance auf dem Gesamtvermögen)  % p.a. / n.v. 
23.3 Sollrendite (Kapitalerträge, welche notwendig sind, um den Deckungsgrad 
konstant zu halten) 
% p.a. / n.v. 
D: BEITRÄGE UND LEISTUNGEN  
24. Finanzierung der Vorsorge (bei mehreren Vorsorgeplänen, Plan mit 
grösstem Beitragsvolumen) 
2006 / 2007 / n.v. 
24.1 Ordentlicher Arbeitnehmerbeitrag in % des versicherten Lohns für einen 
Mann mit Alter 45 gemäss Reglement n.v. n.v. 
 
24.2 Ordentlicher Arbeitgeberbeitrag in % des versicherten Lohns für einen 
Mann mit Alter 45 gemäss Reglement 
 
25. Pensionierung (allenfalls Durchschnittswerte)  
25.1 Ordentliches Rücktrittsalter  
25.11 Männer 
25.12 Frauen 
Reglement 2006 
Reglement 2007 
Reglement 2008 
25.2 Vorzeitiger oder flexibler Rücktritt möglich ab Alter (Jahre) 
25.21 Männer 
25.22 Frauen 
Reglement 2006 
Reglement 2007 
Reglement 2008 
25.23 Besteht eine Überbrückungsrente Ja / Nein 
25.231 wenn ja, wird diese voll vom Versicherten finanziert Ja / Nein 
25.24 Rentenkürzung erfolgt versicherungstechnisch neutral Ja / Nein 
25.241 wenn nein, ausgleichende Finanzierung erfolgt durch AG / VE / / AG+VE 
25.3 Rücktritt nach ordentlichem Rücktrittsalter möglich bis Alter  
25.31 Männer n.v. 
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25.32 Frauen n.v. 
26. Einkauf von Leistungen  
26.1 Reglementarische Leistungen  
26.11 Nur bei Eintritt in die Vorsorgeeinrichtung (Art. 9 FZG)  Ja 
26.12 Bei Eintritt wie auch zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt  Ja 
26.2 Vorzeitiger Rücktritt  Ja 
26.3 AHV-Überbrückungsrente  Ja 
26.4 andere,  welche 
27. Teuerungsausgleich  
27.1 Besteht zusätzlich zum Mindestteuerungsausgleich gemäss BVG ein regle-
mentarischer Anspruch auf Teuerungsausgleich? 
Ja / Nein 
27.11 falls ja, auf vollen Ausgleich? Ja / Nein 
27.2 Wurden die Renten erhöht für 2007 / 2008  Ja / Nein 
28. Leistungsziel  
28.1 Besteht ein Leistungsziel für die Höhe der Altersrente? Ja Nein Ja / Nein 
28.11 
falls ja, Höhe des Leistungsziels für eine Altersrente (exkl. AHV, volle Bei-
tragsdauer) bei einem AHV-Endlohn von CHF 80'000? 
CHF  
29. Koordinationsabzug (bei mehreren Vorsorgeplänen, Plan mit grösstem 
Beitragsvolumen) 
 
29.1 Koordinationsabzug gemäss BVG  
29.2 Fixer Koordinationsabzug, jedoch nicht gemäss BVG  
29.2 Koordinationsabzug variabel (z.B. lohnabhängig)  
29.4 Kein Koordinationsabzug  
29.5 n.v  
30. Verzinsung des Sparkapitals (allenfalls Schätzungen und Durchschnit-
te) 
2007 / 2008 
30.1 bei umhüllender Vorsorge (gesamtes Sparkapital)  % / % 
30.2 bei gesplitteter Vorsorge % / % 
30.21 BVG-Altersguthaben  % / % 
30.22 überobligatorisches Sparkapital  % / % 
30.3 Reglementarische Mindestverzinsung der Altersguthaben (Aktive) % / % 
31. Umwandlungssatz im ordentlichen Rücktrittsalter 2007 / 2008 
31.1 bei umhüllender Vorsorge % / % 
31.11 Männer % / % 
31.12 Frauen % / % 
31.2 bei gesplitteter Vorsorge % / % 
31.21 BVG-Altersguthaben Männer % / % 
31.22 Frauen % / % 
31.23 übriges Sparkapital Männer % / % 
31.24 Frauen % / % 
E: AKTUELLE VORSORGEPOLITISCHE FRAGEN  
32.1 Nach welcher Methode wurde die angegebene Performance auf den Vermö-
genswerten erhoben? 
 
32.11 Endwert durch Anfangswert (nach Ein- und Auszahlungen) Ja 
32.12 Zeitgewichtete Performance Ja 
32.13 Geldgewichtete Performance (Berücksichtigung von Ein- und Auszahlun-
gen) 
Ja 
32.14 Modified Dietz Ja 
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32.15 Andere, welche? Ja 
32.2 Wie wurden die Immobilienanlagen bewertet?  
32.21 Sachwertmethode (Substanz- bzw. Realwert) Ja 
32.22 Ertragswertmethode (Barwert- oder Discounted Cash Flow Methode) Ja 
32.23 Vergleichsmethode (Statistische oder Hedonische Methode) Ja 
32.24 Andere, welche? Ja 
32.3 Wenn ja, messen Sie die Performance relativ zu einer Benchmark?  Ja / Nein 
32.31 Gegenüber einem Index aus der Pictet Indexfamilie? Ja  
32.311 Welchem?  
32.32 Gegenüber individuell definierten Benchmarks pro Anlageklasse? Ja 
32.4 Wie wird die Messung durchgeführt?  Intern / extern 
32.41 Wenn intern, wird ein extern entwickeltes Messsystem eingesetzt?  Ja / Nein 
33. Nachhaltige Anlagen  
33.1 Gibt es einen in den Anlagerichtlinien definierten Ziel-Anteil nachhaltiger 
Anlagen 
Ja / Nein 
 
33.11 Wenn ja, wie hoch ist er? % 
33.2 Welcher IST-Anteil des Gesamtvermögens der VE ist gezielt nach nachhal-
tigen Kriterien investiert? 
% 
33.3 Welcher Anteil des Gesamtvermögens der VE ist via nachhaltige Anlagege-
fässe oder Mandate investiert? 
% 
33.31 Obligationen Schweiz n.v. 
33.32 Obligationen Fremdwährungen  n.v. 
33.33 Aktien Schweiz n.v. 
33.34 Aktien Ausland n.v. 
33.35 Gemischte Anlagen n.v. 
33.36 Andere, welche n.v. 
33.4 Welche Formen nachhaltigen Anlegens werden angewendet?  
33.41 Negative Anlagekriterien, d.h. Ausschluss "problematischer" Branchen oder 
Bereiche, Welche 
Ja 
 
33.411 Rüstung/Waffen Ja 
33.412 Tabak Ja 
33.413 Alkohol Ja 
33.414 Spielcasinos Ja 
33.415 Kernenergie Ja 
33.416 Fossile Energieträger (Erdöl, Kohle, Erdgas) Ja 
33.417 Gentechnik in der Landwirtschaft Ja 
33.418 Airlines Ja 
33.419 Automobile Ja 
33.420 Andere, welche Ja 
33.42 Positive Anlagekriterien, d.h. Wahl der Besten aus jeder Branche [best in 
class] 
Ja 
33.43 Investitionen in nachhaltige Anlagethemen (Klima, Wasser, erneuerbare 
Energie) 
Ja 
33.44 Aktive Wahrnehmung der Stimmrechte (proxy voting) unter Berücksichti-
gung von nachhaltigen Grundsätzen 
Ja / Nein 
33.441 Wenn ja, allein / kollektiv 
33.45 Gezielte Einflussnahme als Aktionär auf Unternehmen unter Berücksichti- Ja / Nein 
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gung von nachhaltigen Grundsätzen (engagement) 
33.451 Wenn ja, allein / kollektiv 
33.5 Welche Aussagen treffen im Zusammenhang mit der Anwendung von 
Nachhaltigkeitskriterien für die VE zu? 
33.51 Anwendung ergibt sich aus dem Zweck, der Haltung des AG (z.B. Kirche, 
Hilfsorganisation) 
33.52 VE folgt mit der Anwendung einem Wunsch der Destinatäre 
33.53 VE hat Meinung, dass Anwendung nachhaltiger Kriterien einer Verantwor-
tung der VE gegenüber den Destinatären entspricht 
33.54 VE hat Meinung, dass Berücksichtigung der Kriterien 
zu längerfristig höheren Renditen führt 
33.55 VE hat Meinung, dass nachhaltiges Anlegen mit zu hohen Kosten verbunden 
ist 
33.56 VE hat Meinung, dass nachhaltige Anlagen ein zu hohes Risiko aufweisen 
33.57 VE hat Meinung, dass der Nachhaltigkeitsgedanke auf das gesamte Portfolio 
anzuwenden ist. 
33.58 VE hat Meinung, dass ein reglementarisch vorgeschriebener Anteil an nach-
haltigen Anlagen nicht zweckmässig ist 
33.59 Andere 
trifft auf VE zu 
trifft auf VE nicht zu 
keine Aussage 
34. Anlagestrategie  
34.1 Wie hoch war die Aktienquote per 31.12.2006 % / n.v. 
34.2 Wie hoch war die Aktienquote per 30.06.2007 % / n.v. 
34.3 
Wie hat sich die VE im 2. Semester 2007 bezüglich Aktienbestand verhal-
ten? 
netto zugekauft 
netto verkauft 
weder noch 
nicht bekannt 
35. Mindestzins  
35.1 Halten Sie den BVG-Mindestzins für 2008 mit 2.75% für 
zu tief / richtig / zu 
hoch 
35.2 Kommentar  
36. Aktueller Deckungsgrad  
36.1 Wie hoch ist der Deckungsgrad per Ende Februar (geschätzt)  % / n.v. 
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8.2. PARTICIPATING PENSION FUNDS 
 
Pension Fund  IA  (in CHF m) 
 Aargauische Pensionskasse 6'274 
 ABB Pensionskasse 3'240 
 ALRIVO Vorsorgestiftung 79 
 Ascom Pensionskasse  1'344 
 ASGA Pensionskasse  6'099 
 Bachmann-Stiftung für Personalvorsorge  1 
 Basellandschaftliche Pensionskasse BLPK 5'247 
 Baumann Personalvorsorge 155 
 Bernische Lehrerversicherungskasse BLVK 5'070 
 Bernische Pensionskasse (BPK) 8'600 
 Bossard Personalstiftung  134 
 BVG-Sammelstiftung der Rentenanstalt  19'604 
 BVG-Stiftung der Cementia Holding AG  2 
 BVG-Stiftung der Plaston AG  13 
 BVG-Stiftung der SV Group  204 
 BVG-Stiftung der Tschudin + Heid AG  20 
 BVK Personalvorsorge des Kantons Zürich  21'759 
 Caisse de pension du personnel de l’Etat du Valais  1'382 
 Caisse de pension du personnel de la commune de Monthey 37 
 Caisse de pension du personnel de l'Etat de Fribourg 2'561 
 Caisse de pensions CAP 2'801 
 Caisse de Pensions de l’Etat de Vaud 7'668 
 Caisse de Pensions de la Banque Cantonale Vaudoise  1'284 
 Caisse de pensions de la Collectivité catholique-romaine de Canton du Jura 27 
 Caisse de pensions de la République et Canton du Jura 1'056 
 Caisse de pensions de Romande Energie 455 
 Caisse de Pensions Philip Morris en Suisse 1'818 
 Caisse de pensions SSPh  639 
 Caisse de pensions Swatch Group (CPK)  3'223 
 Caisse de prévoyance CEH etablissements publics médicaux 2'664 
 Caisse de prévoyance en faveur du personnel de la société Eskenazi SA 9 
 Caisse de retraite d’Audemars Piguet Holding et ses Sociétés affiliées  75 
 Caisse de retraite de PubliGroupe 801 
 Caisse de retraite de Rham Holding  34 
 Caisse de retraite du Groupe DSR  126 
 Caisse de retraite du personnel de la Banque Cantonale du Valais  180 
 Caisse de retraite du personnel enseignant du Valais  842 
 Caisse de Retraite en faveur du personnel du Groupe SICPA en Suisse  112 
 Caisse Intercommunale de Pensions 2'112 
 CAPREVI - Prévoyance Caterpillar 570 
 Cassa pensioni dei dipendenti dello Stato 3'122 
 CIA - Caisse de prévoyance 6'395 
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 CIEPP Caisse Inter-Entreprises de Prévoyance Professionnelle 2'874 
 Clariant Pensionsstiftung  927 
 Comunitas Vorsorgestiftung  1'563 
 CPV/CAP Coop Personalversicherung  6'653 
 Emmi Vorsorgestiftung  595 
 Fondation de Prévoyance de la Nouvelle Compaigne de Reassurance 52 
 Fondation de prévoyance Edipresse 527 
 Fondation de prévoyance en faveur de l'encadrement supérieur de la BCV 24 
 Fondation de prévoyance LPP Mirabaud 96 
 Fondation de prévoyance Manpower 100 
 Fonds de prévoyance en faveur du personnel de l'Association St-Camille 14 
 Fonds de Prévoyance et de Secours de Beau-Rivage Palace SA 3 
 Galenica Personalvorsorgestiftung  508 
 GaleniCare Personalvorsorgestiftung  88 
 GastroSocial Pensionskasse  3'510 
 Gemeinschaftsstiftung der Geberit Gruppe  263 
 Gemini Sammelstiftung zur Förderung der Personalvorsorge 2'031 
 Groupe Mutuel Prévoyance 379 
 Hiag Pensionskasse  308 
 Institution de Prévoyance ILFORD Suisse 185 
 Kantonale Pensionskasse Graubünden 2'120 
 Kantonale Pensionskasse Schaffhausen  1'672 
 Kantonale Pensionskasse Solothurn  2'476 
 KPMG Personalvorsorgestiftung  410 
 Luzerner Pensionskasse  4'773 
 Mettler-Toledo Pensionskasse  386 
 MPK Migros-Pensionskasse  16'578 
 Mutuelle Valaisanne de Prévoyance 353 
 Orell Füssli-Stiftung 115 
 Pensionkasse Swiss Dairy Food AG 290 
 Pensionsfonds der Shell (Switzerland) 914 
 Pensionskasse Alcan Schweiz  1'480 
 Pensionskasse Alstom Schweiz  937 
 Pensionskasse Appenzell Ausserrhoden  644 
 Pensionskasse Basel-Stadt  7'900 
 Pensionskasse Baumann, Koelliker AG  55 
 Pensionskasse Bosch Schweiz  882 
 Pensionskasse Concordia 278 
 Pensionskasse Conzzeta  398 
 Pensionskasse der Antalis AG  100 
 Pensionskasse der Arab Bank (Switzerland) 87 
 Pensionskasse der ASCOOP  2'264 
 Pensionskasse der Baloise Bank SoBa 123 
 Pensionskasse der Bank Sarasin & Cie AG  403 
 Pensionskasse der BEKB | BCBE  795 
 Pensionskasse der Berner Versicherungs-Gruppe  824 
 Pensionskasse der Bernischen Kraftwerke (PK BKW) 1'390 
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 Pensionskasse der Borregaard Schweiz AG  132 
 Pensionskasse der CSG (Schweiz) Credit Suisse Group 11'453 
 Pensionskasse der Danzas Gesellschaften in der Schweiz  496 
 Pensionskasse der Dätwyler Holding AG 283 
 Pensionskasse der ehemaligen Asklia-Gruppe  38 
 Pensionskasse der Electrolux AG  147 
 Pensionskasse der Electrolux Schwanden AG  104 
 Pensionskasse der Elektro-Material AG  134 
 Pensionskasse der Firma Christian Fischbacher Co. AG 66 
 Pensionskasse der Firma L. Kellenberger & Co. AG 42 
 Pensionskasse der Flawa AG 24 
 Pensionskasse der Gemeinde Kilchberg  73 
 Pensionskasse der Gemeinde Steffisburg  42 
 Pensionskasse der Gemeinde Thalwil  104 
 Pensionskasse der Griesser AG  110 
 Pensionskasse der Hewlett-Packard Gesellschaften in der Schweiz  1'076 
 Pensionskasse der JohnsonDiversey 105 
 Pensionskasse der Julius Bär Gruppe 910 
 Pensionskasse der Luzerner Kantonalbank 407 
 Pensionskasse der MBA AG 32 
 Pensionskasse der OBT AG  91 
 Pensionskasse der Oerlikon Contraves AG  1'263 
 Pensionskasse der Papierfabriken Biberist und Utzenstorf 316 
 Pensionskasse der Papierfabriken Cham-Tenero AG  116 
 Pensionskasse der Pestalozzi-Gruppe  119 
 Pensionskasse der Pilatus Flugzeugwerke AG  222 
 Pensionskasse der Politischen Gemeinde Küsnacht 174 
 Pensionskasse der PricewaterhouseCoopers  425 
 Pensionskasse der Rhätischen Bahn  499 
 Pensionskasse der römisch-katholischen Landeskirche des Kantons Aargau  127 
 Pensionskasse der Schweizerischen Nationalbank 636 
 Pensionskasse der sia Abrasives  124 
 Pensionskasse der Siemens-Gesellschaften in der Schweiz  3'148 
 Pensionskasse der Stadt Frauenfeld  106 
 Pensionskasse der Stadt Luzern  1'139 
 Pensionskasse der Tamedia AG  905 
 Pensionskasse der Technischen Verbände 1'434 
 Pensionskasse der Thurgauer Kantonalbank  278 
 Pensionskasse der T-Systems Schweiz AG 217 
 Pensionskasse der UBS 22'181 
 Pensionskasse der Zürcher Kantonalbank  2'343 
 Pensionskasse des Kantons Glarus  472 
 Pensionskasse des Kantons Nidwalden 477 
 Pensionskasse des Kantons Schwyz 1'411 
 Pensionskasse EBM  216 
 Pensionskasse ELCO  142 
 Pensionskasse Emil Frey Gruppe 533 
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 Pensionskasse Eternit  202 
 Pensionskasse für die Mitarbeitenden der Gruppe Mobiliar 785 
 Pensionskasse Gemeinde Köniz  228 
 Pensionskasse Georg Fischer  792 
 Pensionskasse Haco  207 
 Pensionskasse Jumbo 134 
 Pensionskasse Kraft Foods Schweiz  599 
 Pensionskasse Novartis 13'969 
 Pensionskasse Philips AG 421 
 Pensionskasse Post  12'947 
 Pensionskasse Pro Senectute 44 
 Pensionskasse Profaro 347 
 Pensionskasse SBB 13'294 
 Pensionskasse Schreinergewerbe  299 
 Pensionskasse SRG SSR idée suisse  1'779 
 Pensionskasse St.Galler Gemeinden  1'057 
 Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich (PKZH)  14'572 
 Pensionskasse Swiss Re  3'125 
 Pensionskasse Thurgau  2'429 
 Pensionskasse transGourmet Schweiz AG  107 
 Pensionskasse Wasserwerke Zug  117 
 Pensionskasse Weitnauer  109 
 Pensionskasse ZAF  204 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der 3M Firmen in der Schweiz  257 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der Chocolat Bernrain AG  19 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der Firma Xerox AG 95 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der Lenzlinger Söhne AG  36 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der Panalpina (Holding)  226 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der Plaston AG 8 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der Ritter AG  0 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der Spichtig AG  3 
 Personalfürsorgestiftung der Streuli Pharma AG  37 
 Personalfürsorgestiftungen der Alcan-Gesellschaften in der Schweiz  145 
 Personalstiftung der Baumer Gruppe 60 
 Personalstiftung der Leder Locher AG  10 
 Personalstiftung der Rothschild Bank AG  131 
 Personalvorsorge der Klinik Hirslanden AG  471 
 Personalvorsorgekasse der Glarner Kantonalbank  4 
 Personalvorsorgekasse der Ortsbürgergemeinde St.Gallen  75 
 Personalvorsorgekasse der Stadt Bern  1'960 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung Atlas Copco (Schweiz) AG  38 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung création baumann Bern  35 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Adval Tech Holding AG 158 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Albers Gruppe  56 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Aluminium-Laufen AG 79 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Bachofen AG  77 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Baer AG  44 
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 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Cargologic AG 91 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der CSS Versicherung  366 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der GlaxoSmithKline Schweiz  72 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Kalaidos Bildungsgruppe Schweiz  85 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Kern AG  36 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Rivella AG  37 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Scherico AG  97 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der Schulthess  16 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der SI Group-Switzerland GmbH  108 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der SV Group  232 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung der ZZ Wancor  58 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung edifondo 254 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung für die Angestellten der Allianz Suisse  691 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung Gastrag  21 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung Gemeinde Frutigen  10 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung J. Wagner AG 28 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung Region Emmental  187 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung Sudan Partner AG  2 
 Personalvorsorgestiftung Visana  292 
 Phenix Fondation collective de prévoyance 97 
 PK Generali Schweiz  431 
 PKG Pensionskasse  1'939 
 Previcab Caisse de Pensions de Nexans Suisse SA 334 
 Previs Personalvorsorgestiftung Service Public 2'065 
 Publica Pensionskasse des Bundes  28'416 
 PVST der OC Oerlikon Balzers AG  274 
 Raiffeisen Pensionskasse 1'211 
 Sammelstiftung Vita  5'108 
 Sammelstiftung Vita Invest der Zürich Versicherungs-Gesellschaft  273 
 Schindler Pensionskasse 1'552 
 SFS Pensionskasse  340 
 SIG Pensionskasse  613 
 Skycare Foundation de Prévoyance de Skyguide 1'039 
 Spida Personalvorsorgestiftung  593 
 Stiftung für die Zusatzvorsorge der Angestellten der Allianz Suisse  4 
 Sulzer Vorsorgeeinrichtung  4'164 
 Swisscanto Pensionskasse  99 
 Swisscanto Sammelstiftung der Kantonalbanken  3'744 
 Swisscanto Supra  150 
 Synthes Vorsorgestiftung 252 
 Valora Pensionskasse VPK  755 
 Varian Foundation  50 
 Varian Foundation  150 
 Versicherungseinrichtung des Flugpersonals der Swissair 1'242 
 Versicherungskasse der Evang. Mittelschule Schiers  78 
 Versicherungskasse der Stadt St.Gallen Personalamt  839 
 Versicherungskasse des Bankgeschäftes Rüd Blass & Cie AG 43 
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 Versicherungskasse für das Staatspersonal des Kantons St.Gallen  3'044 
 Vorsorge Kolb-Gruppe  30 
 Vorsorge Ruag 1'226 
 Vorsorgeeinrichtung 1 der Zürich Versicherungs-Gruppe  2'320 
 Vorsorgeeinrichtung der St. Galler Kantonalbank  454 
 Vorsorgeeinrichtung der Stutz-Gruppe 62 
 Vorsorgeeinrichtung der Suva  1'910 
 Vorsorgeeinrichtung der Wärtsilä Schweiz AG  224 
 Vorsorgestiftung der Basler, Versicherungs-Gesellschaft  1'793 
 Vorsorgestiftung der JRG Gunzelhauser AG 91 
 Vorsorgestiftung Panetta Gruppe 3 
 Vorsorgestiftung Porta + Partner  6 
 Vorsorgestiftung SMP 84 
 Zuger Pensionskasse  2'148 
 Zusatzpensionskasse der Dätwyler Gruppe 52 
Source: Based on data from the Swisscanto pension fund survey 2008 (pp. 61-68) 
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